Marco Maria Aterrano

The arrival of the Allies in Italy in July 1943 was not the result of an impromptu decision, but rather of a prolonged debate that involved both political and military agencies in London and Washington for the first four years of the Second World War. The decision to pursue the defeat of the Axis through the invasion of Sicily had been reached by the Anglo-American leaders at Casablanca, in January 1943. The choice to give precedence to Italy in the framework of the European war was by no means a foregone conclusion, and its importance in the strategic developments of World War II in Europe has often been underestimated.
This research seeks to re-evaluate the role that the elimination of Italy played in the overall strategy developed by the Allies during the first phase of the Mediterranean conflict. The analysis of the political debates, military planning, and strategic appreciations produced by Anglo-American decision-makers in the 1939-1943 period shows that the Allied wartime interest in Italy, its defeat and the occupation of its territory was the result of a long-term design.

This article studies the Italian Government's legal and political attempts to disarm the civilian population in the long aftermath of the Second World War. It will do so by focusing on two sides of the disarmament campaign: on the one hand, its theoretical-normative developments, through analysis of the parliamentary debates that accompanied drafting of a special legislation on firearms control; on the other hand, the practical implementation of the restrictive regulations promulgated by the Italian Parliament against the backdrop of a fierce political battle and emerging Cold War policing strategies.

The article explores the diplomatic and political processes that led the British, the Americans and the Soviets to accept the participation of French representatives in the machinery of the Allied military government in occupied Italy during the post-armistice period. Their presence at the heart of policy-making for Italy was the result of a long and heated debate between London, ever the supporter of de Gaulle and the Free French, and Washington, which was firmly against diluting its share of power in Italian matters. By analyzing both the politico-institutional relations that were slowly rebuilt between the French and the Italian governments during those months and, in particular, the contribution made to the activities of the Advisory Council, the author seeks to highlight how the French efforts to be included in the Italian affairs were instrumental in regaining their standing among the Allies. At the same time, it also seeks to evaluate the French contribution in shaping the Italian institutional transition, and discusses the emergence of a coherent postwar French policy towards Italy.

Despite its impact on the breakdown of public order and on the rise of armed violence, the role of civilian disarmament in post-Second World War transitions is yet to be properly investigated. This article argues that the disarmament of the population was a key passage in two critical aspects of the normalization of postwar Italy: the reaffirmation of State authority and the reconstruction of control structures in response to the delegitimization of established authorities that followed their collapse in September 1943. Specifically, the article focuses on the intersection between the proliferation of war weapons, public order policing, and the recovery of Italian sovereignty in the aftermath of the Second World War. This article will demonstrate that disarmament was instrumental in reshaping Italian institutions according to the imperative of regaining control over the national territory in a context marked by foreign occupation, conflicting claims of legitimacy and the inversion of the monopoly on legitimate violence. The urgency to disarm incentivized both Italian and Allied authorities to rebuild the State control system in accordance to the pre-existing model of a centralized, authoritative administration. This led toward the preservation - in the sphere of public security - of agencies and individuals strongly compromised with the Fascist regime.

The article seeks to reassess the British focus on ‘knocking Italy out of the war’ and the way it shaped political and military discussions in London long before the American ally joined the combined planning. Between 1940 and 1941 Britain planned four major military operations having Italy as their main target. This complex process drove a wedge between an aggressive prime minister and a more conservative planning staff. A clear separation between a minimalist and a proactive stance marked the entire process, highlighting the existence of a sharp divide within the British planning establishment.

The article seeks to analyze the political strategies adopted by the Badoglio and Bonomi cabinets to limit Allied interference into the government's daily practice during the wartime occupation of Italy, and to break free of what was perceived as strict institutional control imposed by the Allied occupying forces. The Italian attempt to recover spaces of autonomy took place in two areas, namely the reconstruction of a functioning administrative machine in the occupied regions and the implementation of an independent diplomatic action. The author moves the narrative focus on the perception - the occupied's rather than the occupants' - of the Allied presence, and on the Italian response to serious overlapping of powers that was determined by the ‘troubled coexistence’. Giving preference to unorthodox policies contradicting the terms of surrender and often in direct conflict with the Allied directives, in fact, the Italian governments were moving towards the retrieval of institutional prerogatives both on a local and international level, taking advantage of the obvious disagreements between the three victorious powers.

L’articolo intende analizzare le modalità di sopravvivenza dello Stato italiano nelle drammatiche fasi della crisi politico-militare che aveva condotto alla e seguito la sua sconfitta, partendo – piuttosto che dalle difficoltà del governo alle prese con il disgregamento post-armistiziale della macchina statale italiana, già al centro di una ricca produzione storiografica – da una prospettiva che valorizzi la riflessione alleata in materia amministrativa, con l’intento di mostrare quanto l’esito di una occupazione che mantenesse in vita una struttura istituzionale italiana, per quanto limitata nelle sue effettive capacità, non fosse frutto della casualità bellica, bensì di un preciso ragionamento operativo anglo-americano volto a favorire una scorrevole progressione della campagna alleata nell’Italia occupata.
L’intero dibattito anglo-americano sulle sorti dell'Italia, articolato nelle tre fasi caratterizzate rispettivamente dalle tematiche riguardanti Stato, amministrazione e governo, si incentrava su alcune questioni fondamentali dalle quali sarebbero dipese le forme assunte in futuro dall’occupazione stessa, nonché il grado di influenza che questa avrebbe avuto sulla vita istituzionale italiana.
Questo saggio, avvalendosi della documentazione politica, militare e diplomatica conservata negli archivi di Londra e Washington, si propone di indagare l’elaborazione concettuale alleata e la sua aderenza all’applicazione pratica dei principi adottati, ripercorrendo le posizioni assunte dalle capitali atlantiche sulle questioni centrali della forma giuridica dell’armistizio, dell’utilizzo dell’amministrazione italiana e della tempistica per il passaggio ad un controllo pienamente indiretto, valutando altresì quanto la resa imposta agli italiani rispecchiasse la lettera degli accordi di Casablanca e le impostazioni politiche degli Alleati e quanto invece se ne distaccasse.

Anglo-Italian rivalry was a defining factor of the period comprised between the invasion of Ethiopia and the end of World War II. The challenge the Fascist regime posed in the Mediterranean to British vital regional interests resulted in the inevitable degeneration of their relationship. This mutual hostility shaped policies, dictated strategies and engendered long-lasting animosities. As a result, the Italian defeat in 1943 changed the landscape without clearing the air. In the decade that followed the onset of the Abyssinian crisis, the Anglo-Italian relationship was one of the most relevant factors in creating the tensions that would lead up to World War II in Europe, the Italian surrender and subsequent co-belligerency. It was defined by a fluctuating series of ups and downs, dictated by the ever-shifting nature of regional and continental events, with the need to keep reciprocal ambitions in the Mediterranean in check on the one hand, and the mutual unpreparedness to fight a war on multiple fronts on the other. However, the image of a solely negative British policy in occupied Italy – often found in the historiography – does not accurately reflect the evolution it experienced in 1944, when the British policy-making for Italy came in the end to appreciate the value in a change of course. The work of a moderate faction, led by Harold Macmillan, was instrumental in laying the foundation for the post-war alliance between the two countries and in overcoming the acrimony of the past.

This introductory chapter outlines how Fascist Italy played a distinct role in shaping international affairs in the period between 1935 and 1945, creating a Fascist decade of war. In contrast with the tendency to marginalize Fascist Italy’s role in much of the scholarship, we suggest that Italy was one of the principal causes of the international instability leading to World War II and that Fascist ideology influenced the conduct of war across the Mediterranean theatre. The Fascist decade of war is analysed through the political, military, diplomatic and cultural dimensions, adopting a dual perspective. On the one hand, the Italian angle considers the ways in which Fascist policy, strategy and ideology made this decade of war a by-product of the consolidation of the Fascist regime. On the other, the international angle seeks to evaluate how Fascist regional challenges affected the policies, strategies and ideologies of other countries. We, therefore, seek to revisit and challenge traditional military histories by exploring violence, propaganda, perceptions, ideology, empire, race and occupation, engaging with new methodological approaches. In so doing, this volume draws upon recent developments in Italian and international scholarship, providing a necessary update on the state of the field for an English-speaking readership.

From the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 through to the waning months of World War II in 1945, Fascist Italy was at war. This Fascist decade of war comprised an uninterrupted stretch of military and political  engagements in which Italian military forces were involved in Abyssinia, Spain, Albania, France, Greece, the Soviet Union, North Africa and the Middle East. As a junior partner to Nazi Germany, only entering the war in June 1940, Italy is often seen as a relatively minor player in World War II. However, this book challenges much of the existing scholarship by arguing that Fascist Italy played a significant and distinct role in shaping international relations between 1935 and 1945, creating a Fascist decade of war.

Kampen Om Tungtvannet [The Heavy Water War], 2015 6 episodi. Produzione: Filmkameratene (Norway); Sebasto Film (Denmark); Headline Pictures (Uk); Nrk (Norvegia) «Se gli uomini di scienza, intimiditi dai potenti egoisti, si limitano ad accumulare sapere per sapere, la scienza può rimanere fiaccata per sempre, e le vostre nuove macchine non saranno fonte che di nuovi triboli per l'uomo. […] Tra voi e l'umanità può scavarsi un abisso così grande, che, un giorno, a ogni vostro eureka rischierebbe di rispondere un grido di dolore universale» (B. Brecht, Leben des Galilei, 1967 [tr. it. La vita di Galileo, Einaudi, 2012, p. 239]). Così il Galileo di Bertolt Brecht enunciava, con parole che trasportano bruscamente il lettore dall'epoca del protagonista della pièce a quella del suo autore, le irrisolvibili aporie che tormentavano i fisici al servizio dei governi durante la seconda guerra mondiale. La riflessione sulle incertezze, le inquietudini e le responsabilità dello scienziato al tempo dell'atomica, che pervade sì marcatamente il teatro novecentesco-da Brecht a Michael Frayn passando per Friedrich Dürrenmatt (Si vedano F. Dürrenmatt, Die Physiker, 1962 [tr. it. I fisici, Einaudi, 1972], e M. Frayn, Copenhagen, 1988)-, costituisce il pilastro centrale della narrazione di Kampen om Tungtvannet, un dramma televisivo di coproduzione norve-gese/britannica/danese, trasmesso per la prima volta nel 2015, in occasione del settantesimo anniversario del bombardamento statunitense su Hiroshima e Nagasaki. Protagonista assoluta dello sceneggiato è la rincorsa della Germania nazista alla bomba atomica, raccontata attraverso le vicende di un episodio tra i meno noti della guerra in Euro-pa (la storia è narrata in dettaglio in Neal Bascomb, The Winter Fortress: The Epic Mission to Sabotage Hitler's Atomic Bomb, Londra, Head of Zeus, 2016). I ripetuti tentativi di sabotag-gio da parte alleata del ciclo di produzione norvegese di acqua pesante (ossido di deuterio), elemento nevralgico nel progetto nucleare tedesco, rappresentano il fulcro narrativo attorno al quale si dipanano tre storie che sono al contempo individuali e collettive. È ai tre perso-naggi principali che viene affidato il compito di incarnare altrettanti punti di vista, che si affiancano e si sovrappongono per raccontare in tutta la sua complessità la vicenda bellica e le sue implicazioni morali. A Berlino, membro di spicco dello Uranverein e tra i padri fondatori della fisica quanti-stica, il premio Nobel tedesco Werner Heisenberg è il personaggio attraverso la cui prospet-tiva emerge in tutta la sua forza la tensione etica del rapporto fra scienza e guerra. A Londra, reclutato dallo Special Operative Executive per le sue competenze in materia di acqua pesan-te, il fisico norvegese Leif Tronstadt è invece a capo dell'organizzazione di tutte le operazioni connesse al sabotaggio della fabbrica di fertilizzanti Norsk Hydro, tra le uniche capaci di produrre quell'acqua pesante indispensabile alla moderazione dei processi di fissione nucle-are inseguiti da Heisenberg. A Vemork, infine, tra le montagne della Norvegia meridionale, le vicissitudini di Bjørn Henriksen, direttore dell'impianto, aprono uno spiraglio sulla realtà del collaborazionismo e sulle strategie di sopravvivenza al tempo dell'occupazione tedesca. Attraverso le loro storie, in un delicato equilibrio tra tormenti personali e ambizioni professionali, il racconto intreccia quattro temi di grande rilievo storico generale: la forma-altri linguaggi-storia in movimento