Iraqi sources told MBN that security agencies are tracking a network of small cells directly linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), operating outside the structures of the country’s established armed factions. The cells have carried out drone attacks targeting Erbil as well as neighboring countries, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait.
According to the sources, the network was established over the past several months, as Iraqi armed factions began discussing the handover of their weapons under pressure from both Baghdad and Washington. Rather than relying on large formations that are easier to detect, selected members were drawn from major factions and reorganized into small, compartmentalized groups of between five and 10 people.
The sources said the cells represent a shift in how Tehran-aligned groups operate inside Iraq. They maintain a lower profile, and their operations bypass the leadership of established factions. Their primary focus is conducting limited operations, particularly drone attacks.
The use of front names and indirect organizational structures dates back to the aftermath of the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, when the so-called Islamic Resistance in Iraq emerged as an umbrella group for Iran-backed factions. The coalition declared its support for Gaza and launched hundreds of attacks against U.S. military bases in Iraq and Syria before later expanding its operations to target Israel.
During that period, groups such as Ashab al-Kahf and Awliya al-Dam claimed responsibility for attacks, allowing the main factions to avoid direct attribution.
But that approach has begun to evolve as the conflict has intensified.
Amid pressure on Iraq’s main factions to shift toward domestic political activity and avoid broader confrontation, the IRGC, which the United States has designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, has become less able to rely on large, publicly known formations
Instead, the sources said, it has increasingly turned to smaller, more discreet cells that are harder to identify and target.
Some members of these cells previously belonged to factions that had agreed in principle to surrender their weapons, while others underwent intensive training in Iran in recent months, according to the sources.
The sources said the cells report directly to the IRGC through Haji Hamed, the head of the Guard’s advisory mission in Iraq.
Hamed arrived in Iraq after the Islamic State seized large parts of the country in 2014. He was among the Iranian advisers dispatched to assist the Popular Mobilization Forces in their campaign against the militant group and has since remained one of the IRGC’s principal liaison officers with Iraqi armed groups.
Officials familiar with Iraq’s security portfolio told MBN during the Iraqi delegation’s visit to Washington, said the defining feature of the new structure is its direct chain of command to the IRGC, bypassing the leadership of the established factions.
Members of the cells travel in civilian vehicles, wear no military uniforms or organizational insignia, and move drones from one location to another, making it more difficult for Iraqi security agencies to track their movements or identify launch sites before attacks take place.
Iraqi intelligence sources told MBN that the groups could become a growing source of concern for the government because they operate outside any formal organizational structure with identifiable leaders who could be engaged or negotiated with.
The challenge, the sources said, extends beyond the network’s clandestine structure.
Intelligence officials said many members are motivated primarily by ideological commitment to what they described as Iran’s “revolutionary system,” rather than financial incentives, making them more resistant to recruitment efforts or financial inducements.
A strike carried out on July 27 in Diyala province revealed part of the network’s structure.
According to the sources, the strike targeted the Abu Muntazer al-Humaidawi camp in the province bordering Iran and killed several Iranian advisers.
People familiar with the matter said the presence of multiple Iranian advisers at the site provided further evidence of the cells’ direct links to the IRGC.
One source said the network was deliberately designed so that each cell operates without knowledge of the others, with the Iranian side serving as the only link connecting them.
According to the sources, the new model also raises questions about what may remain of Tehran’s armed infrastructure in Iraq if the larger factions proceed with plans to surrender their weapons.
Rather than remaining within established organizations with identifiable leadership and known headquarters, some of those weapons could end up in smaller, more difficult-to-detect groups.
The sources told MBN that the activity of these cells could increase as the Sept. 30 deadline set by the Iraqi government for armed factions to surrender their weapons draws near.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
