World Systems Analysis

Since the revolution emerged in North and East Syria (NES) in 2012, there has been much scholarly attention on democratic confederalism and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES, Rojava). Much of this literature has focused on its exceptional nature. Following Michel-Rolph Trouillot I ask, what is being obscured or masked when we assume and focus on the AANES as exceptional? To that aim, I uncover what North and East Syria (NES) reveals about sovereignty as an ideal and the production of what we recognize as a coherent hierarchical state system. Building on the analyses of Samir Amin and Andre Gunder Frank, I examine the constraints that decades of development of underdevelopment have placed on North and East Syria and on the Autonomous Administration. I ask four primary questions: [1] Can sovereignty exist beyond the state? And if so, what are the contradictions that emerge in a hierarchal state system? [2] How has this hierarchical state-system structured th...

Since the revolution emerged in North and East Syria (NES) in 2012, there has been much scholarly attention on democratic confederalism and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES, Rojava). Much of this literature has focused on its exceptional nature. Following Michel-Rolph Trouillot I ask, what is being obscured or masked when we assume and focus on the AANES as exceptional? To that aim, I uncover what North and East Syria (NES) reveals about sovereignty as an ideal and the production of what we recognize as a coherent hierarchical state system. Building on the analyses of Samir Amin and Andre Gunder Frank, I examine the constraints that decades of development of underdevelopment have placed on North and East Syria and on the Autonomous Administration. I ask four primary questions: [1] Can sovereignty exist beyond the state? And if so, what are the contradictions that emerge in a hierarchal state system? [2] How has this hierarchical state-system structured th...

Cities in Turkey have been objects and subjects of social and geographical transformation, coercion, and capital accumulation since the early years of the Turkish Republic. Urban space in Turkey remains a key site for capitalist production and social reproduction, the construction of identity and difference, the management of social contradictions and antagonisms, the spatialisation and transformation of state power and coercion, and the production of social harm and vulnerability. Histories of industrial policy, economic development, racialisation, nation-building, rural-tourban migration, displacement, ecological destruction, revolt, and counterinsurgency converge in the current conjuncture, producing multiple forms of social and political violence that inhere in the governance of urban spaces in contemporary Turkey, and which shape trajectories of social transformation. The past two decades of scholarship about cities in Turkey provide inspiration for ongoing research, including the work brought together in this special issue. Certain qualities of the centralised and authoritarian governance of urbanisation discussed by authors in this collection are specific to Turkey and reflect histories of state-backed capital accumulation particular to that geographical context. At the same time, some dynamics and experiences of the process, which -following David Harvey (1987) -we can call 'accumulation by urbanisation', help us think about other contexts as well. For example, insights derived from analysis of state-backed urban-regional transformations and shifts in metabolic exchange in Turkey (see, for example, Demirtaş-Milz et al, 2024;) could be brought into productive conversation with analysis of 'real-estate tsunamis' and urban extractivism elsewhere in the Global South, such as in Mexico (see, for example, Flores, 2019;.

The concept of nature, encompassing both the external environment and aspects like human nature, is a significant and well-explored area in intellectual history. However, the relationship between these diverse meanings remains unexamined. I use the term "physical nature" to highlight the interplay between these two levels. Through researching the comprehensive work of Austrian-American historical philosopher Eric Voegelin, I argue that there is a shift in his notion from normative nature, based on his classical philosophical belief in reality and truth, to a plural nature that tends to encompass civilizations geographically isolated regions with the help of the discovery of physical nature.
In the first chapter, I closely read Voegelin's correspondence with conservative theorist Leo Strauss regarding John Locke's natural rights theory. I argue that Voegelin holds a more conservative view of human nature and inclines towards a normative view of nature. However, during his debate with Hannah Arendt about the nature of totalitarianism, he faced the dilemma of the origin of the normality of normative nature.
In the second chapter, I analyze Voegelin's historical philosophy of Order and his linear historical view of normative nature, which was challenged by his reading of China's T'ien-hsia—a parallel historical process to the Western Ecumene, or the inhabited world. I argue that Voegelin's solution relies on the even and homogeneous spatial nature of the Ecumene itself, applying this concept to both China and the West, though he did not elaborate on it. I propose an interpretation based on the spatial perspective and physical nature of the Chinese Ecumene, which aligns with Voegelin's renovation of historiography for comparative civilization studies, influenced by Karl Jaspers. Voegelin's solution offers a promising approach to address the malleability of the concept of nature and the oscillation between different conceptions of nature.

Esta segunda versão do texto de apoio à Aula Ativa "O Caso Nanquim" foi elaborada após um processo de auditoria acadêmica rigorosa que identificou, na versão anterior, o defeito estrutural mais grave que um material de Economia Política pode exibir: a ausência dos autores fundamentais da disciplina. O texto que o leitor tem em mãos mobiliza agora o conjunto teórico exigido pelo paradigma histórico-jurídico com crítica estrutural de Economia Política: Karl Polanyi, Karl Marx, Immanuel Wallerstein, Fernand Braudel, Eric Hobsbawm e Giovanni Arrighi. Cada um destes autores contribui com categorias analíticas específicas e insubstituíveis para a compreensão do Tratado de Nanquim — não apenas como documento jurídico, mas como ato inaugural de uma reorganização das relações econômicas internacionais cujas consequências estruturais ainda configuram o presente.
O ponto de partida continua sendo o mesmo: o Tratado de Nanquim, assinado em 29 de agosto de 1842 a bordo do HMS Cornwallis, ao fim da Primeira Guerra do Ópio. O texto, porém, não apenas narra ou descreve este documento — ele o submete a múltiplas lentes analíticas que revelam dimensões distintas de uma mesma realidade: a destruição de uma instituição mediadora (o Cohong) como ato de desencaixe polanyiano; a criação das condições de acumulação primitiva em escala asiática como Marx as descreveu; a incorporação forçada de uma arena externa ao sistema-mundo capitalista como Wallerstein categorizou; a subordinação de uma economia-mundo autônoma e densa à lógica do capitalismo financeiro-industrial britânico como Braudel teria formulado; o imperialismo de livre-comércio como Hobsbawm o documentou; e o momento de consolidação hegemônica do ciclo sistêmico britânico como Arrighi o teorizou. Estas perspectivas não se cancelam mutuamente — elas se articulam, tensionam e enriquecem reciprocamente. Apresentá-las juntas, com suas convergências e divergências, é o objetivo deste texto.

Development 5.0 For decades, development was interpreted almost exclusively through the lens of economic growth. The performance of country governance was evaluated primarily through economic indicators. Higher production volumes, increased exports, larger urban centers, and expanded industrial capacity were accepted as the principal signs of development. However, this understanding is now undergoing a fundamental transformation. The development paradigm of previous eras evolved into a model that exhausted human beings, depleted nature, fragmented societies, stripped cities of aesthetic identity by mechanizing them, and ultimately placed technology above humanity itself. As a result, development in the new era can no longer be measured solely through economic metrics. Within the framework of the New World 5.0 paradigm, development (Development 5.0) signifies the balanced and simultaneous advancement of humanity, society, the state, nature, technology, and the future itself.

Ha azt mondjuk, hogy osztályok léteznek, akkor az azt jelenti, hogy az osztályszerkezetben elfoglalt hely jelentős hatást gyakorol e hely betöltőjére, méghozzá nem kizárólag egyénként hat rá, hanem egy strukturált kollektíva részeként is. Recenzió Huszár Ákos új könyvéről, Az osztály hosszú árnyékáról.

Prólogo

El Antiguo Egipto no solo construyó pirámides y templos monumentales: también construyó la memoria de sí mismo. A lo largo de tres milenios, los escribas y sacerdotes egipcios registraron con meticulosidad los nombres de sus reyes, conscientes de que la continuidad dinástica era el fundamento mismo de maat, el orden cósmico.

Este volumen reúne las cinco fuentes más importantes de las listas reales egipcias: la Aegyptiaca de Manetón, la Lista de Reyes de Karnak de Tutmosis III, la Lista de Abydos de Seti I, la Tabla de Saqqara y el insustituible Canon Real de Turín. Cada una de ellas ofrece una perspectiva diferente: unas son monumentales y rituales, otras administrativas y precisas; unas celebran la legitimidad, otras simplemente registran el paso del tiempo.

Manetón, escribiendo en griego en el siglo III a.C., nos legó la estructura de las treinta dinastías que aún utilizamos hoy. Las listas monumentales de Karnak, Abydos y Saqqara nos hablan del respeto ancestral y de la necesidad política de construir una línea ininterrumpida de reyes legítimos. El Canon de Turín, por su parte, con su precisión casi burocrática y su inclusividad, nos acerca más que ninguna otra fuente al pulso real de la historia egipcia, incluso de sus períodos más oscuros.

Juntas, estas listas no solo nos permiten reconstruir la cronología faraónica: nos revelan cómo los propios egipcios entendían su pasado. Nos muestran qué reyes deseaban recordar, cuáles preferían olvidar y cómo la historia, para ellos, era ante todo un acto de culto y legitimación.

Este libro no pretende resolver todas las controversias cronológicas —tarea que sigue ocupando a los egiptólogos—, sino ofrecer al lector una visión clara, comparativa y documentada de estas fuentes capitales, acompañada de traducciones, transliteraciones y análisis historiográfico.

Que este volumen sirva tanto al estudioso como al apasionado de la civilización egipcia para adentrarse en uno de los esfuerzos más extraordinarios de la humanidad por preservar su propia memoria.

DIEGO KURILO
Mayo de 2026

By Hiroko Inoue, Christopher Chase-Dunn, E. N.Anderson, Levin Welch and Manjing Gao. This study is part of a larger project that studies sociocultural evolution by comparing small, medium-sized, and large world-systems since the Paleolithic era. This study starts with early state formation in Bronze Age East Asia, but there were smaller whole systems of interpolity networks long before the emergence of cities and states. But here we are focusing on the temporal relationships between the growth and decline of cities and empires and changes in the distribution of power among states, the amount of interstate warfare and internal rebellions in five whole interstate systems (world-systems) since 2700 BCE. World historians have long recognized that the population sizes of settlements and the territorial sizes of polities have both increased over time and have gone through cyclical growth and decline phases. This larger study uses whole interpolity systems (world-systems) as the unit of analysis to address these questions: what are the causal relationships between changes in the sizes of largest cities and empires? Does empire growth cause city growth? Does city growth cause empire growth? And what are the other causes of these size changes? Our earlier studies have found that urban and polity upsweeps (large increases in scale) are correlated over time. In this paper the focus is on the expanding East Asian world-system from the Bronze Age until it merged with the Central system in the 19th century CE to form the global world-system of today. Our main unit of analysis is the political/military interaction network – whole systems of interacting polities that were making war and military alliances with one another. This is what international relations scholars call an “international system.” We examine the relationships between urban and polity swings and changes in the power configuration of these same systems. Interstate power configurations vary from decentralized to centralized based on the relative sizes and power of the interacting states in each system. This paper presents our decisions about the timing of the series of systemic expansions that began with the emergence of early states in the Huang He (Yellow River) valley Bronze Age China. We review the earlier research that has been done on cycles of conflict and their relationships with climate change, epidemics, famines, and floods. We also introduce the study of East Asian “world revolutions.” Our first purpose is to develop a complete data set on interpolity and within-polity conflict by merging those found in other studies in ways that make comparable on and intelligible comparisons possible from the Bronze Age to the 19th Century CE for the East Asian World-System.

Desde cualquier enfoque analítico, la multiplicación y propagación de formas de comportamiento violento constituyen rasgos estructurales de la modernidad. Desde la violencia intrafamiliar hasta las guerras y las prácticas de conquista, la violencia ha permeado históricamente un amplio abanico de relaciones sociales. Presente tanto en instituciones simples como complejas, el debate en torno a sus causas, modalidades y efectos ha contribuido a modificar de manera sustantiva nuestra comprensión del fenómeno. En la actualidad, la violencia se ha consolidado como un objeto visible del debate público y de la crítica social.

Das Projekt untersucht gewerkschaftliche Bewegungen von Architekt:innen in den 1970er Jahren als Fall der Organisation professioneller Praxis durch Institutionen, Netzwerke und Diskurse. Im Fokus steht eine Umbruchphase am Ende der trente glorieuses, in der sich das Verhältnis von Markt, Staat und Planung verschob und neue Formen beruflicher Selbstorganisation hervorbrachten. Zentral ist die Analyse berufsrechtlicher Regulierungen – insbesondere Architektengesetze, Kammerstrukturen und Titelschutz – als institutionelle Arrangements, die berufliche Jurisdiktionen definieren und kollektive Organisation strukturieren.
Historische Quellen zeigen, dass die Fachgruppe der Architekt:innen und Ingenieur:innen der IG BSE das 1970er Architektengesetz in Berlin scharf kritisierte: Es konserviere den Beruf, erhöhe Einstiegshürden für junge Architekt:innen und erschwere gewerkschaftliche Interessenvertretung. Vergleichend werden der britische Architects (Registration) Act von 1931 sowie eine EU-Evaluierung reglementierter Berufe (2015) herangezogen, um die Frage nach Sinn, Wirkung und Grenzen berufsrechtlicher Regulierung im internationalen Kontext zu diskutieren. Damit leistet das Projekt einen Beitrag zur historischen Analyse der Mechanismen beruflicher Regulierung und gewerkschaftlicher Selbstorganisation.

This paper evaluates the 'En Ḥazeva and Tell el-Kheleifeh Iron Age fortresses within a broader chronological and historical context. Occupying strategic locations that dominated the two outlets of the Arabah Valley, the construction of the fortresses was likely driven by the wealth generated from the Arabian trade network. Their monumental scale suggests that a royal power with strong political influence over the Arabah Valley down to its southernmost end at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, initiated their building and operated them. In addition to their functional duties, these building projects were designed to serve as symbols of power and control. Recent radiocarbon measurements establish the foundation date of the 'En Ḥazeva fortress in the first half of the 8th century BCE, before the period of Assyrian hegemony in the southern Levant, and it is therefore argued that their construction was the initiative of the Northern Kingdom of Israel.

This paper presents the results of typological and petrographic analyses of the ceramic assemblages from ʿEn Hazeva Strata VIII and VII. The typological analysis concludes that the strata date to the late Iron Age I and early Iron Age IIA, respectively. The petrographic analysis reveals that a substantial percentage of the ceramic assemblage originated in the copper districts of the Arabah Valley. Considered together the analyses indicate that during these two Iron Age phases ʿEn Hazeva was an integral part of the Faynan district and testify to its essential role in the Arabah Valley's copper trade network.

The collection of the Early Muslim Glazed ceramics at the Hazara University
Museum is the result of a single donation made by Hon. Engr Owais
Ahmad Ghani in 2008 when he was the Governor of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
province (formerly NWFP). The collection was donated during his visit to Hazara
University to inaugurate the Museum. Previously the collection, from an
unknown provenance, was laying in the Governor House.
The collection is one of the richest and largest Islamic ceramics ones in the
museums of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The majority of the pieces (121 pieces) is
stored in the Museum repository in fabric bags, with 77 vessels on display.
Mostly are in good condition but some are badly damaged and broken into
pieces. The present study focuses on a few representative pieces, and it is the
first step of a larger project focusing on the solution of multiple questions, including
taxonomy, provenance, study and analysis of the technical and decorative
aspects, the latter including the epigraphic analyses of the Arabic
inscriptions. The provenance of the early glazed ceramics collection of the Hazara
University Museum, Pakistan is still unknown. We hope will be able to
send soon samples from these ceramics to reputed laboratories of the country
for thin sectioning and archaeometry analysis. Although this might eventually
confirm their possible provenance and technological aspects, this part of the
study is out of focus of this paper. Meanwhile, conservation and preservation
along with other preliminary processes have been completed. The present paper
focuses on the general features of the ceramics. Various classes are in fact represented
in the collection, showing diverse technological manufacturing of the
glazes, different forms and schemes of decoration (Shakirulah et al. 2024), with
a variety of floral, geometric, and epigraphic patterns.

There are grounds to conclude that in 2011–2012 the World System experienced to some extent a phase transition to a qualitatively new state of global protest activity. This phase transition is shown to bear some resemblance to the one which the World System experienced in the early 1960s. The first (after 1919) phase transition of this sort occurred in the early 1960s and was related to the growth of global informational connectivity after World War II, as well as the improvement of the means of protest self-organization due to the spread of television, portable radio receivers, portable electric loud-speakers and other technologies of the Fourth Kondratieff Cycle. The phase transition of the early 2010s was prepared by a new wave of growth of global informational connectivity, as well as the improvement of the means of protest self-organization due to the spread of various technologies of the Fifth Kondratieff cycle (the Internet, satellite television, Twitter and other social networks, mobile telephony etc.). Similarly to what was observed during the Fourth Kondratieff Wave, during the Fifth Cycle while the spread of these technologieswas going on for many years before 2011, their internal colossal potential for generating and spreading protest activity was realized in one leap, as a phase transition.

The scale of the modern economic crisis has refuted theories of a linear and self-regulating market. Adam Smith's "invisible hand" turned out to be nothing but a myth which served the purpose of maintaining the monopoly. In pursuit of alternative interpretations, we have decided that this paper should investigate the scale of crisis in the world and how major powers respond to it, as seen through Kondratiev long wave theory. Initially, we present the basic theoretical presumptions, to which we added modern sociological interpretations. This section is followed by explanations of socio-technological factors which are crucial for the intervals of long waves. Finally, we give a general presentation of the relationship between major powers and their future geocultural strategies: This paper aims to fathom the mechanisms of structurally conditioned crises and to indicate the need to apply Kondratiev long-wave theory when creating highest-level strategic documents.

The Trump administration’s embrace of coercion, transactional alliance politics and performative displays of strength is often defended as hard-headed realism in an unforgiving international system. Key figures within President Donald Trump’s foreign-policy team have explicitly invoked a stripped-down and distorted reading of Thucydides’ The History of the Peloponnesian War to legitimise this approach, treating the dictum that ‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must’ as timeless wisdom rather than as a warning about its consequences. In fact, Thucydides did not celebrate such logic, but rather traced how Athens’ growing reliance on intimidation hollowed out the foundations of its power. The contrast he draws between Periclean grand strategy and the later coercive turn exemplified by the Melian Dialogue shows how unrestrained power corrodes both international influence and domestic cohesion. Focused on Trump’s foreign policy, the Thucydidean lens illuminates the strategic costs of the coercive approach. Power exercised without restraint may compel compliance in the short term, but ultimately accelerates resistance, balancing behaviour and strategic decline.

Amerikalı gazeteci ve program sunucusudur. Bağımsız medya kuruluşlarında çalışmakta, özellikle ABD dış politikası, Orta Doğu'daki çatışmalar ve emperyalizm eleştirisi üzerine yayınlar yapmaktadır. Substack ve Patreon platformlarında "Sanctioned" adlı özel bir seri yayınlamaktadır. Jeopolitik analist ve "Syriana Analysis" adlı programın sunucusudur. Özellikle Orta Doğu'daki çatışmalar, direniş ekseni, İran, Suriye ve bölgesel güç dengeleri üzerine derinlemesine analizleriyle tanınmaktadır. ---1. Giriş: İslamabad Görüşmeleri ve Ateşkesin Durumu Rachel Blevins, 21 Nisan 2026 tarihinde Teksas'tan programı sunmaktadır. Tüm gözlerin Pakistan'da olduğunu, bugün için planlanan ikinci tur görüşmelerin yapılıp yapılmayacağının merak edildiğini belirtmektedir. ABD'nin bir heyet gönderdiğini söylediğini, ancak İran medyasından gelen haberlere göre İran'ın henüz bir heyet göndermediğini aktarmaktadır. Çarşamba gecesi sona erecek iki haftalık ateşkesin uzatılma ihtimalini ve aslında tam bir ateşkesin hiç yaşanmadığını; ABD'nin Hürmüz Boğazı'nda abluka uygulamaya devam ettiğini ve Lübnan'da kesinlikle bir ateşkes olmadığını vurgulamaktadır. ABD ve İsrail'in savaşın

In the field of civil war studies, there is a consensus that the risk of war decreases as income increases. Nevertheless, such consensus has not been reached in the field of civil resistance and unarmed revolutions. This paper proposes a curvilinear framework positing two opposite trends in economic development. On the one hand, it increases the state resources for preventing illegal displacement and makes revolt costly for rebels. Conversely, it boosts resources needed for civil resistance. Utilizing independent sources on revolutions and employing parametric and non-parametric methods, we have identified robust support for the inverted “U-shape” relationship between income level and the risk of unarmed revolutions. This finding reconciles the discrepancies observed in previous studies and provides a different perspective on the “middle-income
trap.”

We extend the Computational Macrohistory (CMH) framework to an eleven-country analysis of structural preconditions for political instability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region during 2000-2012, with particular reference to the Arab Spring uprisings of 2010-2011. Building on the three-country proof of concept presented in WP-2026-003, we construct a five-component Systemic Stress Index (SSI) for Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen, drawing on variables capturing demographic pressure, income inequality, youth unemployment, regime type, and internet penetration. The SSI should be understood as a reduced empirical proxy designed to test whether core
structural signals hypothesised by the CMH framework appear in historical data; it does not implement the full CMH dynamic system. Our results indicate that the SSI correctly classifies eight of eleven countries at the pre-event benchmark year of 2010, achieving a descriptive accuracy of 72.7% against a binary outcome variable distinguishing severe instability (revolution or civil war) from all other outcomes.
This analysis is retrospective classification, not out-of-sample prediction.
Group-level analysis reveals a mean separation of 0.290 standard deviation units between instability and stability clusters. Robustness analysis across six alternative weighting schemes demonstrates that the Base specification is among the most stable, with the Regime-focused scheme achieving marginally superior pairwise discrimination. Leave-one-component-out analysis identifies youth unemployment (E₄) and anocracy stress (derived from P₁) as the most discriminatively critical components. Three misclassified cases—Jordan, Egypt, and Syria—are discussed in detail; each reveals theoretically informative limits of the current five-variable specification rather than random error. The paper concludes by specifying the conditions under which the expanded research programme—targeting N ≥ 30 validated country-cases—would constitute genuine statistical validation of the framework.

This article offers a postcolonial critical reading of Wasini alaraj's 2084: The Story of the Last Arab (2016). Despite its early publication in the aftermath of the arab spring, the novel has received limited scholarly attention, even though it represents a significant contribution to contemporary arab speculative fiction. the study examines how alaraj imagines the arab future not as an 'end of history' in the hegelian or Fukuyaman sense, but as an arab end shaped by cultural stagnation, ideological manipulation, and internal political decay. Drawing on close reading and qualitative thematic analysis informed by postcolonial theory, the article explores the novel's use of allegory, apocalyptic imagination, hybridity, parody, double-voiced discourse, and intertextuality. it highlights how social collapse and its aftermath are portrayed as products of both external domination and internal political failure. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that 2084 engages in a sustained, dialogic rewriting of George Orwell's 1984, transforming its totalitarian logic to address postcolonial and post-arab spring anxieties. the article concludes that alaraj's novel functions as a critical postcolonial indictment of neocolonial pressures and self-inflicted political failures, offering a cautionary vision that prompts reflection on arab futurity, cultural agency, and resistance.

This study examined the manner in which students enrolled in the Honors program at Indiana State University responded to intensive, seminar-based exploration into the life and writing of George Orwell. A common trend among those who teach Orwell, especially at the high school level, is to teach the man’s literature while focusing little attention upon his life. How much more valuable can Orwell scholarship be for students when they study his work in relation to the author’s unique lived experience? Can a more thorough study of this life and literature inspire students to draw more from their own experiences, or become more aware and more critical of the world around them? This research was conducted on the campus of Indiana State University, in Terre Haute, Indiana, and used participants who were enrolled in the Honors program at that university. Specifically, participants who had enrolled in a 300-level Orwell course taught by Dr. Michael Shelden were recruited for the study, which then ran concurrently with that course. Qualitative methods used to gather data from those participants included a questionnaire, seminar sessions, and individual interviews. This study indicated that George Orwell’s biography, i.e., his “lived experience,” is a very important part of Orwellian scholarship, one that allows students to appreciate and understand his writing on a much more meaningful level. The study also provided valuable insights as to Orwell’s continued relevance for students of today, as well as the manner in which studying Orwell—with the proper context—can influence and empower students.

The allegation made by Shri J. Basumatary, President of the Janajati Suraksha Manch (BJSM), against the Gorkha community is entirely without foundation and, regrettably, contrary to constitutional principles. His statement, which appeared in the respected local daily The Sentinel on 11 July 2021, directed towards the indigenous Gorkha community of Assam, particularly those in the Bodoland Territorial Region (BTR) seems to reflect an effort to mislead the wider society of the region rather than contribute to constructive understanding.
It is with a sense of sincere disappointment that one notes such a statement coming from a person regarded as one of the region’s esteemed intellectuals. In offering these remarks, Shri Basumatary has, perhaps unintentionally, displayed a limited appreciation of the rich historical background and the enduring socio-cultural harmony that have long characterised this multi-ethnic region. It is indeed surprising that a scholar of his standing should appear unfamiliar with the distinguished history of the Gorkha community in Assam and its deep-rooted contributions to the region.

Independent Researcher Annotation. In this article, the main functional tasks of the competencies of future educators to occupy in the educational process and the competency frame in the pedagogical activities of are described. Also, in the Republic of Uzbekistan, higher pedagogical educational institutions are widely revealed the importance of introducing a competency approach to students in order to professionally develop them in the educational process and, as a result, the development of universal competencies in future educators, as well as important aspects and specifics of a competency approach in the professional development of the student personality. Keywords. Future educator, competence, competency approach, important aspects of the competency approach, classification of universal competencies, directions that play an important role in the development of universal competence of students, psychological and pedagogical conditions that develop universal competencies. ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКАЯ И ПРАКТИЧЕСКАЯ ЗНАЧИМОСТЬ РАЗВИТИЯ УНИВЕРСАЛЬНЫХ КОМПЕТЕНЦИЙ У БУДУЩИХ ПЕДАГОГОВ Хамидов Улугбек Умидович-Независимый исследователь Аннотация. В данной статье изложены компетенции, которыми должны обладать будущие педагоги в процессе обучения и воспитания, и основные функциональные задачи становления компетентным кадром в педагогической деятельности. Также в целях профессионального развития студентов в учебно-воспитательном процессе высших педагогических учебных заведений Республики Узбекистан широко раскрывается важность применения к ним компетентностного подхода и, как следствие, развитие общепрофессиональных компетенций у будущих педагогов, а также существенные аспекты и особенности компетентностного подхода в профессиональном развитии личности студента. Ключевые слова. Будущий педагог, компетентность, компетентностный подход, важные аспекты компетентностного подхода, классификация универсальных компетенций, направления, играющие важную роль в развитии универсальной компетентности студентов, психолого-педагогические условия, развивающие универсальные компетенции.

Reality is not a collection of discrete objects. It is a convergent manifold — a self-organising, self-similar tapestry woven entirely from relations, sustained by energy flows, and structured by the same mathematical laws
across every scale, from quantum particles to spiral galaxies to civilisational history.

The core argument Reality is not a collection of discrete objects. It is a convergent manifold -a self-organising, self-similar tapestry woven entirely from relations, sustained by energy flows, and structured by the same mathematical laws across every scale, from quantum particles to spiral galaxies to civilisational history. Order parameter A slow collective variable that enslaves fast subsystems near a critical transition. Complexity collapses to a few governing variables. grounds Dissipative Structures (Prigogine) Order through fluctuation Far from equilibrium, random fluctuations amplify into new macroscopic order. Thermodynamic foundation Structures live only by dissipating energy flows. unifies Conformality The same equations govern laser physics, social revolutions, and galactic spirals.

Why the container model fails For centuries, Western thought has treated the world as a collection of sealed containers-nations, individuals, problems. Each box has clear walls. Causes are linear. Solutions are isolated. But living systems leak: they are woven together, historically layered, and shaped by power relations that no container can hold.

Epistemic order denotes the configuration by which a disciplinary field stabilises its criteria of validity, its publication formats, and its hierarchies of legitimacy. This article argues that the academic field in the social sciences maintains that order by relegating certain anomalies — questions, formats, postures — to its margins, through a mechanism analogous to anthropic transfer. Drawing on the AFEP/CNU controversy in French economics, on Merton's analysis of cumulative advantage, and on open infrastructures (HAL, ORCID, and overlay journals), the paper shows that these infrastructures alter the visibility of relegation without suppressing its underlying logic — and may generate new forms of epistemic disorder through information overload and filtering collapse. It concludes with a reflexive falsifiability clause: the anthropic framework cannot serve as its own justification for the marginality of its author.

Haiti has endured both natural and man-made violence since colonization, shaping its population into a global reserve army of labor for the world-system. This paper examines how historical and structural factors, including colonialism, political instability, and economic exploitation, have contributed to the creation of a vulnerable population appropriable as a cheap labor force. It explores how these factors, compounded by phenomenological violence-the internalization of oppression and fear-have led to widespread migration, positioning Haitians as a global reserve army of labor, particularly in industries like sugarcane production in the Dominican Republic. Through this lens, the paper highlights how migration, fueled by both environmental and systemic violence, has entrenched Haitians in labor markets worldwide.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, various currents of Brazilian social thought clashed in a struggle for cultural and political hegemony over how the process of development and industrialization should be carried out in a country like Brazil, which was still predominantly agricultural. Among these currents, ECLAC and liberalism played a decisive role. On the contrary, Marxist currents remained on the margins of this debate, especially after the 1964 coup d'état. This article seeks to revive the Marxist tradition and the critiques of the "developmentalists" in the analysis carried out by André Gunder Frank on the nature of incipient Brazilian capitalism and its dependent and peripheral nature, attributing the main reasons for these two characteristics to preferential relations with US capital and a lack of a social structural classes analysis.

A central finding of development discourses on the impacts of global climate change reflects unequal power dynamics that shape patterns of social mobility, and access to social, political, and economic resources across the world. An understanding of inequality becomes one of the most powerful tools that can be used to study global climate change and its impact. It is widely documented that the effects of global climate change is not be equally distributed around the world. Though through employing systematic review method, this article intend to critically review, analyse and synthesize the central aspects of world system theory with the climate change prospect, and its relevance in terms multidisciplinary research, development intervention policies design, and execution. The study finding reveal that these inequalities exist between developed and developing nation will be further exacerbated by the unequal burdens inflicted by climate-related disasters and limited disaster response capacities. One important predicted outcome of climate change in the third world countries is recurrent occurrences of environmental hazards (desertification, drought, food insecurity, poverty and loss of livelihood, unemployment, and soon. Indeed, while bringing ne w insight and understanding into the development discourses, and social science research will have immense impact for future climate change mitigation, and adaptation action.

УДК 94(470):327(075.8) Сергей красильников Иван кузнецов О НОвОй вЕРСИИ РОССИйСкОй ИСтОРИИ Рец. на: Кагарлицкий Б. Ю. История России : Миросистемный анализ : учебное пособие / Б. ю. кагарлицкий, в. Н. Сергеев. -М. : либроком, 2014. -432 с. sergey krasilnikov ivan kuznetsov oN a New VeRsioN of RussiaN HistoRY Review of kagarliczkij, b. Yu. & sergeev, V. N. (2014). Istoriya Rossii: Mirosistemny′j analiz: uchebnoye posobie [Russian History: world-system analysis: a Manual]. 432 p. Moscow: librokom. The author analyzes A History of Russia: A World-Systems Analysis, a textbook by B. Yu. Kagarliczkij and V. N. Sergeev. It is noted that in their interpretation of Russian history, the authors of the book rely on academician Mikhail Pokrovsky's concept that prevailed in Soviet historiography until the 1930s. The textbook recognizes all the principles of the concept including the constitutive role of commercial capital in the historical processes of the country. Referring to the pattern put forward by M. N. Pokrovsky, the authors consider the main processes of Russian history, such as the introduction of serfdom, Peter I's reforms, and the modernization of the country in the second half of the 19 th -early 20 th centuries. However, the world-systems analysis used by the authors is quite often merely declarative and is not substantiated by factual material. Nor does the book take into account the geopolitical context of the establishment and development of the Saint Petersburg empire; additionally, it ignores the problem connected with the preservation and consolidation of the state's independence, and the military-defense factor. The description of the Soviet period is even more schematic as it quite often overlooks the influence of intersystem factors.

Although complexity plays a significant role in big history, substantial gaps persist in our comprehension. While the papers in this issue do not provide definitive answers to these gaps, they contribute to the ongoing discussion on how to address these issues and propose potential pathways for resolution. These gaps encompass measurement, focus, organization, relevance, consistency, and interpretation. While there may not be unanimous agreement on the specific direction to take, the academic discussions evident in these papers aim to elucidate the issues and foster understanding within the expansive and diverse scientific community. The theme of this special edition is "Evolving Continuously to Bridge Substantial Gaps in Our Understanding of Complexity." Comprising 14 articles, including this Introduction, the issue is organized with a focus on complexity growth, evolution, and various aspects. The articles on growth explore methodologies for measuring, assessing, and examining the symmetry of singularity trends in complexity within the framework of Big History. Those addressing complexity and evolution delve into perspectives such as chaotic cascades, general evolution, selection, and chemical evolution. The aspects section encompasses discussions on integration with traditional academic disciplines, handling the multidirectional aspects of complexity, practical applications of complexity science, proposing an approach to interpreting the Big History journey, and comparing the process to cybernetic models. The significance of the concept of complexity, along with its various facets, is not merely substantial; it forms the very structure of understanding. When contemplating the broadest concepts that can encompass the entirety of Big History or the field of evolutionary studies, only a handful Page iii discussions surround its measurement. The complexity in big history presents an additional challenge due to the broad spectrum of phenomena it encompasses, ranging from the big bang to cosmic development, and the evolution of life, humans, and civilizations.) Lowell Gustafson ("Emergent Complexity: A Rationale for the University") argues that while academia supports many aspects of big history, its integration still faces challenges related to disciplinary boundaries. He notes that big history often concentrates on the narrow path of increasing complexity, overlooking the fact that most systems either become extinct, get stuck in complexity, or revert to simpler states. Ken Baskin's examination of systems analysis in big history highlights the potential application of various systems concepts, including punctuated equilibrium, scaling behavior, energy dissipation, information sensing, storage, processing, and learning ("The Practical Application of Complexity Science to Enhance Big History"). This becomes crucial as big history not only delves into the narrative from the big bang to the present but also broadens its scope to encompass more dynamics, addressing the 'how' and 'why' (as well as the 'how not' and 'why not') of systems evolution. This expanded perspective allows for the inclusion of systems that did not persevere along seemingly promising paths, the consideration of simplification as a potentially advantageous path for some systems, and an exploration of how internal growth dynamics, such as panarchy systems, might pose challenges as they expand, prompting a continual quest for more complex trajectories. Marc Widdowson ("Last stop on the cosmic journey: An estimated time of arrival") adopts a distinct perspective by not focusing on the singularity inflection point, but rather on the time when society could potentially reach its peak measured by the optimal utilization of energy. He analyzes trends in energy consumption and assesses them on the Kardashev scale to investigate the potential timing of this technological utopia. The emphasis for the reader is not in the precise prediction date, but rather in appreciating the thought process concerning how technology and energy utilization might scale in the future.

The paper presents preliminary results of a quantitative analysis of two patterns of complexity growth in the Big Historydecelerating universal (cosmic) evolutionary development evidenced in the Universe for a few billions of years after the Big Bang (around 13.8 billion BP) and accelerating global (biosocial) evolutionary development observed for about 4 billion years on the planet Earth since the emergence of life on it and until the early 1970s. It is shown that the first pattern can be described with an astonishing accuracy (R 2 = 0.999996) by the following equation: y = C1/(t-t1*), where y is the rate of the universal complexity growth (measured as a number of phase transitions [accompanied by the growth of complexity] per a unit of time), C1 is a constant, and t-t1* is the time since the Big Bang Singularity (t1*~13.8 billion years BP). In the meantime, it was earlier shown that the second pattern could be described with an almost as high accuracy (R 2 = 0.9989 to 0.9991) by the following equation: y = C2/(t2*-t), where y is the rate of accelerating global (biosocial) evolutionary development, C 2 is another constant, and t2*-t is the time till the 21st century Singularity (t2*, estimated to be around 2027, or 2029 CE). Thus, the post-Big-Bang hyperbolic decrease of universal complexity growth rate and the hyperbolic increase of the growth rate of global complexity in the last 4 billion years proceeded following the same law. We are dealing here with a perfect symmetry: (1) the rate of the universal (cosmic) complexity growth decreases when we move from the Big Bang Singularity, whereas the rate of the global complexity growth increase when we approach the 21 st century Singularity; (2) more specifically, as the time since the Big Bang Singularity increases n times, the universal (cosmic) complexity growth rate decreases the same n times, whereas when the time till the 21 st century Singularity decreased n times, the global complexity growth rate increased the same n times. A somehow more complex symmetry is observed as regards the interaction between energy dynamics and complexity growth within both processes. The implications of the symmetry of both patterns are discussed.

The paper presents preliminary results of a quantitative analysis of two patterns of complexity growth in the Big Historydecelerating universal (cosmic) evolutionary development evidenced in the Universe for a few billions of years after the Big Bang (around 13.8 billion BP) and accelerating global (biosocial) evolutionary development observed for about 4 billion years on the planet Earth since the emergence of life on it and until the early 1970s. It is shown that the first pattern can be described with an astonishing accuracy (R 2 = 0.999996) by the following equation: y = C1/(t-t1*), where y is the rate of the universal complexity growth (measured as a number of phase transitions [accompanied by the growth of complexity] per a unit of time), C1 is a constant, and t-t1* is the time since the Big Bang Singularity (t1*~13.8 billion years BP). In the meantime, it was earlier shown that the second pattern could be described with an almost as high accuracy (R 2 = 0.9989 to 0.9991) by the following equation: y = C2/(t2*-t), where y is the rate of accelerating global (biosocial) evolutionary development, C 2 is another constant, and t2*-t is the time till the 21st century Singularity (t2*, estimated to be around 2027, or 2029 CE). Thus, the post-Big-Bang hyperbolic decrease of universal complexity growth rate and the hyperbolic increase of the growth rate of global complexity in the last 4 billion years proceeded following the same law. We are dealing here with a perfect symmetry: (1) the rate of the universal (cosmic) complexity growth decreases when we move from the Big Bang Singularity, whereas the rate of the global complexity growth increase when we approach the 21 st century Singularity; (2) more specifically, as the time since the Big Bang Singularity increases n times, the universal (cosmic) complexity growth rate decreases the same n times, whereas when the time till the 21 st century Singularity decreased n times, the global complexity growth rate increased the same n times. A somehow more complex symmetry is observed as regards the interaction between energy dynamics and complexity growth within both processes. The implications of the symmetry of both patterns are discussed.

The analysis of dollar inflation performed by the authors through the approximation of empirical data for 1913-2012 with a power-law function with an accelerating log-periodic oscillation superimposed over it has made it possible to detect a quasi-singularity point around the 17th of December, 2012. It is demonstrated that, if adequate measures are not taken, one may expect a surge of inflation around the end of this year that may also mark the start of stagflation as there are no sufficient grounds to expect the re-start of the dynamic growth of the world economy by that time. On the other hand, as the experience of the 1970s and the 1980s indicates, the stagflation consequences can only be eliminated with great difficulties and at a rather high cost, because the combination of low levels of economic growth and employment with high inflation leads to a sharp decline in consumption, aggravating the economic depression. In order to mitigate the inflationary consequences of the explosive growth of money (and, first of all, US dollar) supply it is necessary to take urgently the world monetary emission under control. This issue should become central at the forthcoming G8 and G20 summits.

In this article, we analyze an inverted U-shaped relationship between the type of regime (on the autocracy-democracy scale) and the risks of revolutionary destabilization. Anocracies tend to be more vulnerable to revolutionary destabilization than full autocracies or full (consolidated) democracies. We also point to a strong positive association between the weakening of autocracies and the risks of revolutionary destabilization that exist among full autocracies. In addition, full autocracies moving towards democracy and transitioning to partial autocratic rule are at increased risk of revolutionary destabilization, which explains why the current global spread of democracy is associated with an upswing rather than a downswing in revolutionary activity. Finally, strong forms of revolutionary destabilization are quite possible in cases of deconsolidation of consolidated democracy, which additionally suggests that the era of revolutions will not end in the foreseeable future. Thus, we propose a general theory on the effect of regime type on revolutionary destabilization and address inconsistencies among various studies regarding the impact of the regime on revolutionary instability. The conducted research also allows us to contribute to the answer to the question posed by many researchers of revolutions at the end of the last century – will the era of revolutions end with the global spread of democracy? Our analysis suggests that if this happens someday, it will not be in any foreseeable future.

Much has been written about the destabilizing factors in the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) (and the Afrasian instability macrozone in general) since
2011; however, the characteristics of its destabilization dimensions have been
little discussed. Our principal component analysis based on the CNTS, Global
Terrorism and Center for Systemic Peace databases, shows that some MENA
countries are the most violently destabilized in the entire world for the period of
1970–2018 compared to all other countries. These results are supported by the
mean factor scores of the principal components of socio-political destabilization
for four world-system regions for three observation periods which show that
both for the 1970–2018 and post-2011 periods, the Afrasian instability macrozone in general, and the MENA region in particular, emerge as the areas with
the highest mean values of bloody destabilization factor scores. Moreover, the
tests conducted show that MENA is the only region where destabilization component of mass protest is associated with repressions both for the general observation period (1970–2018) and for the post-Arab Spring period (since 2011)
while for other regions the correlation with the purges/repressions indicator is
insignificant, albeit positive (South America and sub-Saharan Africa) or even
insignificant and negative (Western Europe). This seems to imply that in the
MENA region protests are much more systematically accompanied by mass repressions than in other parts of the world. On the other hand, for Sub-Saharan
Africa we find the presence of a number of terrorist attacks among the significant contributors to mass protest destabilization, suggesting that mass protest
destabilization in this part of the world is also of a rather special nature, with a
very substantial violent component. Meanwhile, the principal component analysis of destabilization in the MENA region (considered as a semi-peripheral
world-system area) in comparison with South America (another world-system
area), Western Europe (considered as a part of the world-system core), and
Sub-Saharan Africa (considered as a part of the world-system core) has yielded
the following results. In general, we find that the highest percentage of destabilization variance is explained by the mass protest principal component for
the world-system core (represented by Western Europe); on the other hand, the
lowest percentage of the destabilization variance is explained by the bloody destabilization principal component precisely for this part of the world. We also
find that the highest percentage of destabilization variance is explained by the
bloody principal component for the world-system periphery (represented by
sub-Saharan Africa); on the other hand, the lowest percentage of the destabilization variance is explained by the mass protest destabilization principal component precisely for sub-Saharan Africa. The world-system semi-periphery appears here between these poles. The MENA region (which is the core of the
Afrasian instability macrozone) ranks second in terms of both mass protest and
bloody destabilization, with very high levels of both (while South America occupies an intermediate position between MENA and Western Europe).

Much has been written about the destabilizing factors in the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) (and the Afrasian instability macrozone in general) since
2011; however, the characteristics of its destabilization dimensions have been
little discussed. Our principal component analysis based on the CNTS, Global
Terrorism and Center for Systemic Peace databases, shows that some MENA
countries are the most violently destabilized in the entire world for the period of
1970–2018 compared to all other countries. These results are supported by the
mean factor scores of the principal components of socio-political destabilization
for four world-system regions for three observation periods which show that
both for the 1970–2018 and post-2011 periods, the Afrasian instability macrozone in general, and the MENA region in particular, emerge as the areas with
the highest mean values of bloody destabilization factor scores. Moreover, the
tests conducted show that MENA is the only region where destabilization component of mass protest is associated with repressions both for the general observation period (1970–2018) and for the post-Arab Spring period (since 2011)
while for other regions the correlation with the purges/repressions indicator is
insignificant, albeit positive (South America and sub-Saharan Africa) or even
insignificant and negative (Western Europe). This seems to imply that in the
MENA region protests are much more systematically accompanied by mass repressions than in other parts of the world. On the other hand, for Sub-Saharan
Africa we find the presence of a number of terrorist attacks among the significant contributors to mass protest destabilization, suggesting that mass protest
destabilization in this part of the world is also of a rather special nature, with a
very substantial violent component. Meanwhile, the principal component analysis of destabilization in the MENA region (considered as a semi-peripheral
world-system area) in comparison with South America (another world-system
area), Western Europe (considered as a part of the world-system core), and
Sub-Saharan Africa (considered as a part of the world-system core) has yielded
the following results. In general, we find that the highest percentage of destabilization variance is explained by the mass protest principal component for
the world-system core (represented by Western Europe); on the other hand, the
lowest percentage of the destabilization variance is explained by the bloody destabilization principal component precisely for this part of the world. We also
find that the highest percentage of destabilization variance is explained by the
bloody principal component for the world-system periphery (represented by
sub-Saharan Africa); on the other hand, the lowest percentage of the destabilization variance is explained by the mass protest destabilization principal component precisely for sub-Saharan Africa. The world-system semi-periphery appears here between these poles. The MENA region (which is the core of the
Afrasian instability macrozone) ranks second in terms of both mass protest and
bloody destabilization, with very high levels of both (while South America occupies an intermediate position between MENA and Western Europe).

North Africa (MENA) (and the Afrasian instability macrozone in general) since 2011; however, the characteristics of its destabilization dimensions have been little discussed. Our principal component analysis based on the CNTS, Global Terrorism and Center for Systemic Peace databases, shows that some MENA countries are the most violently destabilized in the entire world for the period of 1970-2018 compared to all other countries. These results are supported by the mean factor scores of the principal components of socio-political destabilization for four world-system regions for three observation periods which show that both for the 1970-2018 and post-2011 periods, the Afrasian instability macrozone in general, and the MENA region in particular, emerge as the areas with the highest mean values of bloody destabilization factor scores. Moreover, the tests conducted show that MENA is the only region where destabilization component of mass protest is associated with repressions both for the general observation period and for the post-Arab Spring period (since 2011) while for other regions the correlation with the purges/repressions indicator is insignificant, albeit positive (South America and sub-Saharan Africa) or even insignificant and negative (Western Europe). This seems to imply that in the MENA region protests are much more systematically accompanied by mass repressions than in other parts of the world. On the other hand, for Sub-Saharan Africa we find the presence of a number of terrorist attacks among the significant contributors to mass protest destabilization, suggesting that mass protest destabilization in this part of the world is also of a rather special nature, with a very substantial violent component. Meanwhile, the principal component analysis of destabilization in the MENA region (considered as a semi-peripheral world-system area) in comparison with South America (another world-system area), Western Europe (considered as a part of the world-system core), and Sub-Saharan Africa (considered as a part of the world-system core) has yielded the following results. In general, we find that the highest percentage of destabi-

The present article is devoted to social evolution both as a part of macroevolution and as a specific process that have led humanity to outstanding successes and heights (while creating in the meantime serious crises and major problems). The article examines important theoretical aspects of social evolution within the framework of a more general approach, which we call evolutionary studies. The authors give a definition of social evolution, examine its most important mechanisms, compare it with biological evolution, introduce the concept of social aromorphosis, and analyse the concept of unilinear and multilinear evolution. We show that only by considering the evolution as multilinear one can identify the major trends and patterns of social evolution and evolution in general. The authors view social evolution both as changes in a relatively local and not so long-term perspective and as a larger process that we call social macroevolution. In our understanding, social macroevolution is a special dimension of social