Podcast

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team covers a new election date being set in Kazakhstan, with the country's largest party staying off the ballot, rare protests in Turkmenistan over blackouts and economic frustration, the removal of one of Ashgabat's most important religious figures, renewed clashes along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, fuel shortages hitting much of Central Asia, and border swap deals that have seen thousands of people suddenly finding themselves in a new country. Before then turning to our main story this week, where the dramatic end to the Kamchybek Tashiev trials has delivered one of the biggest moments in Kyrgyz politics this year.

Water Security

Kyrgyzstan’s Water Compensation Push Tests Central Asian Unity

Central Asia’s water diplomacy is entering a contentious phase. Kyrgyzstan, where much of the region’s runoff is formed, is reviving calls for economic compensation from downstream users. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have rejected the idea, saying current agreements do not provide for payments for transboundary river water. The dispute comes as the region tries to maintain annual water-allocation deals while adapting agriculture to worsening scarcity and climate pressure. Water has long tied together the region’s upstream and downstream states. The 2021 and 2022 clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border showed how disputes over land, border infrastructure, roads, security posts, and water access can escalate when local tensions are not contained. Yet political will alone does not guarantee agreements between countries. The Central Asian republics cooperate on water issues through two interstate bodies. One is the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, established in 1993 by all five Central Asian republics. Kyrgyzstan suspended its participation in IFAS in 2016, and now attends the fund’s meetings as an observer. The second body is the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination, whose meetings are held once a quarter. At its 93rd meeting in Bukhara in early April, the commission confirmed limits for water withdrawal from transboundary rivers, following decisions approved at the 92nd meeting in Dushanbe. For the Amu Darya, the 2026 water allocations set the total withdrawal limit for the water-management year from October 2025 to October 2026 at about 55.4 billion cubic meters. Of this, 15.9 billion cubic meters is allocated for the cold period, from October to April. Tajikistan has been allocated 9.8 billion cubic meters per year, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan each receive 22 billion. A significant part of the flow, 44 billion cubic meters, must pass through the adjusted section of the Kerki hydrological post, helping secure the lower reaches of the river. For the Syr Darya, the total water withdrawal limit for the non-growing season is 4.219 billion cubic meters. Kazakhstan will receive 460 million cubic meters through the Dustlik Canal, Kyrgyzstan 47 million, and Tajikistan 365 million, while the largest share will go to Uzbekistan, 3.347 billion cubic meters. The inherited framework is also facing pressure from outside the five-state system. Afghanistan’s Qosh-Tepa Canal, which is being advanced outside the Soviet-era allocation structure, has added uncertainty on the Amu Darya. The Central Asian republics also cooperate in bilateral and trilateral formats. In January, Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan joint working groups met in Turkestan. The sides reaffirmed water cooperation, agreed to continue repairs on the Dostyk canal, and planned automated hydrological posts on the Syr Darya. In May, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan agreed on the operating regime of the Bahri-Tojik Reservoir for the summer of 2026. From June to August, the reservoir is to operate in a coordinated mode to supply irrigation water to farmers in the Maktaaral and Zhetysai districts of southern Kazakhstan. These agreements show that regional mechanisms still work, but experts continue to warn that climate pressure, data gaps, and uneven national interests could overwhelm existing formats. “Forecasting the likelihood of ‘water conflicts’ in the near future is difficult, since much depends not only on the political will of states, but also on the availability of effective tools for managing water resources amid scientific uncertainty and discrepancies in data assessment,” according to Shamshagul Mashtayeva, a Kazakh hydrologist and water-diplomacy specialist. “The time has come for a paradigm shift in the management of these resources and in water diplomacy in order to give the second scenario a greater chance, since the well-being of future generations directly depends on the success of these efforts.” In her view, the combined impact of irregular weather patterns, glacier melt, and biodiversity loss creates uncertainty. That uncertainty could lead to two scenarios: growing economic, social, environmental, and political shocks and conflicts over water, or improved policy with large-scale reforms in the water sector. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have responded partly by introducing digital and water-saving technologies, and by changing crop structures. In Kazakhstan, priority in this year’s sowing campaign was given to higher-margin and strategically important crops. Oilseed crops will exceed 4 million hectares, while more than 3.3 million hectares have been allocated for fodder crops. Wheat acreage has been reduced to 12.1 million hectares, 125,000 hectares less than last year. Corn acreage was also reduced. Rice fields were reduced by 20,600 hectares, and the area of cotton under drip irrigation increased by 29,800 hectares as water-saving technologies were expanded. Kazakhstan has taken a stricter approach to reducing rice planting. In the Shardara district of the Turkestan Region, dozens of farmers who planted rice fields beyond approved volumes were left without irrigation water. Permits were processed through an electronic system, and once the limit was reached, registration of new areas was closed. Uzbekistan has also started to shift land away from water-intensive crops. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev supported a proposal in late April to reduce cotton and grain areas by 7,400 hectares in the Ferghana Region and redistribute land to more profitable crops. Orchards and export-oriented plantations are being created in the Ferghana, Yozyovon, Kuva, and Uzbekistan districts. Uzbekistan’s cotton sector has prepared for intensive planting schemes on 888,000 hectares. Of these, 500,000 hectares are planned for high-yielding, salt-resistant, and drought-resistant foreign varieties. Work is also being organized to plant cotton on 300,000 hectares based on Xinjiang’s experience. Kyrgyzstan, where about half of the region’s runoff is formed and which uses roughly a quarter of that water itself, has repeatedly raised the issue of economic compensation for irrigation water. On January 1, 2026, a new Water Code came into force in the republic, changing the approach to the use of water resources. Water is now recognized as a commodity, and fees will be charged for its use by domestic and external consumers. This marks a shift away from the old “water in exchange for electricity” system toward a market model of water use. The new code regulates domestic water use and its distribution among neighbors such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In February, Jogorku Kenesh (parliamentary) deputy Umbetaly Kydyraliyev also raised the issue, saying Kyrgyzstan bears the cost of maintaining hydraulic facilities, including repairs and maintenance of dams, but receives no direct economic compensation. He cited international practice in which countries pay compensation for the use of water resources. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov raised the issue again at a regional economic summit in Astana in April. He said emergencies in Kyrgyzstan have increased significantly in recent years: mudflows and floods have become three times more frequent, while annual damage reaches about $16 million. The glacier area has also shrunk by 16%, and by the end of the century, the country could lose up to 80% of its glaciers. “We propose resuming the introduction of a mutually beneficial economic compensation mechanism in the water and energy sector under modern conditions. It is necessary to find a balance of interests and develop mutually acceptable solutions based on a comprehensive approach,” Japarov said. Professor Yarash Pulodov, a Tajik scholar in water resources and ecology, has supported the introduction of water-use fees in Kyrgyzstan. He said the transition to market mechanisms, under which water would be treated as a commodity, is a logical step. In his view, charging for water is aimed at modernizing water-resource management, increasing transparency, and ensuring efficient distribution in water-scarce regions. “Although water is a gift from heaven and its use can be regarded as the legitimate right of everyone, in a developed society the infrastructure for delivering this water requires significant costs. Ultimately, all water users and consumers must pay for delivery,” he said. Downstream governments do not accept that premise. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan say no agreement has ever existed, and none exists now, to pay for river water. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation said: “The introduction of payment for transboundary water is not provided for by the current contractual and legal framework and is not under consideration. The main emphasis is on improving the efficiency of water use within the country, building and modernizing reservoirs, reducing losses, and introducing water-saving technologies. The system remains based on recognized principles of water sharing, equality of parties, and long-term regional cooperation.” That leaves Central Asian water diplomacy with less room for ambiguity. Annual allocation agreements still function, and governments are investing in more efficient usage. Yet Kyrgyzstan’s warning has put a price tag on a resource downstream states have long treated as shared under existing agreements. Tajikistan, another upstream state, may face similar incentives as glacier loss and infrastructure costs rise. Whether the region can manage that debate without turning water into a new interstate dispute will depend on stronger data, clearer rules, and trust between upstream and downstream states.

Labor Migration

Central Asian Labor Migration Shifts as Russia Loses Some of Its Pull

Russia remains the main destination for many Central Asian labor migrants, but its dominance is weakening. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Western sanctions, tougher Russian migration rules, and rising hostility toward migrants have pushed workers from the region to look elsewhere. South Korea, the Gulf states, the United Kingdom, Poland, Belarus, and other destinations are increasingly competing with Russia for Central Asian labor. The result is not a collapse of the old migration model, but a visible diversification of flows as the geography of labor migration from the region expands. Kazakhstan: From Destination Country to Source of Skilled Migrants Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, most labor migrants from Central Asia have traveled to Russia in search of work. A shortage of local labor, relatively decent wages, familiarity with the language, and a similar mentality have driven many to seek jobs in major Russian cities. Kazakhstan is an exception. It has not seen mass migration of its own citizens into lower-skilled jobs in Russia such as janitorial or construction work. Kazakhstan’s own economy offers such jobs, unemployment has remained low, and employers continue to report shortages in both manual work and skilled professions. The Bureau of National Statistics put unemployment at 4.5% in the first quarter of 2026. For this reason, Kazakhstan has also long been a destination for migrants from neighboring states, even if Russia has traditionally attracted larger flows. Kazakh citizens working abroad generally aim for higher-paying jobs in sectors requiring qualifications. The government was already tracking this in 2024, when the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection reported, using Foreign Ministry data, that 137,000 Kazakh citizens were abroad for employment purposes. The largest numbers were in Russia, South Korea, Turkey, and the UAE, with smaller numbers in Europe, North America, and elsewhere. A later Ministry report showed the same pattern, with Russia still dominant but alternatives clearly visible: of 126,000 Kazakh citizens employed abroad, 102,000 were in Russia, 15,000 in South Korea, and around 2,000 in the United Kingdom and European Union member states. Those leaving include economists, lawyers, technical specialists, teachers, and medical workers. Although outward labor migration remains limited compared with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Tajikistan, it is adding to official concerns about the loss of qualified specialists. Officials believe Kazakhstan’s labor market is vulnerable to external competition, and a large share of those leaving have higher or technical vocational education. Salary gaps and differences in living standards make these destinations attractive. Qatar has recently joined the list of preferred destinations for labor migration. This has been made possible in large part by intergovernmental agreements signed between Qatar and Kazakhstan. Qatar is now actively recruiting Kazakh specialists, particularly in the oil and gas sector. According to Arman Shokparov, co-founder of People Consulting, around 600-700 Kazakh white-collar professionals currently work in Qatar. Nearly half work in the oil and gas sector, mainly in engineering and production roles. This trend does not mean Kazakhstan is only losing workers. It continues to attract immigrants and returnees, including ethnic Kazakhs under long-running resettlement programs, and the government is also trying to manage internal migration toward labor-short regions. Its new migration policy through 2030 prioritizes skilled migration and relocation to regions with shortages, underscoring that Kazakhstan is both a source and a destination in the region’s labor market. Uzbekistan: Organized Recruitment Beyond Russia According to Uzbekistan’s National Statistics Committee, as of January 1, 2026, the country’s permanent population stood at 38.2 million. Experts believe Uzbekistan can now claim to be the second-most populous post-Soviet state after Russia. Ukraine once held that position, but its population has declined significantly, and no census has been conducted there since 2000. Uzbekistan’s migration balance remained negative: 1,159 people moved to the country for permanent residence, while 10,117 left. Most immigrants to Uzbekistan come from former Soviet states. Russia remains the main source, accounting for 34.1% of all arrivals in the first quarter of 2026. Another 19.7% came from Kazakhstan, and 12.2% from Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan accounted for 4.9%, and Turkmenistan 3.7%. The remaining 25.4% came from other countries. The number of Uzbek citizens working abroad reached 1.2 million, according to an official Migration Agency statement by director Behzod Musaev in May 2026. Unofficial estimates of the broader Uzbek population abroad are higher, but the categories differ and are not directly comparable. Traditionally, Russia and Kazakhstan were the main destinations for Uzbek labor migrants, and Russia remains central. TCA reported that around 106,000 Uzbek citizens went to work in Russia in 2025 through organized recruitment programs. However, migration trends are gradually shifting: organized recruitment to South Korea, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, Canada, and other European or Asian destinations is becoming more visible. The reason for this shift is not only tougher migration legislation in Russia, but also the search for higher wages, safer legal channels, and more predictable working conditions. Kyrgyzstan: Russia Still Dominates, but Alternatives Are Expanding Between January and March 2026, around 3,400 people arrived in Kyrgyzstan for permanent residence, while 353 left. These figures come from the National Statistics Committee. Some analysts link this positive migration balance to relocants from Russia. In 2022, 1.09 million Kyrgyz citizens were temporarily absent from their permanent place of residence. Of these, 964,600 people, or 88.1%, were away for work, meaning labor migrants accounted for 28% of the working-age population. As recently as 2025, government official Bakyt Darmankul uulu confirmed the trend: the number of Kyrgyz migrants in Russia has significantly declined in recent years. According to him, around 600,000 Kyrgyz citizens were working abroad at that time, including 379,000 in Russia. In 2020, the number in Russia stood at around 680,000. He said some returnees from Russia are now heading to other countries. Today, labor migration from Kyrgyzstan extends to 29 countries, with the United Kingdom currently the most in-demand destination. Most people going to Europe and Asia work in seasonal jobs. The UK has provided 40,000 quotas for foreign workers, 10,000 of them for Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz citizens also travel for work to Egypt, the UAE, Kazakhstan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Belarus, Estonia, Bulgaria, Austria, Hungary, South Korea, Turkey, and other countries. The growth of alternative routes is creating a need for better oversight. TCA reported in 2026 that 159 private agencies in Kyrgyzstan held licenses to facilitate employment abroad, while interest in jobs in Europe and Southeast Asia had increased. These channels can make migration safer and more organized, but migrants still face risks when working conditions abroad do not match recruiters’ promises. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan: Flows Are Changing As always, official statistics for Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are mostly available only through foreign sources. Nevertheless, citizens of both countries are increasingly less likely to see Russia as their only realistic destination for work. In Poland, for example, labor migration from Central Asia is growing. In the first quarter of 2026, Tajik citizens received around 6,000 work permits, according to Marta Jaroszewicz of the Centre of Migration Research at the University of Warsaw. She estimated that up to 30,000 Central Asian migrants now live in Poland, with most from Uzbekistan, followed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. According to Jaroszewicz, in the first quarter of 2026 Poland issued around 16,000 work permits to Uzbek citizens, 12,000 to Kazakhs, nearly 8,000 to Kyrgyz citizens, and 6,000 to Tajiks. She stressed that labor migration to Poland remains predominantly male. She also believes migration from Central Asia to Europe could grow substantially in the coming years, driven by demographics, population growth, and a large number of young people and students. Belarusian sources point to a similar shift in Turkmen flows, though figures vary by period and category. One report citing Belarus’ Department of Citizenship and Migration said Turkmenistan had become the largest source of foreign labor migrants, with 23,050 Turkmen citizens, or 48% of the total. Another shorter-period figure reported 6,915 arrivals. The key point is the same: Belarus has become a more visible destination for Turkmen workers, especially in services, construction, and equipment maintenance. Russian authorities also confirmed a significant decline in labor migration from Tajikistan in 2024. More recent reporting points to the same broader direction, with Tajikistan actively seeking new destinations for labor migrants. Tajik migration links with Russia remain deep, but some Russia-centered pathways are weakening as legal, political, and social conditions become more difficult. Russia remains the largest destination for many Central Asian workers, but it is no longer the only choice. The emerging pattern is not a sudden break with the post-Soviet migration system, but gradual diversification, with other destinations now part of a broader labor-migration map. For Central Asian governments, this creates opportunities, including higher wages, remittances, and legal recruitment channels, as well as risks such as brain drain, worker vulnerability abroad, and stronger competition for skilled labor at home.

State-Controlled Religion

Turkmenistan’s Chief Mufti Replacement Recalls Earlier Dismissals

Only two people in Turkmenistan, the chairman of the Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council) and the president, have what could be considered job security. Everyone else is expendable, at a moment’s notice, and that extends to the country’s top clergy. Turkmenistan has replaced the country’s top mufti, and while the reasons for the sudden move are not clear, the removal process is very familiar for Turkmenistan. Frantic Friday On June 19, the mufti of all Turkmenistan, Yalkap Hojagulyyev, led Friday prayers at the Turkmenbashi Ruhy Mosque in Gypjak, some 11 kilometers from the capital, Ashgabat. Saparmurat “Turkmenbashi” Niyazov was Turkmenistan’s first president. The country’s compliant parliament and Halk Maslahaty bestowed the title of “Turkmenbashi,” meaning head of the Turkmen, on Niyazov. Gypjak was Niyazov’s home village, and when he was alive, he spent $100 million building a mosque that could accommodate 10,000 worshipers. After he died in late 2006, he was laid to rest at the nearby mausoleum built specially for him and his family. The June 19 Friday prayers were attended by a special visitor, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who also paid his respects at Niyazov’s mausoleum. After prayers ended, the top figures from the muftiate, the spiritual board overseeing Islamic affairs in Turkmenistan, and select elders from around Turkmenistan met at the mosque for a discussion. That discussion included the announcement that the muftiate had appointed a new chief mufti. That person was Rahman Gurbanmyradov. Gurbanmyradov, who had been the head mufti for Ahal Region, was not at the meeting in Gypjak. He was saying prayers at the Seyit Jemaleddin Mosque in Ak Bugday District, Ahal Region, for a sadaqah (voluntary giving of charity) organized by Halk Maslahaty Chairman Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. Berdimuhamedov was marking the first Friday of the Islamic year 1448, which started on June 16. Back in Gypjak, senior clerics and elders were also considering what to name the new mosque being built in the newly built city of Arkadag, some 30 kilometers outside Ashgabat. Berdimuhamedov succeeded Turkmenbashi as president and held the office for roughly 15 years. During that period, government officials and state media gave him the title “Arkadag,” or “Protector.” Not surprisingly, when one of the elders at the Gypjak meeting proposed naming the new mosque in Arkadag city the Arkadag Spiritual Mosque, there was unanimous support. Why Hojagulyyev was fired is unclear, though there is speculation that Berdimuhamedov had been angry with the mufti since 2023, when Hojagulyyev brought his wife to make the Hajj at state expense. Hojagulyyev had been the head mufti since 2019. Turkmenbashi Tames the Clergy First President Niyazov is credited with bringing the entire state apparatus under his full control in the first years after Turkmenistan’s 1991 independence. However, it took him longer to achieve the total submission of Islamic clergy. Toward the end of 1999, leading Islamic cleric and scholar Khoja Ahmed Orazgylych criticized Niyazov’s public support for the traditional New Year celebration that included dancing around a Christmas tree." The practice dated back to the Soviet period, though then, of course, no religious connection was given to setting up the “yolka” (pine tree) for New Year festivities. Orazgylych was interviewed by a Western media outlet about the yolka. “To speak about the relationship of Islam to the Christmas tree,” Orazgylych said, “I have been studying Islam for 24 years and from the first to the last writings of the Koran I have never come across anything about greeting the New Year with a Christmas tree. Shortly after making these comments, Orazgylych was dismissed, then arrested, jailed, and, after receiving a presidential pardon in 2001, sent into internal exile. Niyazov criticized Orazgylych’s translation of the Quran from Uzbek into Turkmen. Niyazov actually said, “This translation of the Koran is evil,” and ordered all copies of it to be collected and burned. In 2001, Niyazov accused chief mufti Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah of nepotism. Niyazov said the mufti gave jobs at the Dashoguz theological seminary to relatives. The seminary was quickly closed. Ibn Ibadullah kept his position, but later, he started opposing Niyazov’s cult of personality, particularly orders to display Niyazov’s book, Rukhnama, prominently in mosques and use quotations from the book in sermons. In November 2002, there was an assassination attempt on Niyazov in Ashgabat. On December 16, 2002, Turkmenistan’s security service raided Uzbekistan’s Embassy, and the Turkmen prosecutor general accused embassy staff of having harbored the leader of a group of assassins. Ibn Ibadullah was an ethnic Uzbek, and northern Dashoguz Province, where the seminary once was, had a sizable Uzbek population, as it borders Uzbekistan proper. He was dismissed in January 2003 and, at a closed trial in March 2004, was convicted of treason for his alleged role in the assassination attempt and sentenced to 22 years in prison. In August 2007, after Berdimuhamedov became president, ibn Ibadullah was freed and reportedly given an unspecified state post. State-Controlled Religion Ibn Ibadullah was the last Islamic cleric to publicly challenge the Turkmen president’s authority. The clergy had learned from the cases of Orazgylych and ibn Ibadullah that resistance to the whims of the president, no matter how valid according to Islamic teachings, was useless and dangerous. Again, why Hojagulyyev was fired is still not clear, though the pattern in Turkmenistan suggests official accusations, or charges, are probably coming soon. Niyazov had the power to dismiss and appoint chief muftis and other top clergy. Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov appears to retain similar authority, even though his son, Serdar Berdimuhamedov, is now president. Officially, the muftiate made the announcement. But Gurbanmyradov’s presence on the day he was appointed new head mufti at an event organized by the elder Berdimuhamedov indicates that Berdimuhamedov knew about the impending change. Officials are regularly shuffled or dismissed, and it has been that way since the early days of Turkmenistan’s independence. The pattern fits Turkmenistan’s wider system of domestic control, where officials, institutions, and public figures remain vulnerable to sudden changes from above.

Middle Corridor

Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan Tighten Ties, Supporting Middle Corridor

The main maritime route between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan is about 300 kilometers long, linking the area around the Azerbaijani capital of Baku on the west coast of the Caspian Sea to Turkmenbashi port on the east coast. Now the leaders of the two countries are pursuing a years-long effort to bring their nations closer together – economically and diplomatically. The growing cooperation has broader implications for international trade because the Caspian Sea route is a critical part of a trade network dubbed the Middle Corridor, which connects China and Europe via Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Türkiye. The Middle Corridor has become more important because Russia and Iran, two other countries that have Caspian coastlines, have seen their economies and trade links come under pressure because of war, regional tension, and sanctions. North of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan also borders the sea and views it as a key alternative to more traditional trade routes through Russia that have become problematic because of Western sanctions aimed at punishing Moscow over its war with Ukraine. President Serdar Berdimuhamedov of Turkmenistan visited Azerbaijan earlier this week and was welcomed by President Ilham Aliyev, who noted the value of their governments’ collaboration on transport and logistics to the wider world. “Of course, cooperation between our countries in this area is already long-term, I would even say that it is of strategic importance not only for us, not only for our neighbors, but also for a wide geography,” Aliyev said on Monday. “Because today in the world there are not so many very reliable, safe transport routes connecting countries that cooperate with each other.” Aliyev thanked Turkmenistan for welcoming Azerbaijan into the Consultative Council of Heads of State of Central Asia, even though the South Caucasus country is not geographically part of Central Asia. The step, the Azerbaijani president said, recognizes cultural and historical ties as well as regional challenges, creating “the prerequisites for the recognition of the great Central Asia as a single geopolitical and geoeconomic region.” Turkmenistan’s state media said upgraded port facilities in Baku and Turkmenbashi were making the transit of cargo between Asia and Europe more efficient. The leaders of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan signed deals on energy, trade, and agriculture during Berdimuhamedov’s visit. Several years ago, the two countries resolved a dispute over an offshore oil and gas field in the Caspian, agreeing to jointly develop it in a deal that removed a hurdle to warmer relations. There were also personal touches by the two men, both of whom succeeded their fathers as president. Berdimuhamedov laid flowers at the grave of Heydar Aliyev, a former Soviet official who became president of Azerbaijan and was succeeded after his 2003 death by Ilham, his son. The Turkmen president then paid tribute to Zarifa Aliyeva, a prominent ophthalmologist who was Heydar Aliyev’s wife and the mother of the current president. She died in 1985. On Thursday, after Berdimuhamedov´s visit to Azerbaijan, the Turkmen president’s father discussed “priority areas” of the relationship between the two countries in a phone conversation with Aliyev. Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov was previously president but retained significant influence even after his son took over the position in 2022.

Middle East Crisis

The Fragile U.S.–Iran Truce: What Central Asia Stands to Gain and Lose

The preliminary memorandum signed in mid-June between the United States and Iran, followed by renewed talks between Washington and Tehran, has extended a U.S.–Iran truce and opened a 60-day window for negotiations on a final agreement. The nuclear terms remain unresolved, while Israel’s continued military presence in southern Lebanon, despite U.S. pressure for a withdrawal, underscores how fragile the broader regional de-escalation remains. At the end of this period, the parties may sign a final agreement, return to hostilities, or mutually agree to extend the interim arrangement. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, along with neighboring Azerbaijan, have welcomed efforts to de-escalate the conflict between the United States and Iran. The fighting briefly boosted demand for alternative routes through Central Asia, but prolonged instability would disrupt trade, raise transport and insurance costs, and increase security risks. The question now is what the region could gain if the pause holds. Those effects would vary across the region. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan stand to benefit most directly from safer southern rail access through Iran to the Persian Gulf and Türkiye. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are less directly connected to these corridors and less exposed to oil price swings, would feel the consequences mainly through freight costs, fuel prices, and wider regional trade. For Azerbaijan, a sustained pause would reinforce its role as the Caspian link between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye, while renewed instability would push more freight toward Trans-Caspian alternatives. That interest is not merely theoretical. Tajik-Iranian trade reached $119.6 million in the first quarter of 2026, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are developing access to Iranian maritime infrastructure through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The opportunity, however, is conditional. A truce can reduce military risk, but it does not by itself remove the banking, insurance, and compliance problems that have long complicated trade through Iran. For Central Asian exporters and logistics companies, the question is not only whether routes are physically open, but whether carriers, lenders, insurers, and buyers are prepared to use them during a temporary 60-day window. Analysts interviewed by Deutsche Welle said the framework leaves several important provisions unresolved, making a final agreement uncertain. For Central Asia, the most immediate economic variable is the Strait of Hormuz. Kazakh historian and political analyst Sultan Akimbekov identifies its reopening as the key to easing global supply fears. A durable reopening, combined with the temporary U.S. waiver allowing Iranian oil sales through August 21, could put downward pressure on global energy prices. The effects would vary across Central Asia: weaker prices could strain hydrocarbon revenues, while lower fuel, fertilizer, and freight costs could ease imported inflation in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. For Kazakhstan, lower global oil prices would have significant implications. National Bank Governor Timur Suleimenov has said oil generates more than 50% of the country’s export revenues and over 30% of the state budget and National Fund revenues. That would reverse one of the conflict’s few short-term economic benefits for Kazakhstan. Higher crude prices had briefly improved the outlook for export revenues, although market volatility and higher import and freight costs diluted the gain. The truce could therefore remove a temporary windfall for Astana while easing inflationary pressure in the region’s energy-importing economies.

The clearest longer-term opportunity may lie in trade and transit. On June 16, Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin held a bilateral meeting with an Iranian delegation led by Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadegh.

The sides discussed the development of the International North-South Transport Corridor, expansion of port infrastructure, increasing bilateral trade volumes, and improving transport and logistics ties. By the end of 2025, cargo volumes along the North-South corridor had increased by 12% to 3.5 million tons. Rail freight between the two countries rose by 69%. Kazakhstan and Iran intend to modernize transport infrastructure to increase the corridor’s capacity to 20 million tons per year. The sides also emphasized the importance of the recently signed five-party railway agreement between China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey, as well as the upcoming four-party tariff agreement between Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Iran, which is expected to create additional conditions for trade and transit growth. At the start of the military escalation between the United States, Israel, and Iran, regional economist and Logistan editor-in-chief Grigory Mikhailov had already pointed to transport and logistics opportunities for Central Asia. “There is a chance to attract investment into logistics development from major players, primarily China. For Beijing, the current situation is evidence of the need to develop alternative routes bypassing the Middle East. Options include expanding rail transit through Central Asia and Russia, as well as gradually developing the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s Arctic coast,” he said. De-escalation in the Middle East, even if temporary, may alter China’s plans for diversifying logistics routes, but is unlikely to cancel them altogether. This makes the pause a test of route confidence as much as diplomacy. If the ceasefire holds, Iran could regain some value as one of Central Asia’s shortest southern outlets to the Persian Gulf and Türkiye. If it fails, the region’s search for alternatives will accelerate, strengthening demand for the Trans-Caspian route through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. In that sense, both peace and renewed instability could increase Central Asia’s strategic importance, but through different corridors. Another possible scenario involves Kazakhstan’s potential role in arrangements related to Iran’s nuclear program. Under the memorandum signed by Trump and Pezeshkian, Iran agreed not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons, but the framework sets no detailed limits on the program. The fate of Iran’s accumulated enriched-uranium stockpile is to be resolved in later talks. Washington and Tehran have publicly disputed what was agreed on inspections, although the memorandum says nuclear activities involving material and facilities would be supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said Kazakhstan had indicated its willingness to receive Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% if Washington and Tehran reached an agreement on the nuclear program. Grossi made the statement following his May 26 meeting in Astana with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Kazakhstan’s potential role rests on an established non-proliferation record: it hosted two rounds of nuclear talks with Iran in Almaty in 2013 and now hosts the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank. The bank itself is not authorized to receive or process Iran’s uranium enriched to 60%, however, meaning that any such arrangement would require separate legal documents, safeguards, financing, custody rules, and probably dedicated infrastructure. For Central Asia, the truce is less a peace dividend than a redistribution of risk. Hydrocarbon exporters could lose from weaker energy prices, while import-dependent economies could gain from lower fuel and freight costs. The region would also benefit from having more viable routes to world markets. The real question is whether banks, insurers, transport companies, and investors are willing to do business through Iran. Unless they are, the truce will remain a political pause rather than a lasting economic benefit for Central Asia.

Connectivity

EU Launches Platform to Mobilize Up to €2 Billion for Europe–Central Asia Connectivity

The European Commission launched a Connectivity Agenda Platform on June 23, 2026, and concluded statements of intent with international financial institutions expected to mobilize up to €2 billion ($2.3 billion) for transport, border-crossing and trade-facilitation projects across the Black Sea region and the South Caucasus.

The initiative was unveiled at a high-level ministerial meeting in Brussels, hosted by European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos, Commissioner for International Partnerships Jozef Síkela, and Commissioner for Sustainable Transport Apostolos Tzitzikostas.

The meeting brought together transport ministers and senior officials from EU member states, as well as representatives from Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, alongside international lenders, to advance connectivity projects under the EU’s Global Gateway strategy.

The new platform is designed to coordinate investments and policy actions across transport, energy, digital connectivity, and trade. Participants also agreed to improve the operational efficiency of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, a wider framework that includes the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or TITR, also known as the Middle Corridor.

The route links China and Europe through Central Asia and the South Caucasus, offering an alternative to transport routes crossing Russia.

The European Commission said the expected financing would support transport infrastructure, border-crossing modernization, and trade-facilitation projects aimed at improving freight movement across the corridor.

“The Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor is becoming a vital bridge between Europe and Asia,” Síkela said, adding that the investments would help make the route faster, more reliable, and better integrated.

Tzitzikostas said stronger transport links were critical for economic competitiveness and regional resilience.

The platform’s launch came during Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s official visit to Brussels, where he met with European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

In an EU–Kazakhstan joint statement, the leaders reaffirmed the strategic importance of the Trans-Caspian corridor and pledged deeper cooperation under the EU’s Global Gateway strategy.

They also highlighted the EU’s role as Kazakhstan’s largest trade and investment partner and agreed to deepen cooperation in critical minerals, energy, transport, digitalization, and emerging technologies.

Speaking at the Kazakhstan-EU roundtable in Brussels, Tokayev said Kazakhstan was investing heavily in infrastructure to position itself as a regional logistics hub connecting Europe, Central Asia, China, the Caucasus, and the Middle East.

According to Tokayev, cargo volumes along the Middle Corridor have risen fivefold over the past six years, from 0.8 million tons to 4.1 million tons annually, with Kazakhstan targeting a capacity of 10 million tons.

He said Kazakhstan has invested more than $35 billion in transport and logistics infrastructure over the past 15 years, with the Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk serving as major transit gateways.

Tokayev also welcomed logistics agreements worth nearly $1 billion signed on June 23 by the Development Bank of Kazakhstan: one with the European Investment Bank, and a separate agreement with a banking syndicate including Commerzbank, JPMorgan Chase, and Standard Chartered, backed by guarantees from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).

A day earlier, Kazakhstan and European partners announced four transport-related agreements worth a combined $462 million to further strengthen connectivity along the Middle Corridor.

Water Security

Opinion: The Amu Darya Stress Test – Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and the Politics of Agricultural Adaptation

Central Asia’s water crisis is usually discussed as a problem of rivers, reservoirs, and diplomacy. But in 2026, the Amu Darya is also becoming something else: a test of state adaptation. The river basin entered the irrigation season under acute pressure. According to data cited by Kabar, the flow of the Amu Darya stood at only 66.8% of its normal level as of February 11, compared with 101.8% a year earlier. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the river’s flow could fall to around 65% of its historical norm, raising risks for food security and agriculture across downstream states. Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s Qosh-Tepa Canal is advancing. The canal, one of the Taliban government’s most ambitious infrastructure projects, is designed to divert water from the Amu Darya to irrigate large areas of northern Afghanistan. Carnegie Politika has estimated that, once fully operational by 2028, it could take up to 10 cubic kilometers of water annually from the river. For Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the implications are direct. Both rely heavily on Amu Darya water. Both inherited agricultural systems shaped by Soviet-era irrigation, cotton production, and centralized planning, and both are now facing a combination of climate stress, upstream extraction, and aging water infrastructure. Yet their responses are increasingly different. The emerging contrast is not simply between two agricultural policies; it is between two institutional logics: adaptation and control. Uzbekistan’s Adjustment Strategy Uzbekistan is one of the most exposed countries in the region. Its population is large, its agriculture remains water-intensive, and some of its most vulnerable regions, including Khorezm and Karakalpakstan, sit near the lower reaches of the Amu Darya. For decades, the old model relied on large-scale irrigation, cotton, rice, and the assumption that water would continue to move through the regional system much as it had before. That assumption is now weakening. Tashkent’s response remains costly and far from complete. Uzbekistan still faces serious water losses, degraded land, salinization, and uneven implementation of reform. But the direction of travel is visible: the state is trying to reduce exposure by changing crops, infrastructure, and diplomatic behavior. Rice is one example. Traditional flooded rice cultivation is extremely water-intensive, and water shortages have already pushed some Uzbek rice farmers away from traditional Amu Darya regions toward areas with more stable access to water. Uzbekistan has also begun experimenting with less water-intensive methods. In Karakalpakstan, UNDP has supported the introduction of upland rice, which can reduce water consumption by up to 40% compared with traditional rice cultivation. Separately, Uzbekistan has announced plans to expand resource-efficient rice cultivation, including drip irrigation and drought-resilient rice varieties. The state is no longer treating the old water-intensive model as untouchable. In 2026, Uzbekistan allocated significant public financing for water-saving technologies. Government-linked reporting has described plans to expand drip irrigation, sprinkler systems, and laser land leveling across hundreds of thousands of hectares, with a broader target of expanding water-saving technologies to 3.5 million hectares by 2028. Laser leveling may sound technical, but its use reflects a shift from simply demanding more water to trying to extract more value from each unit of water already available. Uzbekistan is also trying to broaden its agricultural export base, including through legumes such as mung beans, though this remains a partial adjustment rather than a replacement for cotton or rice. The most important adjustment, however, may be diplomatic. On Qosh-Tepa, Tashkent has chosen a pragmatic line. Instead of treating Afghanistan’s canal as a hostile act, Uzbekistan has pursued dialogue with Kabul. Rivers without Boundaries reported in March 2026 that Tashkent had offered technical assistance in the design and concreting of the canal bed. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Uzbekistan has offered several times to help with the canal’s construction amid concerns about safety and workmanship. The logic is practical: if Afghanistan is going to take water from the Amu Darya, downstream states have an interest in reducing losses from seepage and poor engineering. This is a difficult position. Uzbekistan cannot stop Afghanistan from pursuing agricultural development, but it also cannot ignore the impact on its own farmers. The result is a strategy of technical diplomacy: reduce the damage, keep channels open, and avoid turning water into an immediate confrontation. Turkmenistan’s Cotton-Command Problem Turkmenistan faces many of the same structural pressures, but its response appears more rigid. The country depends heavily on the Karakum Canal, one of the largest irrigation systems in the world. Built in the Soviet period to carry Amu Darya water across the desert, it remains central to Turkmen agriculture. But it is also associated with high water losses, salinization, and the persistence of water-intensive cotton production in an arid environment. Unlike Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan has shown limited public signs of rethinking the cotton-command model. Turkmenistan has announced water and agricultural measures, including instructions for the 2026 cotton crop, but these measures appear aimed more at preserving production targets than changing the crop model. Cotton remains deeply embedded in the state system. Production targets and centralized procurement continue to shape the sector, but water stress makes this model more costly each year. When water is abundant, a rigid quota system can hide inefficiency. When water declines, the pressure moves downward, onto farmers and public-sector workers. The Cotton Campaign reported in May 2026 that state-imposed forced labor remains widespread and systematic in Turkmenistan’s cotton sector. According to the coalition, the government reversed modest previous steps to reduce mobilization and again relied on public-sector employees, including teachers, students, doctors, and workers in state organizations, to pick cotton or pay for replacement laborers. The pressure is now international as well as domestic. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that in June 2026, the International Labour Organization (ILO) again called on Turkmenistan to dismantle its state-imposed cotton quota system and submit a progress report by September 1. This is not only a human rights issue. It is also a signal of institutional stress. A system that adapts changes incentives, crops, and technologies. A system that cannot adapt often intensifies pressure on the population to preserve output targets. In Turkmenistan’s case, cotton has become more than a crop. it has become a measure of the state’s ability to enforce a plan even as environmental conditions continue to deteriorate. Water scarcity also increases the discretionary power of local irrigation officials. When access to irrigation becomes uncertain, the ability to decide which field receives water and when becomes a form of leverage. The contrast with Uzbekistan is not absolute. Uzbekistan is still facing its own uneven reforms and social costs. The difference is in the direction of adaptation. Tashkent is trying to modify the agricultural system, while Ashgabat appears more focused on preserving the existing one. Qosh-Tepa as a Regime-Level Shock The Qosh-Tepa Canal sharpens this divide. For Afghanistan, the project is a national development priority. It promises food production and state-building in the north. No regional policy can deny Afghanistan’s need for water. For downstream Central Asia, however, Qosh-Tepa changes the old equation. Soviet-era water arrangements largely excluded Afghanistan; now Kabul is turning its geographic position into infrastructure. That creates a new reality for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan: less water may arrive downstream, with the old allocation system no longer fitting the basin. The states most exposed to this shift have two basic options. They can adapt their agricultural systems to a lower-water future by investing in efficiency, changing crop structures, negotiating with Afghanistan, and reducing dependence on the most water-intensive production models. Or they can try to preserve the old model through administrative force and quotas. Uzbekistan is moving toward the first path. Turkmenistan remains closer to the second. Agriculture as a Test of State Capacity The Amu Darya crisis shows that climate pressure does not affect all states in the same way. The same river shock can produce different political outcomes depending on institutional flexibility. A flexible system does not avoid pain. Uzbekistan’s adaptation will create winners and losers. Rice farmers may move, crop patterns may shift, and the local authorities may struggle to implement national water-saving programs. Technical diplomacy with Afghanistan may produce only partial results. But adaptation at least allows the state to recognize scarcity and change behavior, whereas a rigid system suppresses feedback. It treats lower water availability as a problem to be overcome by command. That can preserve the appearance of stability in the short term, but it tends to accumulate stress beneath the surface. This is why the Amu Darya is no longer only a water-security issue. It is an agricultural and institutional stress test. The question is not simply which country has more water; it is which system can change with the water regime. In the coming years, the most important indicators may not be found in reservoir levels or diplomatic statements. They will also appear in rice fields, cotton quotas, irrigation schedules, crop substitutions, and the social pressure placed on rural communities. Uzbekistan is trying to turn scarcity into a forced modernization of its farming system. Turkmenistan is trying to preserve an older command model under worsening environmental conditions. The river is the same. The institutional responses are not.   The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the publication, its affiliates, or any other organizations mentioned.