- Institute of Philosophy and First Semester Studies
University of Tromsø
9037 Tromsø
Norway
https://uit.no/om/enhet/ansatte/person?p_document_id=526834&p_dimension_id=88151 - +47 776 23219
Attila Tanyi
University of Tromsø, Department of Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), Collegium Helveticum, Department MemberUniversity of Konstanz, Germany, Zukunftskolleg, Department MemberUniversity of Liverpool, Philosophy, Faculty Memberadd
- Ethics, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy Of Religion, Intentionality, Theory of Reasons for Action, Philosophy of Action, and 47 moreMetaphysics, Applied Ethics, Philosophy, Metaethics, Naturalism, Practical Reasons and Rationality, Reasons, Silencing, Critical Theory, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Theology, Political Theory, Philosophy Of Law, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Bioethics, Moral Psychology, Social and Political Philosophy, Társadalomelméleti Kollégium (TEK), Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), Ethical Theory, Normative Ethics, Morality (Social Psychology), Analytic Philosophy of Religion, Meta-Ethics, John Rawls, Moral Demandingness, Consequentialism, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, Social and political science, Normative Political Theory, Ontology, Experimental philosophy, Moral and Political Philosophy, Morality, Utilitarianism, Metaphysics of properties, Desire, Social Justice, Rationality, Institutions, Emotions, Cormac McCarthy, Meaning of Life, Bernard Williams, and Cognitivismedit
- I am currently Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tromsø (Norway). I specia... moreI am currently Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tromsø (Norway). I specialise in moral and political philosophy but my work stretches over disciplinary boundaries. I regularly collaborate with philosophers whose specializations are very different from my own, as well as with non-philosophers with an interest in philosophical problems.edit
Research Interests:
Bringing together literary scholars, computer scientists, ethicists, philosophers of mind, and scholars from affiliated disciplines, this collection of essays offers important and timely insights into the pasts, presents, and, above all,... more
Bringing together literary scholars, computer scientists, ethicists, philosophers of mind, and scholars from affiliated disciplines, this collection of essays offers important and timely insights into the pasts, presents, and, above all, possible futures of Artificial Intelligence.
This book covers topics such as ethics and morality, identity and selfhood, and broader issues about AI, addressing questions about the individual, social, and existential impacts of such technologies. Through the works of science fiction authors such as Isaac Asimov, Stanislaw Lem, Ann Leckie, Iain M. Banks, and Martha Wells, alongside key visual productions such as Ex Machina, Westworld, and Her, contributions illustrate how science fiction might inform potential futures as well as acting as a springboard to bring disciplinary knowledge to bear on significant developments of Artificial Intelligence.
Addressing a broad, interdisciplinary audience, both expert and non-expert readers gain an in-depth understanding of the wide range of pressing issues to which Artificial Intelligence gives rise, and the ways in which science fiction narratives have been used to represent them. Using science fiction in this manner enables readers to see how even fictional worlds and imagined futures have very real impacts on how we understand these technologies. As such, readers are introduced to theoretical positions on Artificial Intelligence through fictional works as well as encouraged to reflect on the diverse aspects of Artificial Intelligence through its many philosophical, social, legal, scientific, and cultural ramifications.
This book covers topics such as ethics and morality, identity and selfhood, and broader issues about AI, addressing questions about the individual, social, and existential impacts of such technologies. Through the works of science fiction authors such as Isaac Asimov, Stanislaw Lem, Ann Leckie, Iain M. Banks, and Martha Wells, alongside key visual productions such as Ex Machina, Westworld, and Her, contributions illustrate how science fiction might inform potential futures as well as acting as a springboard to bring disciplinary knowledge to bear on significant developments of Artificial Intelligence.
Addressing a broad, interdisciplinary audience, both expert and non-expert readers gain an in-depth understanding of the wide range of pressing issues to which Artificial Intelligence gives rise, and the ways in which science fiction narratives have been used to represent them. Using science fiction in this manner enables readers to see how even fictional worlds and imagined futures have very real impacts on how we understand these technologies. As such, readers are introduced to theoretical positions on Artificial Intelligence through fictional works as well as encouraged to reflect on the diverse aspects of Artificial Intelligence through its many philosophical, social, legal, scientific, and cultural ramifications.
Research Interests:
This is my introduction to the special issue on world government forthcoming in the journal Philosophical Papers. The issue is to appear in March 2019. It includes the following papers in addition to my introduction (in no particular... more
This is my introduction to the special issue on world government forthcoming in the journal Philosophical Papers. The issue is to appear in March 2019. It includes the following papers in addition to my introduction (in no particular order):
1. Eve Erman: Does Global Democracy Require a World State?
2. Stephen Clark: Citizens of the World and Their Religion
3. Torbjörn Tännsjö: Global Democracy and the Resort to Despotism
4. Joachim Wündisch: Territorial Loss and World Governance
5. Olufemi Taiwo: Nation States Are Not Basic Structures
6. Samuel Director: Global Public Reason, Diversity, and Consent
7. Frank Abumere: World Government, Social Contract, and Legitimacy
1. Eve Erman: Does Global Democracy Require a World State?
2. Stephen Clark: Citizens of the World and Their Religion
3. Torbjörn Tännsjö: Global Democracy and the Resort to Despotism
4. Joachim Wündisch: Territorial Loss and World Governance
5. Olufemi Taiwo: Nation States Are Not Basic Structures
6. Samuel Director: Global Public Reason, Diversity, and Consent
7. Frank Abumere: World Government, Social Contract, and Legitimacy
Research Interests:
This is my introduction to the special section on world government in 13 (3) Journal of Global Ethics. The issue includes the following papers (in no particular order): 1. Attila Tanyi: Introduction 2. Henning Hahn: Political... more
This is my introduction to the special section on world government in 13 (3) Journal of Global Ethics. The issue includes the following papers (in no particular order):
1. Attila Tanyi: Introduction
2. Henning Hahn: Political Reconciliation at the Level of Global Governance
3. Andras Miklos (with Attila Tanyi): Institutional Consequentialism and Global Governance
4. Alice Pinheiro Walla: Global Government or Global Governance? Realism and Idealism in Kant's Legal Theory
5. Vuko Andric: How Do Affected Interests Support Global Democracy?
1. Attila Tanyi: Introduction
2. Henning Hahn: Political Reconciliation at the Level of Global Governance
3. Andras Miklos (with Attila Tanyi): Institutional Consequentialism and Global Governance
4. Alice Pinheiro Walla: Global Government or Global Governance? Realism and Idealism in Kant's Legal Theory
5. Vuko Andric: How Do Affected Interests Support Global Democracy?
Research Interests: Political Economy, Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, Social Sciences, and 15 moreGlobalization, Political Theory, Democratic Theory, Political Science, Global Justice, Philosophy Of Law, Consequentialism, Utilitarianism, Immanuel Kant, Democracy, Moral Philosophy, John Rawls, Social and Political Philosophy, Reconciliation, and Moral and Political Philosophy
Guest editor, together with Martin van Hees, of a special issue of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice on Martin Peterson’s The Dimensions of Consequentialism (CUP, 2013). The issue appeared in the the February 2016 issue of the journal.... more
Guest editor, together with Martin van Hees, of a special issue of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice on Martin Peterson’s The Dimensions of Consequentialism (CUP, 2013). The issue appeared in the the February 2016 issue of the journal.
The issue will include the following papers (in no particular order):
1. Martin van Hees and Attila Tanyi: Introduction
2. Vuko Andric and Attila Tanyi: Multi-dimensional Consequentialism and Risk
3. Campbell Brown: The Rightest Theory of Degrees of Rightness
4. Roger Crisp: Peterson on Rightness and Consequentialism
5. Jan Gertken: Mixed Feelings about Mixed Solutions
6. Frances Howard-Snyder: Degrees and Dimensions of Rightness
7. Thomas Schmidt: Accounting for Moral Conflicts
8. Martin Peterson: Replies
The issue will include the following papers (in no particular order):
1. Martin van Hees and Attila Tanyi: Introduction
2. Vuko Andric and Attila Tanyi: Multi-dimensional Consequentialism and Risk
3. Campbell Brown: The Rightest Theory of Degrees of Rightness
4. Roger Crisp: Peterson on Rightness and Consequentialism
5. Jan Gertken: Mixed Feelings about Mixed Solutions
6. Frances Howard-Snyder: Degrees and Dimensions of Rightness
7. Thomas Schmidt: Accounting for Moral Conflicts
8. Martin Peterson: Replies
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Economics, Political Economy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, Normative Ethics, and 15 moreMoral Psychology, Political Theory, Political Science, Liberalism, Social Justice, Ethical Theory, Moral Philosophy, John Rawls, Social and Political Philosophy, Hayek, Market, Political Sciences, Normative Political Theory, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), and Political Science and public administration
Research Interests:
I begin the chapter with research, reported recently in The Atlantic, on the surprising phenomenon that many successful women, all accomplished and highly competent, exhibit high degrees of self-doubt. Unlike the original research, the... more
I begin the chapter with research, reported recently in The Atlantic, on the surprising phenomenon that many successful women, all accomplished and highly competent, exhibit high degrees of self-doubt. Unlike the original research, the chapter aims to bring into view the role self-respect plays in higher education as another crucial explanatory factor. First, I clarify the main concepts that are relevant for getting a clear view of the notion of self-respect: different kinds of self-respect and the connection to the notion of self-esteem are discussed. After this, in section III, I move on to the main theoretical positions that historically have put self-respect in the centre of their theorizing. The story starts with Immanuel Kant, continues with John Rawls, and ends with the influential accounts of Axel Honneth, Avishai Margalit and several feminist thinkers. Having covered the theoretical and conceptual landscape, I finally connect self-respect to higher education both on the systematic as well as on the more applied level of thinking. I then wrap up the chapter by connecting back to The Atlantic story we have started out with as well as make suggestions of further reading for those with deeper interest in the topic. I also provide a a brief list of the main takeaways as well propose some questions for discussion.
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We discuss how the law and scholars have approached three questions. First, what acts count as acts of entrapment? Secondly, is entrapment a permissible method of law-enforcement and, if so, in what circumstances? Thirdly, what must... more
We discuss how the law and scholars have approached three questions. First, what acts count as acts of entrapment? Secondly, is entrapment a permissible method of law-enforcement and, if so, in what circumstances? Thirdly, what must criminal courts do, in response to the finding that an offence was brought about by an act of entrapment, in order to deliver justice? While noting the contrary tendency, we suggest that the first question should be addressed in a manner that is neutral about the answers to the other two. On the second question, we summarize various arguments about the permissibility of entrapment, while remaining largely neutral about their merits. With regard to the third question, we summarize the approaches to entrapment in various jurisdictions, and we note some patterns, across the jurisdictions here surveyed, concerning shifts from one sort of entrapment remedy to another.
Research Interests:
We characterize, more precisely than before, what Rawls calls the “analytical” method of drawing up a list of basic liberties. This method employs one or more general conditions that, under any just social order whatever, putative... more
We characterize, more precisely than before, what Rawls calls the “analytical” method of drawing up a list of basic liberties. This method employs one or more general conditions that, under any just social order whatever, putative entitlements must meet for them to be among the basic liberties encompassed, within some just social order, by Rawls’s first principle of justice (i.e., the liberty principle). We argue that the general conditions that feature in Rawls’s own account of the analytical method, which employ the notion of necessity, are too stringent. They ultimately fail to deliver as basic certain particular liberties that should be encompassed within any fully adequate scheme of liberties. To address this under-generation problem, we provide an amended general condition. This replaces Rawls’s necessity condition with a probabilistic condition and it appeals to the standard liberal prohibition on arbitrary coercion by the state. We defend our new approach both as apt to feature in applications of the analytical method and as adequately grounded in justice as fairness as Rawls articulates the theory’s fundamental ideas.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Political Theory, Freedom of thought, Moral Philosophy, and 10 moreJohn Rawls, Moral and Political Philosophy, Freedom of Speech, Liberty, Freedom, John Rawls's theory of justice, Political Satire, Humanities and Social Sciences, John Rawls Political Liberalism, and Politicla Science
We address the ethics of scenarios in which one party (the 'agent') entraps, intentionally tempts, or intentionally tests the virtue of another (the 'target'). We classify, in a new manner, three distinct types of acts that are of... more
We address the ethics of scenarios in which one party (the 'agent') entraps, intentionally tempts, or intentionally tests the virtue of another (the 'target'). We classify, in a new manner, three distinct types of acts that are of concern, namely acts of entrapment, of (mere) intentional temptation and of (mere) virtue testing. Our classification is, for each kind of scenario, of itself neutral concerning the question whether the agent acts permissibly (and concerning the extent to which the target is culpable). We explain why acts of entrapment are more ethically objectionable than like acts of (mere) intentional temptation and why these, in turn, are more ethically objectionable than like acts of (mere) virtue testing. Along the way, we scrutinize, and eventually reject, the view that acts of entrapment are ethically unacceptable because intentional temptation is involved in entrapment. (The article touches upon, but is not about, the question of culpability.)
Research Interests:
Some legal theorists say that legal entrapment to commit a crime is incoherent. So far, there is no satisfactorily precise statement of this objection in the literature: it is obscure even as to the type of incoherence that is purportedly... more
Some legal theorists say that legal entrapment to commit a crime is incoherent. So far, there is no satisfactorily precise statement of this objection in the literature: it is obscure even as to the type of incoherence that is purportedly involved. (Perhaps consequently, substantial assessment of the objection is also absent.) We aim to provide a new statement of the objection that is more precise and more rigorous than its predecessors. We argue that the best form of the objection asserts that, in attempting to entrap, law-enforcement agents lapse into a form of practical incoherence that involves the attempt simultaneously to pursue contrary ends. We then argue that the objection, in this form, encompasses all cases of legal entrapment only if it is supplemented by appeal to the premise that law-enforcement agents have an absolute duty never to create crimes.
Research Interests:
In response to the Covid pandemic, the Norwegian government put in place the strictest border controls in Norwegian modern history, barring entry to most foreign nationals. The Prime Minister, Erna Solberg, justified these policies with... more
In response to the Covid pandemic, the Norwegian government put in place the strictest border controls in Norwegian modern history, barring entry to most foreign nationals. The Prime Minister, Erna Solberg, justified these policies with reference to the rise of new Covid variants and the need to limit visitors to Norway as much as possible. As this approach has severe adverse effects on many people, there is a need to critically examine the justification given for closing the border. In this paper, we argue that while many border restrictions are legitimate, the recent banning of entry for groups of people is not adequately justified, that it unduly limits personal freedoms, and places an unjust burden on transnational citizens and Norwegians with close relations abroad.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, Normative Ethics, Applied Ethics, and 12 moreSovereignty, Political Science, Social Justice, Nationalism, European Union, Public Health, Moral Philosophy, Borders and Frontiers, Freedom, Freedom of movement, Immigration Status & Nationality, and COVID-19 PANDEMIC
The present paper identifies a challenge for a certain view of practical reasons, according to which practical reasons (both normative and motivating) are states of affairs. The problem is that those who endorse such a view seem forced to... more
The present paper identifies a challenge for a certain view of practical reasons, according to which practical reasons (both normative and motivating) are states of affairs. The problem is that those who endorse such a view seem forced to maintain both a) that the contents of beliefs are states of affairs and b) that the conception according to which the contents of beliefs are states of affairs is outlandish. The suggestion is put forward that, by distinguishing the content of a belief (as a proposition) from its object (as a state of affairs), the conflict between a) and b) can be neutralised. The resulting proposal is of interest for all those sharing the view that practical reasons must be states of affairs, i.e., things capable of being the case.
Our question is this: what makes an act one of entrapment? We make a standard distinction between legal entrapment, which is carried out by parties acting in their capacities as law-enforcement agents, and civil entrapment, which is not.... more
Our question is this: what makes an act one of entrapment? We make a standard distinction between legal entrapment, which is carried out by parties acting in their capacities as law-enforcement agents, and civil entrapment, which is not. We aim to provide a definition of entrapment that covers both and which, for reasons we explain, is neutral, in itself, about questions of permissibility and culpability. We explain, compare and contrast two existing definitions of legal entrapment that possess this neutrality. We point out some problems with the extensional correctness of these definitions and propose a new definition that resolves these problems. Next, we extend our definition of legal entrapment to cover civil entrapment as well. The definition that we provide is closer to being extensionally correct and will thereby provide a clearer basis for future discussions about the ethics of entrapment than do the definitions upon which it improves.
Research Interests: Criminal Law, Criminal Justice, Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, and 14 moreNormative Ethics, Journalism, Political Science, Legal Theory, Social Justice, Philosophy Of Law, Police, Moral Philosophy, Legal Philosophy, Moral and Political Philosophy, Police and Policing, Normative Political Theory, Entrapment, and Public Policy
Transoral laser microsurgery applies to the piecemeal removal of malignant tumours of the upper aerodigestive tract using the CO2 laser under the operating microscope. This method of surgery is being increasingly popularised as a single... more
Transoral laser microsurgery applies to the piecemeal removal of malignant tumours of the upper aerodigestive tract using the CO2 laser under the operating microscope. This method of surgery is being increasingly popularised as a single modality treatment of choice in early laryngeal cancers (T1 and T2) and occasionally in the more advanced forms of the disease (T3 and T4), predomi- nantly within the supraglottis.
Thomas Kuhn, the American physicist turned philosopher and historian of science, coined the phrase ‘paradigm shift’ in his groundbreaking book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. He argued that the arrival of the new and often incompatible idea forms the core of a new paradigm, the birth of an entirely new way of thinking. This article discusses whether Steiner and col- leagues truly brought about a paradigm shift in oncological surgery.
By rejecting the principle of en block resection and by replacing it with the belief that not only is it oncologically safe to cut through the substance of the tumour but in doing so one can actually achieve better results, Steiner was able to truly revolutionise the man- agement of laryngeal cancer. Even though within this article the repercussions of his insight are limited to the upper aerodigestive tract oncological surgery, his willingness to question other peoples’ dogma makes his contribution truly a genuine paradigm shift.
Thomas Kuhn, the American physicist turned philosopher and historian of science, coined the phrase ‘paradigm shift’ in his groundbreaking book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. He argued that the arrival of the new and often incompatible idea forms the core of a new paradigm, the birth of an entirely new way of thinking. This article discusses whether Steiner and col- leagues truly brought about a paradigm shift in oncological surgery.
By rejecting the principle of en block resection and by replacing it with the belief that not only is it oncologically safe to cut through the substance of the tumour but in doing so one can actually achieve better results, Steiner was able to truly revolutionise the man- agement of laryngeal cancer. Even though within this article the repercussions of his insight are limited to the upper aerodigestive tract oncological surgery, his willingness to question other peoples’ dogma makes his contribution truly a genuine paradigm shift.
Research Interests:
Elsewhere we have responded to the so-called demandingness objection to consequentialism – that consequentialism is excessively demanding and is therefore unacceptable as a moral theory – by introducing the theoretical position we call... more
Elsewhere we have responded to the so-called demandingness objection to consequentialism – that consequentialism is excessively demanding and is therefore unacceptable as a moral theory – by introducing the theoretical position we call institutional consequentialism. This is a consequentialist view that, however, requires institutional systems, and not individuals, to follow the consequentialist principle. In this paper, we first introduce and explain the theory of institutional consequentialism and the main reasons that support it. In the remainder of the paper, we turn to the global dimension where the first and foremost challenge is to explain how institutional consequentialism can deal with unsolved global problems such as poverty, war and climate change. In response, following the general idea of institutional consequentialism, we draw up three alternative routes: relying on existing national, transnational and supranational institutions; promoting gradual institutional reform; and advocating radical changes to the status quo. We evaluate these routes by describing normatively relevant properties of the existing global institutional system, as well as by showing what institutional consequentialism can say about alternatives to it: a world government; and multi-layered sovereignty/neo-medieval system.
Research Interests: Institutional Economics, Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, Normative Ethics, and 20 moreGlobalization, Political Theory, Global Governance, War Studies, Political Science, Politics, Institutional Change, Global Justice, Just War Theory, Consequentialism, Utilitarianism, Moral Philosophy, John Rawls, Social and Political Philosophy, Global Warming, Supranational Governance, Neomedievalism, Institutions, Poverty and Inequality, and World Government
This paper proposes a critique of the naturalist version of the Desire-Based Reasons Model. It first sets the scene by spelling out the connection between naturalism and the Model. After this, it introduces Christine Korsgaard's... more
This paper proposes a critique of the naturalist version of the Desire-Based Reasons Model. It first sets the scene by spelling out the connection between naturalism and the Model. After this, it introduces Christine Korsgaard's circularity argument against what she calls the instrumental principle. Since Korsgaard's target, officially, were non-naturalist advocates of the principle, the paper shows why and how the circularity charge can be extended to cover the naturalist Model. Once this is done, the paper goes on to investigate in some detail the different ways of responding to the circularity challenge. It argues that none of these responses succeed, at least not without serious costs to their advocates. The paper then ends with a brief summary and some concluding remarks. I. Naturalism and the Model In the theory of normative reasons one popular approach is the Desire-Based Reasons Model (henceforth: Model). The Model typically comes with an ethical naturalist (henceforth: naturalist) background. Not everyone rushes to endorse naturalism, however. There are plenty of influential arguments against naturalism but my aim in this paper is to investigate a different and perhaps less discussed objection that does not originally target naturalists: Christine Korsgaard's circularity charge. To this end, we first need a suitable account of what naturalism is, and in this context we then have to locate the Model; after this we can turn to the objection mentioned. My main focus will be on what is often called substantive naturalism. On this view, naturalism is understood as proposing an account of normative properties in terms of natural properties or relations. 1 The two main variations are the analytical and the non-analytical 1 Here I set aside the difficulties surrounding the notion of natural property. Instead, I will act on the supposition that such an account can be given. For a good overview of different definitions and the difficulties they face see Copp (2003) and Ridge (2014).
Research Interests: Philosophy, Ethics, Normative Ethics, Meta-Ethics, Constructivism, and 10 moreNormativity, Moral Philosophy, Reasons, Logistic Regression, Moral and Political Philosophy, Practical Reasons and Rationality, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), Christine Korsgaard, and Circularity
The topic of this paper is the ontology of practical reasons. We draw a critical comparison between two views. According to the first, practical reasons are facts in the world; according to the second, they are propositions. We first... more
The topic of this paper is the ontology of practical reasons. We draw a critical comparison between two views. According to the first, practical reasons are facts in the world; according to the second, they are propositions. We first isolate and spell out in detail certain objections to the second view that can be found only in embryonic form in the literature - in particular, in the work of Jonathan Dancy. Next, we sketch possible ways in which one might respond to each one of these objections. A careful evaluation of these complaints and responses, we argue, shows that the first view is not as obviously compelling as it is thought by its advocates, as it demands a shift from facts to states of affairs - which may well fail to obtain. Indeed, it turns out that not only the hypothesis that practical reasons are propositions is in no obvious way unworkable: as we show in the final part of the paper, explicit arguments in its favour can be provided, at least under the assumption that the same sort of things play the role of both motivating and normative reasons.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Metaphysics, Ontology, Normative Ethics, Meta-Ethics, and 9 moreMetaphysics of properties, Ethical Theory, States of Affairs, Facts, Propositions, Moral Philosophy, Reasons, Practical Reasons and Rationality, Propositions, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, and Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics)
This paper aims to investigate Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivist account of normativity. In particular, the aim is to see whether Gibbard’s theory is able to account for the normativity of reason-claims. For this purpose, I first describe... more
This paper aims to investigate Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivist account of normativity. In particular, the aim is to see whether Gibbard’s theory is able to account for the normativity of reason-claims. For this purpose, I first describe how I come to targeting Gibbard’s theory by setting out the main tenets of quasi-realism cum expressivism. After this, I provide a detailed interpretation of the relevant parts of Gibbard’s theory. I argue that the best reading of his account is the one that takes normativity to be carried by a controlled, coherent, comprehensive set of norms. Finally, I present a potential obstacle to Gibbard’s approach: the regress problem. The idea is to examine the structure of the non-cognitive state expressed and find it inadequate due to the possibility of an infinite regress in the justification of the norms whose acceptance it contains. I then end the paper with some concluding remarks.
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In their article “Is There a Prima Facie Duty to Preserve Genetic Integrity in Conservation Biology?” Yasha Rower and Emma Harris argue that there is no underived prima facie obligation to preserve genetic integrity. In particular, it is... more
In their article “Is There a Prima Facie Duty to Preserve Genetic Integrity in Conservation Biology?” Yasha Rower and Emma Harris argue that there is no underived prima facie obligation to preserve genetic integrity. In particular, it is argued that there is no such obligation because genetic integrity has no intrinsic value. In this commentary I raise doubts about this part of the authors’ argument. I argue that (1) there might well be at least prima facie value in genetic integrity, (2) that the Moorean isolation test the authors use might not work in their favour, and (3) that connecting genetic integrity to the idea of identity might work against the authors’ argument.
Research Interests:
God is thought to be eternal. Does this mean that he is timeless? Or is he, rather, omnitemporal? In this paper we want to show that God cannot be omnitemporal. Our starting point, which we take from Bernard Williams’ article on the... more
God is thought to be eternal. Does this mean that he is timeless? Or is he, rather, omnitemporal? In this paper we want to show that God cannot be omnitemporal. Our starting point, which we take from Bernard Williams’ article on the Makropulos Case, is the intuition that it is inappropriate for persons not to become bored after a sufficiently long sequence of time has passed. If God were omnitemporal, he would suffer from boredom. But God is the greatest possible being and therefore cannot be bored. God, hence, is not omnitemporal. After the presentation of our argument, we address several objections by examining possible differences between human and divine persons.
Research Interests: Christianity, Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy Of Religion, Normative Ethics, and 13 moreTheology, Ethical Theory, Analytic Philosophy of Religion, Metaethics, Moral Philosophy, Boredom, Open Theism, Bernard Williams, Molinism, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, Theism, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), and Perfect Being Theology
In his recent book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson puts forward a new version of consequentialism that he dubs ‘multi-dimensional consequentialism’. The defining thesis of the new theory is that there are irreducible... more
In his recent book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson puts forward a new version of consequentialism that he dubs ‘multi-dimensional consequentialism’. The defining thesis of the new theory is that there are irreducible moral aspects that jointly determine the deontic status of an act. In defending his particular version of multi-dimensional consequentialism, Peterson advocates the thesis – he calls it DEGREE – that if two or more moral aspects clash, the act under consideration is right to some non-extreme degree. This goes against the orthodoxy according to which – Peterson calls this RESOLUTION – each act is always either entirely right or entirely wrong. The argument against RESOLUTION appeals to the existence of so-called deontic leaps: the idea is that endorsing RESOLUTION would not give each relevant moral aspect its due in the final analysis. Our paper argues that, contrary to Peterson, (1) all moral aspects remain visible in what can properly be called the final analysis of a moral theory that involves RESOLUTION; (2) moral aspects do not have to remain visible in judgements of all-things-considered rightness or wrongness, respectively; (3) introduction of what Peterson calls verdictive reasons does not change the overall picture in favour of DEGREE. We conclude that multi-dimensional consequentialists should accept RESOLUTION rather than DEGREE.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, Normative Ethics, Ethical Theory, and 11 moreConsequentialism, Metaethics, Utilitarianism, Moral Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy, Reasons, Practical Reasons and Rationality, Moral Reasoning, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, Ethical and Political Theory and its Applications, and Moral Demandingness
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Research Interests: Neuroscience, Psychology, Philosophy, Ethics, Normative Ethics, and 11 moreMoral Psychology, Morality (Social Psychology), Ethical Theory, Moral Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy, Forgetting, Moral, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), Ethical Theory and Applied Ethics (esp. Environmental Ethics), and Ought Implies Can
Morality is demanding; this is a platitude. It is thus no surprise when we find that moral theories too, when we look into what they require, turn out to be demanding. However, there is at least one moral theory—consequentialism—that is... more
Morality is demanding; this is a platitude. It is thus no surprise when we find that moral theories too, when we look into what they require, turn out to be demanding. However, there is at least one moral theory—consequentialism—that is said to be beset by this demandingness problem. This calls for an explanation: Why only consequentialism? This then leads to related questions: What is the demandingness problematic about? What exactly does it claim? Finally, there is the question of what we do if we accept that there is a demandingness problem for consequentialism: How can consequentialists respond? The present chapter sets out to answer these questions (or at least point to how they could be answered).
Research Interests: Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, Normative Ethics, Moral Psychology, and 16 morePolitical Science, Global Justice, Ethical Theory, Consequentialism, Metaethics, Moral Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy, Reasons, Moral and Political Philosophy, Practical Reasons and Rationality, Rationality, Institutions, Morality, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), Social and political science, and Moral Demandingness
According to act-consequentialism the right action is the one that produces the best results as judged from an impersonal perspective. Some claim that this requirement is unreasonably demanding and therefore consequentialism is... more
According to act-consequentialism the right action is the one that produces the best results as judged from an impersonal perspective. Some claim that this requirement is unreasonably demanding and therefore consequentialism is unacceptable as a moral theory. The article breaks with dominant trends in discussing this so- called Overdemandingness Objection. Instead of focusing on theoretical responses, it empirically investigates whether there exists a widely shared intuition that consequentialist demands are unreasonable. This discussion takes the form of examining what people think about the normative significance of consequentialist requirements. In two experiments, the article finds that although people are sensitive to consequentialist requirements and, on average, find more extreme demands less reasonable, the level of disagreement with consequentialism falls short of qualifying as a widely shared intuition, even when demands are the highest. The article then ends with a general discussion of possible objections to its methods and its findings.
Research Interests: Psychology, Social Psychology, Philosophy, Ethics, Experimental philosophy, and 12 moreNormative Ethics, Moral Psychology, Morality (Social Psychology), Ethical Theory, Consequentialism, Metaethics, Moral Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy, Morality, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), and Moral Demandingness
Research Interests: Philosophy, Metaphysics, Ethics, Normative Ethics, Ethical Theory, and 11 moreMetaethics, Moral Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy, Reasons, Moral and Political Philosophy, Practical Reasons and Rationality, Derek Parfit, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), G E Moore, Metaethics (Naturalism, Value Pluralism, Moral Development, and Open Question Argument
Examining folk intuitions about philosophical questions lies at the core of experimental philosophy. This requires both a good account of what intuitions are and methods allowing to assess them. We propose to combine philosophical and... more
Examining folk intuitions about philosophical questions lies at the core of experimental philosophy. This requires both a good account of what intuitions are and methods allowing to assess them. We propose to combine philosophical and psychological conceptualisations of intuitions by focusing on three of their features: immediacy, lack of inferential relations, and stability. Once this account of intuition is at hand, we move on to propose a methodology that can test all three characteristics without eliminating any of them. In the final part of the paper, we propose implementations of the new methodology as applied to the experimental investigation of the so-called overdemandingness objection to consequentialism
Research Interests: Psychology, Social Psychology, Philosophy, Ethics, Epistemology, and 15 moreExperimental philosophy, Metaphilosophy, Normative Ethics, Moral Psychology, Morality (Social Psychology), Ethical Theory, Consequentialism, Moral Philosophy, Emotions, Knowledge, Intuitions, Epistemología, Morality, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, and Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics)
An influential objection to act-consequentialism holds that the theory is unduly demanding. This paper is an attempt to approach this critique of act-consequentialism – the Overdemandingness Objection – from a different, so far... more
An influential objection to act-consequentialism holds that the theory is unduly demanding. This paper is an attempt to approach this critique of act-consequentialism – the Overdemandingness Objection – from a different, so far undiscussed, angle. First, the paper argues that the most convincing form of the Objection claims that consequentialism is overdemanding because it requires us, with decisive force, to do things that, intuitively, we do not have decisive reason to perform. Second, in order to investigate the existence of the intuition, the paper reports empirical evidence of how people see the normative significance of consequentialist requirements.. In a scenario study that recruited a sample which is representative of the German population in key characteristics, it finds that there is no widely shared intuition as to the excessive demandingness of consequentialist requirements, although people do find higher demands less reasonable. This is true irrespective of people’s level of formal education despite the fact that lower levels of formal education are associated with an increased likelihood of having intuitions that are consistent with the Objection. Apart from contributing in this way to the debate concerning the Overdemandingness Objection, the paper also more directly speaks to the basic discussion concerning the status and role of intuitions in moral philosophy. It discusses methodological questions relevant to the role of intuitions and ends with proposing an improved methodology to investigate intuitions that connects them to emotions in a particular way and also proposes a role for virtue.
Research Interests: Psychology, Social Psychology, Philosophy, Ethics, Epistemology, and 19 moreExperimental philosophy, Normative Ethics, Moral Psychology, Morality (Social Psychology), Ethical Theory, Experimental Ethics, Consequentialism, Moral Philosophy, Reasons, Emotions, Knowledge, Epistemología, Virtue, Morality, Epistemologia, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), Moral intuitions, and Trolley Problem, Experimental Ethics, Moral Judgment
The aim of the paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Model). I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then... more
The aim of the paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Model). I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then argue against the Model through its naturalist background. For the latter purpose I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA), the other is Derek Parfit’s Triviality Objection (TO). I show that naturalists might be able to avoid both objections in case they can vindicate the reduction proposed. This, however, leads to further conditions whose fulfilment is necessary for the success of vindication. I deal with one such condition, which I borrow from Peter Railton and Mark Schroeder: the demand that naturalist reductions must be tolerably revisionist. In the remainder of the paper I argue that the most influential versions of the Model are intolerably revisionist. The first problem concerns the picture of reasons many recent formulations of the Model advocate. By using an objection from Michael Bedke I show that on this interpretation obvious reasons won’t be accounted for by the Model. The second problem concerns idealization that is also often part of the Model. Invoking an argument by Connie Rosati, I show that the best form of idealization, the ideal advisor account, is inadequate. Hence, though not knock down arguments as they were intended to be, OQA and TO do pose a serious threat to the Model.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Metaphysics, Ethics, Moral Psychology, Metaphysics of properties, and 14 moreNaturalistic Ethics, Ethical Theory, Desire, Metaethics, Naturalism, Moral Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy, Reasons, Naturalistic Fallacy, Moral, George Moore, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), and Open Question Argument
In an overlooked section of his influential book What We Owe to Each Other Thomas Scanlon advances an argument against the desire-model of practical reason- ing. In Scanlon’s view the model gives a distorted picture of the structure of... more
In an overlooked section of his influential book What We Owe to Each Other Thomas Scanlon advances an argument against the desire-model of practical reason- ing. In Scanlon’s view the model gives a distorted picture of the structure of our practical thinking. His idea is that there is an alternative to the “weighing behavior” of reasons, a particular way in which reasons can relate to each other. This phenomenon, which the paper calls “silencing”, is not something that the desire-model can accom- modate, or so Scanlon argues. The paper first presents and interprets Scanlon’s challenge. After this, the paper argues, through the examination of three responses, that Scanlon is right in claiming that the model cannot accommodate the phenomenon as he describes it. However, the paper further argues that there is no need to accept Scanlon’s depiction of silencing: advocates of the model can give an alternative account of what happens in cases of silencing that is just as plausible as Scanlon’s own. Scanlon’s challenge is thus, the paper concludes, illegitimate.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Metaphysics, Ethics, Normative Ethics, Meta-Ethics, and 12 moreMoral Psychology, Morality (Social Psychology), Ethical Theory, Desire, Moral Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy, Reasons, Thomas Scanlon, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), Desires, and Silencing
The paper begins with Jonathan Dancy’s attempt to refute the Humean Theory of Motivation. It first spells out Dancy’s argument for his alternative position, the view he labels ‘Pure Cognitivism’, according to which what motivate are... more
The paper begins with Jonathan Dancy’s attempt to refute the Humean Theory of Motivation. It first spells out Dancy’s argument for his alternative position, the view he labels ‘Pure Cognitivism’, according to which what motivate are always beliefs, never desires. The paper next argues that Dancy’s argument for his position is flawed. On the one hand, it is not true that desire always comes with motivation in the agent; on the other, even if this was the case, it would still not follow that desire is identical with the state of being motivated. When this negative work is done, the paper turns to some positive, albeit admittedly tentative remarks about what sort of cognitivist theory of motivation one should endorse. The aim at this point is not to present a brand new theory, but rather to sketch an alternative that stems from what Dancy himself says and is in line with many of his endorsed commitments in other areas. In this way, by moving beyond Pure Cognitivism, the paper sketches a different, but still ‘Dancyesque’ theory of motivation.
Research Interests: Psychology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Ethics, Philosophy of Action, and 18 moreNormative Ethics, Meta-Ethics, Moral Psychology, Motivation (Psychology), Emotions (Social Psychology), Morality (Social Psychology), Ethical Theory, Desire, Moral Philosophy, David Hume, Social and Political Philosophy, Practical Reasons and Rationality, Emotions, Rationality, Cognitivism, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), and Dancy
According to the Desire-Based Reasons Model reasons for action are provided by desires. Many, however, are critical about the Model holding an alternative view of practical reason, which is often called valued-based. In this paper I... more
According to the Desire-Based Reasons Model reasons for action are provided by desires. Many, however, are critical about the Model holding an alternative view of practical reason, which is often called valued-based. In this paper I consider one particular attempt to refute the Model, which advocates of the valued-based view often appeal to: the idea of reason-based desires. The argument is built up from two premises. The first claims that desires are states that we have reason to have. The second argues that desires do not add to the stock of reasons the agent has for having them. Together the two theses entail that desires are based on reasons, which they transmit but to which they cannot add. In the paper I deal with a counterexample to the second premise: tie-breaking desires. I first distinguish two interesting cases and argue that only the second challenges the premise. Then I move on to analyze this challenge by focusing on Ruth Chang’s recent employment of it. I show that contrary to its counterintuitive appearance, the challenge can be sustained. However, I also argue that Chang overlooks the full potential of one particular response to the challenge: the introduction of higher-order reasons determining the normative significance of these desires. At the same time, I show that this response has a problem that Chang does not consider. As a result, the response can only partially disarm the challenge of tie-breaking desires; or not at all, depending on what significance we attribute to the counterexamples.
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The paper begins with a well-known objection to the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Desire-Based Reasons Model or the Model). The objection holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which... more
The paper begins with a well-known objection to the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Desire-Based Reasons Model or the Model). The objection holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of the argument by David Sobel. Sobel invokes a counterexample: hedonic desires, i.e. the likings and dislikings of our present conscious states. The aim of the paper is to defend the premise by bringing the alleged counterexample under its scope. I first point out that reference to hedonic desires as a counterexample presupposes a particular understanding of pleasure, which we might call desire-based. In response, following Sobel, I draw up two alternative accounts, the phenomenological and the tracking views of pleasure. Although Sobel raises several objections to both accounts, I argue in detail that the phenomenological view is not as implausible as he claims it to be, whereas the tracking view, on its best version advocated by Thomas Scanlon, collapses into the phenomenological view and is therefore also defensible.
Research Interests: Neuroscience, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Ethics, Normative Ethics, and 12 moreMeta-Ethics, Moral Psychology, Affective Neuroscience, Neuroethics, Ethical Theory, Pleasure, Moral Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy, Reasons, Practical Reasons and Rationality, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, and Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics)
The paper deals with a charge that is often made against consequentialist moral theories: that they are overdemanding. I call this the Overdemandingness Objection. The first section introduces the Objection by outlining the several... more
The paper deals with a charge that is often made against consequentialist moral theories: that they are overdemanding. I call this the Overdemandingness Objection. The first section introduces the Objection by outlining the several dimensions the notion of overdemandingness encompasses. These are three: scope, content, and authority. I then argue that neither the scope, nor the content-based understanding of the Objection is viable. Constraining the scope of consequentialism is neither helpful, nor justified, hence the pervasiveness of consequentialism cannot be the ground for the Objection. And though recent approaches interpret the Objection as a claim about the excessively demanding content of consequentialism, I argue that the stringency of consequentialism is also unproblematic insofar as demandingness is concerned. These results show that the only way to put the Objection is by focusing on the inescapability of consequentialism. However, it is difficult to see how this reading would fit the intuitive status of the Objection. Nor is it clear that consequentialism can indeed claim to be inescapable by appealing to the content of common sense morality. Finally, even if we set aside these problems, the fact that there is nothing in the nature of moral reasons that would make them override or silence non-moral reasons still discourages this reading of the Objection. I conclude that the case for authority is weak: although this is the only way to understand the Objection, it at best leads to an open ended inquiry concerning the strength and nature of moral reasons
Research Interests: Psychology, Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, Normative Ethics, and 12 moreMeta-Ethics, Political Science, Ethical Theory, Consequentialism, Moral Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy, Moral and Political Philosophy, Hedonism, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), Moral Demandingness, and Neuoroscience
The paper discusses Bernard Williams’ argument that immortality is rationally undesirable because it leads to insufferable boredom. We first spell out Williams’ argument in the form of a dilemma. We then show that the first horn of this... more
The paper discusses Bernard Williams’ argument that immortality is rationally undesirable because it leads to insufferable boredom. We first spell out Williams’ argument in the form of a dilemma. We then show that the first horn of this dilemma, namely Williams’ requirement of the constancy of character of the immortal, is defensible. We next argue against a recent attempt that accepts the dilemma, but rejects the conclusion Williams draws from it. Our objection therefore focuses on the second horn of the dilemma: it contends that Williams overlooks a basic feature of human existence, namely curiosity.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Ethics, Philosophy Of Religion, Normative Ethics, Meta-Ethics, and 11 moreMorality (Social Psychology), Ethical Theory, Moral Philosophy, David Hume, Social and Political Philosophy, Bernard Williams, Immortality, Curiosity, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), and Philosophy of Curiosity
The paper begins with an objection to the Desire-Based Reasons Model. The argument from reason-based desires holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise),... more
The paper begins with an objection to the Desire-Based Reasons Model. The argument from reason-based desires holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of this argument by Ruth Chang. Chang invokes a counterexample: affective desires. The aim of the paper is to see if there is a way to accommodate the counterexample to the first premise. I investigate three strategies. I first deal with the idea that the motivation for the premise may be the thesis that an action is intentional if and only if it is done under the guise of perceived reasons. This offers us a way of defending the premise: by showing that actions prompted by affective desires are not intentional. I, however, argue that this strategy is unworkable. This brings me to the second strategy. Here I consider the idea that the premise does not require a conscious normative thought on the part of the agent; in fact, it may not require any such thought, conscious or unconscious. I claim that this strategy too is a failure. Finally, the third approach builds normative judgment in the desire. This is the approach that I think works; in particular, recent work by Jennifer Hawkins may help us accommodate affective desires. The challenge of affective desires, I conclude, can be tackled.
Research Interests: Psychology, Social Psychology, Developmental Psychology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, and 17 moreEthics, Philosophy of Action, Normative Ethics, Meta-Ethics, Affective Neuroscience, Intentionality, Ethical Theory, Desire, Moral Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy, Control Systems, Children, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), Theory of Reasons for Action, Desires, and Ruth Chang
Research Interests: Psychology, Philosophy, Metaphysics, Ethics, Normative Ethics, and 10 moreMoral Psychology, Ethical Theory, Metaethics, Moral Philosophy, Practical Reasons and Rationality, Derek Parfit, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), External Forces Vs Internal Desires, and Dancy
A tanulmány kiindulópontja John Rawls azon állítása, hogy az önbecsülés társadalmi alapjai talán a legfontosabb elsődleges jószág, amelynek elosztását az igazságosság elvei irányítják. Az irodalomban vita zajlik erről az állításról, amely... more
A tanulmány kiindulópontja John Rawls azon állítása, hogy az önbecsülés társadalmi alapjai talán a legfontosabb elsődleges jószág, amelynek elosztását az igazságosság elvei irányítják. Az irodalomban vita zajlik erről az állításról, amely lényeges pontosításokat eredményezett az érintett fogalom tekintetében. Úgy gondolom azonban, hogy ez a vita nem ment elég mélyre, és ezen hiányosságnak fontos következményei lehetnek az elosztási igazságosság elméletére nézve. Ennek megmutatására Rawls vázlatos megjegyzéseivel kezdem az önbecsülés jelentőségéről. Ezután röviden ismertetem az ezek nyomán kibontakozó diskurzust, melynek során előáll az önbecsülés két fajtája közötti különbségtétel. Jóllehet ezt a megkülönböztetést helyesnek tartom, úgy gondolom és a következőkben amellett érvelek, Robin Dillon és Anna Bortolan írásaira építve, hogy az önbecsülés összetett jelenségének csupán a felszínét érinti. Ahogy e szerzők megmutatják, az önbecsülés struktúrája valójában többrétegű, és a fenti megkülönböztetés nem veszi figyelembe annak alapvető szintjét, melyet e szerzők alapvető önbecsülésnek (Dillon) illetve önérzetnek (Bortolan) neveznek. A dolgozat további részében ezt a két javaslatot tárgyalom, amellett érvelve, hogy Bortolan verziója helytállóbb. Mindez legalábbis potenciális relevanciával bír a kapcsolódó politikai filozófiai vitára nézve: lehetséges, hogy mindazok, akik igazságosságelméletükben fontos szerepet tulajdonítanak az önbecsülésnek, mindeddig nem a megfelelő tárgyra koncentráltak. Konklúzióm értelmében ez a liberális egalitárius igazságosság új feminista kritikájához is vezethet, akár, bár ebben a tekintetben írásom nem bocsátkozik részletekbe.
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This is a short introduction to Cohen's book and argument.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, Normative Ethics, Political Science, and 10 moreSocial Justice, Justice, Ethical Theory, Moral Philosophy, John Rawls, G. A. Cohen, Moral and Political Philosophy, Normative Political Theory, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, and Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics)
Irásom célja John Rawls politikai kötelezettség elméletének vizsgálata. Rawls politikai kötelezettségeinket az igazságosság természetes kötelességeire alapozza, amelyet a normális körülmények között mindenkiben kifejlődő igazságérzet... more
Irásom célja John Rawls politikai kötelezettség elméletének vizsgálata. Rawls politikai kötelezettségeinket az igazságosság természetes kötelességeire alapozza, amelyet a normális körülmények között mindenkiben kifejlődő igazságérzet közvetít számunkra. Ebből következően kötelezettségeink igazolása egyben erkölcsi igazolás is: az igazságosság elveinek igazolása. Dolgozatomban az alábbi módon haladok. Az első szakaszban Rawls érvelését vizsgálom meg különos tekinttettel annak a konstrukciónak az elemzésére, amely az igazolás szerepét tölti be elméletében: az összehangolás egyensúlyáról lesz szó. Ez a megoldás számos problémát vet fel, amely közül a legsúlyosabb a pluralizmus figyelmen kívül hagyása. Ezért a dolgozat tematikailag második felét ezen probléma elemzése tölti ki. Azt vizsgálom meg, hogy hogyan változott meg Rawls elmélete, és az igazolás általában annak hatására, hogy figyelembe vette a pluralizmus tényét. Végül a pluralizmus követelményeire és a rawlsi reakció hiányosságaira építve egy lehetséges politikai kötelezzettség koncepciót vázolok fel, amely a közösség politikai kultúrájának interpretálására épít, beillesztve azt egy diskurzus-alapú elméleti keretbe.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Legitimacy and Authority, Normative Ethics, Political Theory, and 10 morePolitical Science, Ethical Theory, Moral Philosophy, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Legal Philosophy, Moral and Political Philosophy, Political Sciences, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), and Social and political science
Research Interests: Economics, Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, Normative Ethics, and 11 morePolitical Science, Social Justice, Justice, Ethical Theory, Moral Philosophy, John Rawls, Social and Political Philosophy, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), Social and political science, and Difference Principle
Research Interests: Political Philosophy, Ethics, Normative Ethics, Political Theory, Political Science, and 10 moreEthical Theory, Moral Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy, Third Way, Anthony Giddens, Normative Political Theory, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), Tony Blair, Social and political science, and President Bill Clinton
Research Interests: Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Social Psychology, Philosophy, Ethics, and 17 moreExperimental philosophy, Normative Ethics, Meta-Ethics, Moral Psychology, Political Science, Ethical Theory, Consequentialism, Moral Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy, Reasons, Institutions, Psicología Social, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), Social and political science, Moral Demandingness, and Trolley Problem, Experimental Ethics, Moral Judgment
Research Interests: Philosophy, Ethics, Philosophy Of Religion, Normative Ethics, Meaning of Life, and 9 moreApocalypticism In Literature, Analytic Philosophy of Religion, Literature and Philosophy, Philosophy and Literature, Cormac McCarthy, Utopian, Dystopian, and Post-Apocalyptic Fiction, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, Ethical Theory (Metaethics and Normative Ethics), and The work of Cormac McCarthy
Research Interests: Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, Normative Ethics, Social Sciences, and 13 morePolitical Theory, Frankfurt School (Philosophy), Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Jurgen Habermas, Continental Philosophy, Ethical Theory, Moral Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy, 1968, Normative Political Theory, Social and political science, and Political Philosophy, Normative Ethics
Under a ‘dirty hands’ model of undercover policing, it inevitably involves situations where whatever the law-enforcement agent does is morally problematic. Christopher Nathan argues against this model. Nathan’s criticism of the model is... more
Under a ‘dirty hands’ model of undercover policing, it inevitably involves situations where whatever the law-enforcement agent does is morally problematic. Christopher Nathan argues against this model. Nathan’s criticism of the model is predicated on the contention that it entails the view, which he considers objectionable, that morally wrongful acts are central to undercover policing. We address this criticism, and some other aspects of Nathan’s discussion of the ‘dirty hands’ model, specifically in relation to legal entrapment to commit a crime. Following János Kis’s work on political morality, we explain three dilemmatic versions of the ‘dirty hands’ model. We show that while two of these are inapplicable to legal entrapment, the third has better prospects. We then argue that, since the third model precludes Nathan’s criticism, a viable ‘dirty hands’ model of legal entrapment remains an open possibility. Finally, we generalize this result, showing that the case of legal entrapment is not special: the result holds good for policing practices more generally, including such routine practices as arrest, detention, and restraint.
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The paper takes as its starting point John Rawls’s claim that the social bases of self-respect is perhaps the most important primary good the distribution of which is governed by his principles of justice. There has been some debate about... more
The paper takes as its starting point John Rawls’s claim that the social bases of self-respect is perhaps the most important primary good the distribution of which is governed by his principles of justice. There has been some debate about this claim in the literature and this debate has included important clarifications regarding the concept(s) involved. However, I think this discussion hasn’t gone deep enough and this – relative – lack of depth has or at least might have important implications for our theory of distributive justice. To show this, I begin with Rawls’s admittedly sketchy remarks about the significance of self-respect in his theory. After this I briefly describe the debate that followed: what emerges here is a distinction between two kinds of self-respect. While I think this distinction is in good order, I also think and subsequently argue, building on the work of Robin Dillon and Anna Bortolan, that it only scratches the surface of the complex phenomenon of self-respect. In particular, as these authors show, the self-respect complex is, in fact, a multi-layered phenomenon and the distinction as used misses its fundamental level: basal self-respect (Dillon) or self-esteem (Bortolan). In the finishing part of the paper I discuss these two proposals to show that Bortolan’s version is the better one. All this then has clear relevance for the adjoining debate in political philosophy: all those who want to give an important role to self-respect in their theory of justice have potentially focused on the wrong target so far. This, I conclude, might well give rise to a new feminist critique of liberal egalitarian justice.
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Can morality be so demanding that we have reason not to follow its dictates? According to many, it can, if that morality is a consequentialist one. We take the plausibility and coherence of this objection – the Demandingness Objection –... more
Can morality be so demanding that we have reason not to follow its dictates? According to many, it can, if that morality is a consequentialist one. We take the plausibility and coherence of this objection – the Demandingness Objection – as a given and are also not concerned with finding the best response to the Objection. Instead, our main aim is to explicate the intuitive background of the Objection and to see how this background could be investigated. This double aim leads to different albeit connected threads of inquiry. We first outline the Objection, its different forms and how intuition figures in them. After this, we move on to consider the ongoing debate about the use of intuitions in (moral) philosophy with a focus on two challenges: what intuitions are and how we can detect them. To answer these challenges, we propose an account according to which moral intuitions are seemings that are characterized by being non-inferential, spontaneous, non-doxastic, phenomenologically distinctive, non-sensory, intrinsically motivating, and stable. Armed with these seven “markers” of moral intuition, we put a forward a complex experimental methodology and raise and respond to possible problems with it.
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Consequentialism is often criticised as being overly demanding, and this overdemandingness is seen as sufficient to reject it as a moral theory. This paper takes the plausibility and coherence of this objection – the Demandingness... more
Consequentialism is often criticised as being overly demanding, and this overdemandingness is seen as sufficient to reject it as a moral theory. This paper takes the plausibility and coherence of this objection – the Demandingness Objection – as a given. Our question, therefore, is how to respond to the Objection. We put forward a response that we think has not received sufficient attention in the literature: institutional consequentialism. On this view institutions take over the consequentialist burden, whereas individuals, special occasions aside, are required to set up and maintain institutions. We first introduce the Objection, then explain the theory of institutional consequentialism and how it responds to the Objection. In the remainder of the paper, we defend the view against potential challenges.
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. The paper offers a philosophically infused analysis of Cormac McCarthy’s The Road. The main idea is that McCarthy’s novel is primarily a statement on the meaning of life. Once this idea is argued for and endorsed, by using a parallel... more
. The paper offers a philosophically infused analysis of Cormac McCarthy’s The Road. The main idea is that McCarthy’s novel is primarily a statement on the meaning of life. Once this idea is argued for and endorsed, by using a parallel between The Road and a 19th century Hungarian dramatic poem, The Tragedy of Man, the paper goes on to argue that the most plausible – although admittedly not the only possible – interpretation of The Road is that it advocates a religious account of the meaning of life that is able to accommodate all other possible interpretations of how the question of meaning figures in the novel.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Ethics, Philosophy Of Religion, Normative Ethics, Meaning of Life, and 9 moreAnalytic Philosophy of Religion, Metaethics, Moral Philosophy, Literature and Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy, Philosophy and Literature, Cormac McCarthy, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, and Cormac McCarthy The Road
A tanulmány célja a globalizáció fogalmi eredetének filozófiatörténeti vizsgálata. Hogy ezen célját elérje, az írás két rokon fogalom vizsgálatára koncentrál: az univerzalizmusra és a kozmopolitanizmusra. Mivel a két fogalom alkalmazását... more
A tanulmány célja a globalizáció fogalmi eredetének filozófiatörténeti vizsgálata. Hogy ezen célját elérje, az írás két rokon fogalom vizsgálatára koncentrál: az univerzalizmusra és a kozmopolitanizmusra. Mivel a két fogalom alkalmazását nagyban befolyásolták a társadalmi és gazdasági körülmények, ezért a tanulmány is ebben a környezetben tárgyalja őket. Ennek megfelelően, az írás két részből áll. Első felében a hangsúly az univerzalimuson van, a fókusz pedig a klasszikus görög filozófiára, a sztoicizmusra, a reneszánsz humanizmusra, illetve a koramodern gondolkodásra helyeződik. A második rész teljes egészében Immanuel Kant filozófiájának kozmopolitanizmust érintő részével foglalkozik.
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Although trade union membership in the UK went into serious decline in the decades following the Conservative election victory of 1979, recent years have seen an increase. Strikes nowadays are typically lesser in scale and duration than... more
Although trade union membership in the UK went into serious decline in the decades following the Conservative election victory of 1979, recent years have seen an increase. Strikes nowadays are typically lesser in scale and duration than the big strikes of the twentieth century. The law on ballot thresholds under the Trade Union Act 2016 represents a formidable obstacle. Nevertheless, strikes remain common. In the first ten weeks of 2022, BBC News reported on strikes by gritters in Carmarthenshire (GMB), stationary manufacturers in Dalkeith (Unite), bin lorry drivers in Coventry (Unite), staff in higher education (UCU), teachers at a private school in Norwich (NASUWT), confectionary makers in York (GMB), workers on the London Underground (RMT), and refuse collectors in Wiltshire (GMB). (The European Trade Union Institute strike map of Europe shows that in the two decades to 2019 strikes generated higher average numbers of lost work days per 1,000 employees in many Mediterranean and Nordic countries than in the UK.
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News stories about so-called 'paedophile hunters' have become common. The number of prosecutions based on evidence from paedophile hunters has risen rapidly in England and in Scotland (BBC 2019b), and there are organized hunter groups in... more
News stories about so-called 'paedophile hunters' have become common. The number of prosecutions based on evidence from paedophile hunters has risen rapidly in England and in Scotland (BBC 2019b), and there are organized hunter groups in various countries (Hadjimatheou 2019). The Netherlands has recently seen an upsurge in violence by paedophile hunters. In 2020, Jan Kruitwagen died of an aneurysm a few hours after having been assaulted when he went to meet a 15-year-old boy (Kraak 2021; Panorama 2021). Various cases of non-fatal assaults by members of hunter groups have also been reported (Kraak 2021; Kwai & Moses 2020). As with all sexual abuse, it is difficult to measure, or even estimate, the extent of the production and circulation of images of the sexual abuse of children. It is clear, though, that the widespread ownership of internet-enabled devices has enabled a boom in this kind of crime. People, including the police, often think that the problem has become too big for the authorities to tackle (Hadjimatheou 2019).
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A rawlsi szerződéselvű felfogás, amelyet a Theory of Justice című könyvében fejtett ki részletesen, nagyon jelentős és szerteágazó kritikát váltott ki a világ tudományos életében. Könyvtárnyi irodalom gyűlt össze az... more
A rawlsi szerződéselvű felfogás, amelyet a Theory of Justice című könyvében fejtett ki részletesen, nagyon jelentős és szerteágazó kritikát váltott ki a világ tudományos életében. Könyvtárnyi irodalom gyűlt össze az írással kapcsolatban, és már ezért is furcsa, hogy itthon csak most jelent, pontosabban fog megjelenni az amerikai filozófus korszakalkotó műve. Semmi meglepő sincs abban, hogy a mű ekkora visszhangot váltott ki, hiszen olyan elveket próbál összeegyeztetni, mint jólét és szabadság és olyan optimista emberképe van, amely legtöbbünk számára elképzelhetetlen. A fejezet1 öt részből áll: a rawlsi gondolat kifejtéséből, annak intézményi megvalósulásából, a célok rendszeréből, a buchanani és rawlsi szerződéselvű felfogás összehasonlításából, s végül az említett sokoldalú kritika egyes részeinek ismertetéséből.
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Grensestengningen i Norge har store konsekvenser for dem som rammes, og for Norges internasjonale forbindelser, men det finnes ingen seriøs politisk debatt om dette.
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This is a presentation on the ethics of entrapment.
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Some legal theorists say that legal entrapment to commit a crime is incoherent. So far, there is no satisfactorily precise statement of this objection in the literature: it is obscure even as to the type of incoherence that is purportedly... more
Some legal theorists say that legal entrapment to commit a crime is incoherent. So far, there is no satisfactorily precise statement of this objection in the literature: it is obscure even as to the type of incoherence that is purportedly involved. (Perhaps consequently, substantial assessment of the objection is also absent.) We aim to provide a new statement of the objection that is more precise and more rigorous than its predecessors. We argue that the best form of the objection asserts that, in attempting to entrap, law-enforcement agents lapse into a form of practical incoherence that involves the attempt simultaneously to pursue contrary ends. We then argue that the objection, in this form, encompasses all cases of legal entrapment only if it is supplemented by appeal to the premise that law-enforcement agents have an absolute duty never to create crimes.
