Just War Theory

Until recently most militaries tended to see moral issues through the lens of rules and regulations. Today, however, many armed forces consider teaching virtues to be an important complement to imposing rules and codes from above. A closer look reveals that it is mainly established military virtues such as honour, courage and loyalty that dominate both the lists of virtues and values of most militaries and the growing body of literature on military virtues. Although there is evidently still a role for these traditional martial virtues, it is equally evident that they are not particularly relevant to, for instance, military personnel operating drones. This chapter looks into the ethics of unmanned warfare from the perspective of military virtues and military ethics education, and addresses the question of what we need to solve that just-mentioned misalignment: 1) a new set of virtues; 2) a different interpretation of the existing virtues; or 3) a different approach altogether, that is, an alternative to teaching virtues? That we have to think about such questions is at least partly because unmanned systems bring risk asymmetry in war to a new level, making warlike virtues such as physical courage by and large obsolete. The last section of this chapter therefore addresses the question: to what extent does the possibility of riskless warfare makes drone use ‘virtue-less’?

The texts "About the rhythm in military art", "About the gaze in military art", and "About the attitude of the spirit in military art" by the notorious samurai Miyamoto Musashi, are part of his book, known in English as the "Book of the five rings". This ancient military treatise consists of a work of enormous value, divided into five chapters, and is considered the most accurate record of what was considered by Musashi to be his most valuable legacy, his meticulous and rational way of thinking about military art, and in particular , individual duels.

This important work, although it has an evident focus on kenjutsu, that is, on Japanese swordsmanship, more specifically, the Niten ichi-ryū style, founded by Musashi himself, does not fail to present more reflections on the art of war in a more general way.

As the world continues to fail to reduce and control global surface temperatures so the use of solar radiation management (SRM) technology is becoming increasingly likely. This article examines whether capable individual states and other actors, unilaterally or in small groups, are – from a moral point of view- permitted to deploy SRM technology from the global commons. To answer this question the article examines Elizabeth L. Chalecki and Lisa L. Ferraris (2018) ‘ just geo-engineering theory’ and Kyle Fruh and Marcus Hedahl’ s (2019) suggestion that unilateral geoengineering is – in certain circumstances – a justified form of self-defence against the unjust ‘war’ that is climate change. Given that the two pairs of authors disagree on a number of key points (including on the all-important issues of who may deploy such technology and under what circumstances) that analysis remains inconclusive. The article ventures to answer these and other resultant questions by invoking Just Securitization Theory (Floyd, 2019). It finds that from this perspective unilateral deployment of SRM is not merely morally permissible (provided all criteria are satisfied) but that such action may – in future – even be morally required. Echoing Fruh et al (2019) however this research is not an endorsement for SRM use, but rather a warning of what will happen - indeed will need to happen - unless concrete climate action is taken now.

The 15-16th century is new era in the Hungarian history, when due to the West-European ideological and political changes, and the Turkish conquest in the Balkan, the Hungarian thinking on the justification of warfare changed. Because of the western humanist political theory, and constant defensive wars against the Turks on the Balkan brought about the appearance of the ideology of “Bastion of Christianity”. The content of the ideology is that, Hungary as a bastion protects the fortress of European Christianity, and the appearance of which shows that the place of Hungary radically changed in the European Christianity.

A 15-16. század olyan új korszak Magyarország történelmében, amikor a nyugat-európai eszmei és politikai változásoknak, illetve a dél-keleti török előre törésnek köszönhetően átalakult a háború igazoltságáról való gondolkozás. A humanista államelmélet, egyrészt, illetve a török előre töréssel védekezésre kényszerített európai kereszténység keleti határvidékén ebben az időszakban jelent meg a „kereszténység védőbástyája” háborús ideológia. Az ideológia tartalma, hogy Magyarország bástyaként védelmezi az európai kereszténység várát, és amelynek a korszakban való megjelenése azt jelzi, hogy Magyarország helyzete megváltozott a keresztény Európában.


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The very concept of war admits of a form of moral anarchy unfettered by the constraints of law or the moderation of conscience. Within its pursuit, the seemingly noble ends that have justified its inception often become conflated with the reckless means through which it is undertaken. A result is that war can become a self-perpetuating cycle of violence in which ethical mandates are made subservient to tactical imperatives. Indeed, the corporate world and the world at war both contend, at the most fundamental level, with very similar ethical dilemmas that often occur as a result of legal malpractice, corporate malady, institutional mal-influence and political malfeasance.

Thus, this paper examines the dynamics of hostile takeovers as a form of corporate warfare. There are a number of compelling reasons for believing this to be an accurate approximation to corporate reality and therefore an appropriate analogy. These include mutually hostile forces, legions of specialized service providers on both sides alongside the enormous ‘spoils of war’ that can potentially accrue to the victor. In circumstances where it is all-too easy for either of the protagonists to operate outside of statutory prescriptions, there is an evident need for a template through which to analyse and evaluate the ethical dilemmas that hostile takeovers inevitably raise whilst also, where possible, employing its prescriptions as a means of corporate conflict resolution.

This paper evaluates the just war theory (JWT) as one such template. In seeking a conceptually adaptable framework for analysing, interpreting, and articulating antagonistic behaviour during a hostile takeover, it became apparent in the course of the literature review that JWT provided a potentially useful and viable template within which to pursue the above . Just war theory has had the aim of prescribing a series of ethically-based solutions to arresting the foremost human tragedy of conflict while also articulating means through which all parties can, at first, prevent themselves going to war and, failing this, governing their behaviour during and after conflict. The research questions centre not necessarily on whether this template could in some way be a substitute for statutory and regulatory constraints on unethical conduct but, rather, whether it might better inform all stakeholders of the importance of ethically informed restraint in the interest of the greater good. 
Aside from preventing or ameliorating the process of conflict during a hostile takeover, it is postulated that just war theory can also act as tool of arbitration for both raider-company and target-company since it is designed to aid in the facilitation of peace, providing a constructive guide to reconciliation post-conflict. Overall, just war theory has been rigorously applied to situations of genuine ethical concern by the minds of many great thinkers and successfully deployed in the successful governance and resolution of humanities gravest conflicts  – this provides something of an imprimatur in seeking to counter one of the corporate world’s greatest ethical challenges with one of the philosophical world’s greatest insights into mitigating hostile behaviour.

This paper considers whether just war theory needs to be modified to assess the use of military force against terrorist groups. It rejects two existing arguments for doing this ("the contractualist justification" and "the policing model"), and outlines and defends a third ("the consequentialist justification"). Just war theory, it is claimed, is partially designed to bring about certain desirable consequences, and when empirical circumstances change in ways that mean following its principles is less likely to result in those consequences-as when terrorist groups are involved in conflicts-they need to be adjusted.

Few subjects are as widely discussed in religious circles as War and Peace. Yet, as followers of Christ, we live in a world order run by sinners under the dominion of the Devil himself. Even so, religious people debate and argue over this multifaceted issue as if there is a more righteous position, condemning the world to its own trajectory. These positions range from Augustine's "Just Cause" to what is thought to be higher-minded notions like "Non-Resistance", "Non-Violence," or "Pacifism." As is usual, I will take you on a path right between all the thinking factions to present something that transcends the boundaries of the argument. I want to raise a more provocative thought as it relates to people whose aim it is to follow Christ and who see their citizenship to a different realm, yet while they live in this one.

This paper examines the dynamics of hostile takeovers (HT's) as a form of corporate warfare. There are a number of compelling reasons for believing this to be an accurate approximation to corporate reality and therefore an appropriate analogy. In circumstances where it is all-too easy for either of the protagonists to act unethically (Berle and Means, The modern corporation and private property, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1991), there is an evident need for an appropriate template through which to analyse and evaluate the ethical dilemmas that HT's inevitably raise (Armour and Skeel, Georget Law J 95:1727, 2007)—whilst also, where possible, employing its prescriptions as a means of corporate conflict resolution. This paper evaluates just war theory (JWT) as one such template. In seeking a conceptually adaptable framework for analysing, interpreting and articulating antagonistic behaviour during a HT, it became apparent in the course of the research that JWT provided a potentially useful and viable template within which to pursue the above. The research questions centre not necessarily on whether this template could in some way be a substitute for statutory and regulatory constraints on unethical conduct but, rather, whether it might better inform all stakeholders of the importance of ethically informed restraint in the interest of the greater good.

From youth to retirement and from Romans to Final Testimonies, Karl Barth's biography and writings bear witness both to an uncommon interest in war and to war's considerable influence upon his theological development. This chapter considers the arguments of CD III/4 after necessarily brief observations regarding a selection of Barth's extensive earlier writings on war. Although far from exhaustive, the chapter survey aims to contextualize the critical role that war plays in shaping Barth's practical theology of peace. What disturbed Barth most in the early days of World War I was "how God's name is now bandied around and drawn into the sinful, impassioned activity of humankind, as if God were one of the old warrior gods to whom our heathen ancestors appealed." The two decades between world wars brought significant professional transitions for Barth. Barth's theology calls not for winning but for witness.

Warfare ideologies in Europe basically changed in the Early Modern period. This period  is  the  age  of  Reformation,  of  which  Desiderius  Erasmus  was  one  of  the earliest  prominent  thinkers.  Concerning  warfare,  Erasmus  can  be  understood  as a  representative of pacifism, but at the same time, it can be argued that he was the first reformer with a specific theory of justification of war. In this respect, Erasmus had several followers from every part of Europe, including Hungary. This
Hungarian “apprentice” was István Magyari, who was also the first representative of  Hungarian  military  science.  This  paper  uncovers  and  examines  the  common points of Erasmus and Magyari in their theory of justification of war, and Magyari’s divergence from Erasmus’ thinking.

This article discusses the future potential of a norm that emerged recently from the academic literature surrounding the ethics of war, and that echoes a number of political and moral viewpoints around the necessity of terminating ongoing and bloody wars that otherwise are unnecessarily prolonged: the norm of 'jus ex bello'. While it argues in favor of a possibilistic approach to norms – in order to argue why norms should develop, it is necessary to analyze whether they could develop – this article finds that jus ex bello might be an appropriate response to some of the arguments in favor of the need for normative change in warfare. However, four major obstacles to this potential innovation are identified, grounded in cultural history, politics, morality and cognition. Based on the further examination of these, the article goes on to make suggestions for institutional design initiatives, in themselves dependent on possible significant social and cultural evolution, that would favor normative change and the development of jus ex bello.

Both war and policing involve the use of force. While force in war is more often than not lethal, in policing it usually falls short of killing. It is not surprising therefore that there should be a vast body of work by (broadly) Western scholars on the ethics of war most of which focuses on killing therein, whereas there is very little philosophical work by similar scholars on the ethics of policing in general, and police killing in particular. This is a regrettable state of affairs, not least because police violence, and in particular lethal violence, is a fact of daily life in most parts of the world – as attested by a growing and rich ethnographic literature which, though empirical in the main, nevertheless grasps with ordinary people’s ethical stand on police killings.
In this paper, my brief is to scrutinise some divergences and convergences between the ethics of war on the one hand, and the ethics of policing in particular. I focus on killing, and argue that those acts are governed by the same moral norms, whether they are committed by combatants against other combatants, or by police officers against criminals (and vice versa).

Points out how religion is power; power will be used by others--even the non-religious; when things go awry, then, religion is then blamed, often by the same ones who have exploited its power. This calls for critical and wary analysis of the rhetorical use of religion as a pawn, followed by its being blamed as a scapegoat.  Published in The Destructive Power of Religion; Violence in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, edited by J. Harold Ellens (4 volumes, Westport/London: Praeger Publishers, 2004), Vol. 2, 265-83.

The 1648 Peace of Westphalia typifies the “modern” starting point of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention within conventional historical treatments of International Relations (IR) theory. The treaties ending the Thirty Years’ War signaled the dawn of an international society after medieval Latin Christendom with new diplomatic arrangements that assigned legitimate autonomy to specific European states independent of Roman imperial and papal authorities. The ideological archetypes of Westphalia for IR theory during the twentieth century were contemporaries Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) the realist and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) the rationalist. Each of them powerfully envisioned a modern form of international relations: Hobbes accented sovereign political independence and international anarchy between states whereas Grotius affirmed a worldwide association of states absent a global authority yet still regulated by norms of universal law to justify war and intervention. Hobbesian sovereignty and Grotian international law produce the dynamic tension and terms of modern international relations. Yet the turn to the global history of international law has challenged the conceptual parameters of the IR Westphalian narrative focused on intra-European relations between sovereign states. In particular, attention to the constitutive role of imperial expansion and colonial settlement outside Europe offers a richer scope for analyzing the development of “modern” international relations and its legal-political concepts such as the state of nature, the law of occupation, and the law of nations.

The Theses LVI belong to a series of hitherto unpublished early manuscripts of the Dutch humanist and jurisconsult Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) that were acquired by the University of Leiden in 1864. It is not certain when the Theses were written, but preliminary research on the physical manuscript and the sources cited indicate two possible windows. The first is around 1602-1605, that is roughly at a time when Grotius was also working on his Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (De Iure Praedae Commentarius). The second dating places the genesis of the manuscrbipt around 1613-1615.
In the context of Grotius’ writings, the Theses LVI assume an important position for several reasons: They raise questions about state formation, the duty of citizens to the state and the right of political resistance in far greater detail than in any other work of the celebrated Dutch humanist. The Theses LVI also feature important reading notes that yield priceless insights into the sources that Grotius directly consulted and their influence on his ideas. The manuscript grants modern scholars a unique glimpse into the working mind of its author. Evidence points not only to the ferocious haste with which Grotius wrote his works, but also the occasional sloppiness of his reading and research habits."""

This paper examines how blessed Franz Jägerstätter, an Austrian peasant executed by the Nazis during World War II, exemplified what Daniel M. Bell refers to as “just war as Christian discipleship.” After brief considerations of both Christian pacifism and realism, it considers just war theory today in connection with recent Catholic teaching as found in the Vatican II document Pacem in Terris, specifically in no. 34 on “An Attitude of Responsibility,” which calls for Christian discipleship and responsibility based on Jesus’ way of the cross, in the context of faith in divine providence and the Resurrection.

Parmi les différentes conceptualisations dont le phénomène de la guerre a pu faire l’objet, l’œuvre de Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) et celle de Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) se sont souvent trouvées rangées, depuis le développement du champ disciplinaire des relations internationales en particulier, parmi des auteurs dits « réalistes » tels que Thucydide ou Machiavel notamment. Or leur pensée respective semble échapper à toutes les formes de catégorisation : ni pur « réalisme », ni bellicisme, ni pensée de la « raison d’État », d’une part, ni idéalisme, « pacifisme », ou pensée de la guerre juste, d’autre part, l’œuvre de Hobbes et celle de Clausewitz occupent une place à part parmi ceux qui, semblablement à eux, ont pris la guerre pour objet de leur réflexion. Malgré les deux siècles et bien d’autres choses qui les séparent, une pensée hétérodoxe de la guerre se fait ainsi écho à travers elles. Hobbes comme Clausewitz s’efforcent en effet d’appréhender la guerre, non point en juristes, tel Hugo Grotius, ni même en spécialistes de l’art de la guerre, comme Machiavel, ou bien encore en moralistes, tel Juste Lipse, mais bel et bien en tant que théoriciens soucieux de saisir la logique présidant aux rapports conflictuels entre les êtres humains, c’est-à-dire à la fois la suite des causes et des effets conduisant à la guerre et l’ensemble des règles commandant le déroulement de cette dernière une fois enclenchée. Le tableau de la guerre qu’offrent par conséquent Hobbes et Clausewitz à leurs lecteurs, bien qu’il puisse paraître sombre ou cynique, n’est pas celui de la déraison ou d’une hybris totalement déchaînée : loin de présenter la guerre comme un phénomène inextricable, chacun s’efforce, à sa façon, de rendre intelligible le phénomène guerrier, d’en mettre à nu les principes et les ressorts à la fois passionnels et rationnels, nécessaires et contingents.

The study of the ethics of war is brimming with cases taken from the realist perspective, where war among states is neither right nor wrong and is viewed outside of morality all together, and relativism perspective, where evaluating an action id done according to the ethical standards of the society within which the action occurs. Revamping the study of war is Mr. William Shaw, who approaches ethics through the lens of utilitarianism, the theory where the best action is the one that maximizes utility when considering all interests equally. Utilitarianism and the Ethics of War walks the reader through the theories of realism and relativism before approaching utilitarianism where the author addresses two main questions: When, if ever, are we morally justified in waging war; and, if recourse to arms is warranted, how are we permitted to fight the wars we wage?

Abstract: Despite a recent explosion of interest in the ethics of armed conflict, the traditional just war criterion that war be waged by a “legitimate authority” has received less attention than other components of the theory. Moreover, of those theorists who have addressed the criterion, many are deeply skeptical about its moral significance. This article aims to add some clarity and precision to the authority criterion and to debates surrounding it, and to suggest that this skepticism may be too quick. First, it provides an analysis of the authority criterion, and argues there are (at least) two distinct moral claims associated with the criterion, requiring separate evaluation. Second, it outlines an increasingly influential “reductivist” approach to just war theory, and explains how it grounds powerful objections to the authority criterion. Third, and in response, it sketches the most promising strategies for providing a (qualified) defense of authority, and the further questions and complications they raise. Importantly, these strategies aim to rehabilitate the authority criterion from within a broadly reductivist view.

Violent conflict among human beings is, unfortunately, one of the great constants in our history as a species.  As far back as we can see, the human species has engaged in war and other forms of organized violence.  But it is equally true that, as far back as human culture and thought have left written records, humans have engaged in thought about morality and ethics.  Although cultures vary widely in how they interpret death and killing from a moral and religious perspective, every human culture has recognized that taking human life is a morally grave matter; every human culture has felt the need to justify taking of life in moral and religious terms.

This essay defends the notion that violent protests are permissible just in case pacifism is not obligatory and just war theory criteria are the controlling factors of violence. A "just riot" is a violent protest that meets the demands of just war/rioting criteria.

The September 11 terrorist attack on the United States of America gave birth to the term “war on terror.” Since the definition of terrorism is a matter of heated contention, this paper first attempts to give a definition of terrorism in the context of the U.S “war on terror” from the four perspectives of actor, motive, method, and target. This paper then offers a moral judgment of this war applying the ethical theory of Immanuel Kant, by putting terrorism, the means and methods of the war, and the legitimacy of revenge under the microscope of the Categorical Imperative. Based on a progressive assessment on these three steps, the paper concludes that the U.S. “war on terror” is not morally permissible.

Grossman, Lieutenant Colonel Dave, On Killing. The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, New York, Back Bay Books / Little, Brown and Company, 1995.

"The sympathetic nervous system mobilizes and directs the body's energy resources for action. The parasympathetic system is responsible for the body's digestive and recuperative processes. Usually these two systems sustain a general balance between their demands upon the body's resources, but during extremely stressful circumstances the fight-or-flight response kicks in and the sympathetic nervous system mobilizes all available energy for survival. In combat this very often results in nonessential activities such as digestion, bladder control, and sphincter control being completely shut down. This process is so intense that soldiers very often suffer stress diarrhea, and it is not at all uncommon for them to urinate and defecate in their pants as the body literally "blows its ballast" in an attempt to provide all the energy resources required to ensure its survival. A soldier must pay a physiological price for an energizing process this intense. The price that the body pays is an equally powerful backlash when the neglected demands of the parasympathetic system return. This parasympathetic backlash occurs as soon as the danger and the excitement is over, and it takes the form of an incredibly powerful weariness and sleepiness on the part of the soldier." (p70)

Unless he is caught up in murderous ecstasy, destroying is easier when done from a little remove. With every foot of distance there is a corresponding decrease in reality. Imagination flags and fails altogether when distances become too great. So it is that much of the mindless cruelty of recent wars has been perpetrated by warriors at a distance, who could not guess what havoc their powerful weapons were occasioning. — Glenn Gray The Warriors The link between distance and ease of aggression is not a new discovery. It has long been understood that there is a direct relationship between the empathic and physical proximity of the victim, and the resultant difficulty and trauma of the kill. This concept has fascinated and concerned soldiers, philosophers, anthropologists , and psychologists alike. At the far end of the spectrum are bombing and artillery, which are often used to illustrate the relative ease of long-range killing.

This essay tries to investigate whether just war criteria and current International Law can serve as a tool to limit the enormous scope of cyber-operations and its legitimate defensive responses. More light will be shed on the question of jus ad bellum than on jus in bello, based on the hypothesis that the former poses a more fundamental problem, above all with regards to the “attribution problem”. As Dever & Dever (2013) state, cyber defense models “rely heavily upon the advancement of technological capability to assist with the ever vexing issue of attribution.” (Robinson/Jones/Janicke 2015: 87) Friesen (2009) agrees with the statement, adding that the inability to attribute a cyber attack stands in the way of regulating cyber warfare. (ibid.)

Elucidating the most serious issue with regards to the permissibility of the use of force, the “attribution problem” (Barrett 2015: 387), will then lead us to analyse the relation between attribution & deterrence. We will see that increasing protection trumps attribution and the responsive use of force, although attribution remains crucial for deterrence issues. Following neo-realist assumptions that states with more power and better technology may intentionally falsely identify less powerful states or groups as perpetrators to legitimately wage retributive cyber-strikes to expand their interest and increase their relative capabilities, international solutions modelled on UNSC-R 1373 are briefly presented to serve as a solution to the multi-faceted issue.

W obecnym świecie, coraz bardziej pogrążonym w chaosie i przemocy, podejmowanie zagadnień dotyczących wojny i pokoju wydaje się uzasadnione. Liczne ataki terrorystyczne, za których początek na skale światową możemy uznać wydarzenia z 11.09.2001 roku, ukraiński Majdan, jawią się jako źródła ognisk zapalnych dla światowego konfliktu.

A variety of ethical objections have been raised against the military employment of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs, drones). Some of these objections are technological concerns
over UAVs abilities’ to function on par with their inhabited counterparts. This paper sets such concerns aside and instead focuses on supposed objections to the use of UAVs in principle. I examine several such objections currently on offer and show them all to be wanting. Indeed, I argue that we have a general duty to protect an agent engaged in a justified act from harm to the greatest extent possible, so long as that protection does not interfere with the agent’s ability to act justly. UAVs can afford precisely such protection. Therefore, we are obligated to employ UAV weapon systems for a justified mission if it can be shown that their use does not significantly reduce a warfighter’s operational capability. Of course, if a given military action is unjustified to begin with, then carrying out that act via UAVs is wrong, just as it would be with any weapon. But the point of this paper is to show that there is nothing wrong in principle with using a UAV and that, other things being equal, using
such technology can be, in fact, obligatory.

Since its publication in 1977, Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars has been the most influential work and the dominant view on traditional Just War Theory. Through his 2009 book Killing in War, Jeff McMahan directly challenges Walzer’s war principles and proposes a novel and revolutionary theory of the ethics in war that, according to some reviewers1, could shake the current understanding of jus in bello.

In this paper, I integrate key developments into a “just peace” moral analysis and argue for the Catholic Church to also develop and embrace a “just peace” approach. First, I describe present Catholic social teaching and the present threads I see related to just peace. Second, I describe the ecumenical turns to just peace and Glen Stassen’s just peacemaking, which has similarities to present Catholic social teaching. Third, I offer a critical analysis of Catholic social teaching and just peacemaking to propose a turn to a freshly integrated “just peace” approach.