A tactful and comprehensive analysis of a thinker often misquoted and misunderstood by reductive caricatures and false dichotomies between him and his counterpart across the pond, Corbett. Highly recommended.

This book is considerably more than a mere summary of the thinking of one of the most important naval strategist in U.S. history. Sumida has undertaken, very successfully, to organize the thoughts of Alfred Thayer Mahan into an accessible and coherent structure. This work provides the student of Mahan's strategy with an indispensable framework to understand the thinking that produced that strategy. Of particular value are a "select analytical index" of Mahan's writings. This book is not meant to be a substitute for reading Mahan's work, especially the first volume of `Influence' series, but does provide a sure guide for interpreting those writings.

Alfred Thayer Mahan himself, although a brilliant thinker, clearly had a number of faults. Sumida while by no means diminishing Mahan's accomplishments engages these to demonstrate the full scope of Mahan's thought process. All in all I would say that this is the best book that this reviewer is aware of on the meaning and implications of Mahan's seminal work. Mahan's version of grand strategy is now pretty much obsolete in many respects, but it is still worth studying and analyzing. This book makes both these activities considerably easier.

This book is a fresh re-analysis of the complete works of Alfred Thayer Mahan, certainly one of the greatest American military strategists. The author is Dr. John Sumida, a well-respected military historian and professor at the University of Maryland at College Park (GO TERPS... hehe). The work is part of a thesis that Dr. Sumida (and I seem to recall him mentioning that a few others were in his camp) has been slowly and carefully developing through his research in recent years that is a radical reinterpretation of Mahan's work, but mainly his intent, along with the equally seminal work, of the famous 19th century military genius/theorist/strategist Carl von Clausewitz, "On War." This thesis is the basis of high-level graduate and under-graduate classes he has at UM, a truncated version of that class that he gives at the Naval War College (I believe), and lectures that he gives at numerous other institutions. The work exists within the sub-category of military history that has been termed "Strategic Theory," which is basically the intersection of advanced philosophy with complex military situations and strategy. This is not your average history book, it is complex, difficult, challenging, and fascinating. A careful read of the, relatively, short book is necessary to grasp the message and concepts. However, if you are a person who cut their teeth on Nietzsche and reads (not: watches movies) about battles from hundreds or thousands of years ago for fun, then I assure you that you will feel a great reward for having conquered this complex topic. It is worth noting that Dr. Sumida's views in the field are far from traditional. His analysis of Mahan and Clausewitz is counter to the predominant culture's views but his point of view is steadily gaining acceptance, as evidenced by the fact that he teaches (or taught) at the Naval War College. This book is just the beginning however, covering only Mahan but still presenting and backing up Dr. Sumida's thesis. The bulk of his work and insight should be coming along soon in a book that he says will be an adaptation of the class (focusing on Clausewitz and his "On War") that I took with him. I recommend this book and the rest of his work, but of course you must decide if this is the stuff for you. All I can say is that when his book on Clausewitz come out, it will go in between this book and "On War" on my bookshelf. After I read it, of course.

Note: If you want the poor man's version of his class (good luck) the books he had us read were these and in this order.

1. Hare Brain Tortoise Mind by Guy Claxton

2. Zen in the Art of Archery by Eugene Herrigel

3. Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered by Jon Tetsuro Sumida

4. On War by Carl von Clausewitz

This was a choice for additional reading for one of my graduate level classes. I cannot tell if the author is beyond my intelligence or completely absurd, but this 90-some-odd page hell was one of our more difficult readings. Even the introduction pulls an argument that takes a jump in logic to understand. Too bad I spent the money on this and convinced myself to suffer through. Words of advice: If you ever have the choice of reading this doozy or a longer work, go with the latter. You don't need this hot mess of a historical reflection, unless this is your research field, of course.

Review of Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command

In this book Sumida begins by saying the more unsavory elements of Mahan such as racism, imperialism, social Darwinism are going to be excluded from the book. I don’t see how those elements can be excluded when they are core to his theories. Professor Sumida’s advancement of Mahan’s ideas of use of American sea power in a trans-national role to secure the international trade system sounds very similar to the ideas of the Project for a New American Century. I think of the role of American sea power is to protect the US and its national interests. I googled Professor Sumida to see if I could find any links to the neo-conservative movement but discovered none.

The author notes the frequent contradictions in Mahan’s writings. I think this may be why his work has been diminished in significance over time. I believe Julian Corbett has written a much better explanation of why sea power is decisive due to its ability to effect events on land. Corbett notes that no one lives on water so a navy is only important by what effect it has on the land. Mahan like Corbett uses history to document the decisive effect of sea power in previous wars. Corbett breaks down the components of naval power into ship of the line and cruisers. Corbett stated the dangers for a maritime power like Britain to become engaged in continental war but understood the value of amphibious operations. Mahan who served in the Civil War and saw firsthand the impact of amphibious operations took the position that amphibious operations were not important and a drain on resources. Mahan said the end all be all of sea power was concentration of force and to seek the decisive battle. Victory in the decisive battle gained control of the sea for use by your side and prevented use by the enemy to transport troops or commerce. Corbett understood that there were times when fleet dispersal was necessary and contributed to setting up a possible decisive battle. He also understood that a navy did not need to have that decisive battle to have decisive effect. I really think that the work of Corbett was more incisive and useful then and now.

Mahan had disdain for technical experts and engineers and believed those types though necessary should never be in a position to make executive decisions. I believe the Royal Navy is set up with executive line officers and engineers with two distinct career paths. The US Navy has adapted the approach that officers should have training and assignments in both areas. Mahan puts a lot of emphasis on the intangible side of leadership as being more important than material. Mahan’s work appealed to naval officers and national leaders all over the world. This focus on the spiritual side of leadership in being more important to winning wars than the material side would appeal to people from Japan and Germany because they knew they would be at a material disadvantage in future wars. The author notes that Mahan’s ideas were more Clausewitzian than Jominian.

An example of Mahanian contradiction in what he espoused as a core belief is his changing position on reason for existence of a navy. He originally stated that sea power stemmed from the need to protect a large commercial fleet. Eventually he changed his position to recognize that a nation like the US today with no significant commercial fleet and could have a strategic reason for a large navy. Mahan denotes this difference as sea power vs naval power. Mahan discussed the greater facility that authoritarian nations could maintain sea power much easier than democracies at great length. I have no doubt that Mahan recognized the good of democracy far outweighed any benefits from an authoritarian system. I am not so sure Sumida sees it that way. Mahan did not foresee the rise of the military-industrial complex as noted by Sumida. Had Mahan lived to see it develop his worries about military armaments having a voice within govt would have disappeared.

After reading the book it is tough to get an idea what Mahan really believed. I think this is probably due mainly to Mahan’s contradictions but the author really didn’t provide any help in deciphering Mahan. It appears Mahan can be twisted to into just about any shape desired to support navalism, militarism, imperialism, social Darwinism and neo-conservatism. Those who praise Mahan are eager to mention that his ideas were gobbled up and acted upon by people all over the world. I have yet to see one author analyze except in passing the responsibility of his theories for World War I and II and the increasingly violent world of today. The violence today is increasingly resource driven as would have been expected by Mahan. The response to this competition has been approached by the US in a Mahanian style.

Like the Author's, Decoding Clausewitz, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command, reveals the fundamental work of a prominent writer of military literature; in this instance, Mahan's instruction of Naval officers in the art of command.

By absorbing the the two works, the reader will reap an intellectual synergy from the author, and from the profound teachers he has written about.

Also having been a student of then, Mr. Sumida, I learned the high value of analysis as a critical element of understanding historical narrative. The reader will be well rewarded by learning from these works, and Professor Sumida's practice of analytical history. Professor Sumida has imparted this important perspective with me and I have applied in a career far removed from academia, proving of great value.

These works provide a glimpse of what graduate work might be like with a great thinker.

I now impatiently await Sumida's, In Defense of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy 1889-1914.

Thank you, Professor Sumida.

(Class of '81; Go TERPS!)

Its a good book especially for those who works on A.T. Mahan theory as their resources.it is usefull to interpret the contemporary development of naval world

Excellent book on Mahan and Naval strategy. Received book in exceptional time from the seller as well. Book was in better condition than what was expected.

Excellent service and product thank you