Notes

1. Tomás Almaguer, *Racial Fault Lines: The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California* (Berkeley, 1994).
2. Gary Y. Okihiro, *Margins and Mainstreams: Asians in American History and Culture* (Seattle, 1994), chap. 2.
3. Dan Cauldwell, "The Negroization of the Chinese Stereotype in California," *Southern California Historical Quarterly* 1 (June 1971).
4. "Success Story: Outwhiting the Whites," *Newsweek*, 21 June 1971.
5. Pete Wilson, "Why Racial Preferences Must End," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 18 January 1996, A21.
6. Richard Bernstein, "Moves Under Way in California to Overturn Higher Education's Affirmative Action Policy," *New York Times*, 25 January 1995, B8.
7. By rearticulation we mean "the process of redefinition of political interests and identities through a process of recombination of familiar ideas and values in hitherto unrecognized ways." Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*, 2d ed. (New York, 1994), 163 n. 8.
8. A particularly explosive example is the Allen Hughes and Albert Hughes film *Menace II Society* (1993).
9. This position is best articulated by Thomas Sowell in his numerous publications. For the most current example, see his *Race and Culture: A World View* (New York, 1994).
10. Dinesh D'Souza, "The Failure of the 'Cruel Compassion,'" the *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 15 September 1995, B1.
11. Yumi Wilson, "Wilson Explains His Affirmative Action Plans," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 1 June 1995, A16.
12. SP-1 and SP-2 are the two UC Regents resolutions passed on 20 July 1995 that ban the use of race and gender preferences in, respectively, admissions and employment practices at the University of California. The text of SP-1 is reprinted as an appendix to this issue on page 184.
13. Indeed, this imagery of the meeting was carried by all the major newspapers the following day—the *New York Times*, the *San Francisco Examiner*, the *San Francisco Chronicle*—and depicted in television reports as well.
14. "Affirmative-Action Aftermath," The *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 4 August 1995, A18.
15. Andrew Hacker, *Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal* (New York, 1992), chap. 8, esp. 9–10. Hacker justifies his bipolar framework by suggesting that over time Asian Americans may be absorbed into a new expansive definition of what "white" is.

RICHARD WALKER

California's Collision of Race and Class

CALIFORNIA IS A FRANKENSTEINIAN laboratory of modern hopes and failures. It has provided fertile ground for fast-track capitalist development and experiments in liberal democracy, while at the same time allowing for the mingling of many diverse peoples. But the state has also displayed the antinomies of economic crisis, class hatred, racism, and political reaction. California has repeatedly set the agenda for the United States as a whole, for better or worse, and has set the tone again in the 1990s for a paroxysm of immigrant bashing and black-white racial antagonism. Today's Californians face the profound task of integrating a plethora of non-European peoples into what is still overwhelmingly a white man's republic, and their success or failure will mark this nation's history well into the next century. Alas, the prospects are dimmed by inauspicious circumstances of economic restructuring, class division, political recidivism, and recrudescent racism and classism. If Californians fail at this task, the desperately needed renewal of class and race relations, politics and government, work and economy will be put off yet again, and the United States will remain a staggering, increasingly monstrous presence on the world's stage.

We, the People: Race and Class Recomposition

California has been a state of immigrants since the Spanish conquest in the late eighteenth century. It has never known a decade when the number of newly arriving people did not exceed the number of those born within the state.[1] Since the extermination of the indigenous people, the vast majority of Californians have been of European origin. Nevertheless, Asians and Mexicans have been a constant presence, and people of African origin finally arrived in large numbers in the 1940s for wartime work. Race in California and the West has never been a simple black-and-white issue.

California became whiter in the mid–twentieth century, thanks to the exclusionary immigration quotas of 1924 and the interwar breakup of the European world system. The gradual return to economic globalism, capitalist penetration of the Third World, and loosening of immigration restrictions in 1965 have returned California to something nearer its appearance in the last century. But the

geography of new arrivals has tilted sharply away from Europe and the eastern United States and toward the Pacific Basin, in line with the shift of the center of gravity of world capitalism away from the Atlantic. In the last two decades, California (especially Los Angeles) displaced New York as the chief receiving area for immigrants (35 percent of immigrants to the United States arrived in California in the 1980s versus 14 percent in New York). Some 400,000 migrants per year poured in during the last decade (versus 300,000 births), and the state's population surged past 30 million by 1990, up 12 million from the previous twenty years. Fewer than 50 percent of current inhabitants were born in-state.

This influx has transfigured the face of California. Nonwhites will become the majority in the next century. Latinos rose sharply in number during the 1980s (by 70 percent), Asians more precipitously (by 127 percent). By 1990, whites had fallen to roughly 57 percent of the populace, while Latinos jumped to 26 percent and Asians nearly 10 percent (Africans holding at about 7 percent and indigenous people at 1 percent). The number of foreign-born residents went up by 80 percent. An economic earthquake moved two and a half million Mexicans northward, where they joined a half million Filipinos, a quarter million Salvadorans, Vietnamese, Koreans, and Chinese and over one hundred thousand Guatemalans, Canadians, Britons, and Iranis. The central cities have undergone the most dramatic recomposition. In 1970, Los Angeles was 75 percent white, by 1990 it was only 38 percent white. San Francisco went from 75 to 43 percent white in the same period.

Racial recomposition of California went hand-in-hand with class recomposition. The working class of the 1990s is composed overwhelmingly of Latinos (mostly Mexicans, Salvadorans, and Nicaraguans) and East and Southeast Asians (mostly Filipinos, Vietnamese, and Chinese), who serve in disproportionate numbers as manual workers. Overall, 79 percent of men of Mexican origin were in blue-collar jobs in 1980 versus 55 percent of Anglo men in such jobs. Because of labor market segmentation, immigrants are largely confined to specific occupational "niches."[2] Mexicans dominate Southern California manufacturing; Salvadorans stock the furniture industry and gardening crews; Guatemalan and Salvadoran women are the principal group of domestics; Chinese and Thai women fill the garment sweatshops north and south; Little Vietnam supplies the electronics belt of Orange County; Silicon Valley electronics feeds off men and women of many origins; Chinese, Central Americans, and Filipinos labor in the restaurants and tourist hotels of San Francisco; and agribusiness in the interior valleys makes hay on the backs of Mexicans, both mestizos and Mixtecans.

Contrary to popular images of hordes of unskilled peasants jumping border fences, today's immigrants include a healthy measure of the highly skilled who are competitive for technical, professional, and managerial jobs, as well as many well-capitalized business owners and entrepreneurs. The numbers of the skilled

are particularly large among East Asians, South Asians, and Middle Easterners. Fields such as medicine, engineering, and computing have become immigrant niches for Iranis, Chinese, Filipinos, and Indians.[3] Less visible are the many Canadians and Europeans in electronics, banking, and teaching. These favored immigrants usually arrive already trained, with considerable acculturation to English and American commercialism, and they have permeated the petit bourgeois layers of California society. California has always received an extraordinary bounty from its skilled and well-capitalized migrants and, unlike the rest of the United States, has seldom felt the full impact of mass migrations of the rural poor.[4]

California has always depended on long-distance migration to feed its growth. In fact, the percentage of foreign-born residents was considerably higher a century ago, 39 percent in 1860 and 25 percent in 1900 versus 22 percent in 1990. The recent wave of migration was no larger, nor of longer duration, than the great post–World War II influx and fits closely to a pattern of 15–25 year "long swings" of migration going back a century.[5] The imposing logistics of coping with millions of new people are daunting, to be sure, and require money, ideas, and commitment to rebuilding the state on a new human foundation. But it has been done before. Schools, houses, and infrastructure were built in ample number for the baby boomers of the postwar era of in-migration (including the Walker family). So what has changed? Race, politics, and the economy, to which we now turn.

We, the Laborers: Fuel for the Fires of the White-Hot Economy

California has grown bigger than all but six countries in income and output, with a gross domestic product of $700 billion in 1990 and $900 billion in 1995.[6] It enjoyed a spectacular boom from 1975 to 1990, seemingly immune to the national disease of falling profits, foreign competition, plant closures, and stagnant employment. When the circus was over, the big top fell in with a spectacular crash that triggered widespread panic about the future of the state and left the poor and the dark exposed to the winds of economic destruction and political scapegoating for the debacle.

During the long boom, 5.5 million new jobs were added, employment peaking in 1990 at 14 million. Average income per capita doubled from 1980 to 1990 (18 percent in real income). Well positioned on the eastern flank of the Pacific Rim, California became the national leader in exports to the global market, going from 10 to 20 percent of U.S. foreign trade, and the biggest recipient of direct foreign investment.[7] Southern California manufacturing employment peaked in 1988 at more than 1.25 million jobs, making Los Angeles the biggest industrial center in

the United States (twice the size of second-place Chicago), while the Bay Area doubled its employment and Silicon Valley (Santa Clara county) became the densest manufacturing site in the country.[8]

California took over as the principal engine of U.S. economic growth and its high-tech sectors were trumpeted as the model for a nation losing its knack in manufacturing. On one side was electronics, where Silicon Valley was hailed as the world center of the new computer-information age and emblem of American innovation and entrepreneurship at its best. On the other side was mighty aerospace, the American trump card for beating back the Soviets and economic decline; as defense spending shot up to $300 billion, California's share of prime contracts peaked at 23 percent. A new generation of "smart war machines" was ushered in, and Orange County avionics became the biggest electronic cluster on earth, while the Bay Area received huge contracts for satellites, guidance systems, and Star Wars lasers.[9]

Then there was finance capital: at the beginning of the 1980s California was home to the world's largest bank (Bank of America) and credit card company (VISA), the country's biggest Savings and Loans (led by impresario Charles Keating), and the nerve center of the junk bond market (presided over by Michael Milken). New branches of foreign banks sprang up like mushrooms and loans were easy to come by. As regulations fell, fast-buck operators shuffled a deck of dubious assets, backed by the wizardry of Wall Street. Inflated by fire-sale finance, construction ballooned to $40 billion in 1989 (five times the previous peak in 1973).[10] Excess piled upon excess, and the California economy became white-hot.

Economic growth through the 1970s and 1980s was fed by the influx of almost 5 million new people from around the world. Not only were California jobs plentiful, they paid well—better than jobs in the rest of the United States and an order of magnitude higher than in Mexico or China. During the recent boom, incomes were one-sixth above the national average.[11] California's wage and income advantage has not disappeared despite the arrival of millions of new workers, however. California has enjoyed a virtuous circle of investment, employment and spending in a highly diversified economy, and its skilled labor and ample capital have sustained a high rate of innovation that keeps California products in demand far and wide.[12]

The crisis of 1990–94 slammed the high-flying California economy harder than anything since the Great Depression. The state was forced into collective downsizing in the wake of a decade of overaccumulation of factories, workers, securities, real estate, and executive fat. Wealth shrank, thanks chiefly to real estate values shriveling by 25–30 percent. After leading the country in new business formation, California's failure rate soared, with 20 percent of the nation's bankruptcies in 1991–92. Construction came grinding to a halt almost everywhere in the state, with housing starts hitting the lowest point since World War II.

Southern California was the worst hit. The post–cold war military cutbacks cost the state some 250,000 of 400,000 jobs in defense. Greater Los Angeles accounted for over a quarter of all job losses in the country in 1990–93, losing one-quarter to one-third of its manufacturing workforce.[13] The south hit the financial skids as paper empires sank without a trace; Milken, Keating, and other con-men went to jail; bank lending stagnated; venture capital plummeted; and Japanese investment dried up (from $3 billion per year in 1990 to $16 *million* in 1994). Then Los Angeles watched helplessly as a revived Bank of America bought out Security Pacific Bank.[14] The Bay Area was less devastated but still lost 120,000 jobs from 1990 to 1993.

Workers bore the brunt of the catastrophe. Gross job loss amounted to almost 1.5 million (10 percent) from 1990 to 1992: 900,000 in wholesale and retail trade, 200,000 in manufacturing, 150,000 in construction, 70,000 in agriculture. Net job growth was negative from 1991 through 1993, with unemployment edging toward 10 percent by 1993 and remaining at 8 percent in 1995—two points higher than the national average. Not surprisingly, immigrants stopped coming. In-migration plunged after 1990, out-migration increased, and net migration hit zero in 1992–93 as the recession bottomed out. This did not stop immigrants from taking the blame for "glutting" labor markets, even though layoffs of locals and migrants alike were the real culprits, and unemployment rates rose equally for all racial and ethnic groups.[15]

California sits on the cusp of an epochal change in the geography of capitalism in which its place is no longer secure. It has seen such economic sea changes before, and survived them through a combination of new technologies, political initiatives, and cultural change. This time, one cannot be sure.[16] An uptick in the business cycle is restoring some of the bloom to the Golden State, with strengths in electronics, entertainment, and exports to East Asia. But long-run industrial leadership may be passing irreversibly across the Pacific. No region (or nation) is ever immune to the inevitable downswings of accumulation and shifts in the fortunes of places.[17] The economic insecurity—for the bourgeoisie as well as the working class—adds to the uncertainties and conflicts of social recomposition and racial change.

A Nation Divided: The Growing Class Schism

Even as the economy was roaring ahead, a yawning chasm between the classes was opening up that marked the United States as the most divided of all wealthy countries. California led the pack along with the rest of the sunbelt states. Those who owned capital did spectacularly well. California's jet stream of fast-track entrepreneurs and rentier families more than doubled in the 1980s to over 340,000 millionaires (one in ten people!), and its richest families—Hearsts, Pack-

ards, Waltons, Gettys, Haases, Bechtels—disproportionately filled the top ranks of America's *haute bourgeoisie*.[18] Michael Milken earned the highest personal salary in history, while Richard Riordan, now Mayor of Los Angeles, made $100 million through leveraged buyouts. In the Bay Area the number of million-dollar executive paychecks jumped from five to fifty-four.[19] The professional and managerial class prospered: average income for the top fifth of families rose by 15 percent to $107,000, and the Bay Area, spiritual center of the yuppie lifestyle, remained the richest metropolitan area in the country and the most expensive to live in.

Meanwhile, the working class lost ground. The real income of the middle 20 percent remained flat through the decade (and declined by 10 percent in the costly Bay Area). For the lower 40 percent the bottom fell out.[20] Wages stagnated in full-time jobs, while temporary and part-time work increased. Working people kept their income up by sending more family members out to work, holding two or three jobs, and working more overtime.[21] Chronically high unemployment averaged 7.5 percent over the twenty-year period beginning in the 1970s. A staggering gap opened up between total state income and total wages (including salaried professionals)—a crude measure of total surplus value—which expanded from $155 billion to $330 billion over the decade. This helps explain where all the millionaires came from.

While wages for all workers ebbed, nonwhites fared worse across the board. Latino workers earned 70 percent of what white workers earned, on average. The per capita income of Latinos was 45 percent that of whites because Latinos tend to have larger families. Blacks and Asians did somewhat better, but not much, with per capita incomes 61 percent and 72 percent that of whites, respectively. Unemployment rates have been consistently higher for nonwhites than they are for whites. Immigrant labor has provided the upper classes of California with a new mother lode of economic surplus. The excess profits gained by hiring Latino wage-workers, for example, instead of better-paid white workers was about $85 billion in 1990. All the same, the widening class schism also shows up *within* every race or nationality—European, African, Asian, or Latino—muddying a simple race-class alignment.[22]

Throughout the mean-spirited 1980s, new battalions were added to the armies of the poor. The poverty rate stood at 12.5 percent in 1990, even before the recession sent it skyward to 18.2 percent. This rate put California into the top ten poor states (just behind Arkansas) in this most impoverished of rich nations. South Central Los Angeles has a higher poverty rate now than at the time of the Watts Rebellion, and outside the coastal-urban belt higher unemployment, insecurity, and dependence on social services are permanent features. Saddest of all is California's astronomical rate of poverty among children—over 25 percent (33 percent for children under the age of six).[23]

In short, at the same time that the racial composition of California has changed so dramatically and the economy has gone into free fall, class contradictions have sharpened. Working-class comfort and security have declined in tandem with a massive engorgement of the rich. Anxiety over unemployment, bad wages, poverty, job competition, housing, and health care is rife. All this would be true regardless of the numbers of immigrants and their racial and ethnic composition, because the erosion of working-class incomes and welfare has been taking place throughout the country and, indeed, the world.[24] But Governor Pete Wilson and the Right have used immigration as a scapegoat for the sorry state of the working class. Are they worried, perhaps, that because the working-class and nonwhite peoples now overlap to such a great degree, the combination of class and race resentments could put fire in their bellies? Better to divide the white- and the dark-skinned, the newly arrived and the long resident, than to face their unified protests against an economic miracle gone sour.

At the same time that the economic divide among the people has been widening, an even more egregious political gulf has opened up between the governing and the governed. This begins with the erosion of electoral representation. The voting public remains over 80 percent white, while the populace is only 56 percent white. The median age of the electorate is fifty, and two-thirds earn more than $40,000, while the median income overall is only $16,400. People of Asian, African, and Latino origin represent 47 percent of the total population, 43 percent of all adults, 30 percent of the citizens eligible to vote, 24 percent of the registered voters, and only 17 percent of the actual voters in 1992. One-third of Latinos, for instance, are ineligible to vote by reason of youth, one-third by lack of citizenship, and of the remaining third only one in three is registered and one in six actually casts his or her ballot: in short, a total of only about one-thirteenth of the Latino population participates in electoral politics. Anglos constituted 37 percent of Los Angeles's residents in 1992, and 12 percent of public school enrollment, but 70 percent of the active electorate; in contrast, Latinos made up 41 percent of the residents and 65 percent of the schoolchildren, but only 8 percent of the electorate in June 1992.[25]

The current political wisdom is that the crisis of California government stems from gridlock in Sacramento and antigovernment sentiment among the voters.[26] But the chief problem is a glaring lack of political legitimacy in a polity claiming to be a democratic republic, thanks to the disenfranchisement of the new majority of color. The electorate is an aging white elite disinclined to tax itself to pay for government spending on the needs of workers, people of color, and young people. The interests of the mass of these working people for jobs, public education, or health care are not expressed by elected officials, who are overwhelmingly white and well-to-do. The political logic of the Republican party's attack on immigrants, cutbacks to cities, and neglect of public schools is thus clear on simple electoral grounds. But neither vote counting nor personal enrichment suffices to account for the virulence of the ideological and political assault on the poor, the foreign, and the dark, to which we now turn.

They, the Criminals: The Political Attack on the Poor and the Alien

Faced with economic restructuring and social recomposition, the higher circles of California business and politics have little on offer. In place of industrial policy, educational programs, or strategies for political renewal, we get a reactionary agenda of lower taxes, police patrols, and reduced social expenditures. The basic trope in the ideological armory of the state's elite is the threat posed to the law-abiding citizen by the criminal, the poor, the foreign, and the dark-skinned. Covered up very nicely in the process is any reckoning of the sins of the white male burghers who dominate California's economy and polity.

The Criminalization of the Poor and Dark. California—particularly Los Angeles—has led the national wave of hysteria over crime and the criminal justice system in America over the last thirty years.[27] The Nixon administration unleashed the War on Crime in the face of mass social unrest and urban revolts, above all the Watts Rebellion. Large doses of federal money pumped into state and local governments inflated the legions of police, gave them new armaments, put more bite into criminal penalties, and built hundreds of prisons. All this was radically intensified under the banner of Ronald Reagan's War on Drugs, when Los Angeles's gang wars were engraved on public consciousness and Northern California marijuana fields came under aerial assault.[28] The recent wave of anticrime hysteria was topped off by the $30 billion federal Crime Bill passed in 1994, spurred by events such as the 1992 revolt in Los Angeles and the 1994 kidnapping-murder of the Bay Area's Polly Klaas (the Lindbergh baby of our time).[29]

Since the early 1980s, prison construction has been California's main form of infrastructural investment, with over $5 billion in nineteen new facilities. The 1994 Three Strikes initiative will require an estimated fifteen to twenty new prisons, costing another $20 billion. Vacaville (near Sacramento) is now home to the world's largest prison. The number of people incarcerated has increased from 23,000 in 1980 to 125,000 today (200,000 if one includes local jails and youth camps), and California jails more young black men than does South Africa. Although the salary of prison guards averages $47,000 per year, equal to the pay of a full professor in a state college, the state ranks among the worst in prison brutality (a federal court recently ruled that Pelican Bay, the state's "model" high-security prison, violates constitutional protections against inhumane torments).

While crime and violence are endemic to the United States, the specter haunting the white and the elite is out of all proportion to the danger. People are arrested and incarcerated in larger and larger numbers (the highest rates in the world), even though crime rates have been level since 1970. Crime is still blamed on lack of deterrence, despite the ineffectiveness of all the new cops and hardware. The newest bugaboo is the repeat offender, who can now be locked up for life after three felonies. Affluent people lock themselves away in gated communities even though most crime is perpetrated on the poor, and most violence is wrought within the family. Crime has been radically racialized, so that people of color are incarcerated at six times the rate of whites. Even so, because whites are a larger percentage of the total population, "angry white men" are the largest group committing crimes of violence; yet they are treated as victims (nine out of ten murders are *intra*racial).[30]

The attack on the poor is of equally long standing, beginning with Richard Nixon's dismantling of the War on Poverty and Great Society housing programs. But it was Reagan who launched the most virulent campaign to punish welfare mothers, subsidized renters, and free-lunching schoolchildren. Not surprisingly, social assistance cutbacks threw millions more into poverty and hundreds of thousands onto the streets without shelter.[31] California's economic decline, stumbling working class, and sagging safety net continue the Reaganauts' evil work. Statewide AFDC (Aid for Families with Dependent Children) cases rose 40 percent from 1988 to 1993, even though benefits had fallen 20 percent in real terms since 1973. While poverty has gone back to depression levels, general assistance has been cut to the nub by counties all over the state in the name of budget balancing. Wilson's Proposition 165 to punish welfare mothers was barely defeated in 1992—only to reappear as federal policy from the Newt Gingrich Congress. Riverside is now the site of the country's most notorious experiment in forcing welfare recipients to take jobs, regardless of the consequences for them, their children, or the job market. Homelessness catapulted into public view as the Reagan era hit home, but as time wore on pity turned to disgust. Los Angeles police unleashed street sweeps to rid downtown of thousands of vagrants in the late 1980s, and in 1992 San Francisco elected as mayor an ex–police chief who used his "Matrix Plan" to arrest anyone sleeping in public places.[32] Draconian antipanhandling laws have been passed in every town from San Diego to Berkeley.

The Anti-Immigrant and Anti-Affirmative Action Campaigns. Now it is immigrants' turn to bear the brunt of reactionary venom. The Save Our State initiative of 1994, Proposition 187, sought to deprive undocumented immigrants of their rights to public schooling, health care, and welfare. It required school districts and service providers to verify the legal status of students and applicants and report to state officials and the INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service). Proposition 187 made a great deal of the "illegal" acts of some immigrants but was struck down by the courts as unconstitutional. Proposition 187 was the political brainchild of Californians Alan Nelson and Harold Ezell, former commissioners of the INS. Nelson became the chief Sacramento lobbyist for FAIR (Federation for American Immigration Reform), writing anti-immigrant bills for conservative legislators. A national organization, FAIR made its name in the English-only movement, teaming up with former California Senator S. I. Hiyakawa in 1984 and receiving $1 million from the white-supremacist Pioneer Fund. The campaign for 187 was organized by an ad hoc group out of Orange County

called Save Our State, drawing on the same people, from Sacramento to Simi Valley, who had fought against busing and had engineered the tax revolt of 1978.[33] Proposition 187 would have gone nowhere, however, if Governor Wilson had not needed an issue to revive his popularity ratings for the 1994 gubernatorial election, lacking any other plausible ideas for solving California's problems. Equally galling was the haste with which Democratic senators Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer jumped on the anti-immigrant bandwagon.

Nativism and opportunism overlay a base of economics. What pushed the anti-immigrant agitation to center stage was the state's permanent budget crisis, caused by a combination of recession and the tax revolt begun by Proposition 13 in 1978.[34] New people need schools, health care, and other government services that a bankrupt state cannot provide. In Pete Wilson's impeccable class calculus, well-to-do white people are the valued taxpayers, while poor immigrants and mothers are nothing but a fiscal burden. In fact, the great majority of recent immigrants to California are not poor and make little use of health and welfare services (the only large groups to do so are *political* refugees invited in by the U.S. government, principally Laotians, Cambodians, and Russians).[35] Overall, immigrants cost less in government services than they pay in taxes. Even Wilson admits that the problem for California is that the tax revenue goes to the federal government while the expenses are paid by the state.[36]

The recession recruited many people to the argument that immigrants take jobs away from "real" Americans.[37] No doubt there is competition, but labor market segmentation channels immigrants into certain employment niches and not others: some sectors, such as garments, that bloat up with sweatshops full of dirt-cheap immigrant labor, would not have expanded at all with more expensive resident labor. Competition for jobs has also increased because more people now work two or more jobs, more women and youth now participate in the labor force, and the number of unemployed workers in all categories remains high. But the crucial determinant is the preference of employers for cheaper and less militant workers. This sometimes shows up in the preference for immigrant labor, but it represents a broad-based strategy against labor in general through the use of temporary workers, part-timers, and subcontractors, as well as through age discrimination, antiunion actions, and the like. In the absence of immigrants, would white and black workers born in the United States have fared better? Not likely. After the mass layoffs of unionized manufacturing workers in the early 1980s, blacks remained unemployed in large numbers right through the height of California's economic boom; they were systematically uninvited to the industrial banquets in Orange County and Silicon Valley.[38] Meanwhile, unemployed white workers had the option of taking jobs in Las Vegas and other locations around the western United States that were booming from the spillover of branch plants and back offices from California.

The fear of immigrants has been driven by the widespread notion that masses of impoverished Third World people are washing onto our affluent shores. But immigrants go where the jobs are, not to regions with poor job opportunities. Migrants are drawn overwhelmingly more by labor demand than they are pushed out of their home countries by poverty, as the close correspondence of business cycles and migration cycles shows. California has drawn very selectively from the worldwide pool of potential migrants and only a small proportion of the world's people have wanted to immigrate here.[39] Employers fish in seas of potential labor. In-migrants tend to be funneled directly into job opportunities. Employers, in fact, regularly recruit in foreign countries—directly, indirectly by leaving it to ethnic labor contractors, or informally by word of mouth. Word passes along immigrant social networks that are remarkably effective in funneling immigrants from specific locales in the sending countries to specific workplaces and neighborhoods in the United States. Once employers begin to hire pioneer immigrants, they set in motion "chains of migration" that keep the labor market well stocked.[40] They may reel workers in for a very long time before the chain of migration breaks.

The central trope in the Proposition 187 movement was the campaign against *illegals*. Again and again one heard the cry, "But they're breaking the law," putting immigration on a par with theft and violence. The civil rights movement and particularly the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 had, of course, previously rendered a whole host of restrictions on citizenship, marriage, and voting illegal, and the Immigration Reform Act of 1965 overturned the draconian National Origins Act of 1924. After a generation of relatively open immigration, three restrictive laws were passed by Congress in quick succession: the Refugee Act of 1980, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (ICRA) of 1986, and the Immigration Act of 1990. The ICRA defined illegal aliens as people living in the United States without official government sanction, and it imposed fines against employers that have not been enforced. White people's hypocrisy was everywhere in evidence, as those who regularly hired immigrants to mow their lawns, clean house, and tend their children suddenly raised a hue and cry over illegal aliens (typically, senatorial candidates Michael Huffington and Feinstein were both shown to have hired undocumented immigrants as domestics and to have failed to pay the legally required social security taxes for them).

Most "illegal aliens"—including large numbers of Europeans and Canadians—do not, in fact, sneak across the border but enter legally and overstay their visas. Consider the hundreds of thousands of Mexicanos who move in a continuous circuit back and forth across the border: with family and friends on both sides, they return to home villages frequently for holidays, births, and funerals—or permanently after building a nest egg for marriage, investment, or retirement. Half of those crossing the border into the United States "illegally" already have

jobs here to which they are returning. This binationalism is utterly obscure to most whites, as typified by Wilson's remonstrance to President Ernesto Zedillo to "butt out of California's business" for expressing concern over Proposition 187.[41]

Affirmative action has been a target of conservative agitation in California for many years. In 1978 Alan Bakke won the precedent-setting case against the University of California at Davis medical school for "reverse discrimination" against white males. Reagan took up the counteroffensive when he entered the White House, putting the Civil Rights Commission in the hands of Clarence Thomas and his ilk. But affirmative action had, meanwhile, become deeply institutionalized in this state, from local government contracting to University of California admissions policies. Recession and the rightward trajectory of Governor Pete Wilson opened the doors for a renewed campaign against it. This trajectory responded to the fears of job competition among the professional and unionized strata of the labor force in much the same way that immigrant bashing spoke for the unemployed common worker, including African Americans. But once again political ideology and opportunism had the upper hand. Hard on the heels of Proposition 187 came a proposal for a new ballot measure in 1996, cleverly titled the California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI) by two academics with links to Reed Irvine and Dinesh D'Souza's moribund Accuracy in Academia campaign against political correctness in the classroom. Wilson seized on polls showing CCRI to be a winner and hoped that taking on affirmative action would propel him to the presidency. Wilson's henchman on the Board of Regents, Ward Connerly (a businessman whose success was leveraged by state contracts set aside for minority businesses), led the charge to remove affirmative action from the university system, over the protests of the president of the University and the chancellors of all nine of its campuses, in a nationally showcased decision in mid-1995.

Us and Them: The Politics of Race and Reaction

California has often embodied the best of the American juggernaut. It has been a place where millions of enterprising people have been able to work for a good pay, exploit the abundance of nature, buy a little property, exercise their imagination, cast their ballots, and maybe even make the leap into the ranks of the bourgeoisie. Impressive opportunity, political openness, and equality were available by comparison with most of the world and with most of capitalist America. Yet California's American identity was hammered out in the mid–nineteenth century at the height of the formation of the racialist ideology of what Alexander Saxton and David Roediger have called "the White Republic."[42] So California was not only "the one successful revolution of 1848" for the cosmopolitan mix of petit bourgeois argonauts, but equally the triumph of Anglo-Saxon Manifest Destiny on the shore of the Pacific.[43] For the next century, white Americans dominated the body politic. But after World War II the sun began setting on their golden century, as citizenry, law, and ideology underwent epochal shifts due to migration, civil rights struggles, and the disruption of racial triumphalism. Of late, we see California's reactionaries conjuring up the ghost of the White Republic in hopes of recovering a lost sense of unity among the privileged and unprivileged among the pre-immigration populace. But will the genie perform its magic this time round, in a period not of economic and racial triumphalism but of sustained threat to the old order?

In California's blood-stained racial history, the list of horrors unleashed in the name of commercial conquest and the civilizing mission of the white race is long. The native peoples were murdered and enslaved, the Californios divested of their property, African Americans denied the rights of citizenship, the Chinese lynched and driven into ghettos, the Japanese denied land as their enterprise proved threatening, Mexicans deported en masse when labor surpluses appeared in the Great Depression, and Japanese Americans thrown into concentration camps in the Second World War. This is the tragic face of a land in which fortune smiled on so many, one hidden so well that most whites have lost the memory of their own selection as the children of America's Israel.[44]

California has an equally ignoble history of invidious racial ideology to inspire and justify its practices. One has only to read Richard Henry Dana on the Californios or John Muir on the Basque sheepherders or James Phelan, William Randolph Hearst, and Michael DeYoung on the Yellow Peril at the turn of the century. By the 1920s, Lewis Terman of Stanford, codeveloper of the IQ test, was calling Mexicans "uneducable," and practical eugenicists were sterilizing more "defectives" in mental hospitals and prisons in California than anywhere else in the United States.[45] In the 1960s and 1970s, William Shockley of semiconductor fame and Arthur Jensen of UC Berkeley were the foremost exponents of African genetic inferiority. Today, biologists Paul Ehrlich of Stanford and Garrett Hardin of UC Santa Barbara provide scientific cover for FAIR, peddling fear of inundation by the "fast-breeding races" of the Third World.

Despite the panorama of racism, however, the record is not of a piece. The White Republic of Euro-Americans was constituted from the encounter with subjugated peoples, but in California and the West it was forged in the crucible of a multiple encounter that included Latinos and Asians, as well as Native Americans and Africans. The right to feast at California's petit bourgeois banquet depended heavily on appearance and place of origin, with different races having radically different points of entry into the class structure.[46] White supremacism, unleashed with its full fury against the Indians, was modulated in other cases by ambiguity and conflict: the resistence and partial legitimacy of the Californio elite, who were

themselves substantially of European origin and commercialized; the nineteenth-century legal struggles of African Americans and Chinese Americans, as in the successful invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment in *Yick Wo v. Hopkins* (1886); the protests of the Japanese government and Japanese American evasions of the Alien Land Law of 1913; the changing view of the embattled Chinese, who were converted to "honorary Caucasians" in the 1940s.[47] To this mix must be added the purifications of the Anglo-Saxons by means of racialization and class hatred visited on certain "whites," from the vigilante hangings of Australians and Irish in the 1850s to the hysteria over Okies and hobo armies in the 1930s.[48]

In the end, California was often less racist than the rest of the United States, allowing many Africans, Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, and Mexicans to live and work in peace. That degree of freedom was created by countervailing power, as well as a counterpoint of cosmopolitan tolerance. It can be found in Ross Browne's polemics against the slaughter of the Indians and John Rollin Ridge's heroic rendition of the outlaw Joaquin Murieta; in the ironies of Mark Twain and Ambrose Bierce; in Helen Hunt Jackson's and Charles Lummis's romances with "America's mediterranean"; in Mary Austin's and the Berkeley anthropologists' embrace of the indigenous Californians; and in Carey McWilliams's brilliant denunciations of racism. And it shows up in a thousand humble achievements of multiracial settlement and work.[49]

But the turn of the wheel came during the civil rights era, with beginnings in the 1930s and World War II. The 1930s brought collaboration between the Black Sleeping Car Porters and the middle-class NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People), as well as between white and black reformers, as evidenced in the fight for the first African American schoolteacher in Berkeley. The Longshoremen's Union that emerged from the General Strike of 1934 was racially integrated, as were the farmworkers' unions of the 1930s. Blacks won legal suits against all-white unions in the wartime shipyards and won the right to integrated public housing. The first school desegregation order came in the California case of *Mendez v. Westminster* (1946), which was enforced by Governor Earl Warren. Victories against miscegenation and naturalization restrictions were won in the courts in the late 1940s. The black leadership finally won employment and housing victories with the statewide Fair Employment Practices Act in 1959 and the Fair Housing Act of 1963. The black power movement turned up the heat; Oakland's Black Panthers were the most symbolically charged players in the political theater of a rebellious time. The efforts of Asian and Latino activists added further impetus to battles for Third World colleges and Ethnic Studies programs. In the 1980s, California universities finally opened their doors to large numbers of nonwhite undergraduates, and Stanford and UC Berkeley became the first colleges to institute non-Eurocentric academic requirements.[50] By 1980, Oakland had become the most integrated city of significant size in the United States, and a remarkable diaspora of middle-class people of various races into former bastions of white exclusion was well under way.

We must therefore be careful not to lay the blame for the present recrudescence of nativism and white supremacy simply on a universal white racism, as if the high tide of Anglo-Saxonism had never receded and as if class and economy played no role in how people are dominated and denigrated. Class and politics must be foregrounded in the study of racial formation. To do this, the dialectic of class and race must first be taken seriously. It is not enough to insert races in a class structure and declare race the central stratifying variable. The scramble for class power and privilege has lent particular force to the suppression of contending "races," and the denigration of those at the bottom of the class system has gone hand in hand with racial character assassination. Not by accident were Africans equated with slaves, Mexicans with hacienda peonage, and Chinese with "coolie labor":[51] Euro-American burghers equated working-class poverty, manual labor, and scruffy appearance with darkness, inferiority, and difference, which fit comfortably with the standard racist tropes.[52] So it is not surprising that white immigrants and workers traded one kind of racialization to escape another in buying into the White Republic. The antiracist literature has been a valuable counterweight to naive Marxist class analysis, but the danger is that the industrialists, financiers, petit bourgeoisie, plantation owners, and merchants disappear.[53] The white working class, for all its racism, has never been in a position to dictate the terms of racial conquest and class encounter. One must therefore keep a sharp eye on the upper classes and their purposes: the commercial and slave interests behind the war with Mexico, the merchant base of the anti-Irish Vigilantes, the petit bourgeois character of the Forty-Niners, the opportunism of Leland Stanford and the railroad magnates in the use and disposal of Chinese labor, the hysteria of imperialist-minded newspaper moguls against the Japanese, the upper-class disdain for defections among the eugenicists, the competitive threat presented by Japanese farmers, the agribusiness role in expelling increasingly militant Mexicans, the *Los Angeles Times*' instigation of the Zoot Suit riots, and so on.[54]

Second, politics must be taken seriously as a force for change.[55] The White Republic, Manifest Destiny, Chinese Exclusion, Yellow Peril, and the rest were all politically inspired initiatives that became part of the racial structure of the United States by virtue of their political success. Conversely, the liberal opening of the civil rights era was a political achievement against a background of Nazi Germany's racial holocaust, economic prosperity for most of the United States, and the country's imperial role as bulwark against communism and nationalist revolution. So, too, is the reactionary race and class offensive of the last twenty years a political phenomenon in which California has played a leading role. This has not been a working-class movement but an elite war of position. It has had its minions among the everyday folk, the Christians and faith-healers of the market,

but it has been led, funded, and imagined by the powerful, and the evidence of their backing and benefit is overwhelming.[56] Despite the right-wing chorus of racial disharmony, the majority of white people in California have welcomed immigrants as fellow workers, neighbors, and members of the commonwealth. It has been political opportunism and mass disenfranchisement, more than popular sentiment from below, that has turned Proposition 187 into a winner and threatens affirmative action programs.

Conclusion

Every epoch is a mortal thing that eventually sickens. It may give way to rebirth of the social order or to perpetual senility—even to barbarity and calamity.[57] California's extraordinary record of expansion left the state with a massive set of strains on its economy, government, and social cohesion. The hasty termination of the social experimentation and political revolt of the 1960s, however, left Californians unable to see their way clear to reconvert the war industries; integrate racially; reconstruct rotting cities; reconfigure corporations; salvage public education; or spend public monies for recovery, employment, and universal health care. The failure of imagination rests partly on bourgeois ideological reflexes, but behind such a failure lies a political impasse born of the right-wing hold on the public agenda. If we are not to mourn the passing of the late, great Golden State, there must be change at the top caused by energy and anger from below.

Can the forces of social reclamation rise again? Promising challenges to the white establishment are now coming from the many hyphenated Americans of post–Anglo California: for example, Mexican Americans are struggling over redistricting in Los Angeles County, Chinese Americans for the first time hold a majority on Monterey Park's city council, and the state's first Filipino American public official has been elected in Daly City. Proposition 187's threat to the foreign-born has induced hundreds of thousands to seek citizenship in the last year; ironically, Pete Wilson may have written off precisely these potential votes in order to win the 1994 election. When Wilson's presidential campaign petered out, it lent hope that California's anti-immigrant and anti–affirmative action viruses would not spread. Aspiring minority burghers are being politicized by racial attacks, as demonstrated by the formation of the well-heeled Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights. Significantly, tens of thousands of Latino high-schoolers with little political experience turned out against 187, and their march of over 100,000 may be the largest demonstration ever held in Los Angeles.[58] Fortunately for California, the racial divide here remains a complex escarpment, not simply a Grand Canyon of black-white incomprehension and mistrust. Nonetheless, the immigrant and antiracist awakening of the 1990s has a long way to go if it is to overcome the political legacy and economic somnolence of the Anglo bourgeoisie.

Notes

Many thanks to Jeff Lustig and Jorgé Lizárraga for their input to related papers on which this draws.

1. Margaret Gordon, *Employment Expansion and Population Growth* (Berkeley, 1954); and Richard Walker and Jorgé Lizárraga, "California in Flux: Immigration, Economic Growth, and Working Class Welfare," in Anibal Yanez and Lionel Maldonado, eds., *Immigration: The Panic, the Promise* (forthcoming).
2. Half of every major immigrant group in Los Angeles worked in such niches in 1990. Of 83 large manufacturing industries counted in the 1990 census, 53 were Mexican employment niches. A niche is defined as ethnic concentration 50 percent greater than the proportion of that group in the whole working population. Figures from Roger Waldinger and Mehdi Bozorgmehr, eds., *Ethnic Los Angeles* (forthcoming). On labor market segmentation in general, see Alice Amsden, ed., *The Economics of Women and Work* (New York, 1980); Michael Reich, *Racial Inequality* (Princeton, 1981); David Gordon, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich, *Segmented Work, Divided Workers* (New York, 1982); William Dickens and Kevin Lang, "The Reemergence of Segmented Labor Market Theory," *American Economic Review* 78 (1988): 129–34.
3. See Waldinger and Bozorgmehr, *Ethnic Los Angeles*, and Ivan Light and Edna Bonacich, *Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Koreans in Los Angeles, 1965–1982* (Berkeley, 1988).
4. Waldinger and Bozorgmehr, *Ethnic Los Angeles*, ask, "When else do we find a parallel in American ethnic history?" but seem unaware that the answer is "In California, especially San Francisco." See, e.g., William Issel and Robert Cherny, *San Francisco: 1865–1930* (Berkeley, 1986), chap. 3. Also see Gordon, *Employment Expansion*, 13–17.
5. Gordon, *Employment Expansion*, chap. 6; Walker and Lizárraga, "California in Flux." On transatlantic migration of the last century, see Brinley Thomas, *Migration and Economic Growth* (Cambridge, 1974).
6. On the economic history of California, see Richard Walker, "Another Round of Globalization in San Francisco," *Urban Geography* 17, no. 1 (1996): 60–94.
7. Employment and trade data from State of California. Also see H. Poniachek, *Direct Foreign Investment in the United States* (Lexington, Mass., 1988).
8. For overviews of Los Angeles and San Francisco at the end of the 1980s, see Mike Davis, *City of Quartz* (London, 1990); Edward Soja, *Post-Modern Geographies* (London, 1989); and Richard Walker and the Bay Area Study Group, "The Playground of U.S. Capitalism? The political economy of the San Francisco Bay Area in the 1980s," in Mike Davis et al., eds., *Fire in the Hearth* (London, 1990), 3–82.
9. On California's role in the defense buildup, see Ann Markusen et al., *The Rise of the Gunbelt* (New York, 1991). On the electronic and aerospace technopoles, see Annalee Saxenian, *Regional Advantage* (Cambridge, Mass., 1994); Allen Scott, *New Industrial Spaces* (London, 1988); Allen Scott, *Technopolis* (Los Angeles, 1993). Other key sectors are entertainment, agribusiness, garments, metal- and woodworking, machining, medicine and biotech, trade and transport, utilities, and construction.

10. On the financial bubble, see Martin Mayer, *The Greatest-Ever Bank Robbery* (New York, 1990); Michael Lewis, *Liar's Poker* (New York, 1989); Steven Pizzo, Mary Fricker, and Paul Muolo, *Inside Job: The Looting of America's Savings and Loans* (San Francisco, 1989); Moira Johnston, *Roller Coaster* (New York, 1990); Michael Robinson, *Overdrawn: The Bailout of American Savings* (New York, 1990). Construction figures from the State of California, presented in Walker and Lizárraga, "California in Flux."
11. For migration, employment, and wage data, see Walker and Lizárraga, "California in Flux," and Gordon, *Employment Expansion*.
12. The plunder of natural wealth, from gold and silver to oil and lumber, has also played a considerable role. See again Walker, "Another Round"; Scott, *Technopolis*; Saxenian, *Regional Advantage*; and Harvey Molotch, "Los Angeles as Product: How Design Works in a Regional Economy," in Allen Scott and Edward Soja, eds., *The City: Los Angeles and Urban Theory at the End of the Twentieth Century* (forthcoming).
13. On job shrinkage in Southern California, see Allen Scott, "The New Southern California Economy: Pathways to Industrial Resurgence," *Economic Development Quarterly* (forthcoming): table 1; and Mike Davis, "Who Killed LA? Part I: A Political Autopsy," *New Left Review* 197 (1993): 3–28, and "Part II: The Verdict Is Given," *New Left Review* 199 (1993): 29–54.
14. On the financial debacle, see references in note 10.
15. Unemployment figures from the California Employment Development Department, cited in the *San Francisco Examiner*, 4 November 1992, C1; and the *New York Times*, 19 December 1995, C22. On discouraged immigrants see "Illegal Immigrants Sour on California," *San Francisco Examiner*, 9 January 1994, B3; and "Huge California Exodus as Economy Plunged, *San Francisco Chronicle*, 2 September 1993, A1 (600,000 people left California for the rest of the United States, June 1992–93, while only 450,000 people went the other way). For annual figures on migration and unemployment by race, see Walker and Lizárraga, "California in Flux."
16. For a budding recognition of the task facing California, see Council on California Competitiveness, *California's Future and Jobs* (Sacramento, 1992); and Stephen Levy and R. Arnold, *The Outlook for the California Economy* (Palo Alto, Calif., 1992).
17. For a general statement of this idea, see Michael Storper and Richard Walker, *The Capitalist Imperative* (Oxford, 1989). For a recent appraisal of California's improving fortunes, see B. D. Ayres, "California's Economy Shows Signs of Regaining Its Glitter," *New York Times*, 19 December 1995, A1, C22.
18. While only 11 percent of U.S. adults lived in California in 1990, the same year 17 percent of all U.S. millionaires (IRS estimates reported in the *San Francisco Examiner*, 21 August 1990) and 20 percent of the *Forbes* 400 richest Americans resided in the state.
19. *San Francisco Chronicle*, "Annual Report on Executive Compensation," 23 May 1994, B1. The United States has the highest average salaries of CEOs and the lowest productivity gains since 1980 of any country in the world. Andrew Shapiro, "We're Number One," *Nation*, 27 April 1992, 552.
20. California ranked thirteenth among the states in worsening inequality in the 1980s. Figures by quintiles from a study by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, D.C., reported in the *San Francisco Examiner*, 22 August 1994, A6.
21. On the declining fortunes of the American working class as a whole, see Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone, *The Great U-Turn* (New York, 1988); Kevin Phillips, *The Politics of Rich and Poor* (New York, 1990); Juliet Schor, *The Overworked American* (New York, 1991).
22. See the various studies in Waldinger and Bozorgmehr, *Ethnic Los Angeles*.
23. In the San Joaquin Valley, heart of agribusiness, county poverty rates are all over 20 percent and public assistance rates are around 30 percent. Child poverty figures from a study by Victor Fuchs and Diane Reklis of Stanford, reported in the *San Francisco Chronicle*, 3 January 1992, A1; see also the excellent periodic reports by groups such as Children Now, Children's Advocacy Institute, and California Tomorrow.
24. Phillips, *Politics of Rich and Poor*; Schor, *Overworked American*; Barry Bluestone, "The Inequality Express," *American Prospect* 20 (Winter 1994): 80–91.
25. Figures from the *San Francisco Chronicle*, 22 September 1994, A4, and from Leo Estrada, paper presented at the conference "A State Divided," Sacramento, 16 November 1994.
26. For a sharp commentary on "California's Elected Anarchy" see Peter Schrag, *Harper's*, November 1994, 50–57. Schrag, however, stresses "perfectionism" as the cause of the problem, and neglects the systematic rightward swing in politics and the class and race power behind it. For a longer analysis of the political and governmental imbroglio of California, see Richard Walker, "California Rages Against the Dying of the Light," *New Left Review* 209 (1995): 42–74.
27. Thanks to Tony Platt, California State University–Sacramento, in a personal communication with the author, for the basic facts on the war on crime.
28. For a telling portrait of the War on Drugs, see Davis, *City of Quartz*. On marijuana, see Ray Raphael, *Cash Crop: An American Dream* (Mendocino, Calif., 1985).
29. Had it not been for the Polly Klaas tragedy, the Three Strikes initiative would not have passed the California legislature or been included in the national crime bill. Its three biggest backers, by far, were Michael Huffington, the California Correctional Peace Officers, and the National Rifle Association.
30. Figures from Tony Platt, in a personal communication with the author, and from Doug Henwood, *Left Business Observer*, no. 62 (7 March 1994): 3.
31. Fred Block et al., *The Mean Season: The Attack on the Welfare State* (New York, 1987); Herb Gans, *The War Against the Poor: The Underclass and Antipoverty Policy* (New York, 1995).
32. On homelessness in Los Angeles, see Jennifer Wolch and Michael Dear, *Malign Neglect* (San Francisco, 1993); and on Matrix, see Scott Winokur, "Frank Jordan's War on the Homeless," *San Francisco Examiner Magazine*, 6 November 1994, 14–30; and *San Francisco Chronicle*, 13 December 1993, A1.
33. *San Francisco Examiner*, 12 December 1993, A10; Mike Davis, "California Über Alles," *Red Pepper* (January 1995): 30–31; Elizabeth Kadetsky, "Bashing Illegals in California," *Nation*, 17 October 1994, 416–22.
34. On the budget crisis, see Walker, "California Rages"; Jeff Lustig and Dick Walker, "No Way Out: Immigrants and the New California," (Berkeley, 1995); Lenny Goldberg, *Taxation with Representation* (Sacramento, 1991).
35. The vast majority of immigrants to California are in fact not poor, according to William Frey, University of Michigan Population Studies Center, reported in the *San Francisco Chronicle*, 10 December 1993, A1. A host of contending studies exist on immigrants' use of welfare benefits, each one resting on different definitions of immigrant households and types of benefits. None shows markedly higher welfare payments to immigrants compared to families born in the United States (some show lower payments), especially when adjusted for poverty rates, family size, and age. The best overview is Michael Fix and Jeffrey S. Passel, *Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record Straight* (Washington, D.C., 1994).
36. The Urban Institute estimates the revenue gap for undocumented immigrants (as

high as 1 million in California) at $1.8 billion versus Governor Wilson's estimate of $2.5 billion, most of which is for schooling. By comparison, the 50,000 gunshot wounds suffered each year cost the state roughly the same amount in medical fees as undocumented workers' children cost to educate (about $1.1 billion). Calculation on gun violence costs by the California Research Bureau, reported in the *San Francisco Chronicle*, 22 October 1994.

37. *Los Angeles Times* exit polls showed that 187's main backers were Republicans, men, whites, and older people (income was not a good indicator, however, and the positions of blacks and Asians were midway between those of white and Latino voters).
38. On black unemployment in South-Central Los Angeles, see Mike Davis, "The LA Inferno," *Socialist Review* 92 (1992): 57–80; and on Orange County, see Scott, *New Industrial Spaces*, and Scott, *Technopolis*.
39. The classic argument for the priority of labor demand over supply conditions is Michael Piore, *Birds of Passage* (New York, 1979).
40. On networks and immigration as a social process, see Douglas Massey et al., *Return to Aztlan* (Berkeley, 1987).
41. On the migratory circuits of Mexicans, see ibid. On recent binational politics, see Jésus Martinez Saldaña, "At the Periphery of Democracy" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1993).
42. Alexander Saxton, *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic* (London, 1991); and David Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness* (London, 1991).
43. Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny* (Cambridge, Mass., 1982); and Gray Brechin, *Imperial San Francisco* (forthcoming). California was a combination of commercial empire and racial conquest, as both Horsman and Brechin make clear.
44. On California's legacy of racism, see, e.g., Sucheng Chan, *Asian Americans* (Boston, 1991); Rodolfo Acuña, *Occupied America* (New York, 1988); Roger Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice* (Berkeley, 1977); Albert Camarillo, *Chicanos in California* (San Francisco, 1984); Albert Hurtado, *Indian Survival on the California Frontier* (New Haven, 1988); Douglas Daniels, *Pioneer Urbanites: A Social and Cultural History of Black San Francisco* (Philadelphia, 1980); Rudolph Lapp, *Afro-Americans in California* (San Francisco, 1987).
45. See again Brechin, *Imperial San Francisco*; and Gray Brechin, "Conserving the Race: Natural Aristocracies, Eugenics, and the U.S. Conservation Movement," *Antipode* 28, no. 4 (1996): 229–45.
46. Tomás Almaguer, *Racial Fault Lines* (Berkeley, 1994). Almaguer follows a long line of Chicano scholars and new Western historians in arguing for the distinctiveness of the Western regional experience, which is less determined by black-white relations than by relations between several different cultures. Horsman goes even farther in arguing that white supremacy in the whole United States was influenced decisively by the war with Mexico and the westward conquest.
47. For examples of struggle against white domination, see again the sources in note 43, as well as Almaguer, *Racial Fault Lines*.
48. See, e.g., Robert Senkewicz, *Vigilantes in Gold Rush San Francisco* (Palo Alto, Calif., 1985); Robert Burchell, *The San Francisco Irish, 1848–1880* (Berkeley, 1980); James Gregory, *American Exodus* (New York, 1991).
49. Despite the efforts of black scholars such as Douglas Daniels to undercut the smug cant of cosmopolitan tolerance in San Francisco, a realistic picture still allows that things were often much better there than elsewhere in the United States. See especially Larry Crouchett, Lonnie Bunch, and Martha Winnacker, *Visions Toward Tomorrow: The History of the East Bay Afro-American Community, 1852–1977* (Oakland, Calif., 1989). See, e.g., J. Ross Browne, *The Indians of California* (San Francisco, 1856); John Rollin Ridge, *The Life and Adventures of Joaquin Murieta, the Celebrated California Bandit* (San Francisco, 1854); Helen Hunt Jackson, *A Century of Dishonor: A Sketch of the United States Government's Dealings with Some of the Indian Tribes* (Boston, 1888); and the many works of Carey McWilliams (see note 54).
50. Of course, multiculturalism is itself a problematic slogan that refers principally to integration for the upper classes. See Katharyne Mitchell, "Multiculturalism, or the United Colors of Capitalism," *Antipode* 25 (1993): 263–94.
51. For a nuanced treatment of the pivotal role of slavery in white racism in the United States, see Audrey Smedley, *Race in North America* (Boulder, Colo., 1993).
52. See Etienne Balibar's essays in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class* (London, 1991); and Robert Miles, *Racism After "Race Relations"* (London, 1993). Conversely, Anglo-Saxon and Republican ideologies were well established before they became racialized. Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, chaps. 1 and 2; Smedley, *Race in North America*.
53. See, e.g., Alexander Saxton, *The Indispensible Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California* (Berkeley, 1971); Michael Kazin, *Barons of Labor* (Urbana, Ill., 1987); Daniels, *Pioneer Urbanites*; and, more generally, Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States* (New York, 1986).
54. One would do well to start from the superlative work of Carey McWilliams, such as *Factories in the Fields* (Boston, 1939); *Ill Fares the Land* (Boston, 1942); *North from Mexico* (New York, 1961); and *Prejudice: Japanese Americans, Symbol of Racial Intolerance* (Boston, 1944).
55. Martin Carnoy, *Faded Dreams: The Politics and Economics of Race in America* (New York, 1994).
56. See again references at note 21 and note 31. On the new Right's class and race agenda, see, besides Carnoy, *Faded Dreams*; Mike Davis, *Prisoners of the American Dream* (London, 1986); Fred Block et al., *The Mean Season*; James Ridgeway, *Blood in the Face* (New York, 1990); David Roediger, "The Racial Crisis of American Liberalism," *New Left Review* 196 (1992): 114–19; Cornel West, *Race Matters* (Boston, 1993); Kevin Phillips, *Boiling Point* (New York, 1993); Howard Winant, *Racial Conditions* (Minneapolis, 1994); Stephen Steinberg, *Turning Back* (Boston, 1995).
57. For the longer view, see Perry Anderson, "The Figures of Descent," *New Left Review* 161 (1987): 20–77.
58. Elizabeth Kadetsky, "School's Out," *Nation*, 21 November 1994, 601.

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SPECIAL ISSUE

Race and Representation: Affirmative Action

Edited by Robert Post and Michael Rogin
