Case name: Dolan v. City of Tigard

Opinion filed: 1994-06-24

Docket No.: 93-518

Citations:
• 129 L. Ed. 2d 304
• 114 S. Ct. 2309
• 512 U.S. 374
• 1994 U.S. LEXIS 4826

Case holding summaries:
• "A land use regulation does not effect a taking if it . . . does not `deny an owner economically viable use of his land.'" (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980)) (alteration in original)
• describing the right to exclude others as "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property"
• development permit conditioned upon granting flood plain and public bicycle easement constituted taking for which compensation must be provided where not reasonably proportionate to the impact of proposed development
• absence of nexus between permit condition and legitimate state interest converts valid land regulation into an "out-and-out plan of extortion"
• municipality conditioned building permit on land owner's setting aside property for a storm drainage system and a public park
• invoking “the well-settled doctrine of ‘unconstitu- tional conditions’ ”
• recognizing the importance of state court decisions in this context given that they have dealt with the question “a good deal longer than we have”
• "Cities have long engaged in the commendable task of land use planning, made necessary by increasing urbanization. . . . The city's goals of reducing flooding hazards and traffic congestion, . . . are laudable, but there are outer limits to how this may be done."
• considering whether a city could require dedication of a “floodplain easement” and a “pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement” as a condition of granting a building permit
• acknowledging that " '[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law' "
• concluding hypothetical public easement would, “[w]ithout question,” be a taking
• distinguishing earlier land use/zoning cases from development exaction cases on the ground that exactions are "not simply a limitation on the use petitioner might make of her own parcel, but a requirement that she deed portions of the property" to the government
• "In determining what is due process of law regard must be had to substance, not to form."
• Fifth Amendment protects right to exclude others
• "One of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is 'to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole"
• holding that essential nexus requires rough proportionality between the exaction and the legitimate state interest
• public easement required as a condition of development permit is a taking requiring compensation
• invoking “the well-settled doctrine of ‘unconstitu- tional conditions’ ”
• “Under the well-settled doctrine of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’ the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right . . . in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government . . . .”
• explaining that “the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right . . . in exchange for a discretionary benefit”
• the “right to exclude others is ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.’” (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United Sates, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 100 S. Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1979
• Takings Clause applies to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment
• holding that compelled dedication of an ease- ment for public use would constitute a taking
• invalidating a permit condition that would have constituted a taking
• treating exactions as different from regulatory takings and essentially the same as a physical taking
• “Under the well-settled doctrine of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’ the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right . . . in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government . . . .”
• public easement required as a condition of development permit is a taking requiring compensation
• clarifying that in addition to Nollan’s “essential nexus” requirement, “the required dedication [must be] related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development”
• recognizing city has burden of proof
• considering whether a city could require dedication of a “floodplain easement” and a “pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement” as a condition of granting a building permit
• "We think this standard is too lax to adequately protect petitioner's right to just compensation if her property is taken for a public purpose."
• "[T]he greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling"
• no taking where no one "identified any property . . . that has allegedly been taken"
• requiring a showing of a reasonable relationship between the planned subdivision and the municipality's need for land
• "`The Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home' "
• ordinance lacking "reasonable relationship" or "rational nexus" to property's use violated Nebraska Constitution
• noting that an "average reciprocity of advantage" was deemed to justify many laws
• such "`reciprocity of advantage' " weighed in favor of a statute's constitutionality
• "`[A] use restriction may constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose' "
• finding takings claim premature because property owner had not yet sought compensation under Tucker Act
• explaining why this portion of the opinion was merely "advisory"
• explaining that "a claimant's parcel of property [cannot] first be divided into what was taken and what was left" to demonstrate a compensable taking
• “In evaluating petitioner’s [unconstitutional condition] claim, we must first determine whether the essential nexus exists between the legitimate state interest and the permit condition exacted by the city.” (quotations omitted)
• requiring that courts determine whether an “essential nexus” exists between the “legitimate state interest” and the condition imposed by the government
• same; referring to "well-settled doctrine of `unconstitutional conditions'"
• permit to expand a store and parking lot conditioned on the dedication of a portion of the relevant property for a "greenway," including a bike/pedestrian path
• "We conclude that the findings upon which the city relies do not show the required reasonable relationship...."
• requiring that courts determine whether an “essential nexus” exists between the “legitimate state interest” and the condition imposed by the government
• taking occurred when city granted build- ing permit on condition that owner dedicate public green- way along stream and allow public access
• rejecting argument that permit requirement deprived landowner of "economically beneficial use" of property where "Petitioner is surely able to derive some economic use of her property"

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