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May culture post

In May I read (or finished)

Reginald Hill, Bones and SilenceRecalled to Life
These are the eleventh and twelfth of Hill’s 22 Dalziel and Pascoe novels, which I have to admit I’m finding increasingly unrewarding. (Still, past halfway now…) In the previous Hill review I noted the presence of a “character [type] that Hill had deployed before … a killer who is convinced he is acting from the best possible motives, and simply can’t explain why so many people end up dead around him”. There’s a stellar example in Bones and Silence, making his entrance by committing a murder literally before Dalziel’s eyes; his exculpations grow Gothically contorted (“I’d never met the woman before, and I wish I’d never let my friend talk me into helping him murder her – oh, he’s disappeared, you say?”). A very odd subplot centres on a very odd minor character, the theatre director Eileen Chung; she’s flamboyant, flirtatious and 6′ 3″, making me wonder if Hill was building up to outing her as trans, and dreading what Dalziel would make of that. (But no.) Recalled to Life for its part has a cold case with political connections for its main plot, and felt refreshingly different – right up till the dénouement, which drops into a wearying so you thought… but in fact… groove, incidentally making it clear why Hill had populated the setup with quite so many characters. I wouldn’t call Hill a lazy writer, but I do think that he got to the “doing tricks to stave off boredom” stage with Dalziel and Pascoe quite quickly.

Tana French, The Keeper
This is terrific. It’s French’s third book about former Chicago police officer Cal Hooper, who has settled in a village in Western Ireland, and – like the other two – it’s very much about his negotiations with the village. A kind of unpredictable triple perspective shift dominates how Cal looks at the village: is it, as it appears, a peaceful rural backwater, a place where anyone would be happy to retire? Is it simply a place where people live, its inhabitants just as likely to be stupid and venal – and break the law – as anywhere else? Or is there something else here, a sense of connection within the community and continuity over time, a genuine rootedness which he can’t necessarily understand but shouldn’t ignore? The working-out of the plot of this one – which is satisfyingly neat but still heart-wrenching – gives a definite answer: yes, no, all of the above.

Patricia Highsmith, The Boy who Followed Ripley, Ripley Under Water
The fourth Ripley book is odd, not least because it’s very plot-light. There’s a lot of incident – Ripley pokes more than one hornet’s nest – but with very little effect; not much happens that wouldn’t have happened anyway. But if you get a kick out of the idea of Tom Ripley hanging out in a gay bar, then dragging up by way of disguise – or, indeed, the idea of Tom Ripley getting a kick out of dragging up – it does have that to offer. (Ah, the queerness of Ripley! This book is about as far as the character ever goes: just a perfectly ordinary married man who generally sleeps alone and keeps up with a lot of old friends, all male and most of them gay. Nothing to see here.)

Ripley Under Water was the last novel Highsmith published before she died; it appeared 36 years after The Talented Mr Ripley and 21 after Ripley Under Ground. Nevertheless, it’s something of a return to form. Like The Boy Who, this book confronts Ripley with an American visitor who seems to have sought him out. In this case, the visitor is almost a mirror image of Ripley: a superficially charming but deeply malicious character, with a fixed but seemingly motiveless determination to bring Ripley down. Given that the third Ripley (Ripley’s Game) was also atypical – an organised crime setting, high levels of sheer sadistic nastiness on Tom’s part – I think we can say that the (head-)canonical Ripley reading order goes 1, 2, 5.

Terry Pratchett, Wyrd Sisters
Re-read in preparation for watching the stage show – which was good, although I was slightly surprised it wasn’t more of a comedy. Then again, once past the first couple of books the comedy of Discworld is of the “let’s imagine something ridiculous and play it completely straight” variety, with incidental verbal gags – malapropisms and misunderstandings – dropped in every so often to keep the mood up; very much a humour journalist’s toolkit, and one that won’t necessarily catch fire on stage. There are also some moral lessons, courtesy of the three witches at the centre of the plot, mostly concerning the power of storytelling. It’s fairly early Pratchett, though; the lessons aren’t hammered home, and there are suggestions that the witches’ moral universe may not be all that consistent. It’s those gags that have stayed with me: Granny Weatherwax’s gnomic advice that “there’s many a slip between dress and drawers”; Magrat’s puzzlement at stories of witches “dancing in their shifts” (perhaps there were too many of them to dance all at once); and a magnificent running gag about the “divers alarums” stage direction, which culminates in an audience member calling out that the witches cause shipwrecks “and alarum the divers!”. Chapeau, sir. (Oh, you’ve got one.)

Lauren Groff, Brawler
A rather impressive collection of short stories in a Tessa Hadley-ish mode, let down by occasional lurches into a kind of introspective sententiousness which struck me as very American; very Emersonian, anyway. Take the character, tasked with summarising social service case histories, whose colleague notices that she’s taking far too long and gives her some advice: she should be “sharp and cold”, for the sake of her own well-being (“if you’re writing all that fancy prose you’re going to feel all that badness in you”). And also for the sake of keeping the job, I guess. Mostly – 95% of the time – I thought these stories were really enjoyable and really accomplished; just occasionally I wished that the characters, the narrator or both would get over themselves.

Also in May, I watched three films as part of the Manchester International Crime and Justice Film Festival:

A man escaped (Robert Bresson 1956)
As a newcomer to Bresson I’ve got nothing much to add to the received view of this film: it’s slow, but in a way that’s focused and deliberate rather than plodding; the performances verge on being emotionless, but still tell a powerfully engaging story. Not to everyone’s taste; I was asked if I could find a quote for the programme that wasn’t from a man, and this proved something of a challenge. In the end I settled for Pauline Kael’s verdict, with a tactful ellipsis replacing the italicised words:

Bresson’s hero’s ascetic, single-minded dedication to escape is almost mystic, and the fortress constitutes a world as impersonal and as isolated as Kafka’s. The movie was shot at Montluc with fanatic authenticity; the photography, by Léonce-Henry Burel, is austerely beautiful. François Leterrier, a Sorbonne philosophy student, is the lead. The music is Mozart’s Mass in C Minor. All this makes it sound terribly pretentious, yet sometimes even the worst ideas can be made to work. It’s a marvellous movie.

That sinking feeling (Bill Forsyth 1979)
Not a comedy heist movie, but a heist movie that’s also a comedy; it’s also an odd kind of social realism, and also an ungovernable outpouring of absurdism for its own sake. An unruly amalgam of forms and styles which works triumphantly in its own terms – and whose budget was low enough to get into the Guinness Book of Records.

M (Fritz Lang 1931)
Another classic film about which it’s hard to find much to say. The central device – a compulsive child-killer is put on ‘trial’ by the criminal underworld, whose business has been threatened by an increased police presence – is superbly executed; Peter Lorre as the killer is all too clammily believable, and both he and his ‘lawyer’ make some powerful arguments in his defence. Extraordinary cinematography, of course.

as well as the following films:

Close (Lukas Dhont 2022)
Another film it’s hard to say much about, but this time for plot reasons. Two close friends find themselves negotiating the transition to ‘big school’ – a transition from one way of being a child to another – in very different ways, with consequences that end up being heartbreaking. At one point I was strongly reminded of The Quiet Girl; both films resound with the awful, echoing realisation, which we all experience at one time or another, that that won’t be possible now – not any more, not ever.

The Christophers (Steven Soderbergh 2025)
I’m generally in favour of Steven Soderbergh making two or more films a year, particularly if it means we get to watch performances like this one from Ian McKellen. (Michaela Coel is also very good.) The film isn’t great, though; very stagey, very much “the scene about X” followed by “the scene about Y”, without much more internal logic than that.

Obsession (Curry Barker 2025)
Unlike Backrooms (see next month) – a film which rather satisfyingly explained itself as it went on – Obsession immediately left me with the impression of a rather sketchy and uneven horror film, marred by some perverse plotting and characterisation choices. But it stayed in my mind, and stayed, and changed as it did so. Some of the points I initially found unsatisfactory (the unevenness of Nikki’s initial conversion, Bear’s weakness and timidity) now seem central to the film, which tells a very dark story about male fantasy and entitlement. Also, Inde Navarrette’s performance is extraordinary. While anyone who’s been close to an unhappy baby knows that big voices don’t have to come from big bodies, it still seems shocking and odd – for basically sexist reasons – to hear a really loud yell from a woman who stands five foot nothing. (Not that yelling very loudly is all she does.)

Wuthering Heights (Andrea Arnold 2011)
Although Emily Brontë never describes Heathcliff as Black, she certainly describes him – or rather, describes other people as treating him – as not White; to that extent, James Howson was probably a more appropriate casting choice than Jacob Elordi. This version is also much longer on eighteenth-century social realism than on timeless passion. This spares it the more heightened passages of the recent version, but it isn’t entirely a good thing: Emily Brontë’s characters didn’t do a lot of rutting, but they were actually very big on timeless passion. The first, child-Kathy-and-Heathcliff half of the film has some of the wonderment of a child’s point of view about it, and as a result works much better than the second.

Passenger (André Øvredal 2026)
Horror covers a lot of ground these days. This film explained what it was doing as it went along, then explained it again, then once more for luck – and it wasn’t even doing very much. Fun but forgettable.

Normal (Ben Wheatley 2025)
If Hot Fuzz was Town Under Suspicion meets Twin PeaksNormal is Hot Fuzz meets Free Fire. Or possibly meets Hot Fuzz meets Free Fire meets Nobody, and meets Twin Peaks again for good measure. It’s a lot of fun; a straight drama with a light touch, which after a certain point kicks off… and then really kicks off. My only disappointment was that Michael Smiley never turned up.

Carnival of souls (Herk Harvey 1962)
This low-budget cult oddity – whose director was discouraged by its commercial failure and never made another feature – is currently appearing periodically on Talking Pictures TV; it’s well worth catching. Like Marion Crane, our heroine is looking to make a new start in a new town, but fears her past can’t be so easily abandoned. She’s left considerably more behind than a workplace theft, though. The dissociative episodes in which she suddenly becomes invisible and inaudible to everyone around her are terrifically well executed, and their eventual explanation is genuinely chilling.

Palestine Action at the Court of Appeal (5 of 5)

Monday the 15th of June 2026 was a bad day: not only for Palestine Action, but for the Palestine solidarity movement; for protest and extra-parliamentary politics generally; and, not least, for the rule of law in Britain.

In February, the High Court ruled that the proscription of Palestine Action as a terrorist group was unlawful; on Monday the Court of Appeal heard the government’s appeal against that ruling, and granted the appeal almost in its entirety. (You can download the judgment here.) Punctilious in its application of relevant legal arguments to the facts of the case, the judgment was nevertheless dominated by an extraordinary level of deference to the executive and an equally pronounced hostility to Palestine Action, and ‘direct action’ more generally. Sadly, this threefold combination – chapter-and-verse legality in analysis, while interpretation is steered by deference to the executive and hostility to Palestine Action – will make this judgment extraordinarily hard to overturn, even given a sympathetic court; and the current Supreme Court emphatically is not a sympathetic court.

But to say that the judgment looks lawyer-proof is not to say that it’s beyond criticism. In this series of posts, I’m looking at:

  1. the High Court’s original ruling
  2. the Appeal Court’s ruling on the ‘policy ground’: did the Home Secretary exceed her powers?
  3. the Appeal Court’s ruling on the ‘human rights ground’: was there an impermissible interference with human rights?
  4. the themes and attitudes that run through the Appeal Court ruling
  5. where it all leaves us.

Part 5: Summing up

On the plus side, the Appeal Court declined to endorse the Home Secretary’s attempt to use the ascription of terrorism as a Get Out Of Jail Free card, invoking Article 17 ECHR as grounds for allowing infringements of Articles 10 and 11. You can’t claim that somebody is abusing free speech protection so as to support a terrorist group if what they’re actually doing is opposing your labelling of the group as terrorist.

But that’s where the good news ends – and even this isn’t all that good, looked at more closely. The High Court had been fairly brisk in proceeding from rejecting the Article 17 reference to citing the evident interferences with Article 10 and 11 caused by the proscription of Palestine Action, and from there to concluding that the proscription should be disallowed for that reason. The Appeal Court agreed that Article 17 was not applicable, but then took a dramatically different approach: instead of simply noting that the Home Secretary’s case was disastrously weak, the AC meticulously constructed a strong case that she might conceivably have argued, and then in effect read that case into the record. The effect of the AC’s judgment, in other words, is to leave the Home Secretary with a much stronger case than if the AC had simply endorsed the Article 17 reference.

So it’s a strong ruling, which will be hard to overturn; a strong ruling and a bad one. It’s bad, firstly, for Palestine. I have no idea what quantifiable effect Palestine Action’s activities had on the Israel war machine, but I think we can assume that there were some effects. Taking Palestine Action out of the picture – and strongly deterring anyone else from following their example – saves the Israeli military time and money, making it that much easier for them to continue to conduct undeclared wars of aggression and kill civilians.

It’s bad for the Palestine solidarity movement, whose active members are now likely to face the kind of enhanced scrutiny from the police that the Troops Out Movement became accustomed to in the 1980s. More broadly, the prescription will have a chilling effect on Palestine solidarity in its less active and committed forms; again, those of us who remember how careful we used to have to be when broaching the topic of Northern Ireland in conversation have some idea of what’s coming. And, needless to say, delegitimising Palestine solidarity in this way is itself bad for Palestine.

It’s very bad, moreover, for direct action, and any group or movement that uses it as a tactic. The Appeal Court never stated outright that direct action was no different from terrorism, but they pointedly spurned every opportunity to identify any differences – and, at the end of the day, a group has now been proscribed as terrorist, and its proscription validated in the Court of Appeal, on the basis of having carried out direct action. Any group whose actions go beyond symbolic protest and into resistance – actively trying to stop something from happening – will now have this judgment hanging over their heads.

It’s bad for democracy more broadly. ‘Violence’ is one of the most opaque and ideological terms in politics. The only thing that’s reliably true about it is that it marks the borderline where legitimate politics stops: anyone engaging in violence instead of politics, or even – horrors! – bringing violence into politics, has forfeited their right to be heard. What actually constitutes violence is another question. Over the last forty years, parallelling the progressive elimination of physical force from everyday life, the extent to which unauthorised physical force is tolerated in politics has grown progressively narrower – although, given the concentration of legitimate violence and its means in the hands of the state, this process is more one-sided than the first one, and as such less benign. The AC judgment not only exemplifies this process but accelerates it: it redefines violence as damage to property, then anathematises this new definition of violence as ‘terrorism’ – a move which denies those carrying it out any political legitimacy and mobilises the coercive force of the state against them. The pacification of politics proceeds apace, to the great advantage of those in power.

It’s dreadful news for the rule of law. The rule of law means that the law has certain properties that make it possible to live freely while obeying it – broadly speaking, the law is general in its provisions, which are knowable and comprehensible, and it’s possible to choose to obey the law without coercion. Crucially, the rule of law also means that an additional condition obtains, which is that the government – while it is empowered to make law – must also abide by the law; this means that when the government does make laws, they should not be laws that apply to arbitrarily specific groups of people, or laws whose implications for how people should live are unknowable, or laws whose subjects can only be expected to obey them under threat of punishment. Added to what’s already a confused and over-engineered body of counter-terrorism law, the proscription of Palestine Action fails on all three of those criteria.

I am not a lawyer – the exams, as you are probably aware, are extremely rigorous – and after this judgment I’m quite glad of it. Perhaps the single worst part of it is that the AC lawyers approving the proscription make no attempt to justify it in legal terms. We are told only that we should trust the Home Secretary, who has made the decision rationally and in good faith; if any more specifics are needed, we should be happy that the proscription will make life easier for the police, who won’t have to hang around waiting for someone to commit a crime before they can make an arrest. The Appeal Court is commending a decision by the Home Secretary, not in spite of its facilitating breaches of the rule of law in the name of national security, but because it does so. This judgment shames the legal profession.

Palestine Action at the Court of Appeal (4 of 5)

Monday the 15th of June 2026 was a bad day: not only for Palestine Action, but for the Palestine solidarity movement; for protest and extra-parliamentary politics generally; and, not least, for the rule of law in Britain.

In February, the High Court ruled that the proscription of Palestine Action as a terrorist group was unlawful; on Monday the Court of Appeal heard the government’s appeal against that ruling, and granted the appeal almost in its entirety. (You can download the judgment here.) Punctilious in its application of relevant legal arguments to the facts of the case, the judgment was nevertheless dominated by an extraordinary level of deference to the executive and an equally pronounced hostility to Palestine Action, and ‘direct action’ more generally. Sadly, this threefold combination – chapter-and-verse legality in analysis, while interpretation is steered by deference to the executive and hostility to Palestine Action – will make this judgment extraordinarily hard to overturn, even given a sympathetic court; and the current Supreme Court emphatically is not a sympathetic court.

But to say that the judgment looks lawyer-proof is not to say that it’s beyond criticism. In this series of posts, I’m looking at:

  1. the High Court’s original ruling
  2. the Appeal Court’s ruling on the ‘policy ground’: did the Home Secretary exceed her powers?
  3. the Appeal Court’s ruling on the ‘human rights ground’: was there an impermissible interference with human rights?
  4. the themes and attitudes that run through the Appeal Court ruling
  5. where it all leaves us.

Part 4: What they were thinking

The AC judgment’s painstaking legalism and its deference to the executive are foregrounded – almost spelt out – in two concluding paragraphs, #180 (concluding the proportionality assessment) and #207 (concluding the entire judgment); its hostility to Palestine Action, and to direct action more broadly, finds its fullest expression in #205.

Here are ##180 and 207:

in relation to the latitude to be afforded to the Home Secretary’s decision-making, the decision that she took may have been borderline. That possibility does not reduce the latitude to which the decision-maker is entitled. The Home Secretary is invested with the statutory and constitutional authority to make proscription decisions to protect the public where national security is at stake. She has to balance, in the most difficult of circumstances, the rights of some individuals to freedom of speech and assembly against the rights of other third parties and the national security of the United Kingdom. The fact that she might have reached the opposite conclusion, in making that difficult decision, does not diminish the legitimacy of her decision-making or the respect that it deserves.

We have [applied] well-established legal principles, allowing the appropriate latitude to the decision that Parliament entrusted the Home Secretary to make. The Home Secretary had both the institutional competence and the democratic accountability to make that decision.

The judgment is at pains to spell out, as if to an undergraduate class, how things are done in the world of law; consider also the passage, discussed in the previous post, in which the AC not only carried out the ‘balancing’ exercise that the High Court had deemed unnecessary but did so according to a set formula, which itself was punctiliously spelt out. In this case, it’s a staple of Law as a discipline – and something well worth stressing, at least to an audience of undergraduates – that a decision, once made, is made. There’s no such thing as being mostly guilty or borderline guilty: you can appeal against a verdict, but the verdict stands in the mean time, and it may well stand forever – even if the first jury couldn’t reach a verdict and the second decided on a majority; even if the judge had misgivings; and (of course) even if you know full well you’re innocent. More generally, a decision that’s made reluctantly and only after an accumulation of evidence tips the balance in its favour is no different, in law, from a decision that was staringly obvious. If the ball goes in off your shin pad, it’s still a goal; once a court has ruled, it’s ruled. And if, for the sake of argument, Yvette Cooper had made that original decision to proscribe with a heavy heart and a rueful awareness of the alternatives, it would have no effect on the legality of the decision.

All of which is fair enough, as far as it goes. That said, surely nobody needed reminding at this point that it was legitimate for the Home Secretary to exercise the power to proscribe – or, for that matter, that the Home Secretary enjoyed both “institutional competence” and “democratic legitimacy”. If those were the only questions being asked, the answer would be Yes in all but the most bizarrely extreme circumstances. The question before the AC – as it had been before the HC – was whether, as a matter of law, the decision to proscribe was correctly taken: whether (not the power to proscribe, but) this specific exercise of the power to proscribe was legitimate.

The AC’s answer to that question is not to answer it, but to stress the “well-established legal principles” according to which courts must allow the executive an “appropriate latitude”. We see here how the judgment’s legalism works to complement, rather than counteract, its deferential attitude towards the executive. Here and elsewhere – as, for example, in that extraordinary statement that “in all cases where proscription is under consideration” the respective Home Secretary acts “on rational grounds and in good faith” – the overriding message is that the Home Secretary is not only an elected politician but also a jolly good chap who’s got a jolly difficult job to do. And if some officious lawyer might think that such or such a decision was wrong, that lawyer should observe the well-established legal principle of not meddling with things that don’t concern them.

Clearly, this line of argument says nothing about this proscription decision specifically. But it’s worse than that. The real problem is that it says nothing about this decision that couldn’t also be said about every other such decision – including decisions as yet unmade which might be controversial in future. This judgment sets a precedent, in other words, and in this respect it’s a really woeful precedent. Despite its expert deployment of the forms and language of law, the AC plainly does not see its role as upholding the principles of legality – or any other principle that doesn’t happen to coincide with the wishes of the executive.

Whether #205 is even worse, I’ll let you decide. It’s certainly differently bad.

Palestine Action overtly promotes unlawful violence amounting to terrorism. It is not, as it claims, a direct action civil disobedience protest group like the suffragettes operating transparently in the open. It is a covert organisation that operates using secret cells to avoid the detection and prosecution of those using violence to destroy the property of third parties. Palestine Action’s activities have caused injury as well as property damage.

Others have commented on the historical illiteracy of that reference to the Suffragettes. Palestine Action, its actions and its claims are also characterised with a quite extraordinary degree of tendentiousness – verging, repeatedly, on outright falsehood. A corrected version of those sentences might read something like this:

Palestine Action overtly promotes unlawful violence against property, amounting to terrorism as defined in the Terrorism Act 2000, albeit not as that word is generally understood. It is not, as it claims, a direct action group, and makes no claim to be a civil disobedience protest group like the suffragettes operating transparently in the open. Like the militant wing of the Suffragettes, it is a covert organisation within a broader movement, that operates using secret cells to avoid the detection and prosecution of those using violence to destroy the property of third parties. Palestine Action’s activities have caused injury as well as on one occasion led to a charge of GBH without intent, although the group’s consistent focus is on property damage.

But the AC had a job to do, and drawing the appropriate distinctions in this way wouldn’t have helped do it.

What was at stake was the operative definition of the word ‘violence’, and by extension the word ‘terrorism’. It’s true that the Terrorism Act breaks down the ‘violence’ element of the offence into numerous possible elements, including action involving “serious damage to property”: there’s no strictly legal obstacle to labelling a group ‘terrorist’ on the basis of a campaign of sabotage (say, for instance, forcibly disabling military equipment). However, the everyday meaning of words like these is also always in play; an authoritative finding that Palestine Action was dedicated exclusively to property damage would not have been helpful to the government.

The High Court judgment hadn’t been much use; it had expressed scepticism about whether it was appropriate to describe sabotage as ‘non-violent’ or as ‘civil disobedience’, but it had also insisted on the distinction between direct action and terrorism, and maintained – with good reason – that Palestine Action fell on the ‘direct action’ side of the line. The task the AC set itself, in line with the third running theme of its judgment, was to erase that line: to assimilate the category of ‘direct action’ to that of ‘terrorism’ and thus delegitimate it, validating the proscription of PA and facilitating future proscriptions of similar groups.

In that task, I’m afraid, it’s been almost entirely successful, assisted by the approaches – superficially opposed but in reality complementary – of punctilious legalism and deference to government. The legal vacuity of paragraph #180 and the strain put on most of the key terms in #205 are clear signs of a weak argument once they’re pointed out – but the argument is weak, not invalid. At the end of the day, it’s true that a borderline decision is still legally valid, and that the Home Secretary had the power to proscribe; as for individual proscriptions, they’re as legitimate as the courts say they are, and the AC evidently doesn’t have any problem with this one. Similarly, whether a group should be proscribed only for recognisably terrorist actions it has committed, or so as to disrupt a pattern of activity which might in future include terrorist acts, is a question for the courts par excellence – and the Appeal Court has duly answered it. The fact that they’ve answered it in a way that prioritises deference to the executive over the rule of law is a problem, perhaps even an error, but it’s not an error of law. It might be possible to relitigate the question of whether operational considerations can or should weigh in the balance of a decision to proscribe, but the Appeal Court’s position on that question is, again, weak rather than invalid. (And the High Court had, unfortunately, made its position more vulnerable to counter-argument by resting this part of its argument on an irrelevant distinction, between factors that guide and restrict discretion.) Lastly, it is true that Palestine Action (like many other groups) have carried out acts that can be found to fall under the (roomy) umbrella definition of ‘terrorism’ in the 2000 Terrorism Act – and that they aren’t “a direct action civil disobedience protest group … operating transparently in the open” (if only because that’s a highly unlikely combination, practically a contradiction in terms). A case can be made for the legality of their proscription, and duly has been – with punctilious legalism, consistent deference to the executive and dogged hostility to direct action and its exponents.

So it’s going to be a tough decision to overturn; it’s likely to stand, and to set a precedent. Which is very bad news – and not only for Palestine Action.

Next: some concluding thoughts on the wider implications of the AC judgment

Palestine Action at the Court of Appeal (3 of 5)

Monday the 15th of June 2026 was a bad day: not only for Palestine Action, but for the Palestine solidarity movement; for protest and extra-parliamentary politics generally; and, not least, for the rule of law in Britain.

In February, the High Court ruled that the proscription of Palestine Action as a terrorist group was unlawful; on Monday the Court of Appeal heard the government’s appeal against that ruling, and granted the appeal almost in its entirety. (You can download the judgment here.) Punctilious in its application of relevant legal arguments to the facts of the case, the judgment was nevertheless dominated by an extraordinary level of deference to the executive and an equally pronounced hostility to Palestine Action, and ‘direct action’ more generally. Sadly, this threefold combination – chapter-and-verse legality in analysis, while interpretation is steered by deference to the executive and hostility to Palestine Action – will make this judgment extraordinarily hard to overturn, even given a sympathetic court; and the current Supreme Court emphatically is not a sympathetic court.

But to say that the judgment looks lawyer-proof is not to say that it’s beyond criticism. In this series of posts, I’m looking at:

  1. the High Court’s original ruling
  2. the Appeal Court’s ruling on the ‘policy ground’: did the Home Secretary exceed her powers?
  3. the Appeal Court’s ruling on the ‘human rights ground’: was there an impermissible interference with human rights?
  4. the themes and attitudes that run through the Appeal Court ruling
  5. where it all leaves us.

Part 3: the ‘Human Rights Ground’

On the ‘human rights’ ground of appeal the AC has a rare word of criticism for the Home Secretary:

The Article 10 and 11 rights of many peaceful and lawful protesters are affected by proscription. The Home Secretary was wrong to argue that Article 17 meant either that no Article 10 and 11 rights of individuals were engaged or that the proportionality balance did not need to be undertaken at all.

However, where the High Court concluded that her invocation of Article 17 signified that the Home Secretary had not taken Article 10 and 11 rights into account, the AC does something much more adventurous: it conducts a ‘proportionality balanc[ing]’ exercise of its own, then asks whether the Home Secretary’s original ruling can plausibly be assumed to be consistent with such an exercise. The conclusion (spoiler) is that any infringement on article 10 and 11 rights should be considered to be justifiable – and, rather than being taken to undermine the government’s case, the Home Secretary’s invocation of Article 17 can be politely ignored. A cynic might say that the Appeal Court does the Home Secretary’s homework for her, before giving her a passing mark and declaring itself satisfied that it’s the kind of homework that she might have done if she’d got round to it.

This is the largest single section of the judgment (92 paragraphs (##91-182)). It’s thorough, you have to give it that; it opens with six paragraphs on ‘Bank Mellat proportionality’ and fourteen on the ‘margin of appreciation’. (The entire discussion of the ‘policy ground’ had only taken 21 paragraphs (##70-90).) Bank Mellat proportionality is an approach to assessing the proportionality of a measure to the problem it addresses, taking into account the negative side-effects it may cause. The idea is to replace a more or less intuitive and value-laden assessment of proportionality with a set of tests that can be applied with greater consistency. (The High Court stated that it had not applied the Bank Mellat tests, but that its conclusions would have been the same if it had done.)

In this case the tests were:

(i) whether the objectives of the Proscription Decision were sufficiently important to justify the limitation of fundamental Article 10 and 11 rights, (ii) whether the Proscription Decision was rationally connected to those objectives, (iii) whether a less intrusive measure could have been used instead of the Proscription Decision, and (iv) … whether, balancing the severity of the effects of the Proscription Decision on the rights of those affected by it against the importance of the objective of the Proscription Decision, to the extent that the Proscription Decision will contribute to the achievement of those objectives, the former outweighs the latter.

These, it seems fair to say, are tests designed not to be too difficult to pass; the answers to the first and second tests are highly likely to be affirmative, while the third relies for any force it has on a sceptical attitude towards the evidence furnished by members of government. By the time the crucial fourth test is considered, the decision-maker’s mind is likely to have been primed to consider the measure in question as important, rationally justifiable and lacking any adequate substitute.

As for the “margin of appreciation”, this is (or at least began life as) a term of art in European Convention of Human Rights jurisprudence. (For the discussion of this point I am indebted to this blog post from 2013 by Mark Elliott.) Where a breach of Convention rights has been identified, the European Court may in some situations “defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the elected body or person whose act or decision is said to be incompatible with the Convention” (Lord Hope in the 2000 case Kebilene), out of respect both for national democracy and for the greater competence of domestic courts to address local conditions. We might think that the margin of appreciation had no application to domestic jurisprudence; Lord Laws described it in 2009 as having a close affinity to “the margin of discretion, or deference (now a less favoured expression), which our courts will pay to the judgment of public decision-makers in matters of discretion or policy”, but took care to distinguish the two. When the Appeal Court asserts that “the Home Secretary should be accorded a wide margin of appreciation (or respect) in making her judgment”, it’s possible that it’s simply using the newer language to evoke an old habit of deference.

In 2013, however, Mr Justice Sales (who is now Lord Sales and Deputy President of the Supreme Court) put forward a more ambitious reading of the “margin of appreciation”, which extended its scope to any judgment engaging ECHR rights:

Where the ECtHR applies the margin of appreciation so as to conclude that a state has not violated a Convention right when it acts in a particular way, the necessary corollary is that the Convention rights of the individual applicant did not extend to a right to require the state to refrain from acting in that way. … I do not think it is easy to separate out the content of the rights from the application of the margin of appreciation.

According to Sales, rather than being kept in reserve to be invoked as and when a country’s rights discourse diverges sufficiently from the ECHR, the ‘margin of appreciation’ should be read back into ECHR rights themselves – which will consequently lose much (or all) of their peremptory force. In Elliott’s words:

the margin of appreciation, in its entirety, is hard-wired into the ‘Convention rights’, such that a domestic court applying those rights would have no choice but to give Parliament or the Executive the full benefit of the margin of appreciation

It’s very possible that this is the sense in which the AC is using the term “margin of appreciation”: as implying that deference to the executive is mandatory when considering ECHR rights. Certainly the AC’s “proportionality balance” exercise is an object lesson in giving the executive “a wide margin”. A discussion of possible alternative civil remedies (in the context of the third Bank Mellat test) is brought to a halt with the bluff assertion that “the Home Secretary cannot be expected to abrogate her undoubted powers of proscription in the face of terrorist activity on the basis that she could, instead, promote civil self-help remedies for private parties to pursue”: not much point having powers of proscription if you never use ’em, eh? As for whether general criminal law might be adequate, we are told, with seeming approval, that “[t]he Home Secretary submits that the reason why charging individuals with offences arising from criminal conduct is less effective than proscription is that it generally follows commission of the crime”. Which is true enough: you can’t stop people committing crimes by arresting them if you need to have something to arrest them for (that pesky habeas corpus!) Then:

it is right to regard the prevention of crimes in pursuit of a terrorist objective as a very high priority. .. There is an advantage to proscription because it enables the disruption of the organisation and the prosecution of individuals for offences which are likely to be easier to prove.

What’s being described here is the exploitation of the vagueness of counter-terror legislation to facilitate intelligence-led prosecutions on ‘ouster’ charges. These are charges that ‘oust’ the criminal court from its role of deciding guilt and innocence on substantive criminal charges, asking it instead to criminalise selected individuals on charges that are “easier to prove”: criminal offences such as doing things that aren’t generally a crime, possessing items or pieces of information that it’s not generally a crime to possess, being in places where it’s not generally a crime to be. In the 2018 paper I referred to in the previous post, I characterised this and similar abuses of the law as a deliberate departure from the rule of law. And here it is, being counted as a positive by some of the highest-placed lawyers in the country. It’s enough to make me wonder why I bother.

The next paragraph exemplifies the judgment’s combination of punctilious legalism in form and deference to the executive in substance. Its exposition of the coexistence of a public and private side in groups carrying out political violence, and of how proscription enables governments to disrupt the public side – essentially by ruling that a political group with these objectives and these associations is no longer a political group but a criminal enterprise – is unexceptional, even if the scope of the power itself might give us pause. (If we think of the rule of law as a state of affairs in which everyone not only knows what kind of activity will get them prosecuted, but has a reasonable chance of choosing to avoid that, it’s clearly rather problematic for the government to outlaw an activity which was previously lawful, is harmless and is widely seen as praiseworthy.)

Still, what the AC say about the power to proscribe, and the reasons why it’s used, is straightforward enough. But we’re also treated to the following, frankly extraordinary statement:

in all cases where proscription is under consideration, the Home Secretary will be dealing with an organisation which she believes, on rational grounds and in good faith, is concerned in terrorism. That organisation will be comprised of individuals who may commit crimes for which they may be prosecuted

The Home Secretary has only to suggest proscription for the courts to conclude that the suggestion is not only (a) made in good faith and (b) made on rational grounds, but also (c) correct. (I suppose strictly speaking every person reading this “may commit crimes for which they may be prosecuted”, but the intended reading here is clearly that the group’s members are appreciably likely to commit terrorist crimes.) Deference carried to this point requires the AC to abdicate its legal role altogether, or else to discharge it in the persona of an unusually credulous child. It’s enough to make me wonder why they bother.

We then move on to the crucial fourth Bank Mellat test, where the actual balancing takes place. This part of the judgment opens with a long section devoted to misrepresenting Palestine Action, and thereby to closing the door on any treatment of ‘direct action’ as distinct from, and less serious than, terrorism. First, to be fair, we get a case for the defence: we’re told, with quotations from PA’s spokespeople, that the group’s founding was “inspired by the long tradition of direct action in this country: from suffragettes to anti-apartheid activists to Iraq war activists”; that the vast majority – over 99% – of the group’s actions had not been characterised as ‘terrorist’; that “Palestine Action [had] never promoted or endorsed violence against people” and that Britain has “a long and honourable history of accommodating protests and demonstrations where people break the law to affirm their belief in the injustice of law or government action”. To sum up, PA’s actions were not protest but direct action; not terrorism but, again, direct action; not personal violence but direct action against property; and direct action of the kind that has frequently in the past ended up being approved by juries, by governments and by history.

Now, Palestine Action could have claimed that their actions were non-violent in every way; or that they were primarily a protest group using civil disobedience to make their point; or that they’d never even been accused of a terrorist act. They could have claimed to be doing nothing that Stop the War or the Anti-Apartheid Movement hadn’t done before them; if the mood had taken them, they could even have claimed kinship to Millicent Fawcett’s Suffragist movement.

In any of those cases, they would have been lying through their teeth, and the Appeal Court could have had them on toast. Showing both prudence and commitment to their principles, PA didn’t make any of those claims. Undeterred, the Appeal Court simply assumed that they had done. We are told that “Palestine Action characterises itself as a non-violent ‘direct action protest group’ which follows in the footsteps of the suffragettes, and the campaigns against apartheid and the Iraq war”; the AC dismisses this as absurd. (Hadn’t PA activists thrown smoke bombs to cover their retreat from one action? Perhaps only three out of 385 actions had been labelled ‘terrorist’, but what about those three actions – if PA were so very non-violent, why hadn’t they disowned them?) Later we’re told that “Palestine Action is not a transparent non-violent direct action protest group as it claims”, although I’m not sure where ‘transparent’ came from; in any case, as we saw above, PA had specifically claimed to be a direct action group that didn’t endorse or advocate violence against people, which is a bit different. We’re told, for good measure, that “on a fair analysis, Palestine Action has little or nothing in common with the suffragettes or the anti-apartheid or Iran War protest groups”. As has been widely noted, this is straightforwardly false as far as the suffragettes are concerned. Perhaps more to the point, it’s just as false on the other two counts if the comparison is specifically with anti-apartheid and anti-Iraq war activists who carried out direct action – as PA’s explicitly was.

A series of minatory official assessments are then cited – none of which focuses on violence against the person – before we’re told that “[the assertions] that Palestine Action was a peaceful direct action group that posed no serious risk of violence, do not withstand these assessments”. Once again there’s a polemical grace note after the main point has been made: “The Underground Manual’s encouragement to cell members to ‘think big’ and to carry and use lethal weapons such as sledgehammers … contradict Ms Ammori’s basic submission that Palestine Action is a transparent non-violent civil disobedience protest group.” There’s ‘transparent’ again, and ‘civil disobedience’ has been swapped in to replace ‘direct action’; funny how PA’s self-description seems to get more innocuous every time it’s cited. Classifying everything that might be used to inflict serious injury as a ‘lethal weapon’ is also a bold move, and one which the AC would probably not want to see followed in other contexts. (I went to the shops today and got some bananas, a ready meal and four lethal weapons – it was four for the price of three, and it was easy enough to bring them home, as I’d taken the lethal weapon.)

After all that, it’s not surprising to find that the AC concludes in favour of proscription, finding the interference with Article 10 and 11 rights to be proportionate and justified. In doing so, it reiterates that it has not restricted itself to considering identifiable terrorist acts – or, indeed, identifiable acts of any kind which had actually happened.

The Divisional Court … misunderstood the Proscription Policy as meaning that only terrorist activities could be considered. We have taken a realistic view of all of Palestine Action’s activities. The escalating trajectory of violence and damage to the property of third parties operating lawful businesses in the United Kingdom … weighed heavily in the balance in favour of immediate proscription.

We emphasise that the Proscription Decision was not merely a judgment based on Palestine Action’s past activities, as the Divisional Court appears to have considered. It involved an assessment of future risk to national security if Palestine Action was not proscribed. A pattern of escalating behaviour was obviously highly material

In my February blog post, I suggested that rejecting the High Court’s understanding

would open the door to rampantly opportunistic uses of counter-terrorism legislation, allowing the government to target an organisation it wanted to suppress by fitting one or a few of its actions to the (notoriously capacious) 2000 definition of terrorism and then arguing that the organisation should be proscribed because of all its other undesirable activities.

And here we are. My only mistake was not to consider the possibility of an organisation being proscribed because of all its possible future undesirable activities.

Next: what, as far as we can tell, were these people thinking?

 

Palestine Action at the Court of Appeal (2 of 5)

Monday the 15th of June 2026 was a bad day: not only for Palestine Action, but for the Palestine solidarity movement; for protest and extra-parliamentary politics generally; and, not least, for the rule of law in Britain.

In February, the High Court ruled that the proscription of Palestine Action as a terrorist group was unlawful; on Monday the Court of Appeal heard the government’s appeal against that ruling, and granted the appeal almost in its entirety. (You can download the judgment here.) Punctilious in its application of relevant legal arguments to the facts of the case, the judgment was nevertheless dominated by an extraordinary level of deference to the executive and an equally pronounced hostility to Palestine Action, and ‘direct action’ more generally. Sadly, this threefold combination – chapter-and-verse legality in analysis, while interpretation is steered by deference to the executive and hostility to Palestine Action – will make this judgment extraordinarily hard to overturn, even given a sympathetic court; and the current Supreme Court emphatically is not a sympathetic court.

But to say that the judgment looks lawyer-proof is not to say that it’s beyond criticism. In this series of posts, I’m looking at:

  1. the High Court’s original ruling
  2. the Appeal Court’s ruling on the ‘policy ground’: did the Home Secretary exceed her powers?
  3. the Appeal Court’s ruling on the ‘human rights ground’: was there an impermissible interference with human rights?
  4. the themes and attitudes that run through the Appeal Court ruling
  5. where it all leaves us.

Part 2: the ‘Policy Ground’

The ‘policy ground’ refers to the High Court’s conclusion that the Home Secretary, in making the discretionary decision to proscribe, had allowed her discretion to be limited by factors which it was not appropriate to take into account. As I noted in the previous post, there is room for scepticism regarding the High Court’s distinction between factors limiting and guiding a decision-maker’s discretion; as I also noted, this is beside the point, as the distinction the Court was actually making was between factors which apply to one candidate for proscription in particular and those applying to candidates for proscription generally.

The Appeal Court indirectly confirms this reading by dealing with both these points together:

The Home Secretary contends that the purpose of the Proscription Policy was to render transparent some of the non-exhaustive factors that will be considered. We agree. … the list of factors is expressly non-exhaustive. And there is no proper basis on which to limit the factors available to the Home Secretary for consideration by reference to “similarity” with the five listed factors … Likewise, we see no sound basis for the suggestion of a presumptive constraint by reference to a “particular need” to proscribe an organisation

The last sentence, dismissing any distinction between one organisation in particular and organisations in general, is casual to the point of being cavalier. The “sound basis” for assuming that a “particular need” should be cited is, surely, the contrast between the organisation which is considered eligible for proscription and all the other comparable organisations which aren’t. Identifying comparator cases for the particular case being processed, and reasoning about it in that context, is a fairly routine approach to the law, one would have thought.

But the AC’s lack of legal imagination in this respect is symptomatic of its approach more generally. The idea that a factor that only ever weighs in favour of proscription should not be cited in support of a decision to proscribe is simply dismissed:

It may be permissible to have regard to a factor even if that factor points only towards proscription.

Perhaps sensing that this bare assertion lacks a certain something, the AC goes on to question whether ease of prosecution and disruption does in fact always point towards proscription.

it was not right … to assume that operational impact will always point one way, in favour of proscription. … On the contrary, as the Home Secretary posits, if almost all of an organisation’s members and sympathisers are located abroad, the operational consequences of proscription will be severely limited. Operational impact would be a factor against proscription. One could also posit the example of an organisation in the process of dissolution but with membership intending to continue terrorist acts on behalf of multiple different organisations.

The reasoning is ingenious, but specious. There may be organisations in respect of which proscription would offer no practical advantage; we would expect the Home Secretary not to waste her time considering whether to select any of those organisations for proscription. Which is to say, we wouldn’t expect any organisation to be considered for proscription unless doing so might be advantageous for law enforcement: this is a threshold condition, not a selection criterion. While there may be many organisations which couldn’t be policed more intrusively as a result of being proscribed, there are many more for which that advantage of proscription would obtain – and, within that broad class, that consideration can’t discriminate between one organisation and another. Citing that benefit as a reason for proscribing a specific organisation is therefore inappropriate, as the High Court had concluded. To put it another way, the HC argued that ‘operational considerations’ apply generally, not that they apply universally; all that the AC has done is to refute the latter.

The AC then loops back and asserts baldly that ‘operational consequences’ can, in fact, be cited as a factor influencing the Home Secretary’s discretion:

operational consequences are concerned with the efficacy of proscription. That is a highly material factor to be placed in the scales of the balancing exercise on proportionality. … even if, contrary to our view, the Divisional Court were right to hold that the purpose of the Proscription Policy was to limit the Home Secretary’s discretionary power to proscribe, that would not have prevented the Home Secretary from legitimately considering operational consequences as a relevant factor.

The AC is equally brisk in rejecting the HC’s argument that only Palestine Action’s putatively terrorist activities should have been considered:

the Divisional Court was wrong to interpret the term “activities” … as meaning “activities amounting to terrorism within the meaning of section 1 of the 2000 Act”.  … whilst the purpose of proscription is to prevent acts of terrorism, in deciding whether to proscribe the Home Secretary must assess the risk of future acts of terrorism. All of an organisation’s activities, such as recruitment, fundraising, radicalisation and all terrorist and non-terrorist activities may be relevant to that assessment.

The question is not whether an organisation has committed terrorist acts, but whether it has been engaged in a pattern of activity which contributed to the commission of terrorist acts or might contribute to their commission in future. As I wrote in 2018:

‘terrorism’ [is implicitly identified] as a culpable pattern of activity rather than in terms of any readily identifiable harm done or prohibition breached. … The logic seems to be that a pattern of behaviour identifiable as ‘terrorism’ is afoot, which should be interrupted by criminalising anything associated with it.

In short, on the first ground of appeal the AC looks at the ‘easy question’ which I suggested that the Home Secretary had asked herself – “Would it be useful to law enforcement to proscribe Palestine Action, with particular reference to the programme of criminal acts that they are carrying out?” – and concludes that it’s absolutely fine; the most it might need is some suggestion that the group’s criminal actions was likely develop into terrorism in future. This in itself, incidentally, is an extraordinarily permissive reading of policy, opening up the alarming possibility of organisations being proscribed as terrorist on the sole basis of an assessment of “the risk of future acts of terrorism”. Pre-crime, meet pre-proscription.

Next: the Appeal Court looks at what the Home Secretary said about human rights infringements, and at what she might have said but didn’t

 

Palestine Action at the Court of Appeal (1 of 5)

Monday the 15th of June 2026 was a bad day: not only for Palestine Action, but for the Palestine solidarity movement; for protest and extra-parliamentary politics generally; and, not least, for the rule of law in Britain.

In February, the High Court ruled that the proscription of Palestine Action as a terrorist group was unlawful; on Monday the Court of Appeal heard the government’s appeal against that ruling, and granted the appeal almost in its entirety. (You can download the judgment here.) Punctilious in its application of relevant legal arguments to the facts of the case, the judgment was nevertheless dominated by an extraordinary level of deference to the executive and an equally pronounced hostility to Palestine Action, and ‘direct action’ more generally. With very few exceptions, the judgment takes a government-friendly reading if one is available, tacitly dismissing the possibility that a court’s interpretation of a government minister’s actions might take precedence over the minister’s own. Where Palestine Action are concerned, conversely, tendentious interpretations and misreadings abound, consistently tending to reduce the interpretive space for the organisation to be granted any kind of political legitimacy.

This threefold combination – chapter-and-verse legality in analysis, while interpretation is steered by deference to the executive and hostility to Palestine Action – will make this judgment extraordinarily hard to overturn, even given a sympathetic court; and the current Supreme Court emphatically is not a sympathetic court (the ‘activist’ jurisprudence of the Hale SC is an increasingly distant memory). But there’s always Strasbourg – and to say that the judgment looks lawyer-proof is not to say that it’s beyond criticism. Where there are logical leaps, tendentious misrepresentations and unstated assumptions – and where deference to the government takes precedence over the principle of legality – you’d have to hope that there might be a toehold for a legal critique.

But that’s for the future.

In this series of posts, I’ll look at:

  1. the High Court’s original ruling
  2. the Appeal Court’s ruling on the ‘policy ground’: did the Home Secretary exceed her powers?
  3. the Appeal Court’s ruling on the ‘human rights ground’: was there an impermissible interference with human rights?
  4. the themes and attitudes that run through the Appeal Court ruling
  5. where it all leaves us.

First, let’s go back to February.

1. Two Steps Forward

As I wrote in February, the High Court ruled that the proscription of Palestine Action was unlawful on two grounds. The first concerned the Home Secretary’s discretion in proscribing Palestine Action, and in particular the factors guiding her exercise of discretion. In law, the Home Secretary’s discretion in exercising the power to proscribe is not unfettered: it must be exercised in the light of relevant factors, which must be stated. There’s a policy document listing the kind of considerations likely to be involved (the scale of the organisation’s activities, the level of threat it poses, etc), but the document stresses that the list is not exhaustive: it’s open to the Home Secretary to add, and list, other factors guiding her discretion.

Which Yvette Cooper did, stating inter alia that proscribing Palestine Action would provide “significant disruptive benefits beyond the current policing powers”. And this is where the High Court began to have problems. Quoting my own paraphrase:

the nature of the policy is to limit the Home Secretary’s discretion: “to constrain use of the discretion so that not all organisations that meet the concerned in terrorism requirement will be proscribed” (italics added for clarity) – and all the relevant considerations have the same function.  … the question isn’t really “how big is this organisation?” but “is this organisation particularly big (as compared with other organisations that aren’t proscribed)?”. And likewise, crucially, with those additional factors: the Home Secretary isn’t free to say “here’s an additional factor weighing in favour of proscription”, but needs to be saying “here’s an additional factor weighing in favour of proscription in this specific case“.

The problem is that “proscribing organisation X will make it significantly easier to disrupt” is always true: proscribing Palestine Action would make it easier to disrupt its activities, but so would proscribing Reform UK or the Women’s Institute. So this is the wrong kind of ‘consideration’

An interesting critique of the High Court judgment challenged this line of argument, arguing that there was no need to assume that factors considered by the Home Secretary must be of a nature to limit her discretion: “The better view is that the policy’s purpose … is simply to guide (a neutral term) the discretionary power to proscribe”. I think this is broadly correct, but it doesn’t really affect the point that the High Court was making. When making a binary choice (to proscribe or not to proscribe) the distinction between discretion being ‘guided’ and being ‘limited’ – between ‘you may do any of these things’ and ‘you may not do this thing’ – is largely semantic. In other words, “you are empowered to proscribe any organisation with characteristics X and Y” isn’t really any different from “you are not empowered to proscribe any organisation that does not have characteristics X and Y”. The real point the Court was making is that an ‘operational’ consideration, like ease of disruption, will apply to potential candidates for proscription in general; as such, it can’t reasonably be used to justify proscribing one organisation in particular. Quoting myself again: “[it] shouldn’t be allowed to weigh in favour of a discretionary decision to proscribe in a specific case, because it will be valid in every case”.

The proscription of Palestine Action wasn’t only justified on the grounds of operational convenience, however. Cooper also cited the nature and scale of the group’s activities, as policy suggested she should. But here, the High Court found, she again exceeded her legal competence. Describing an incident in which a business believed to be associated with Israeli arms company Elbit was vandalised, Cooper stated: “Regardless of whether this instance itself amounts to terrorism, such activity is clearly intimidatory and unacceptable”. The High Court demurred:

The power in the 2000 Act is to proscribe organisations because they act in ways that mean they are concerned in terrorism, not because of other activities that fall short of terrorism. The nature and scale of an organisation’s activities ought therefore to concern only those activities that amount to terrorism.
(italics added for clarity)

So much for the first ground on which Palestine Action appealed against proscription (Ground 6, confusingly enough): whether the Home Secretary followed her own policy in proscribing Palestine Action (and, as I wrote in February, “in a court of law it’s not open to the Home Secretary to say ‘but cynically using whatever powers I could lay my hands on was my policy!'”). The second ground (Ground 2, as luck would have it) related to interference with human rights guaranteed under the European Convention. The rights in question are those guaranteed by Article 10 – freedom of expression, including the right to receive and impart information – and Article 11 – freedom of association and assembly. It’s not hard to see how making it a criminal offence to (for example) sit on the ground holding a home-made sign reading “I oppose genocide. I support Palestine Action.” might impinge on rights under articles 10 and 11.

Articles 10 and 11 aren’t unqualified, though; most importantly for the present argument, they’re qualified by Article 17, which provides that human rights may not be exploited so as to abuse human rights. The government invoked Article 17, arguing that “any expression of support for, or association with, Palestine Action, amounts to expression of support for or association with terrorist activity, and so falls outside the scope of articles 10 and 11 by virtue of article 17”. Which is neat, but a bit too neat: if protests in support of a terrorist group are not covered by articles 10 and 11, and if proscription is sufficient to make a group a terrorist group, then to criminalise protests against a group’s proscription will never interfere with articles 10 and 11. Unsurprisingly, the High Court was not impressed:

this case is primarily concerned with the rights of individuals who have not acted unlawfully either before or since proscription, who would have wanted to express support for and associate with Palestine Action – whose stated aim is “to stop genocide and other atrocity crimes by causing disruption to corporate actors who aid, abet, facilitate and profit from those crimes” – and who wished to engage in peaceful protests under the banner of Palestine Action, but are stopped from doing so. It cannot sensibly be said that such persons are seeking to deflect the article 10 and 11 rights from their real purpose by employing them for ends contrary to Convention values.

It’s interesting that the High Court doesn’t simply call out the circularity of the Home Secretary’s reasoning (“if I say they’re terrorists and you disagree with me, that means you support terrorists, because that’s what I said they were”) It would be possible to say that, although the Home Secretary’s logic was flawed, it didn’t matter, since Palestine Action actually was a terrorist group. The High Court takes some pains to head off this possibility. Reading this paragraph now, what’s particularly striking is the implicit recognition that “express[ing] support for and associat[ing] with” an organisation “causing disruption to corporate actors who aid, abet, facilitate and profit from [atrocity] crimes” might be a legitimate form of political activity. Expressing solidarity, that is, with a direct action group. Direct action is the political tactic of acting, often in violation of the criminal law, so as to go beyond protesting against something and prevent it from happening. Generally this will be something that you believe should itself be a crime – indeed, a greater crime than doing a bit of property damage trying to stop it. Think Earth First!; think hunt sabbing; think Ploughshares; think Climate Camp; think of Stop the Seventy Tour; think of the Women’s Social and Political Union. (There’s really no shortage of examples.) As many of the examples in that list suggest, the other peculiarity of direct action is that the belief in the justice of the cause often ends up being shared: by juries, by governments, by the history books. There’s at least a tacit recognition in the High Court’s judgment that the verdict of future historians might be more favourable to Palestine Action and its activities than to those ‘atrocity crimes’ and the companies profiting from them – and more generally that direct action, while it involves law-breaking for political purposes, is not the same thing as terrorism, so that sympathisers with a direct action group should not be treated as terrorist sympathisers.

To sum up, the High Court’s finding on the Home Secretary’s exercise of discretion was, in effect, that Cooper had asked herself the wrong question, an easy question instead of a hard one. The appropriate question was “Are there facts about Palestine Action which make it particularly appropriate to proscribe them as terrorist; specifically, have they got a significant record of activities rising to the level of terrorism?”. Instead, Cooper asked “Would it be useful to law enforcement to proscribe Palestine Action, with particular reference to the programme of criminal acts that they are carrying out?”. The High Court’s finding on the infringement of rights of expression and association, secondly, was that the proscription did cause such an infringement, which wasn’t magically annulled – as the Home Secretary suggested – by the proscription itself. (Looking ahead for a moment, it’s worth mentioning that the Appeal Court agreed with the High Court on this specific point. And little wonder – the claim that protesting against a group being labelled ‘terrorist’ equates to supporting terrorism is worthy of Kafka.)

Given the weight carried by ‘terrorist’ labelling, proscription of a group as terrorist is one of the Home Secretary’s most consequential powers; this was an opportunistic and avowedly instrumental abuse of that power. The High Court’s judgment wasn’t flawless, but it made most of the right calls – and it was right to reverse the proscription.

Next: the Appeal Court rules on the ‘policy ground’ 

 

April culture post

In April I read (or finished)

Christopher Brookmyre, Quite Ugly One Morning
In which maverick investigative journalist Jack Parlabane stumbles into a messy murder plot involving corruption, both corporate and personal, among health service administrators, and a hapless low-level hitman called Darren whose interventions make life much worse for everyone involved, including himself. This is written in even broader strokes than One fine day…, and there’s a rather laddish relish in the gruesomeness of the violence; I wasn’t really a fan. Maybe I should stick to later Brookmyre.

Reginald Hill, Under World
Middling Dalziel and Pascoe. Set in a vividly imagined rural mining village, it’s driven partly by a long-threatened subplot involving marital stress between the Pascoes, partly by two new examples of character types that Hill had deployed before. There’s a young man so compellingly beautiful as to have a hypnotic effect on everyone around him, male or female; and there’s a killer who is convinced he is acting from the best possible motives, and simply can’t explain why so many people end up dead around him. Hill borrows credibility for these fairly literary types from the heightened atmosphere of a murder-based plot – if this is happening, why shouldn’t this be the culprit? – and does so pretty effectively.

Ken Macleod, Beyond the hallowed sky
I first crossed paths with Ken on the USENET newsgroup soc.history.what-if, back in the last century. SHW-I’s stock in trade was alternative history; the usual procedure was to pose a question – “what if Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo?”, “what if Jim Callaghan had called an election in 1978?”– and then either ask for comments on what would have happened next or write the story yourself. Things often got strange, with vast consequences blooming from small PODs (points of departure); one of shw-i’s most celebrated what-ifs began with Gordon Banks playing for England against West Germany in 1970, and ended with Prime Minister Enoch Powell alone with a bottle of whisky and a pearl-handled revolver. I never wrote a full what-if myself, although I did once plan one, asking what would have happened if Britain had had a Pim Fortuyn figure; I liked David Owen for the role, as I remember.

Anyway, Ken was, and is, really good at narrative what-ifs. I don’t mean simply in plot terms, although this novel’s starting-point – “what if you got a letter from your future self proving the possibility of faster-than-light travel?” – is a pretty good one. This is a what-if novel in a deeper sense, and specifically a political sense. Suppose a world carved up into three main blocs – China and Russia allied, England allied with a reactionary US, a post-revolutionary Scotland allied with Europe (thanks Ken!). Suppose freely-accessible artificial intelligence, developed to a really high level. Then drop faster-than-light travel – or more specifically the knowledge of faster-than-light travel – into the mix and… well, wind it up and watch it go.

The book’s a fascinating and often dramatic extrapolation from those (not at all incredible) starting premises; it stops with a lot of threads hanging – ready for the two sequels that followed – but then, there were a lot of threads. What I missed was the sense of a theme or even an overarching story; the sense of the book being about something (not necessarily something that the author knew about going in). I find that that’s what I love most about sf, and it’s not always there. Mind you, it’s also what I most love about horror/weird fiction – and literary fiction for that matter – and it’s not always there either.

Celia Dale, A spring of love
A strange novel; its subject matter is just as grimy as the other two Dales I’ve read, but the tone is sadder and more heartfelt. When a naive young woman living with her mother meets a charming young man, it’s obvious to the reader that he’s up to no good, but the hideous consequences that seem to hang over her head from that moment stubbornly fail to materialise for most of the book (not all). The conclusion seems to be that love conquers… quite a lot. (Not all.)

Kate Colqhoun, Mr Briggs’ hat
Victorian true crime: the first murder in Britain on a moving train, and one which – once you’ve seen all the evidence presented here – it’s hard to think was really solved (although somebody was hanged for it). The book’s absorbing and well written, although – in the way of true crime – it moves more slowly than it needs to, and – in the way of historical true crime – periodically pauses for a few pages to explain things like Victorian railway mania or ‘sensation’ novels.

M. John Harrison, Settling the world
From a different part of the sf forest, this is a retrospective selection of short stories, and one whose criteria of selection and organisation aren’t obvious – as a bemused Strange Horizons reviewer commented, we get “five stories from the Seventies, five from [2015-20], and seven from the thirty-five years in between but nothing at all from 2003-2017”. Whatever the reasoning, this selection policy does give us the opportunity to compare early and late Harrison. A typical ‘early’ protagonist is a Ballardesque beaten-down man in a suit, known only by his surname and finding himself in situations that move from Alasdair Gray-like absurdity to horrific sublimity. Later protagonists are similarly male, beaten-down and mononymic, but encounter the sublime among shops and houses, litter and dirt, solitude and compulsion: a street wet with rain under a clear evening sky, an old man with food stains on his tie, the light on the surface of a cup of coffee. If the sublime is what they encounter. I’m probably not explaining it very well.

Percival Everett, The Trees
Suppose that the descendants of the people who lynched Emmett Till were found dead – murdered, unmistakably, and the bodies mutilated. Suppose that alongside each body was found the body of a Black teenager, also horribly murdered; suppose that the Black bodies vanished soon afterwards; suppose that it was one body, the body of Emmett Till himself. What next? A strange, audacious work of political fantasy, told in a light comic style which somehow never detracts from the deadly serious subject matter.

Also in April, I watched these films:

See how they run (Tom George 2022)
“Get a shovel!”
– Yes, sir.
“And tell Cook it’ll be ten for dinner.”
– Yes, sir.
“And is there enough coal?”
– Yes, sir. Three bags full, sir.
An Agatha Christie pastiche, which is also an actual murder mystery featuring (a fantasy version of) Agatha Christie; a script-led comedy, and one which (as that quote suggests) is not averse to a properly silly joke. We also learn that Saoirse Ronan is a fine light comedian; casting directors please note.

The Night House (David Bruckner 2020)
A very effective and atmospheric horror movie, but one of those that would have been better off without a dénouement. Ironically, I always feel a bit let down when a horror film tells the audience just what’s going on – “she thought she was being persecuted by dark forces from the Demon Dimensions, and you know what, she was absolutely right”‘. Some of the best horror films leave it in suspension, with a threat that’s at once absolutely real and absolutely a metaphor. To make matters worse, in this case the real thing that is absolutely definitely happening is quite existentially horrible. It’s a good watch till you get there, though.

Ready Or Not 2: Here I Come (Tyler Gillett and Matt Bettinelli-Olpin 2026)
A very silly sequel to a very silly film – although, having said that, it works as well as it does precisely because it takes the conceits of the first film absolutely seriously. If you like two or more out of

  • Ready Or Not
  • the scenes with the rich spectators in Squid Game
  • films with two sisters arguing for comic effect
  • the ‘handcuffed’ sequence in The 39 Steps
  • films with Sarah Michelle Gellar

you’ll probably enjoy this film.

Father Mother Sister Brother (Jim Jarmusch 2025)
Three short films about difficult parent/child relationships: ‘Father’ (Tom Waits, with Adam Driver and Mayim Bialik hanging on for dear life); ‘Mother’ (Charlotte Rampling, Cate Blanchett and Vicky Krieps, playing different versions of ‘tightly-controlled’); ‘Sister Brother’ (Indya Moore and Luka Sabbat). You don’t expect Jim Jarmusch to set a brisk pace, but I did find the third of these dragged – possibly because the leads didn’t have the personal magnetism of the cast of the other two, possibly because it’s a bit shapeless, and possibly just because I’ve been in the situation depicted (siblings meet to divide up their late parents’ possessions) and watched the whole thing in a state of nervous apprehension. (Spoiler: they put it off to another time.) They’re not ambitious works – ‘Mother’ would work well as a short TV drama, and ‘Father’ is practically a comedy sketch – but the seriousness with which Jarmusch treats them (and the slow pacing) works surprisingly well, in at least two cases out of three.

Undertone (Ian Tuason 2026)
The central conceit of this film – “what if Blair Witch, but audio rather than video?” – is strong and fairly well executed, but there’s an awful lot of other stuff going on; too much, really. Also, the dénouement is pretty much ‘cards on table’ – and, while it does sometimes gesture to an “or it might be a metaphor” reading, taking that reading seriously would turn this into an anti-abortion film, which seemed downright odd as well as unwelcome. Great sound design, though.

Akira (Katsuhiro Otomo 1988)
This looks amazing, which gets it quite a long way – particularly when it looks so good in so many different ways. Action sequences out of a 1970s Japanese cartoon (but produced with a proper budget); cityscapes like something out of Blade Runner; frankly unfilmable scenes of urban destruction; nightmare-fuel sequences of machine/human hybridisation; and sequences where nothing fantastical happens but which are so well composed that, if this were a live-action film, the Director of Photography would deserve an award. I don’t think the plot’s entirely believable, though.

Rebuilding (Max Walker-Silverman 2025)
A quiet film about living in the aftermath of disaster. Josh O’Connor is a Colorado cattle farmer whose farm is destroyed by wildfire; he finds an unexpected new community among the fellow residents of a FEMA camp (shades of Nomadland). It’s a bit schematic – he thinks he’s going to rebuild his farm, but he needs to accept it’s gone before he can rebuild his life – and Josh O’Connor is in a pretty low gear most of the time, not needing to do much more than deliver his lines and look hangdog. It’s beautiful to look at, though, and O’Connor is completely believable as a cowboy called Dusty (is there nothing he can’t do?).

Rose of Nevada (Mark Jenkin 2025)
This film – like Jenkin’s previous films Bait and Enys Men – was shot in 28-second takes on a clockwork camera without sync sound; all dialogue, as well as ambient sound and effects, had to be added in post-production. As I write it’s nearly four weeks since I saw it, and not only is it still vividly present in my mind, it’s still showing; I wouldn’t rule out seeing it again.

Which is pretty extraordinary. I don’t know if the power of the film somehow derives from the way it was made; at the very least, those technical factors don’t get in the way, as you would have thought were bound to (and as I think they did in the case of Bait). The film is hypnotically immersive: it draws you in – to its story, to its world or worlds – and keeps you there. When it ended I felt, not that the time had flown by, but that I’d been in that place for even longer than the runtime – three hours, even four – and that I’d have been quite happy to stay there for the rest of the day.

What’s it about? At the most basic level, it’s about what the loss of fishing has done to Cornish communities that depended on it – but really, that’s just the setup. The film’s about the past – individuals’ past as well as the community’s; it’s about living with the past, living in the past and/or moving on. To put it another way, it’s about loss and living with loss (if that’s possible); it’s about the importance of respecting those who have gone before, and the danger of feeding hungry ghosts. I also think it’s about a man falling eight feet straight down ; the image of that fall recurs repeatedly in the film, and seems in some way to encapsulate what’s going on. It’s a terrific film, anyway – however it was made. (Never mind the Bolex!)

100 Years Ago

Among the MPs calling on Keir Starmer to resign this week, I was struck by one name in particular: Catherine McKinnell, MP for Newcastle upon Tyne North.

I remembered the name because I’d written about her on this blog before. In October 2019 I identified eight Labour constituencies where Labour’s relative vote share – which is to say, their vote share at a given election relative to that of the Conservatives (a metric which now looks even more idiosyncratic than it was then) – had fallen at every General Election from 2005 to 2017. To be precise, I identified the only eight constituencies where that had happened and Labour had held on nevertheless; there were another 24 which had the same pattern of declining Labour (relative) vote share, and which had been taken by the Tories at some point. “[I]f I were one of the MPs for the eight seats in this group where Labour hung on in 2017,” I added,

I wouldn’t be placing the blame for my 2017 performance on things that have changed since 2015. There’s a downward trend in those constituencies which was clearly established long before that – and the great majority of Labour seats, along with the great majority of English constituencies generally, broke that trend in 2017, if they hadn’t already broken it in 2015.

Of those eight MPs, three lost their seats in 2019 (including Ruth Smeeth, now in the Lords) and another three retired before the election (including John Woodcock, now Baron WalnutWalney); the other two were Ian Lavery (MP for Wansbeck; 2019 majority 2%, down from 24.6%) and Catherine McKinnell (2019 majority 12.2%, down from 21.5%). “Comfortable majority in 2019, but a long and uninterrupted decline in Labour vote share before that”; that’s Catherine McKinnell MP.

The other time I wrote about McKinnell was in my 2019 election post-mortem. But before we revisit December 2019 (as I’m afraid we must), let’s look back a bit further. In April 2019 this article appeared in the Northern Echo:

BERJAYA

The four MPs believed that ‘published opinion’ – the views that circulated in the media in the name of public opinion – was woefully misrepresenting the reality of public opinion, particularly in the North:

If you are an MP in the North of England, as we are, “published opinion” (and Nigel Farage) tells you we are surrounded by shouty people who all voted for Brexit; whose entire lives are dominated by anger that the “elites” are betraying them. “Published opinion” states that we Northern Labour MPs live in constant fear of losing our seats, unless we repeat that mantra that Leave Means Leave, and if we don’t deliver “the will of the people”, we are all heading for the political scrapyard. …

How dare the media use our constituents to reaffirm Brexit stereotypes of 2016? They were stereotypes then and they still are. Yes, we all know Leavers who still want Brexit. But we also know Leavers who, now they know what Brexit will mean for their families, jobs and incomes, have changed their mind. We know people who are adamantly opposed to a People’s Vote. We know others who were opposed but who now see it as the only democratic way out of the mess we are in …

The myth has taken hold that, just because a constituency voted for Leave, Labour voters in those seats did the same. The truth is that Labour voters split by a margin of two to one in favour of Remain in the referendum. A poll of 5,000 Labour voters in the party’s “heartlands” of the North and the Midlands last month showed that margin has risen to three to one – and four to one if they were faced with a choice between the Government’s Brexit deal and remaining in the EU.

Four to one, eh? Not much chance of those voters abandoning Labour for the Brexit Party or Boris Johnson’s Tories, I’d have said. Why, a message like “Get Brexit done” would be electoral poison! Bring on the People’s Vote, with an option to remain – it’s the only way to hold on to Northern Labour voters!

The letter sending this hopeful but uncompromising message was signed by Mary Creagh (MP for Wakefield) and three MPs for constituencies in the North East: Anna Turley (Redcar), Phil Wilson (Sedgefield) and Catherine McKinnell. McKinnell apart, the signatories weren’t in the “declining Labour vote share at every one of the last four elections” club, but that’s not to say that their vote share hadn’t seen a bit of a drop. Here’s a chart with some figures for those four MPs’ constituencies, for the elections from 1997 to 2017.

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These aren’t vote shares, they’re Labour majorities. That’s right: in Newcastle North, Redcar and Sedgefield, Labour’s majority over the Tories was over 40% in 1997, and substantially above 30% in 2001. Out west in Wakefield (purple) it wasn’t quite so emphatic; they were weighing the vote, in 1997 at least, but they didn’t need to use a livestock scale.

There’s not a lot to say about the trend in Sedgefield and Wakefield, other than “it’s downward”. It is interesting, though, that the downward trend extends to the difference between 2015 and 2017: it’s hard to overstate  how unusual this is. Labour took 30.4% of the vote in 2015 and 40% in 2017, and a rising tide does tend to lift all boats; not Wilson and Creagh, though.

Redcar and Newcastle N are different again. Those Readybrek columns with the orange outlines indicate majorities over the Lib Dems, the Tories being pushed into third place – and, in 2010 in Redcar, a Lib Dem win from Labour. Redcar and Newcastle N were already third-party-curious in 2005, and agreed with Nick in quite a big way in 2010.

In an earlier post I argued that one of the key factors in British politics this century has been

[the] five million voters Labour lost between the two victories of 1997 and 2005, and all the people who thought like them. … Over time many, perhaps most, will have got the habit of staying at home at election time, but many will have taken the opportunity in 2005, 10, 15 to cast an anti-system, “sod the lot of ’em” vote – for the Lib Dems, for the BNP, for UKIP. … Roll that bloc of voters forward to 2017 and 2019, and the only question is how many of those people [would] be open to Corbyn’s anti-establishment appeal, and how many [would] prefer their anti-system politics with a definite Right-wing stamp.

What made the ‘none of the above’ vote particularly explosive in some Labour-dominated areas was a second factor:

the greater strength, and legitimacy, of the far Right in some areas than others. This is a factor that feeds through from 2005 on, first in higher votes for far Right parties, then in substantially higher votes for UKIP – and then, in 2017, in blunting the edge of Corbyn’s “anti-establishment” appeal. Local factors will be involved here … the BNP got more than 8% of the vote in eight constituencies in 2005 and twelve in 2010, including five in both – and they were all Labour seats.

How do our four northern constituencies, with their People’s Vote MPs who were definitely not heading for the scrapyard, score on these metrics? Here’s the far-Right vote in those constituencies, going back to 1997. Under this heading I’m including the BNP, National Front and English Democrats, but also UKIP, the Brexit Party, the Referendum Party and Veritas. (Ah, remember Veritas? No, seriously, do you remember Veritas? Well, why would you?)

BERJAYA

A definite presence in 2005, albeit not rising to a saved deposit (two separate parties in Wakefield totalled 5% of the vote); a much stronger showing, with the odd saved deposit, in 2010; and this in turn was a base to build on in 2015, when the Lib Dems had shown their true colours and a lot of ‘sod the lot of them’ voters were looking for a home. As we see below:

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This plug-ugly chart suggests what happened to the Lib Dem vote in 2015. The left-hand column is the drop in Lib Dem vote share between 2010 and 2015; the right-hand column shows the gain in vote share by the Tories and Labour combined (hideous blue and red check) and the gain in votes by UKIP (purple). I’m now regretting using the parties’ actual colours, although in my defence Brexit Party sky-blue would have been even worse than purple. To borrow a line from Graham Norton, people worry that this kind of polarisation could lead to clashes. Clashes? I’ll say there’ll be clashes!

(You may wish to scroll down at this point.)

Anyway, I think what we see in these constituencies, especially in Newcastle N and Redcar, is disillusionment with Labour feeding a “none of the above” vote for the Lib Dems. Their vote in turn slumps with the disillusioning experience of the Coalition, giving the local far Right material to build a substantial UKIP vote in 2015. But that vote ebbs away in 2017, what with people not caring about Brexit any more, leaving our four MPs sitting pretty on a reduced but still substantial majority. With the threat from the Lib Dems seen off and UKIP out of the picture, it was happy days – where else were “none of the above” voters going to go, after all?

Here’s that first chart again, extended slightly:

BERJAYA

This is what happened in those four constituencies in 2019 in more detail (“Leave” and “Remain” represent the combined changes in vote share of parties unambiguously committed to one or the other).

Constituency Labour Remain Leave Result
Mary Creagh Wakefield -9.9% +1.9% +8.4% Lab LOSS
Catherine McKinnell Newcastle-upon-Tyne North -9.9% +8.4% +4.9% Lab HOLD
Phil Wilson Sedgefield -16.9% +3.6% +13.6% Lab LOSS
Anna Turley Redcar -18.1% -0.6% +20% Lab LOSS

It would be hard to argue that those results are the natural consequence of insufficient sympathy with the People’s Vote campaign; noticeably, the one constituency where the Remain vote increased more than the Leave vote was the one that Labour held. Not to mention what it said about Brexit in Labour’s manifesto for the 2019 election:

Labour will give the people the final say on Brexit. Within three months of coming to power, a Labour government will secure a sensible deal. And within six months, we will put that deal to a public vote alongside the option to remain. A Labour government will implement whatever the people decide.

Short of actually using the phrase People’s Vote, you couldn’t get a much clearer endorsement of what those four MPs had demanded. Seems like this wasn’t a good idea after all. Not that you’d have known it from the post-election comments from Phil Wilson. He didn’t seem to think losing his seat had anything to do with his, or Labour’s, position on Brexit. In fact it didn’t have anything to do with him, or the Labour Party more generally, at all:

I know we talk about policies and empathy with the electorate – none of that’s important. The one thing, the one aspect of the Labour Party, in fact of any political party that wants to be in government, people take the most notice of is the leader.

He also said that a leader who “just perpetuates Corbynism or that kind of far-left kind of politics” would be the wrong kind, but maybe that doesn’t come under ‘policies’.

Anna Turley, more pithily, went for “I lost my Redcar seat thanks to Jeremy Corbyn and I’m furious”. Turley seems to have been shooting for some sort of gold medal in chutzpah. She acknowledges that Labour’s position on Brexit was a vote-loser (“for every time Brexit was raised on the doorsteps, the leadership was raised four more”); then puts the blame more specifically on the way that Labour’s position kept changing (“instead of strong leadership and a clear position, then we have had three years of U-turns, triangulation and dancing on pinheads”); then acknowledges her own contribution to division in the party and confusion among voters (“I have never been able to tell my constituents what Labour’s Brexit position truly was – only my own.”)

There’s something deeply unserious here. No one can look at the charts above and think that those three losses came out of a blue sky. Labour support in those areas had been ebbing away for the best part of two decades. After 2010, the risk of an insurgent party rallying the “sod the lot of them” vote – and the danger that that insurgent party would come from the far Right – was obvious. Even in April 2019 it was radiantly clear that Boris Johnson could capitalise on Brexit – or rather on the weak public awareness of what Brexit was, and the correspondingly strong desire to have somebody say that it was now “done” – and that Nigel Farage could at the very least make trouble for Labour.

People like Turley and McKinnell – following the lead of Keir Starmer – insisted nevertheless that Labour should stop its fence-sitting, stop treating the 2016 Brexit referendum result as untouchable and formally commit to opening a route whereby it could be reversed. Less than a year later, it was radiantly clear that painting a Remain target on Labour’s back had not, after all, been the way to win Labour hearts and minds. Our doughty People’s Vote champions knew exactly what the problem was: the party had the wrong leader. (Also, people didn’t like the way Labour’s Brexit policy kept changing, but that was the leader’s fault as well.) This revised analysis had the great advantage that it didn’t require anyone to reassess the effect of their own political commitments, or indeed to take responsibility for anything – anyone that is, apart from one man (who nobody liked anyway).

But, to be fair, Labour had a new leader by the time of the July 2024 General Election, and they did have a pretty good election: Catherine McKinnell was re-elected with an increased majority, Anna Turley stood again in Redcar and won, while Mary Creagh returned as MP for Coventry East. You’d think that losing a previously safe seat would be the end of an MP’s career, but apparently that’s not the case at all. (Phil Smith, the fourth People’s Voter, isn’t in the Commons, but that’s mainly because he’s in the Lords.) Also, a Labour government was elected, of course. But Labour hadn’t won by making a stronger commitment to Europe; in fact the manifesto, its cover resplendent with a full-length picture of Keir Starmer, stated quite firmly “There will be no return to the single market, the customs union, or freedom of movement.” Strange to think of McKinnell and friends running on that policy; even stranger to see the guy who floated the Remain option in the first place putting his name to it. But I’m forgetting, the 2019 election wasn’t about Brexit, it was all about the leader. New leader, new Labour. Something like that.

There are a number of possible interpretations of this course of events, ranging from Father Dougal-esque levels of naive idiocy to a downright sinister degree of reckless double-dealing. I mean, perhaps those four MPs genuinely believed a People’s Vote would be a vote-winner and genuinely overlooked all the evidence to the contrary, not to mention the indications that it was a hugely divisive topic within the party; and maybe they genuinely forgot all about it the moment it was adopted as party policy, meaning that in December it genuinely didn’t occur to them that it might have had something to do with the result. That’s possible, although in that case I might recommend one of those cognitive tests that Donald Trump apparently does so well on. It’s also possible that bringing the party back under the control of the Right was the goal all along, that the People’s Vote campaign was only important to these people as a means to that end, and that throwing the 2019 election was acceptable collateral damage. It’s also possible that genuine enthusiasm for the European project played a part in the enthusiasm for a second referendum, although we can’t put much weight on this without wondering what happened to it after the 12th of December 2019. Ultimately cynical, partisan recklessness seems the simplest and most comprehensive explanation, with oblivious stupidity trailing in second place.

Here’s the story as I see it. Once upon a time there were a lot of Labour MPs who cared about working people, particularly their constituents, but otherwise weren’t really very political at all; they certainly weren’t left-wing, unless of course you asked them outright (in which case they were on the Left because everyone in Labour is on the Left, and how dare you suggest otherwise). Then there was New Labour: the tidal wave of relief at finally getting the Tories out, boosted by genuine enthusiasm for what looked like a fresh new way of doing politics, took Tory seats all over the country and lifted safe Labour seats to whole new levels of safety. And Labour MPs who weren’t very political, and who knew their seats were safe, did what you’d expect them to do: not very much.

Then people got a look at the new government – the first Labour election victory since 1974, the first Labour government elected with a workable majority since 1945 – and found it a bit of an anti-climax. This led in turn to the big non-vote of 2001, the rise in the Lib Dem vote and the first stirrings of the far Right – more than stirrings in some areas. (There were fifteen constituencies where far Right candidates kept their deposits in 2005, 2010 or both, all of them Labour (at the time); they included the constituencies of Yvette Cooper, Hilary Benn, Ian Austin and (of course) Margaret Hodge.) And Labour MPs who weren’t very political, and who knew their seats were safe, did what you’d expect them to do: not very much. Then there was the Coalition and the big disillusionment with the Lib Dems, leaving a big bloc of increasingly cynical voters in search of a home; then came the rise of UKIP, and the catastrophically disappointing 2015 election result, with Labour’s vote only rising 1% (to 30.4%) as compared with 2010. And Labour MPs who weren’t very political, and who knew their seats were safe, did what you’d expect them to do – and the cushion of votes that those safe Labour seats rested on quietly ebbed away.

And then there was Jeremy Corbyn, and a lot of those MPs were galvanised into action. Unfortunately the main effect of the action they took was to make their votes drain away even faster, to the benefit of the far Right and/or Boris Johnson, but it would all be worth it when Labour was back in safe hands – hands as safe, as comfortably non-left-wing and as fundamentally non-political as their own. Proper Labour hands. Get a proper Labour leader and we’d leave the nightmare of the 2019 result – 32.1% of a 67% turnout, sixty seats lost – far behind; we’d soon be polling in the 40%s again!

Hard to remember now, but Labour actually was polling in the 40%s when the 2024 election was called; the new leader did seem to do the trick, at least when people got a chance to compare him to the alternative (viz. Liz Truss). It didn’t last, though. The new safe pair of hands was triumphantly successful at the election, raising the tantalising possibility that everyone had been right after all, but success was built on an alarmingly low vote: Labour’s landslide was won on 33.7% of a 60% turnout – i.e. fewer people than voted Labour in 2019. This may have shown how terrifically seat-winningly efficient Labour’s election strategy had been, but it definitely showed that the level of public support for the party was lower than anyone thought. This realisation became particularly pressing when support for the party went on declining – and on, and on. As I write, Labour’s 14-day polling average hasn’t been above 30% since October 2024; in fact, the last time the average was above 20% was October 2025.

Then came the 2026 local elections. While Reform UK have been the big winners, there have also been wins in different parts of the country for the Greens and various groups of more or less Left independents, with some councils showing much bigger gains for the Left than the Right. What has been consistent is that Labour has lost heavily. In Wakefield Labour went from 48 seats to 1, and Reform UK from 2 to 58. Newcastle Council went for both Reform UK and the Greens in quite a big way; they gained 24 and 22 seats respectively, Labour losing 45. The north of the city, curiously, was mostly unaffected either way, already being dominated by the Lib Dems; Newcastle, like Gaul, is now divided in three parts, with a Reform UK southwest and a Green southeast – and two indomitable Labour councillors hanging on like Asterix in a northern ward. (There were no elections this year in the authorities covering Redcar and Sedgefield.)

Catherine McKinnell has looked at these results and looked at Keir Starmer, and she hasn’t much liked what she saw.

The message given by the voters on Thursday was clear as day – the Labour Government has to change, or we will change the Labour Government. Local councillors who had given decades of public service between them bore the brunt as message bearers. We now have only two Labour councillors left in Newcastle – the lowest ever.

Having spoken to many constituents over these past few weeks, I know many voted in sorrow rather than anger, but they were clear that they could not support the Labour Party at this time. We are not connecting with voters, and they do not feel we are delivering for them. This, despite some of the most profound reforms to children and families, housing, young people, employment and immigration the country has seen in generations.

It’s become clear that it’s time for a new leader to take us to the finish line of this term and onto the next. A leader that will waste no time looking inward, but relentlessly deliver the manifesto that we committed to at the General Election. A leader who has a clear unwavering sense of direction, a proven track record of delivery, and an ability to connect with voters on the left, right and centre. It’s vital we now see a swift and orderly transition so we can get on with delivering on our promise of change. The voting public have been crystal clear we have no time to lose.

Reading this, I despair slightly. There is no politics here! The two key words – ‘connect’ and ‘deliver’ – are pure management-speak; they only need initial capitals to be the names of teams on The Apprentice. Not only is there no politics, there’s barely a coherent thought: we’re told that voters “do not feel we are delivering for them”, then that they’re wrong – “profound reforms to children and families, housing, young people, employment and immigration” have in fact been delivered – and then that the next party leader should have “a proven track record of delivery”, implying that the current leader doesn’t. And of course, McKinnell doesn’t linger over what those ‘profound reforms’ actually are, whether they were enacted willingly or after a public commitment not to do so, or even (whisper it) whether they were all good things (which I rather doubt in the case of immigration).

That just leaves ‘connecting with voters’ as what the Prime Minister can’t do and why he has to go: specifically, ‘an ability to connect with voters on the left, right and centre’. Politics makes a late showing at this point, but only in the form of convictions inconveniently held by people whose votes Labour might want. The party leader should be above all that – with no particular convictions of their own – and should be able to ‘connect’ equally, and make Labour’s case with equal facility, to voters on the left, on the right or in those bourgie Lib Dem areas. What the case for voting Labour actually is – and why those voters shouldn’t just vote for left-wing candidates, right-wing candidates or bourgie Lib Dems, as they did this time round – remains unclear: “look what we’ve delivered,” presumably. (“Oh, you don’t feel we are delivering. Sounds like we need to work on connecting with you! Thanks for the feedback!”)

I’m sorry for all those local councillors with “decades of public service” behind them who lost their seats to Green paper candidates (there was one in our ward), and especially those who lost to Reform racists. We can’t afford a Farage government – and, with the best will in the world, the Greens aren’t going to be ready to win a General Election by 2029 – so the (short- to medium-term) future has to be Labour. But the party really can’t go on like this.

Up till the 2019 election, Newcastle N and Sedgefield had been Labour since 1983; Redcar had had that five-year Lib Dem blip in the 2010s, but had otherwise been Labour since Feb 1974; and Wakefield had been Labour since 1932. These were ideal conditions for the flourishing of a particular kind of Labour mentality, which I think of as ‘politics as a service’. It’s based on the assumption that Labour politicians at whatever level – from an individual councillor up to Cabinet ministers – are essentially there as managers. Their job is to deliver incremental improvements where possible, but primarily just to keep things running: apply the rules, sort out disputes as they arise, and then get out of the way and let people get on with their lives. Phrases like ‘delivering for our people’ are often used. The biggest threat to this way of being a Labour politician – and hence this kind of politician’s greatest bugbear – is the Left, with its wild dreams of transforming the system and its weird preoccupation with issues that don’t centre on delivering for our people.

This mentality and its believers got a new lease of life from New Labour – which did call for transforming the system, but not in ways that the Left wanted – just as all those existing Labour majorities got a handy bump. The trouble was that New Labour’s remedies only seemed both appealing and adequate for a limited amount of time: once past the Great Financial Crisis, the only modernisation Blair’s epigones seemed to be offering involved the dismantling of protections New Labour itself had brought in. Since the built-in hostility to the Left ruled out looking for renewal from that quarter, the old Labour mentality was left with nothing to offer other than the promise of competent management. If you want more from your elected representatives than keeping things running pretty much as they are, these aren’t going to be the politicians for you. And, as we approach ten years after Brexit and twenty after the GFC, people increasingly don’t want things to stay pretty much as they are.

I’m sure the MPs I’ve been focusing on are hard-working and well-liked constituency MPs; indeed, I don’t follow politics in the North East at all closely, so for all I know McKinnell and the others may have been involved in all kinds of interesting initiatives. But the story told by Labour’s polling and election results is clear. Looking at those huge (but gradually declining) majorities, against the context of everything else that was going on in the period, makes me visualise a rock in a turbulent stream: a rock of complacent entitlement, stolidly resisting the stream of politics. The one time that it looked like Labour was going to acknowledge the stream and work with it – 2015-19 – resistance was simply redoubled. But the stream has been wearing the rock down all this time; anyone trying to run a Labour government now starts with much less credit with the public than they would once have taken for granted, and might still expect.

Keir Starmer was not the start of something new but the resumption of a long history of decline – decline in the sheer capacity of a certain kind of Labour politics to understand the world and act on it, as well as decline in popular support for the party. The local election results demonstrate how far the second of these has gone; McKinnell’s letter, the first. If Labour is going to have a future – and right now we need Labour to have a future – it needs to break with this history, with the ‘politics as a service’ mentality and with the complacency and entitlement that go with it; it needs to forget about managing business as usual and embrace political conflict, taking the side of the exploited, the excluded, the oppressed. The conflicts won’t be hard to find: they’ve been going on all this time.

March culture post

May already? Blimey. I’ll catch up at some point, possibly. In the mean time here’s March.

In March I read (or finished)

Christopher Brookmyre, The Cracked Mirror, One fine day in the middle of the night

The Cracked Mirror opens in a Scottish village where an elderly lady seems to know about everything that goes on, to the point where the local police regularly consult her on unsolved murders. We then go to Los Angeles, where a hard-bitten, hard-drinking police detective is pursuing a case that his superiors seem to want to shut down. How these two meet – and in what fictional universe – is the real subject of the book. One fine day (etc) is also an odd stylistic collision: a gruffly macho hostage/siege scenario, but played out in a not even slightly macho school reunion – Die Hard scripted by Liane Moriarty. If you like reading about machine guns, ammunition and body armour, with breaks to catch up on who got off with who in year eleven and who never forgave them, this is the book for you.

Nicci French, Beneath the Skin, Land of the Living, What happened that night

The setup of What happened that night, the most recent Nicci French novel, is an interesting riff on Gerrard and French’s recurrent trope of big gangs of friends from university days having increasingly ill-advised parties. A convicted murderer, released on licence after twenty years, reunites the people – formerly a big gang of friends, etc – who had been together the night of the murder, with the intention of finding out who actually did it. It not being him. Now read on… I approached 2003’s Land of the Living with some trepidation, having got the impression that it told the stories of three successive women abducted by a serial killer, with the first two stories ending (à la Bunker Diaries) in the woman’s death. Actually there’s only one woman, and she lives; happy ending, relatively speaking! 2000’s Beneath the Skin, however, tells the stories of three successive women with the same stalker, and two of them don’t make it. So that was grim.

Reginald Hill, Child’s play
I’m persevering with the Dalziel and Pascoe series but finding them increasingly artificial, played out within the bounds of their own conventions; it’s a game that Hill plays much less ambitiously than Brookmyre or even Gerrard & French. The impression isn’t helped by the plot of this one being straight out of Victorian melodrama: a disputed will, complete with rival claimants and a returning heir, long presumed dead. Also, Pascoe’s both intellectual and ineffectual, his wife’s a Guardian-reading liberal feminist, and Dalziel is gross and boorish but turns out to be not only smarter but also more liberal than anybody thought. So that’s nice.

Kazuo Ishiguro, A pale view of hills
Ishiguro’s more or less disowned this book, which I re-read in preparation for seeing the film (see below). Wrongly, I think; the narrative voice is one of Ishiguro’s best (and most unreliable). The reader’s ultimately left with a superposition of possible interpretations that’s genuinely impossible to resolve.

Jacqueline Harpman, I who have never known men
Speaking of The Bunker Diaries… This is the story of a group of women who are held prisoner by a smaller group of men, although nobody can remember how they got there; the narrator, a young girl, thinks she may have been included by mistake. It’s a very strange story, and grows stranger after the women escape.

Francis Spufford, Nonesuch
Just your average resourceful-heroine Home Front story. Specifically, a resourceful stock-trader heroine Home Front story, with secret scientific research. Also featuring jazz clubs and Bright Young Things and Fascist traitors; it’s a resourceful stock-trader heroine, secret scientific research, jazz clubs and Bright Young Things and Fascist traitors Home Front story. With Crowleyan magick and a secret London, and alternative timelines. And if anyone can bring off a resourceful stock-trader heroine, secret scientific research, jazz clubs, Bright Young Things and Fascist traitors, Crowleyan magick, secret London and alternative timelines Home Front story, Francis Spufford can. It’s also ‘to be continued’, which, having read it, is good news – although, having read it, I’m blowed if I can see how.

Also in March, I watched these films:

If I Had Legs I’d Kick You (Mary Bronstein 2025)
Bringing up a small child is difficult, particularly when the father’s away and you’ve got a full-time job. It’s particularly difficult when the child has a life-changing eating disorder, especially if you’re drinking too much, you’re not sleeping, and the ceiling’s just fallen in. Intense & powerful – the device of never showing the child on screen was very effective – but what it was more broadly ‘about’ I’m not sure.

The Running Man (Edgar Wright 2025)
Edgar Wright’s made some great films, but this isn’t one of them. A mess, sadly – flashy, lumbering and incoherent, like a dystopian sf movie made by someone who’s never read any dystopian sf.

Crime 101 (Bart Layton 2026)
A tight, well-written ‘to catch a thief’ drama, with more to it than meets the eye – the characterisation of Chris Hemsworth’s jewel thief is surprisingly complex – and the added wild-card element of Barry Keoghan playing, essentially, a young Tim Roth (think The Hit or especially The Firm).

The Testament of Ann Lee (Mona Fastvold 2025)
I’m fascinated by religious movements offering salvation in this world, and the Shakers’ combination of community, celibacy and dance is particularly compelling. The film was a bit of a disappointment, though. Fastvold’s decision to make it as a musical was bold, but blurred too many lines: sometimes it seemed that we were watching what the Shakers actually did at their services, at other times what the participants believed they were doing – and at other times we were unmistakably watching musical numbers evoking the Shakers through the medium of interpretive dance. Fatally, the film didn’t seem very interested in the beliefs or the religious practices of the Shaker community; newcomers to the history would learn surprisingly little.

Sound of Falling (Mascha Schilinski 2025)
If I’d left this film half-way through, I would probably have said it was powerful and vividly strange, with beautiful visuals and an extraordinary, enveloping soundtrack, but that it didn’t really work as a whole. Something clicked for me about half an hour from the end, making me feel retrospectively that it hung together a lot better than I’d thought; it worked even better when I’d left the cinema and read a bit about it on Wikipedia. On reflection I should probably watch it again.

The Bride! (Maggie Gyllenhaal 2026)
This, on the other hand, didn’t work at all, but it was still an absolute blast. As you’ll be aware, Viktor Frankenstein refused to make a female companion for the monster. In this version of the story, the monster waited out the next fifty years in Chicago, becoming a movie buff in the process, until he could find someone who would do the job. However, the body they used had been possessed by the discarnate spirit of Mary Shelley (yes I know, just go with it), and the Bride’s consequent rebel stance meant that things rapidly got rather Bonnie and Clyde, while also getting more than a bit #MeToo. No, it doesn’t make sense. It was a lot of fun, though.

Resurrection (Bi Gan 2025)
Another “check Wikipedia on leaving the cinema” film, although in this case Wikipedia wasn’t very enlightening. Technically an absolute tour de force – an opening sequence midway between Georges Méliès and Guy Maddin gives way to a noirer-than-noir gangster sequence, followed in turn by a Tibetan Buddhist two-hander reminiscent of Kurosawa, a Paper Moon plot shot in realist Technicolour and a neon-soaked urban vampire love story. But the individual sections were often hard to follow – not helped, at least for this viewer, by the supernatural elements woven through all of them – and what it all added up to was beyond me.

Midwinter Break (Polly Findlay 2026)
A quiet, slow-moving film about a late-middle-aged relationship coming apart… perhaps. Very good on long-term couples’ routines, and on the recurring irritations, unbridgeable differences and unrecoverable losses that can be quietly ignored for years on end, until suddenly (perhaps) they can’t. A film like this stands or falls on the acting, and both Lesley Manville and an unrecognisably shlubby Ciarán Hinds are quietly superb.

A Pale View of Hills (Kei Ishikawa 2025)
A surprisingly well-executed adaptation of a surprisingly complex book. I felt Ishikawa should have had the courage of Ishiguro’s convictions, though; there was a lot of added business, often involving relatively minor characters. A more tightly focused film wouldn’t necessarily have been thinner (see previous).

Ready Or Not (Tyler Gillett and Matt Bettinelli-Olpin 2019)
We re-watched this in preparation for the sequel. Like the folk song that ends with the line “Don’t go sailing with a murderer”, the life advice this film offers is unlikely to be useful to many; still, “don’t marry into a family that has made a pact with the Devil” is certainly better advice than the reverse. Does what it says on the tin, but does it with energy and flair.

Good Boy (Jan Komasa 2025)
In which Chris and Kathryn, two parents with grief in their past (Stephen Graham and Andrea Riseborough), take charge of Tommy, a young man who’s gone off the rails (Anson Boon) and introduce him to the better things in life – literature, classical music, good food and above all good manners. Meanwhile they keep him chained up in the basement, for his own and everyone else’s safety. It’s not a horror film exactly, although the scene in which Chris disciplines Tommy – “Bad boy! Bad boy!” – will stay with me. It reminded me oddly of Never Let Me Go; there’s a sense in both that an individual person’s life is unique and precious, but at the same time malleable to the point of being interchangeable with any other. (Who can replace a man? Anybody, with another man.)

 

Yer Blues (5): Like any other candidate

This is the fifth and (hopefully) last in an occasional series of posts about Your Party. This one’s about two recent announcements, concerning dual membership and candidate selection for the local elections. Together, I think they tell us a lot about which way the party’s heading.

Your Party has had a difficult birth – unnecessarily difficult in many identifiable ways, but also necessarily, unavoidably difficult. At the local ‘proto-branch’ meeting I attended, it rapidly became clear that some big structural questions needed to be answered, and that it wasn’t going to be possible to build the party in any meaningful sense until they were. And so it has proved.

What’s at stake is the relationship between five relatively small groups and two large ones:

  1. the steering group driving the formation of the new party, whose membership is not known but apparently consists of Jeremy Corbyn and allies from his Labour Party days such as Karie Murphy
  2. the elected Central Executive Committee, whose membership is known and which is dominated by Corbyn and his supporters
  3. ‘independent’ politicians committed to YP, including the pro-Gaza independent MPs elected in 2024 and various groups of councillors who have left Labour
  4. those Left parties and party-type groups which have taken an interest in the Your Party project, with memberships ranging from four figures down to two
  5. the people, drawn partly from those groups and partly from post-Corbyn exile from the Labour Party, who have responded to calls to build Your Party branches

and

  1. the much larger (50,000+) paid-up membership of Your Party
  2. the even larger (800,000+) constituency of people potentially interested in joining the party

Building Your Party branches is obviously going to involve group A, and with any luck some of group B. But how is it going to happen – and who’s going to make it happen? Those of us who came together as ‘proto-branches’ (group 5) naturally hoped that we could do it, with a bit of help (and authorisation) from group 1. Initially, we thought this would be a relatively simple matter: get the centre to send us a membership list for the constituency, do some mailouts, invite people along to meetings and so forth. This turned out not to be possible, for reasons I’ll come on to in a moment.

This left the proto-branches with two alternatives. One was the decidedly challenging (and costly) route of bypassing the centre by making themselves known in their areas, and appealing to local members of groups A and B to come along and join them; statistically those people have to be out there, after all. There has been a bit of activity on that front, but the emphasis has fallen more and more on the second alternative: this involved the proto-branches co-ordinating among themselves – with the aid of the structures and personnel of the Left groups (group 4) – to form something in the shape of a network of branches, ready to be brought to more active life at such time as the centre authorised the infusion of a larger membership from group A.

The trouble is that groups 1 and 2 – the steering group and the CEC – have shown no sign of being willing to help this process along, or (frankly) to let it happen at all. They’ve ignored or rejected all requests to circulate membership lists, citing legal considerations or simply stonewalling. Nor does this attitude seem likely to change. In fact the proto-branches are currently (not to put too fine a point on it) under attack, by way of measures aimed at the other Left organisations (group 4).

The question at issue here is dual membership: being a member of YP while also being a member of the SWP, the AWL or what have you. Repeated attempts have been made to ban dual membership of Your Party, particularly at – and, indeed, just before – the inaugural YP conference. The fudge that was agreed at the conference stops short of an automatic ban, but not very far short; replicating one of the worst features of Labour Party disciplinary structures, it is left to YP’s governing bodies to compile a list of those specific groups with which dual membership is disallowed.

We’re now seeing the effect of that policy, when combined with the dominance of the CEC by Corbyn’s ‘The Many’ group. In a previous post I highlighted some frankly sectarian comments from the ‘The Many’ during the CEC elections, saying that they “rais[ed] the ludicrous prospect of a purge of the Left”. Ludicrous or not, the guy who was smeared as a Trot and kicked out of his party seems to be happy to oversee precisely that – a purge of the Left, aiming to kick the Trots out of his party.

This truly wretched series of articles from “Your Party Voices” sets out the thinking, if it can be called that. Here you can learn all about the SWP, the SP, the AWL, the RCP (Not That One) and four other organisations. Specifically, that link will take you to a handy summary of what’s wrong with all eight groups: how some of them stand candidates in elections (red flag: electoral conflict with YP!), some have their own internal disciplinary structures (red flag: organisational conflict!), and some – you may want to sit down at this point – actually support socialist revolution (horrors! ideological conflict!).

It doesn’t get any better after that. A series of individual articles works painstakingly through these organisations, stressing that they are all different and that they all have good socialists among their members, people who would be an asset to YP. But it’s a foregone conclusion: no group that stands candidates in elections can possibly have dual membership with YP (the more positive option of proposing this to those groups as a condition of continued dual membership isn’t mentioned). As for the groups that don’t contest elections, well, all this talk of communist revolution, it’s not quite the thing, is it? Besides, organisational discipline – members all voting the same way? sub-groups of members electing their own leaders, then following them instead of Jerthe elected leadership of YP? We can’t really have that, can we? Again, there’s no discussion of finding ways to make dual membership work constructively, or ways to offset the influence of disciplined sub-groups of members; repeatedly, the articles go straight for the nuclear option, essentially arguing that dual membership can’t be allowed because – and for as long as – it causes divided loyalties. (More than one of these articles suggests that members of Party X are perfectly welcome to join YP: they just need to leave Party X, or preferably dissolve it entirely. The bland solicitude with which this intransigently hostile suggestion is offered adds insult to injury.)

The ‘organisational conflict’ criterion – based on the assumption that dual membership means divided loyalties – is key to this argument; it provides a ready-made reason to ban every organisation on the list. Which is not surprising: members of any organisation, from the Catholic Church to the RSPB, are liable to be called on to do something for that organisation at some point. What’s being proposed is essentially a blanket ban applied at the leadership’s discretion – the discretionary element being represented by the approved list of banned groups. And that list – like the British government’s list of proscribed ‘terrorist’ groups – could be extended. So far there’s been no reference to RS21 or Socialist Resistance (or Counterfire, but I think that may be because they’ve already left) – but if they came to the notice of the leadership in the wrong way that could change overnight. Indeed, the same logic would make it possible to bring the ban-hammer down on internal groups within YP – like, oh say for instance, Grassroots Left.

Clearly, no branch-building process led by the proto-branches is going to be permitted; instead, the membership of those proto-branches is being depleted, divided and demoralised. What kind of branches – and what kind of party-building process – will we get instead? What I suppose we must call the Corbynite leadership’s vision seems to centre on group 3: let independent councillors and MPs gravitate towards Your Party, let members and supporters gravitate towards their local independent councillors and MPs, and the party will grow by a process of agglomeration, a bit like the process of planetary formation (and with the same quality of smaller bodies revolving around the larger ones). This would not be a spontaneous or unguided process, however; YP centrally would remain in control of who was admitted to the party and on what terms. For rank-and-file members not blessed with a local independent councillor or MP, the advice seems to be “sit tight”. As for those 800,000 people in group B, well, we can get back to recruiting them when we’ve got things set up properly.

In an earlier post I distinguished between seeing a branch as an “electoral support system” and seeing it as a “community organisation … bring[ing] together activists in the area, across or outside party lines”, a project which I associated both with Corbyn and with Jamie Driscoll (now of the Green Party). In practice this now looks like a false opposition. At least, Corbyn’s idea of a community organisation – and of YP as a federation of such organisations – seems to look a lot like an electoral support system for an independent MP or councillor, with YP as an umbrella group for suitably-approved independents.

Looking at how this approach is playing out in the forthcoming local elections, I have to say it’s getting a bit Underpants Gnome: I can see what the leadership is doing, but I can’t see how it’s going to lead to building a party. In the May elections there will be approximately 200 candidates associated with Your Party, contesting seats in 39 local authorities. Specifically:

  • 24 Your Party candidates, contesting seats in 15 local authorities
  • 26 independent candidates endorsed by Your Party, contesting seats in 17 local authorities
  • 13 named groups of candidates endorsed by Your Party, contesting seats in 14 local authorities, with a total of 250+ candidates (updated 30/4 and 7/5 – thanks to Josephine in comments)

The great majority of ‘named group’ candidates – 200+ – are accounted for by five groups: Newham Community Independents, Aspire, Redbridge Independents, Your Bradford and Ealing Community Independents. (again, updated 30/4 – thanks JG)

I haven’t been able to get a precise figure for the number of candidates, particularly in the last category. This is for a variety of reasons. One is that groups of assorted ‘community independents’, while they are doubtless hard-working individuals and an asset to their local areas, tend not to have the organisational focus and work discipline of (oh say for example) Trotskyist cadre; while some of the ‘independent’ groups endorsed by Your Party have announced how many candidates they’re standing in May, others haven’t. Another issue is that the boundaries of the ‘independent’ groups are less than clear. Enfield Community Independents, for example, are standing 17 candidates and endorsing another 10 independent candidates: should we consider the ten independents as endorsed (transitively) by Your Party, or not?

Nor is the scope of YP’s direct endorsements always clear. An announcement from Walsall Community Independents that they had YP support was swiftly contradicted after it emerged that the Walsall group includes former Tories. Under ‘Walsall’ in the official YP list of candidates, we now read that YP endorses ‘Palfrey & The Delves Independents’ and three independent candidates. But this is double counting: Palfrey & The Delves is a ward, and it’s the ward where those three independent candidates are standing. In Oldham, meanwhile, YP have endorsed Shabir Hussain and Sony Shah, describing them as ‘independents’. However, Hussain and Shah are standing as part of The Oldham Group, alongside five other candidates (while an eighth candidate describes himself as ‘Workers Party – Oldham Group’). Clear it ain’t. (NB Some updates to this and the next few paragraphs 7/5 in the light of recently-published information.)

It would have been a lot simpler if YP-approved independents had been required to join the party and change their designation on the ballot paper accordingly. This need not have been at the expense of their former ‘community’ identity: British electoral law permits a six-word description, so it would have been perfectly possible to use “Enfield Community Independents – Your Party” or similar. But this is very much not the way the YP leadership is thinking, as the situation in Islington makes clear. Islington is partly covered by Corbyn’s constituency; up to now he’s been working with the Islington Community Independents (ICI). There are nine ICI candidates standing in May, along with ten plain old Independents. A couple of months ago, ICI registered several different six-word extended versions of their name, including “Islington Community Independents – For The Many”, “Islington Community Independents – Empowering Your Community” and “Islington Community Independents – People Before Profit”. All of those three will appear on ballot papers in May; they’re being used by six, two and one of the nine candidates respectively.

But this is where it gets a bit odd. There are no Your Party candidates in Islington; not only that, Your Party’s list of candidates doesn’t mention Islington Community Independents. Instead, for Islington it simply lists “three independent candidates”. Rumour has it that there’s been a split in ICI, with the majority favouring merging with the local proto-branch and building a YP branch on that basis. It’s certainly the case that neither ICI nor any of its candidates is endorsed by YP; the three who are endorsed are running against ICI, as no-label Independents. So we’ve got an established group of community-based independents, disowned by Your Party, who want to take the Your Party name, connect with YP activists locally and start building a branch – and a smaller (possibly much smaller) group, endorsed by Your Party, who are loyal to the YP leadership but want to maintain a nebulous arm’s-length ‘community independent’ existence. It’s worse than Life of Brian. Something similar seems to have happened in Newham, where the centre has endorsed the ‘Newham Independents Party’ in the teeth of the local YP proto-branch – which has abandoned YP and now operates as the North East London Solidarity Network.

If Your Party’s various candidates and affiliates do badly on May 7th, I think the project really is over: as far as we can make out the leadership have bet everything on this (they certainly haven’t bet anything on anything else). But suppose they do well. Suppose that all 24 Your Party candidates get elected and all 26 YP-endorsed independents. (This will give Greater Manchester, for example, a grand total of five YP or YP-adjacent councillors, shared across Manchester, Salford, Stockport and Tameside.) 50 new councillors getting elected, across 28 councils, is hardly going to make a ripple on those councils (let alone nationally), so let’s roll the dice again and get a bunch of independents elected. Suppose that it’s a great night for Arise Harrow, for Lydiate and Maghull Independents, for Enfield Community Independents and the independents they endorse; suppose it’s a Your Party clean sweep (or at least a group-endorsed-by-Your-Party clean sweep) in Newham and Tower Hamlets.

What happens then? I can only see two possibilities. One is that the successes of Aspire, the Newham Independents and all the rest are strongly associated with Your Party. I’m not sure how that strong association is going to be made – all those independents aren’t likely to rebadge as Your Party after the elections if they didn’t do so before – but let’s just assume, in an Underpants Gnome style, that when the dust settles everyone looks at Lydiate and Maghull Independents and thinks ‘Lydiate and Maghull Independents – Your Party’, and so on around the country. What then? Having a party label wouldn’t change the way those ‘community independents’ work (i.e. independently): for that to happen there would need to be an infrastructure to hold them to account – which would mean building branches, which in our case we have not got. Longer-term, all the agonising decisions those groups would have to make to run a council without adequate funding would be hung around Your Party’s neck, compounded by all the mistakes inexperienced politicians are liable to make and all the political calls they get wrong (and they will get things wrong). I can’t see that being a good way to build a new party.

But what’s far more likely is the second possibility, which is that most of those groups will thank Your Party for its help in getting them elected, then quietly forget about it and go back to being community independents. (The whole point of being in a local independent non-party group is not to be part of a national party, after all.) In which case the whole exercise will seem to have been a bit pointless.

Either way, May’s results aren’t going to bring the people at large flocking to Your Party, or even bring the lost 800,000 of group B flocking back. As for Your Party branches, it looks like they just aren’t going to get built. Which in turn means that the party won’t get built – at least, not as anything other than a fan club for the leader, Forza Italia / Reform UK-style.

Whether slowly or fast, I’m afraid Your Party is going nowhere.

You can find my earlier posts on Your Party here:

Yer Blues(1): What’s Bin Did (October 2025)
On the formation of the new party and the hopes it raised
“Even while writing this post I’ve had the urge to write some formulation like “…which raises some interesting issues”, and immediately felt wretched – the whole point of actually launching an actual party was that we were actually going to do something”

Yer Blues(2): The local news (November 2025)
What it’s been like on the ground: the first couple of meetings of what isn’t as yet a branch
“While to begin with we were all members of the Labour Party, under Starmer’s leadership some of us were expelled and most of the rest drifted away. … But the network endured – even when it had outlived its original purpose of organising within the Labour Party – and the first meeting of people interested in Your Party in the Withington constituency grew out of this network”

Yer Blues(3): Why a branch? (December 2025)
Should YP be modelled on the contemporary Labour Party or the party as it was in the 1990s – or the Italian Communist Party of the 1940s?
“I think we should do whatever we can to make our local branch(-to-be) more like a transmission belt to whatever’s going on locally, and less like a hierarchical node in a structure like an organisational chart … I hate to say it, but I really think we need to go to the people, or at least think seriously about what that would mean.”

Yer Blues(4): Oh, Jeremy Corbyn (March 2026)
Some things that Corbyn’s supporters (myself included) should have learnt from his leadership of the Labour Party
“A politician who puts their own beliefs and principles above relationship-building is not going to be a reliable member of a collective project … A politician like that may have followers, but they won’t have many allies – not for long, anyway.”

February culture post

In February I read (or finished)

Reginald Hill, A Killing Kindness, DeadheadsExit Lines

I’m still working my way through Hill’s Dalziel and Pascoe series. The ingenuity of the plotting and the unillusioned bleakness of the setting keep me interested, and they’re a quick read. What does become rather wearing over the series is the authorial political standpoint – a rather cake-having combination of unimpeachably liberal attitudes, on one hand, and worldly mockery of the delicate flowers who advocate them on the other. Ellie Pascoe, in particular, is a Guardian-reading, police-hating liberal from Central Casting; her repartee with Peter ditto is less His Girl Friday, more Millie Tant. But Hill keeps finding new angles on the characters, the format or both, as when A Killing Kindness confronts the cynical but low-stakes worldliness of Andy Dalziel with the unapologetic evil of a serial killer. Deadheads for its part doesn’t even seem to have a crime: people die in car accidents all the time, after all, and anyone can fall off a ladder – and if some unrelated person’s path through life is smoother as a result, well, some people are just lucky. Chilling, and definitely a step up. Exit Lines is less impressive; its setup involves three old men dying on the same night, and the chapters are headed with ‘last words’ (a.k.a. exit lines). It kept me reading, but did rather give the impression that Hill was doing tricks to keep himself interested.

Sarah Perry, Death of an Ordinary Man
There’s an odd vignette about halfway through this book, when – some time after the death of her father-in-law – Perry goes to a reception and talks to another woman who lets slip that she has an elderly relative who doesn’t have much time left. Perry grips her arm, looks in her eye and tells her, You’ll be fine. You think you won’t know what to do, but when the time comes you’ll know. Trust me! In retrospect she realises that this wasn’t entirely appropriate. This is a tremendously honest book, focusing on things that a lot of us know about, but that rarely get talked about: the way the identity of a person dying both remains and is worn away; the way the last few weeks and days expand into years, not unlike the first days and weeks after a birth; the depths of the despair that you navigate, and the irrational flashes of overpowering confidence that sometimes come with it (you’ll be fine!). A valuable book.

Seicho Matsumoto, Tokyo Express
I don’t know if there was a Japanese Golden Age of crime fiction, but this is from that period and in that style, ‘ticket-stubs and timetables’ police-procedural sub-variety – albeit with a broader streak of politics than Dorothy Sayers usually allowed herself. A scene that’s stayed with me has our detective asking his superior how they’ll proceed if a certain rather senior civil servant turns out to be involved. Don’t worry about him! the superior laughs reassuringly. By this he turns out to mean “don’t worry about him, we’ve got no chance of touching someone like that”.

Martin Edwards (ed.), Silent Nights
A British Library anthology of Christmas-themed crime stories, bought as a Christmas present (from me, as it happens, but the recipient was fine about taking turns reading it). It’s an assortment of relatively familiar pieces and stories by now-forgotten authors, some of which were real discoveries (Marjorie Bowen is an author to look out for, albeit not necessarily under that name). One or two did leave me unsurprised that they had been forgotten, though – the mystery that’s solved when the detective spots a tell-tale knee print, in particular.

qntm, There is No Antimemetics Division
The first novel to have begun life on the SCP site; you could say it’s escaped containment, ho ho. SCP is a collaborative site dedicated to the SCP Foundation and the anomalous objects and entities it contains; ‘SCP’ stands both for ‘Special Containment Procedures’ and for the Foundation’s motto, ‘Secure, Contain, Protect’. Building on a strand of sf dealing with memetic anomalies/dangers/attacks, this novel proposes antimemetic anomalies: entities that variously shield themselves by attacking the observer’s memory, propagate by spreading through observers’ minds or simply feed on knowledge. They are mind-bendingly dangerous (literally) and extremely difficult to contain or control, for reasons that can be summed up by a line from the blurb:
“Welcome to the Antimemetics Division. This is not your first day.”
Hard sf it ain’t, of course, but the author very effectively builds a world and works within it. My favourite works of fiction inhabit a borderland between literary fiction, sf and horror – a bit Aickman, a bit M. John Harrison, a bit The Unconsoled – and this is right in that area. qntm (a.k.a. Sam Hughes) is a writer to keep an eye on.

Uketsu, Strange Pictures
Another escapee from Online – Uketsu is the professional name of an otherwise anonymous Japanese YouTuber, specialising in weird and surreal short films. The pictures are strange, but the fiction wasn’t as strange as I would have liked, and the book’s rather short (“the food here’s terrible, and such small portions!”). Also there’s a strong puzzle-solving element, which makes it a bit of a one-shot read. Interesting, though, and decidedly different. Both this and TINAD were Christmas presents, incidentally, and well-chosen ones – I probably wouldn’t have picked them up otherwise.

Graeme Macrae Burnet, Benbecula
This short book (part of the Darkland Tales series) is about a seemingly motiveless murder in a rural community; it’s based on a real case, and its telling puts us in the head of a disturbed man (although not the murderer). In short, if you’ve read His Bloody Project, this is quite similar. It’s vividly written and tells us a lot about the hard life of Scottish islanders in the 19th century, but I wouldn’t really say I was glad to have read it.

Adrian Tchaikovsky, Saturation Point
Another short book, and the first thing I’d read by Tchaikovsky. A climate-change horror story, in which a scientific mission – not all of whose motives may be equally high-minded – ventures into the equatorial zone, where both heat and humidity now make it impossible for humans to survive. This is hard sf, up to a point, and engagingly done. As for what’s beyond that point, at strategic intervals Tchaikovsky rather endearingly has characters refer dismissively to “Ballardian BS”, “Strugatsky BS”, “Island of Dr Moreau BS” and “Innsmouth BS” – all of which sources he cites in an afterword (and without the ‘BS’).

Also in February, I watched these films:

The History of Sound (Oliver Hermanus 2025)
Coming out of this film, my immediate response was to nitpick – why did it go on so long, and in so many different time-frames, after the central story was over? Why did Lionel, the central character, have to be a world-class classical singer as well as a folk song enthusiast? If Lionel was such a wonderful singer, wouldn’t it have been better if David – a mere music student – didn’t also have a perfectly good voice? And if Lionel was going to sing David something he didn’t know, surely he’d dig a bit deeper than The Silver Dagger… In short, I loved it. Josh O’Connor is good rather than great, but Paul Mescal is back (after Hamnet) to doing what he does best – which is to say, being still for the camera in a way that’s magnetically watchable. What’s remarkable about the film is that the two men’s clandestine love story is at its core, and their song-collecting expedition – the singers they hear, the songs they record – is also at its core: the central story, an episode like nothing else in either man’s life, is vivid, intense and deeply moving.

Nouvelle Vague (Richard Linklater 2025)
A lot of fun, and a good film to see soon after seeing A bout de souffle. (A lot more fun than A bout de souffle, we could also say.) Does the seemingly impossible by making Jean-Luc Godard seem like an impatient young man who genuinely had some good ideas, and also like a pretentious, egotistical twerp. I particularly liked the scene where the Jean Seberg character gets changed under her nightdress; apparently Godard suggested this solely because the film’s producers had turned up to watch the scene being shot, in the hope of getting a look at Seberg topless. No boobies for you today, gentlemen!

Send Help (Sam Raimi 2025)
Also a lot of fun, although otherwise it had very little in common with Nouvelle Vague (truly, cinema is a land of contrasts). It really is “Castaway meets Misery“, but with a better sense of humour than either of them – and a lot more gore. And Amy Adams is great – it’s her film. Ideally it would have been called No Help Is Coming – that’s what it’s about, from start to end – but I guess negatives in titles give off bad vibes.

Hamlet (Aneil Karia 2025)
Possibly not the best production of Hamlet I’ve ever seen, but definitely in the top two. Riz Ahmed has spoken about being given Hamlet to read by an English teacher, after he complained that what they were reading wasn’t relevant, and being blown away by it: something’s wrong with the world and this guy’s the only one who sees it! and everyone’s gaslighting him and saying everything’s fine, and they treat him like he’s mad! and maybe he is mad… I’m not saying that’s a totally adequate reading of Hamlet (although it’s a damn sight better than what we saw in Hamnet), but it’s very powerful, particularly when you’ve got an actor as courageous as Ahmed in the lead. Karia made some great choices in adapting it, too, from merging Horatio into Ophelia to staging the play at Claudio’s wedding (which, combined, gave the “country matters” lines excruciating new life). Strongly recommended.

Iron Man 3 (Shane Black 2013), Shang-Chi and the Ten Rings (Destin Daniel Cretton 2021)
Background watching for the Wonder Man series on Disney+ (recommended), or re-watching in the case of Iron Man 3. They were both fine, and Shang-Chi did as promised have some nice martial arts/wirework sequences. The connection between Shang-Chi and the rest of the MCU turned out to be rather tenuous, though, as the mysterious Oriental Coming Race superbeings at its heart have as one of their superpowers remaining hidden from the world and having no contact with it whatsoever. While it does explain their non-appearance on the evening news, this makes it hard to forge many connections between what happens to them and any other plotlines we may be aware of. Marvel have had this problem before, more than once – Wakanda, Kamar-Taj, Afterlife – and dealt with it by either (a) introducing imperialism or (b) destroying the place. Good luck, Ta Lo!

The Secret Agent (Kleber Mendonça Filho 2025)
Is this:

  1. a vivid reconstruction of everyday life under a corrupt south American dictatorship
  2. a meditation on time, memory, trauma, death and survival
  3. a dark political thriller that gets darker as it goes on
  4. a deadpan surreal comedy in the school of Chris Morris or David Lynch
  5. a whirlwind, white-knuckle ride of a movie – a blast from start to end

Wrong answers only.

It’s actually all five. It missed out at the Oscars to Sentimental Value, which I think was the wrong call (although that is a great film), but it won’t be forgotten; it’s an astonishing piece of work.

So, farewell then, February! With any luck I might even get round to March before the end of April. Next: probably some more Your Party stuff, hélas.

A hawk from a handsaw

In which I scratch an itch that started bugging me nearly three months ago, and sadly hasn’t gone away: the film HAMNET. Which I did not like.

1. An Oscar-Winning Performance

I don’t begrudge Jessie Buckley the Best Actress Oscar (she will no doubt be relieved to hear). She was great in BeastWild Rose, Men and The Lost Daughter, although she went wildly over the top in Wicked Little Letters; just to complicate things, she was great in The Bride! while also going wildly over the top (in two different roles, three at a pinch). To my mind she also went wildly over the top in Hamnet, but getting the Oscar for that performance isn’t a problem, given that awards are (a) meaningless and (b) very often awarded for Having Been Good In A Bunch Of Stuff, which she has.

Besides, the problem with the part of Agnes wasn’t Buckley. Like bowlers in cricket, actors need to ‘get the length’ of a production – where to pitch a performance, in terms of pace, expression, irony, inwardness… One of the small pleasures of watching Twin Peaks used to be watching newly-introduced actors getting the length of David Lynch World, while veterans like Kyle McLachlan and Jack Nance carried on imperturbably around them. Jessie Buckley had the length of Hamnet – far more so than Paul Mescal, who was often closer to the hollow solemnity of Gladiator II than to the extraordinary still power he can bring to the right part (AftersunAll Of Us StrangersA History Of Sound). It was a big part, and so was her acting; if she went over the top, it was (as with The Bride!) because the film needed her to.

But this is odd. I seem to be saying that Hamnet required Jessie Buckley to go just as crazy as The Bride! or Wicked Little Letters, despite those films being a camp Gothic horror riff on Frankenstein and a foul-mouthed burlesque of village-green mysteries, respectively; it doesn’t seem like a club in which Hamnet ought to belong. (I guess all three of them are spun out of well-loved texts, so there’s that.) Moreover, if Buckley’s performance – or the film – was as wildly OTT as my reaction to it suggests, hardly anybody else seems to have noticed; reviews have been respectful at worst, rapturous at best (not to mention that Oscar).

There is a hint of a reservation in a lot of the reviews, admittedly: Buckley “can pull off the kind of scene that on paper could sound trite” (Sight and Sound); “The craft on display alone is enough to bring a tear to your eye.” (RogerEbert.com); “It is a film that moves because of the performances which are so absorbing” (a five-star review in The Guardian). Even critics who were less enthusiastic about the film – such as Mark Kermode, who found it emotionally manipulative – concur in praising the film’s artistry. Great craft, great performances; as for the material, well, never mind. But to my mind this gets it the wrong way round. My problem with the film is that I don’t think Buckley’s performance, or the undoubted directorial and cinematographic craft on display, did elevate the material; I think they were absolutely of a piece with it. Buckley did fine; the problem was Hamnet itself (directed by Chloe Zhao, screenplay co-written by Zhao and Maggie O’Farrell, adapted from her book Hamnet (which, I should say, I haven’t read)).

2. Another Gentleman Of The Same Name

To get a sense of the issues with Hamnet, let’s go back to the beginning. We know that William Shakespeare was born in 1564, the son of a glover, and Anne Hathaway in 1556, the daughter of a yeoman farmer – a step above the peasantry. We know that they married in 1582, and that their daughter Susanna (1583-1649) was born six months later; we know that twins Judith (1585-1662) and Hamnet (1585-1596) were born two years after that, that there were no more children, and that Hamnet died aged 11 and had a church burial. We also know that Anne was illiterate; that her father’s will left her the rough equivalent of £2,000, as her future dowry, when he died in 1581; that the will named her as Agnes; and that Shakespeare’s own will was (famously) amended, after it was first drafted, to leave her his ‘second best bed’. That’s about all we do know about Anne/Agnes – or about Shakespeare prior to 1592.

In 1592 Shakespeare, an actor turned playwright, seems to have been denounced anonymously by fellow writer Robert Greene, as an arrogant jack-of-all-trades and plagiarist:

an upstart crow, beautified with our feathers, that with his Tiger’s heart wrapped in a Player’s hide supposes he is as well able to bombast out a blank verse as the best of you, and, being an absolute Johannes Factotum, is in his own conceit the only Shake-scene in a country

(The italicised phrase riffs on a line from Henry VI Part 3.) The record goes quiet again after that, till in 1594 we find a 30-year-old Shakespeare as the co-owner of the Lord Chamberlain’s Men, a company which put on his plays in Shoreditch.

And, er, that’s it. For Will Shakespeare’s early life – and his life outside the theatre generally – reliable information is sparse; for Anne Shakespeare it’s basically nonexistent. (The name Agnes was widely pronounced ‘Annis’ at this time; it may have been used as a variant on ‘Anne’ or vice versa. I’m sticking to the more familiar ‘Anne’.)

People have been speculating about what might fill these gaps for centuries. While Shakespeare had (in Ben Jonson’s disapproving words) “small Latin and less Greek”, there are enough allusions to classical authors (Greek as well as Roman) in his work to prove that he wasn’t a complete ignoramus in that respect. Perhaps (as Colin Burrow has argued) this was just the profit a bright student gained from a grammar school education. Others – beginning with John Aubrey in the seventeenth century – have speculated that some of Shakespeare’s “lost years” were spent as a tutor, which would both require a basic competence in Classics and develop it through use. And then there’s the question of religion.

3. Catholic Will and the Death of Ham{ln}et

Henry VIII broke with Rome when Shakespeare’s father was still a child; by the time of Shakespeare’s birth the establishment, or imposition, of a mostly-Protestant Church of England was well under way. Catholic worship continued in some areas, in conditions of increasing clandestinity; adherence to the reformed Church – and acknowledgment of the Queen as its head – was necessary to take any part in public life. There are several invocations of – or at least hints at – Catholic themes in Shakespeare’s work, from the (apparent) references to Purgatory by the ghost of Hamlet’s father to the (possible) reference to the dissolution of the monasteries in Sonnet 73. Were these evocations of a Catholic past, or even signs of lingering Catholic loyalties on Shakespeare’s past? Evidence has been found that Shakespeare’s father John was a recusant Catholic, although the strongest piece of evidence – a document in which John Shakespeare supposedly affirmed his Catholic faith and asked to be buried with the rites of the Catholic Church – was ambiguous in its application to Shakespeare Senior, and has since been lost. Another possible scrap of evidence is the 1581 will in which the Lancashire Catholic gentleman Alexander Hoghton made a bequest to a servant named William Shakeshaft, characterised as a ‘player’ – a pseudonymous reference to a young fellow Catholic with a budding dramatic career?

Put it all together – as Stephen Greenblatt did in 2004, with his book Will in the World and the essay “The Death of Hamnet and the Making of Hamlet” – and you get quite a vivid origin story, both for Shakespeare and for Hamlet, and one on which O’Farrell acknowledges having drawn. The son of a covertly Catholic father, as a young man Will Shakespeare works – perhaps as a Latin tutor – for a Catholic gentleman in Catholic Lancashire; a year later we find him back in Warwickshire, getting Anne or Agnes Hathaway pregnant. Fourteen years on, he has the agonising experience of seeing his son buried, in the relatively austere rites of the new Church of England and without any possibility of continuing intercession for his soul, Purgatory having been eschewed along with the Pope. Does John – Hamnet’s grandfather – ask for masses to be said, perhaps covertly, for his grandson’s soul? Is Shakespeare pricked by his own conscience – or by memories of the respect he’d seen accorded the dead up in Lancashire? Four years later, Hamlet meets his father’s ghost on stage, condemned to Purgatory by the fact of having died without receiving the sacraments; was this how Shakespeare believed his own son now suffered? Or was it what he feared for his own father? (Inconveniently, perhaps, John Shakespeare was still alive at this point, dying the following year.) Or was the ghost’s purgatorial afterlife a paradoxical portrayal of the death-in-life of a bereaved father? And did Hamlet’s inwardness and indecision parallel Shakespeare’s own predicament? He too may have found that family affection and respect for his father bound him to to a course of action that could not be publicly avowed – namely, trying to ease Hamnet’s passage through Purgatory by having masses said and candles lit.

And Hamnet’s mother had a fair bit to cope with, too.

4. Capable Anne, Alone

There’s not much evidence about Anne Shakespeare, but you can do quite a lot with the absence of evidence. We know that Shakespeare had left Stratford-upon-Avon for London by 1594, that he died in Stratford-upon-Avon in 1616 and that his wife Anne died in 1623; putting these fixed points together with the lack of any evidence of Anne Shakespeare being reduced to penury in the mean time, it’s reasonable to assume that Anne kept the Stratford-upon-Avon household going for the best part of twenty years. She will almost certainly have baked bread, brewed beer and provided for the household practically in other ways – perhaps keeping chickens or a pig, perhaps keeping bees for honey or growing fruit for conserves. We don’t know, but we do know that it was normal for married women of this period to do these things, and that if they didn’t, they and their dependants would probably go without; there was no possibility of making up any shortfall by nipping out to the shops.

Along with Greenblatt, O’Farrell draws on Germaine Greer’s Shakespeare’s Wife, which is concerned to rescue Anne Shakespeare not only from the condescension of posterity but from the disdain of Stephen Greenblatt (who argued that Shakespeare used London as an escape route from an unhappy marriage). As well as leaning heavily on our knowledge of the kind of thing women of that period were likely to have done – in which she includes wine-making and herbal medicine – Greer makes full use of the absence of evidence. There is, after all, no firm evidence that Anne was illiterate all her life; surely the poet she was married to – and who had punned on her name in a sonnet – would at least have encouraged her to learn to read. (And if she could read, might she have been the addressee of some of the sonnets – the ‘Fair Youth’ whose attractions are counterposed to the aloof and imperious ‘Dark Lady’, perhaps?) The marriage may have been unhappy, but it may not; in the absence of evidence either way, why shouldn’t we assume an affectionate and supportive relationship, albeit one mostly conducted at a distance? There are no surviving letters from Shakespeare to Anne, admittedly, but then there are no surviving letters from Shakespeare to anyone. Conversely, the lack of any correspondence with Anne may indicate that Shakespeare didn’t send any money home, which in turn would mean that Anne must have been raising a bit of money by her own efforts. Perhaps she brewed beer for sale as well as for her household; perhaps she grew mulberries, kept silkworms and spun silk. We just don’t know…

5. Rewind

But that’s the problem: we don’t know. We don’t know any of it. We’ve got no evidence that Anne could read (and if she couldn’t, of course, the lack of correspondence with her husband wouldn’t be an issue). We’ve got no firm evidence that the relationship was affectionate and supportive, or that it wasn’t. In the cosmically unlikely event that a record of Anne Shakespeare’s daily routine in the late 1590s were to be found, I’d be astonished if it didn’t include both brewing and breadmaking, but we can’t be that confident about anything else. My chickens and fruit-trees, Greer’s herbal medicine and silkworms, it’s all speculation; it’s all, not to put too fine a point on it, made up.

As for Catholic Will, a ghostly emissary from Purgatory – as written by a believing Catholic – would surely be recognised as such by the grieving son who witnesses him. In Hamlet, whether the ghost is the ghost of Hamlet’s father is a major plot point – is Hamlet losing his mind? might it be a demonic visitation, trying to lure Hamlet into sin? Again, what you’d expect a visitor from Purgatory to do is yearn for Heaven and ask for his son’s prayers – not to yearn for, and ask his son to carry out, bloody eye-for-an-eye vengeance. Whatever Shakespeare’s religious beliefs may have been, Hamlet doesn’t provide evidence of orthodox Catholicism. Nor is there any evidence that Shakespeare was the ‘William Shakeshaft’ mentioned in Alexander Hoghton’s 1581 will; in fact it seems highly unlikely, given that (a) Shakespeare would have been 17 at the time (b) Lancashire was an awfully long way away from Stratford-upon-Avon and (c) there’s no need to assume that ‘Shakeshaft’ was a pseudonym at all, as it was a local surname. As for John Shakespeare’s ‘testament’… well, show me John Shakespeare’s ‘testament’. I can’t put too much weight on telling pieces of evidence that have disappeared.

Shakespeare may not even have been the ‘upstart crow’ that Greene wrote about (in which case the ‘lost years’ extend to 1594). He’s certainly not the only candidate. The ‘absence of evidence’ problem returns here. If the passage was about Shakespeare, this would suggest that Shakespeare was reasonably well-known at the time – well enough to be worth lampooning. But the argument cuts both ways: we could equally argue that the passage should be read as applying to someone we know to have been well-known, and as such that it probably wasn’t about Shakespeare. A “shake-scene” could be an actor just as much as a playwright, after all – an actor who had starred in Henry VI Part 3, perhaps. As the sceptical commentator linked to above asks, if you saw somebody being attacked with the words “so go ahead, _____, make my day”, would the name you put in the blank space be “Joseph”? It was Joseph Stinson who wrote that line, after all…

We seem to have come a long way to end up with very little. And that’s no fun at all.

6. Fast Forward

I’m not saying that O’Farrell should just have written about an illiterate farmer’s daughter who stayed at home and brewed beer while her semi-estranged husband was knocking around with actors, hack writers and aristocratic patrons in that London, even if that is how I’d ultimately sum up The Anne Shakespeare Story. I wouldn’t choose to make Anne Hathaway literate and give her a brewing business – which is why my book about her would be a lot shorter than Germaine Greer’s – but that doesn’t mean it’s not a legitimate interpretation. Both Capable Anne and Catholic Will are good stories; you could get quite quite an interesting drama out of putting them together, and one which – as Greenblatt shows – might well have the death of Hamnet at the centre of it. Put that lot on screen and, while it would definitely irk the purists, a raised eyebrow and a muttered “well, maybe…” would be as bad as it got; I wouldn’t be raving about it, but it wouldn’t have positively annoyed me.

But then, I’m not sure anyone else would be raving about it either. (Ben Elton’s All Is True filled in the gaps in the story of the Shakespeare family in some interesting ways, and nobody remembers that.) What annoys me about Hamnet is not so much that it took the Catholic Will and Capable Anne speculations as its starting-point but that it built on them, and how it built on them – and I’m afraid that in many cases it’s those additions that have given the film popular appeal.

Thinking about it subsequently I’ve been reminded of sixth-form Latin. Sometimes, after translating a line of poetry, I’d look again and find I had a word left over; I’d fit it into my translation somehow, and as often as not the teacher would sigh and say “but how could that possibly be right?”. Coincidentally, the ‘Latin class’ scene in the film is a small example of what I’m talking about. We see teenage Will tutoring a group of boys in Latin; he does this by giving them a brief passage to read, and having them read it out. Which, fair enough, might form part of Latin tuition – reading a foreign language out loud is a good test of whether you understand how the language fits together or you’re just decoding, a syllable at a time; it would be more usual for the teacher to ask the student to translate what they’d just read, though. In this case, not only do the students not translate the Latin, they all read the Latin passage together, like a choral reading of a Latin grace (you too, which college?). I can’t imagine any reason for doing this; to get any pedagogical benefit out of simple reading you’d surely want to do it one student at a time. When they get to the end of the passage, moreover, they start again and read the same passage over and over, rendering an already pointless exercise completely meaningless. That’s not right; how could that possibly be right?

7. I am not Prince Hamnet, nor was meant to be

A much more significant rewrite or embellishment is represented by the climactic scene in which Agnes joins the audience for a production of Hamlet. The play Hamlet, the character of Prince Hamlet and the name Hamnet are at the heart of Stephen Greenblatt’s extended version of the Catholic Will speculation. For Greenblatt, Hamlet – and Hamlet’s encounter with the Ghost – were significant for Catholic Will in a whole variety of interconnected ways:

  • The Ghost’s references to Purgatory show that Shakespeare still believed in it and was hence a Catholic
  • The scene dramatises the pressure Shakespeare felt to remain true to John Shakespeare’s religious beliefs (“Swear!”)
  • The scene expressed Shakespeare’s fear that Hamnet, having died without Catholic rites, was now in Purgatory
  • The scene dramatises the purgatorial state Shakespeare felt that he was in as a bereaved father
  • Hamlet’s indecision dramatises Shakespeare’s uncertainty over whether to have masses said for Hamnet
  • Hamlet’s indecision, and his inaction for most of the play, represent a new development for Shakespeare, who now for the first time was dramatising states of mind and thought processes; this was brought to a head by the thought of Hamnet’s death and (Anglican) burial, which gave him a newly heightened awareness of the complexity of his own state of mind

You have to buy into Catholic Will for most of this to make sense; if you think – as I’ve suggested earlier – that the Ghost’s references to Purgatory don’t suggest Catholicism on Shakespeare’s part, the rest of the ideas put forward here tend to drop away. But they’re interesting ideas. The last may be the strongest, at least up to the semi-colon: Greenblatt makes a very good case for the progressively more sensitive and adventurous dramatisation of mental states in Shakespeare’s plays, drawing examples from Richard III and Julius Caesar as well as Hamlet. But that in itself is a separate question from the effect of the death of Hamnet on the plays.

Having said all of that, whether or not the Ghost is in Purgatory doesn’t figure in Hamnet: O’Farrell retains Greenblatt’s focus on a Hamlet/Hamnet connection without adopting his speculations about what that connection was. Which is a problem. Remember, Hamlet is a revenge tragedy: an addition to the genre of The Spanish TragedyThe White DevilThe Changeling, The Courier’s Tragedy et al. It’s the story of a young man who wants to avenge himself on his uncle for killing his father and marrying his mother, and (in the play’s great innovation) spends most of the play not taking revenge but gathering evidence, going mad with grief and rage, or both.

The bridge that Greenblatt builds from the inwardness and indecision of Prince Hamlet to the clandestinity of recusant Catholics in Elizabethan England is long and rickety, but it is arguable (at least, if you accept the idea of Shakespeare as a recusant). O’Farrell needs there to be a bridge from Hamlet – dead father, betrayed son, indecision, madness, revenge – to the death of Hamnet considered in non-religious terms, as the death from illness of an eleven-year-old boy; and it’s not at all clear to me what that bridge could be. What we end up with is, in effect, “Shakespeare is to Hamnet as the Ghost is to Hamlet (i.e. his father)”, closely followed by “Hamnet was a lovely boy who is now dead, and so was Hamlet”. These analogies are set up by the staging of Hamlet in the scene at the Globe, which is highly selective and distorted. We don’t see Hamlet, we see Act 1 Scene 5 (Ghost appears), followed in short order by Act 5 Scene 2 (Hamlet dies); we don’t even see much of the scene with the Ghost, who appears less as a figure of agonised horror than as a solemn admirer of the young prince. (As one commentator put it, “playing the role of the ghost of Hamlet’s father, [Will] gets to say goodbye to his son on stage as he never did in life” – fair enough, except that the one thing the Ghost had not returned to do was to say goodbye.) I also couldn’t believe in the groundlings, not heckling and talking among themselves but standing in dignified silence, shushing Agnes when she starts to talk back – or for that matter in Agnes, instantly recognising the (youthful but clearly adult) figure of Hamlet as the image of Hamnet.

There is some warrant for having Shakespeare take the part of the Ghost, as the film shows him doing – Nicholas Rowe says that Shakespeare did this in his 1709 Some Account of the Life of Mr. William Shakespear (although citing Rowe as an authority on Shakespeare’s acting career is a bit like citing a 21st-century writer as an authority on Vesta Tilley). But the relationship of Will Shakespeare to Hamnet is unlike that of the Ghost to Hamlet in just about every conceivable way, beginning with which of the two of them is dead. And, while Hamlet is a young man, and the play does need him to die at the end, the play isn’t in any sense about a young man dying. In short, these analogies strike me as facile at best, at worst as going directly against what the play Hamlet actually says and does.

In passing, the collective happening that erupts at the end of the scene – giving collective expression to the feeling that it’s very sad when a young man dies – was down to Buckley, not O’Farrell or Zhao:

“There was no hands reaching out. There was no Hamnet. There was nothing. So it was all kind of being discovered in real time. … I was driving home, and Max Richter’s ‘On the Nature of Daylight’ came on my podcast, and it just cracked something in me, and I sent it to Chloe, and the two of us met in the morning, and I said to her, ‘I just realized I am amongst 300 people who all have their own private grief or life.'”

A woman then worked with the extras on set, meditated with them and “gave them permission to bring their grief” to the space, Buckley said, which led to them all reaching out with their hands.

Mark Kermode was less complimentary about the use of ‘On the Nature of Daylight’, calling it a major mis-step (the piece is used prominently in Arrival, and features in Shutter Island, The Last of Us and The Handmaid’s Tale). I imagine that Max Richter himself – who had written the score for Hamnet, including a choral piece intended for that scene – was at least a bit puzzled.

But in any case, beyond the bare fact that a father looks at his son in one scene and the son dies in the other, this reading of those two scenes really has nothing to do with Hamlet. It can’t possibly be right as a reading of the play – which is a problem when you’re writing about that play’s author.

8. William Shakespeare: Lust for Glory

Tutor Will, who we met earlier, seems to be a vestige of Greenblatt’s Catholic Will, although in the film he hadn’t gone far from home – it’s while he’s conducting that dubious Latin lesson that he first sees Agnes. But there aren’t many other traces in the film; John Shakespeare appears, but only as an overbearing brute who wants his son to see sense, buckle down and make some bloody gloves. (This is after we’ve seen Tutor Will in action – although he was a pretty rubbish tutor, so maybe his father had a point.)

What we get instead is more of a Hollywood Will, a talented unknown who makes it to the big time from humble beginnings. Not seeing Shakespeare in London is fair enough; it’s Agnes’s story, after all. The trouble is, we don’t get any sense of how Shakespeare’s career as a writer developed – and that is a problem, as that’s also the story of how he came to grow apart (or at least live apart) from Anne. The most plausible reconstruction is that he started acting, left home to act full-time, and after several years graduated to being an actor-manager and a writer; as a writer, he mixed with other writers, who competed, collaborated, borrowed and stole as writers do, and found himself patronage, as writers did. After several years of this Shakespeare began to stand out from the crowd, and what made him stand out was his work rate: rather like David Bowie in the Beckenham Arts Lab (if you’ll excuse the analogy), Shakespeare was doing the same kind of thing as his peers, but at a higher quality and higher volume: he was writing more (and better) material and reading a lot more. Off the stage, most of his time must have been taken up with writing and reading (rather like David Bowie, etc). (Someone who knew Bowie in the late 60s commented that on a Friday night everyone would be trying to look cool by namedropping books they hadn’t read, and Bowie was no exception – but when he did it, you’d see him on the Monday and he actually would have read the book. I suspect Shakespeare was similar, although he’d have been namedropping Chaucer and Boccaccio instead of Colin Wilson and Carlos Castaneda.)

We get no sense of this Shakespeare from Hamnet. What we do get is an aspiring writer stuck in a provincial backwater, who doesn’t know how he’s going to make it but is determined to reach for the stars. When Agnes holds Will’s hand, she senses immediately that he’s going to do great things (she sees “a landscape … spaces, caves, tunnels and oceans, undiscovered countries”). In another scene, Will solemnly tells Hamnet that he Must! Go! to London!; in another, Agnes explains that Will wants something Bigger! than This! What irks me about all this – what makes me think it can’t possibly be right – is that artistic success on Shakespeare’s scale is something that nobody had achieved before: nobody knew what Shakespeare was going to end up doing before he did it, Shakespeare himself included. More to the point, nobody would have understood what he did, or recognised it as worth doing, until he’d done it. Remember the story about Noël Coward and Edith Evans: given the line “on a clear day you can see Marlow”, Evans persists in rendering it “on a very clear day…”. Eventually Coward snaps: “On a clear day! On a clear day you can see Marlow! On a very clear day you can see Beaumont and bloody Fletcher!” We recognise Christopher Marlowe, Beaumont and bloody Fletcher and the rest as foothills in the long shadow of Mount Shakespeare. Subtract Shakespeare from the picture and the scale changes: Shakespeare might perhaps have dreamt of doing what Marlowe did, but the greatness he actually achieved would have been inconceivable to him, and to anyone else. See also the Beatles, circa 1963. (And, when you think about it, David… never mind.)

Speaking of biopic clichés, there’s even a “come back to bed” scene, where we see Will literally burning the midnight oil as he works on a draft of Romeo and Juliet – in Stratford-upon-Avon, some time around 1590. (OK, it may have been a candle.) The implication is that a five-act play about noble families in northern Italy is just the kind of thing that a glover’s son would take it into his head to write. (To write, and then for some reason to hold back while theatres were putting on Titus Andronicus, The Taming of the Shrew and Richard III. But that’s by the way.) This idea of artistic creation, as a spontaneous and timeless outpouring of innate genius, is just fatuous. David Byrne commented once on how, when he was growing up, anyone who thought of a melody and wanted to turn it into ‘a song’ would probably write a chorus and a middle eight – and not, for example, a choral harmony line and a counterpoint. As with music, so with poetry: it’s something that the individual writer (however talented) learns to write, in the style of the writers of their time, engaging with the audiences of their time. Showing Shakespeare becoming Shakespeare isn’t what this film is about, admittedly – but showing Shakespeare always having been Shakespeare is depressingly silly.

9. H is for Hawk (and M is for Mugwort)

Equally silly is the spin O’Farrell puts on Capable Anne. The first time we see Anne, she has a leather gauntlet on her arm and a hawk perched on it. Now, in Shakespeare’s time falconry had a longstanding association with the nobility, but I’m not aware of any legal restriction on commoners keeping birds of prey; this scene isn’t impossible, but it does seem extremely unlikely. Training a bird of prey is a difficult, time-consuming and expensive process, which over time uses a lot of meat that could have fed a dog or a person. And what does the expenditure of all that time, effort and meat get you? A bird that will take game for you: it will catch smaller birds and rabbits, and bring you the carcases. Useful – except that you can catch rabbits with snares and birds with nets and birdlime, with no need to train anything or waste any good meat. Falconry had a longstanding association with the nobility in Shakespeare’s time, because it’s a luxury; no yeoman farmer, however well-to-do, would encourage his unmarried daughter to spend her time teaching a bird to hunt.

But Agnes the falconer isn’t just a farmer’s daughter. In building the character, O’Farrell seems to have started with Greer’s version – which is already largely built on blank spaces in the record – and then built on the blank spaces in that. Greer suggested that the kind of thing women of that period were likely to have done included growing medicinal herbs; O’Farrell’s Agnes is a herbalist with an encyclopaedic, but intuitive, knowledge of what herb should cure what ill.

Not only does she know the properties of herbs, she knows what forms of words need to be said to activate them; herbalism and folk medicine become something more like folk magic. In the film (not, I think, in the book) Agnes has frequent recourse to one charm in particular. The words she recites, in three or four different scenes, are taken from the Nigon Wyrta Galdor (‘Nine Plants Spell’), a charm preserved in a 10th-century manuscript:

Remember, Mugwort,
what you brought to pass,
what you readied,
at Regenmeld.

You’re called Una, that most ancient plant.
You defeat three, you defeat thirty,
you defeat venom, you defeat air-illness;
you defeat the horror who stalks the land.

As the name suggests, the charm proceeds by invoking nine plants in order, mugwort and ‘una’ being the first two. This is followed by an incantation listing the different venoms against which a mixture of the nine was supposed to protect the user, and finally a brief list of instructions detailing how to prepare and apply it. It’s not at all clear what all the herbs are, or all the venoms referred to, or even where ‘Regenmeld’ was – but then, the tenth century is a very long time ago. (The full text refers to both Christ and Odin, incidentally.)

Now, the lines quoted above (and used in the film) are a modern English translation from 2020. The original reads more like this:

Gemyne ðu mucgƿyrt
hƿæt þu ameldodest
hƿæt þu renadest æt Regenmelde

Una þu hattest yldost ƿyrta
þu miht ƿið III & ƿið XXX
þu miht ƿiþ attre & ƿið onflyge
þu miht ƿiþ þa[m] laþan ðe geond lond færð

I’m not criticising the film’s Agnes for speaking 2020s English; it’s what everyone else in the film is speaking, after all. Historical fiction often works like the Tardis’s Translation Circuit, and for similar reasons. But I do think it’s staggeringly unlikely that the Nine Plants Spell would have survived in oral tradition from the tenth to the seventeenth century, handed down from mother to daughter through 30+ generations, translated into successive versions of English as they developed, without the text being corrupted with nonsense words or mondegreens. Not only do we have absolutely no evidence that this did happen, it’s just not the kind of thing that would.

As for Anne’s folk magic, I don’t know what kind of recipes seventeenth-century herbalists used, although I suspect that by and large they weren’t spells invoking the herbs so as to bind them to the herbalist’s service; I should think they were more of the “simmer without boiling until the liquid is reduced by half” variety. But let’s say, for the sake of argument, that the recipe for a sleeping draught used by someone like Anne Shakespeare would begin “O valerian, mighty closer of eyes” and go on from there, only getting round to quantities and timings five minutes later. Now: is it likely that someone like Anne would launch into a recipe/charm like the Nine Plants Spell repeatedly, sometimes in public, sometimes apparently for the sheer fun of it? And is it likely that she would only have that one spell? Her repeated recourse to it is made all the more obvious by the fact that she never gets much beyond the two verses quoted above; you’re left with the impression that this girl really likes mugwort.

We also learn that Agnes has an affinity with wild things and the natural world; that she insists on giving birth to her first child in the woods; that her birth mother was a ‘forest witch’ (her father has since remarried). Not only that, but (as we’ve seen) she has a kind of contact-based second sight which allows her to see that Will is destined for greatness when she first holds his hand.  Green Witch Anne, meet Hollywood Will! (It’s probably churlish of me to note that Hamnet’s death still comes as a surprise.)

Just to recapitulate, we know nothing about Anne Hathaway’s family, except that her father was a lawyer who, like her mother, hailed from Philadelphia… ah, I see what I’ve done there. Start again. We know nothing about Anne Hathaway’s family, except that her father was a yeoman farmer and had a bit of money put by when he died. We know nothing about her mother except that she must have existed and was almost certainly married to Anne’s father, the alternative tending to leave historical traces. I don’t know if there was any such thing as a ‘forest witch’ in seventeenth-century England – although the phrase, and the idea, is so popular now as to be basically impossible to google, which may be a clue – but we’ve got about as much warrant for thinking that Anne Hathaway’s mother was one as for thinking that she practised double-entry book-keeping. But (quoting the link above) the idea of being a green (or forest) witch taps into a set of ideas that “[appeal] to those seeking alternative, nature-based spiritual paths … [and] speaks to a feminist perspective too, as it advocates a feminine ethic of care and respect for nature and living in harmony with the earth, as well as offering a means for empowerment, self-determination and self-growth”. (The article in question is on the academic self-promotion site The Conversation; it was written by a Senior Lecturer in Strategic Marketing.)

A Green Witch is, among other things, a very flattering role to play. As presented in the film, it can’t possibly be right as a reading of the historical Anne Shakespeare’s life, but that’s not the only job it’s doing there. Like the myth-making of Hollywood Will, like the secular sentimentality of Beautiful Boy Hamlet, the soothing dream of Green Witch Anne is very much of its time – the time in question being the 2020s.

10. Here We Go Again

Going back to the Greenblatt and Greer sources we started with, I’m not a big fan of Catholic Will, Capable Anne and recusant’s-dilemma Hamlet. I think all these ways of looking at Shakespeare and his work are speculative to the point of being fanciful, while also being reductive of the real complexities of Shakespeare’s life story and his work. I think it’s far more interesting to think of Will Shakespeare as an unusually able and hard-working hack writer in a turbulent creative milieu, Anne as the wife he (for reasons we’ll probably never know) left behind, and Hamlet as an extraordinarily rich and complex text which imagines a thoughtful protagonist with a rich inner life, then drops him in the middle of a revenge plot.

But I’d take Catholic Will, Capable Anne and recusant’s-dilemma Hamlet all day long over Hollywood Will, Green Witch Anne and Beautiful Boy Hamlet. All of these go far beyond even the most speculative interpretation of the material. We end up in a fictional realm with about as firm a mooring to history as Mamma Mia 2; a realm where historical figures can be used like action figures, moved about as the writer chooses. And this, I think, is why the main performances in the film had to be so histrionic – a register that Jessie Buckley inhabits with ease, but one where Paul Mescal struggles. We might have been looking at Will and Anne Shakespeare, but what we were watching was all from our own time: a dramatised rendering of contemporary anxieties, contemporary fantasies, contemporary clichés.

 

 

January culture post

As March turns into April, what better time could there be to look back on, um, the books I read in January. Several better times, actually, but they’ve all gone. In January, anyway, I read (or finished)

Reginald Hill, An April Shroud, A Pinch of Snuff
Enjoyable (and quick) reads, but not the best D&Ps. Since A Clubbable Woman, Hill hasn’t resorted again to the “explaining a bizarre and improbable crime scene with a bizarre and improbable crime” getout, but both of these do commit the lesser sin of explaining a b. and i. ect ect with a bizarre and improbable setting and cast of characters: the makers and aficionados of artistic hardcore porn form the cast of A Pinch of Snuff, while An April Shroud is basically set at Rawlinson End. (I didn’t think there was that much artistic h. p. (I mean, there’s only one Caligula), but I guess things were different in the 1970s.) In An April Shroud Hill also decided to humanise Andy Dalziel – at least, he gives him a sex life – which came as a bit of a shock. What next, a conscience?

Randall Munroe, What If? 2
Not sure quite what didn’t work for me with this one – whether Randall had genuinely done all the good ones in book 1 (which seems unlikely) or the format was wearing thin. Maybe I just shouldn’t have read them one after the other. Anyway, I kept book 1 and sent this one back to the (charity) shop.

Thomas Pynchon, Shadow Ticket
Like October, this was a thin month for reading, as most of my available reading time got Pynchoned. Unlike Vineland, though, this didn’t blow me away; there are some wonderful and inimitably Pynchonian sequences (the riff on irradiated cheese is superb), but they’re few and far between. It’s good (particularly for an author in his eighties), but it’s not great; it’s ultimately a bit inconsequential. In fact it could have fitted into Gravity’s Rainbow as a sub-plot (although Gravity’s Rainbow is long enough as it is).

Also in January, I watched these films:

The Quiet Girl (Colm Bairéad 2022)
We’d given our daughter a DVD of this film for Christmas, and were very happy to re-watch it with her. It’s still beautiful, still uplifting, still heartbreaking.

Reality+ (Coralie Fargeat 2014)
New cybernetic brain implant makes everyone who has it look ultra-hot to everyone else who has it. Sounds good, right? One small problem, you can only leave it running for twelve hours at a time… I’m not going to say that this short is better than The Substance, but it’s definitely good enough – and different enough – to make me sorry that Fargeat didn’t just make a feature-length version.

Some Like It Hot (Billy Wilder 1959)
Our daughter was staying with us, and it turned out she hadn’t seen Some Like It Hot. Certain elements of the plot are rather less than right-on (in fact probably always were), and I was a little worried that we might be in for a repeat of the Annie Hall experience. No need; it’s still wonderful. As we started watching it I suddenly realised I had no idea where the Tony Curtis character was during the scene when Jack Lemmon’s arguing with Joe E. Brown (no spoilers please). The answer’s simple: he’s right there, snogging Marilyn Monroe. And you don’t notice either of them.

The Deep Blue Sea (Terence Davies 2011)
There’s a “Midas touch” quality to this film: Rachel Weisz looks wonderful, Tom Hiddleston looks wonderful and the interiors – the interiors look amazing. Both the leads are doing good work, and Terence Davies couldn’t make a film without turning it to gold. The story is rather small, though, and doesn’t live up to the cinematography.

Marty Supreme (Josh Safdie 2025)
Marty’s redemption moment didn’t quite land for me; it seemed a bit unearned. (As indeed did his love interest; there’s aiming high…) But Marty being an irresponsible, egotistical, manipulative, arrogant little shit – and still going places and making things happen – and getting knocked back – and still fighting back – and… all of that did work for me. A double espresso to Uncut Gems‘s line of coke, but a double espresso is quite a fun thing.

Hamnet (Chloe Zhao 2025)
I started hating this film within the first five minutes and didn’t really stop; there was hardly a moment when I wasn’t thinking, “Would they really do that?” or “They definitely wouldn’t say that“. If you haven’t seen this, see something else instead – Riz Ahmed’s Hamlet is superb, Paul Mescal’s great in The History of Sound and Jessie Buckley’s extraordinary in The Bride! 

28 Years Later: The Bone Temple (Nia DaCosta 2025)
Loved it. Wasn’t going to win anything and probably won’t turn a profit, but I thought it was terrific; really absorbing (enveloping, even), a director who knew exactly what she was doing, brilliant cinematography, and much less of the first film‘s tonal inconsistency (and world-building inconsistency, let’s be honest). A great soundtrack, too: excellent use of Duran Duran (!), plus Ralph Fiennes doing the karaoke from Hell (quite literally), and the Unexpected Radiohead Needledrop Of The Year. It works well as a horror film (it’s even got a “final girl”), and it’s got a fair bit to say about good and evil and what it means to be human. If you haven’t seen this, see it.

No Other Choice (Park Chan-wook 2025)
So, there’s this Korean paper factory which gets bought by a US company. The manager gets laid off; he applies for jobs but realises he’s competing with a small pool of other ex-managers – some of whom are better qualified than he is and will always be chosen ahead of him. What to do? The film begins as black comedy – a contemporary Korean riff on Kind Hearts and Coronets – but rapidly moves on to ask what a contemporary Korean recreation of Kind Hearts and Coronets would actually feel like. Ultimately it’s a meditation on people who treat other people as expendable – beginning with the main character’s new bosses but not ending there.

A Bout de Souffle (Jean-Luc Godard 1960)
The Annie Hall problem recurred unexpectedly here. I could see what Godard was doing to some extent and approve of it, even enjoy it, but I found it really difficult to get past what an utter, entitled, arrogant, sexist arse the Jean-Paul Belmondo character was. Scenes that I’ve seen described as enchanting – the long hotel room scene, for example – just seemed to me to show an egotistical man relentlessly trying to get a woman into bed and refusing to take any interest in anything else. But then – and this is why the reference point is Annie Hall, not Marty Supreme – basically everyone in the film treats the Jean Seberg character as prey, or at best as eye-candy; the author interview scene is painful, in a way that doesn’t seem to have been intended. Also, I don’t think jump cuts were the future of cinema, not least because sync sound was.

Next: now wait for last month! Or I might give Hamnet a post of its own…

Yer Blues (4): Oh, Jeremy Corbyn

This is the fourth and (probably) last in an occasional series of posts about Your PartyYou can find the earlier posts here:

Yer Blues(1): What’s Bin Did (October 2025)
On the formation of the new party and the hopes it raised
“Even while writing this post I’ve had the urge to write some formulation like “…which raises some interesting issues”, and immediately felt wretched – the whole point of actually launching an actual party was that we were actually going to do something”

Yer Blues(2): The local news (November 2025)
What it’s been like on the ground: the first couple of meetings of what isn’t as yet a branch
“While to begin with we were all members of the Labour Party, under Starmer’s leadership some of us were expelled and most of the rest drifted away. … But the network endured – even when it had outlived its original purpose of organising within the Labour Party – and the first meeting of people interested in Your Party in the Withington constituency grew out of this network”

Yer Blues(3): Why a branch? (December 2025)
Should YP be modelled on the contemporary Labour Party or the party as it was in the 1990s – or the Italian Communist Party of the 1940s?
“I think we should do whatever we can to make our local branch(-to-be) more like a transmission belt to whatever’s going on locally, and less like a hierarchical node in a structure like an organisational chart … I hate to say it, but I really think we need to go to the people, or at least think seriously about what that would mean.”

I suppose I should add that since last December I’ve become (even) less optimistic about YP, to the point that I’m no longer inclined to use words like ‘we’ when talking about it. There are many reasons for that, but a lot of them are associated with one person.

1. 100 Years Ago

I mentioned Jeremy Corbyn in one of the first blog posts I wrote. I started blogging just before the 2005 election, mainly to set out arguments against voting Labour; in my summing-up I said that nobody should vote for a Labour candidate at that election, “not even if they’re Jeremy Corbyn”.

I didn’t write much about him for the next ten years. In 2015, though, I was strongly in favour of Corbyn’s leadership campaign. (Not everyone was. An old friend – who, like me, goes back far enough to have known Keir Starmer when he was a leftist – annoyed me greatly when Corbyn’s candidacy was announced by repeatedly saying, “He’s not the guy.” Difficult to argue with now, clearly, but unnecessarily negative at the time I still feel. H’mph.)

I’m not going to deny that the subsequent adulation of Corbyn reached levels unusual in British politics, or that he was an unusual candidate to be at the centre of it. What I would stress is that it was never really about his qualities as a politician, or even as a person (although it helped that he seems to be a good constituency MP and a nice guy on a personal level). The main thing about Corbyn – indeed, initially the entire point of his leadership campaign – was the principles he held, and the door he wedged open for those principles to be expressed with the imprimatur of the Labour Party.

“If Jeremy Corbyn wins this election, he’ll be the first genuinely anti-imperialist leader of the Labour Party for a long time – possibly the first ever,” I wrote in 2015, adding – what was already obvious – that “[m]any people … [would] oppose him for that reason”. Ten years later, in a very different political climate, I didn’t see any reason to revise this opinion:

it seems to me that his biggest sin – the one thing that made him persona non grata in respectable politics – was his unhesitating and consistent opposition to the imperialism of Britain and its allies. Among other things, this found expression in an opposition to Zionism which guided his approach to Israel/Palestine

(Back in 2015 I’d also wondered “how big a bomb the friends of Israel and hunters of anti-semitism are going to manage to put under him”, in case anyone thought that one had come out of a blue sky.)

It wasn’t just anti-imperialism, though. In a 2020 assessment of Keir Starmer‘s leadership, I wrote:

when he became Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn was strongly associated with a couple of ideologies which he’d upheld for thirty years as a backbencher: an ideology of human equality, of every person (anywhere in the world) mattering as much as any other; and an ideology of constructive empowerment, of mobilising people to make the world a better place.

This radical notion of human equality leads quite logically to a “consistent opposition to the imperialism of Britain and its allies”; no need to assume some kind of anti-British or anti-American partisanship. (Clearly, we could say something similar about Corbyn’s anti-Zionism.) I don’t know what would have become of that ‘ideology of constructive empowerment’ if Labour had been elected – and it wasn’t just a matter of mobilising to knock on doors and go to rallies – but it would have been interesting to find out; if nothing else, a government coming in with the assumption that it could set about making the world a better place would have been welcome.

So there was that. There was also, crucially, the way that Corbyn presented his beliefs. In 2020 I wrote that I admired Corbyn “for the integrity he displayed; for getting the message across that not sticking to what he believed in wasn’t an option”. This was a peculiarly effective – and decidedly novel – approach for a Labour leader.

The managerial, clientelist ‘realism’ of the old Labour Right; the hesitant, defensive triangulations of the centre-left past and present; Blairism, with its toxic combination of charismatic populism and rightward-trimming calculation: all these different traditions shared one fundamental assumption, the pessimistic certainty that you can’t go Left. … Corbyn’s leadership swept all of that away, for a time at least

Moreover, simply taking a position on the Left and staying there was enough of a novelty to give Corbyn “a certain populist anti-system appeal” – no small advantage in a period when disaffection with politics-as-usual is a significant driver of political choice. Summing up (as I did in 2025):

humanist internationalism and participatory mobilisation as goals, the unsettling energy of the outsider as means and the cachet of sincerely, consistently and demonstrably standing for these things as guarantee … those were the great strengths of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader

2. Lead Like a Craze

But there, I think, the case for the defence will have to rest. I was quite positive in 2016 about what Corbyn wasn’t doing – “Jeremy Corbyn has never presented himself as a charismatic leader or as somebody who can impose a new direction on the Labour Party single-handed” – but that only gets you halfway; if that wasn’t how he was leading the party, what was he doing?

During his leadership campaign in 2015 Corbyn was – appropriately enough – in permanent campaign mode, which played to his strengths:

he hasn’t stayed within the terms of debate set by the government and their friends in the media … equally, he hasn’t wheeled out the old socialist verities in a comforting wuffly voice, or denounced the machinations of imperialism in tones of blood and thunder. He’s just talked sense – realistic, logically argued, morally decent sense – much more consistently and on a much wider range of issues than the other candidates.

But leading like a campaigner only really works, longer term, if you’re leading other campaigners: people who already share your goals and are happy to work without guidance or discipline from above. While both of those conditions were true of a significant proportion of the Labour Party membership after 2015, they were never true of either the Parliamentary Labour Party or the party’s central and regional staff – both of which groups Corbyn needed to be able to lead, one way or another. As I wrote in 2020:

[Corbyn’s] victory was acutely uneven: substantial layers of the party were not only unaffected by it but resistant to it, to the point of continuing to treat the Left as a marginalised minority even while it was represented by their own leader. Attitudes like these ran deep, grounded as they were in that basic pessimism about the possibility of ever moving Left. Persuasion and dialogue were never going to make a dent in them; those groups could only be brought into line by action, either from above or from below – or, ideally, both. … Corbyn’s attitude has always been “I tried, they didn’t listen, I’ll just keep trying”, or in other words “with you if possible, without you if necessary” – and a party leader’s attitude really needs to be “with you if possible, over your dead body if necessary”.

Or, as I put it in 2016:

Corbyn isn’t a shmoozer or a fixer; he isn’t going to win over doubters with his warmth and strength of personality, or whip them into line with threats and inducements. He has his programme, he’d like people to get with it, and if they don’t, well, maybe they’ll be persuaded next time. The problem is, if he isn’t going to charm Labour MPs or threaten them, in a lot of cases he probably isn’t going to communicate with them at all

And (returning to that 2020 post), “the leader owes it to their followers to apply some pressure on backward elements in the party – there’s only so much we can do from below”. I think this is worth stressing. It wasn’t just that Corbyn was a good leader of the membership, on the plus side, but a bad party manager on the minus side; the role he was in couldn’t be partitioned like that. He was a bad party manager, which meant that he let the membership down.

Now it’s true that he went into the role assuming that the party machine – up to and including the deputy leader – would work with him and not against him. It’s also true that they damn well should have done: in many cases the people he seemed to be failing to manage should really have been doing the managing on his behalf. As I wrote in 2016,

there were several Labour MPs who genuinely thought Corbyn should be given a chance, and he has pretty much lost them. But all those horror stories could have been avoided with better party management – which isn’t one person’s responsibility. It’s also interesting to imagine how similar stories of failure to communicate between leadership and Shadow Cabinet members would have been reported under Blair; I remember a falling-out between Blair and Clare Short, before the 1997 election, when the comments approvingly quoted on the BBC News came not from Short but from Peter Mandelson, speaking on behalf of Blair on God knows what authority.

You do not under any circumstances ‘got to hand it to’ Peter Mandelson, but a Corbyn leadership with enforcers – even a Backstabber Without Portfolio of its own – would have been a very different proposition.

But, but, but. If people weren’t performing, they should have been told to shape up. If the apparatus was controlled by opponents of the leadership, those levers that the leadership did control should have been used to change that, or at worst to work round it. If all of that was too much for the leadership as individuals, they should have appointed somebody to oversee it. All of this as a matter of urgency, and never mind who’s going to go running to the papers (they’ll do that anyway). All roads lead back to the leader’s office, and what did Corbyn’s leadership do? Not enough, and nowhere near quickly enough.

Even the benefits of leading in campaigner mode didn’t really last. In 2015 – and again in 2017, to be fair – Corbyn was in his element, going on the offensive and setting his own agenda. But when he came under sustained attack, he did precisely what I’d commended him for not doing: he retreated from “talking sense on a wide range of issues” into something not unlike Tony Benn’s “old socialist verities” mode, with patient restatements in the broadest possible terms of the good things he believed in and the bad things he opposed. As I wrote in 2020,

while “principle pure and simple” works well as a form of advocacy, once you get into argument it’s a one-shot strategy; if it doesn’t work, you’ve got nothing to back it up except trying it again. Corbyn didn’t just refuse to get into personalities (“they go low, we go high”); all too often, he refused to get into detail – and that left the space for his enemies to define the issues on which he was being challenged.

Specifically, the line I quoted above about Corbyn’s anti-Zionism quoted needs to be completed:

his unhesitating and consistent opposition to the imperialism of Britain and its allies … found expression in an opposition to Zionism which guided his approach to Israel/Palestine, although he always fought shy of articulating it – wrongly, I think; equivocating didn’t reduce the hostility his beliefs aroused, and made him seem evasive and untrustworthy.

As a leader of the Labour Party, Corbyn was a great figurehead. The trouble was, more than that was needed; much more, really. The Labour Party had problems that couldn’t be fixed with an earnest appeal to potential allies, and failing to fix them would vitiate any serious left-wing project. Even in 2015 I had a moment of clarity on this one:

One of my rare moments of disenchantment with the leadership election came when I realised that we were all acting as if the leader of the party set the direction of the party: elect Kendall, get a right-wing party; elect Corbyn, get a left-wing party. But this way of looking at it is profoundly undemocratic – and an older Labour left would have seen this. … the Labour Party is [now] little more than a set of local fan clubs for the policy directions set by the leadership. But that’s a real loss, and one which can’t be remedied by parachuting in the right kind of leader.

3. Ahead Where?

So: the main positives about Jeremy Corbyn, as Labour leader, were his political beliefs and the unapologetic consistency with which he held them, and always had held them. The negatives were the flip side of that principled consistency: his beliefs were what they were, he believed them to be correct and virtuous, and that was that; arguing over details wouldn’t change anything, so why bother? As for persuading people who didn’t want to be persuaded, or keeping them in line with bargaining, flattery, incentives and threats – the daily currency of coalition-building in an organisation like the Labour Party – nothing in either Corbyn’s beliefs or his experience fitted him for that. If anything, Corbyn’s history as a campaigner made him less likely to care about building teams and retaining allies. If an MP joined you in advocating nuclear disarmament, or Irish reunification, or recognition of Palestine, so much the better. But if not, so what? Lots of people didn’t support those things, after all; you might as well obsess over the people who refused to sign a petition on behalf of a political prisoner.

The trouble is, leading like a campaigner doesn’t work when you’ve got a finite number of potential allies to recruit from, each of whom has their own political priorities and doesn’t necessarily identify with yours: it fosters an indifference to relationship-building which is liable to alienate anyone not already committed to your cause. And that, frankly, is putting it politely. In day-to-day terms, what “indifference to relationship-building” looks like is a politician who dumps allies, abandons agreed lines, breaks agreements and generally goes their own sweet way. A politician who puts their own beliefs and principles above relationship-building is not going to be a reliable member of a collective project (Corbyn’s past as a long-term backbencher and serial whip-breaker may not be as irrelevant as we thought). Give someone who thinks like this a leading position in a project and they’re liable to identify themselves with the project and vice versa – and fight any potential threat to that position as if it was a threat to the project itself. A politician like that may have followers, but they won’t have many allies – not for long, anyway.

Which brings us to Your Party. When the original appeal to supporters was launched, I repeatedly asked people with connections who was actually behind the initiative, who constituted the steering group that was presumably guiding it all; I asked repeatedly because I couldn’t quite believe how few names were being cited. Since then the list has only got shorter, as one ally after another has decided they’re better off joining the Greens, sticking to local independent groups or jacking the whole thing in. This isn’t all down to Corbyn, but he’s far from innocent: repeated interventions have exhibited a determination to centre Your Party on Corbyn and his fellow independent MPs, and concentrate power within the party in the hands of Corbyn’s (remaining) allies.

The latest development in this saga was the election of the Your Party Central Executive Committee (CEC). Electioneering for the CEC was rapidly dominated by two slates – ‘The Many’, associated with Corbyn, and ‘Grassroots Alliance’, associated with Zarah Sultana. Claims and counter-claims ensued; TM accused GA and Sultana of being under the influence of Trotskyist extremists who would impose ideological purity tests, while GA accused TM and Corbyn of being compromised by association with the other independent (but not particularly left-wing) MPs. TM’s public statements raised the temperature further, suggesting that the only thing standing between Corbyn and another 2017 was those pesky ideological purists with their voter-hostile policies, and raising the ludicrous prospect of a purge of the Left. Sultana, meanwhile, did her bit for comradely debate by attacking the Greens as pro-NATO (a position they share with the Labour Party of 2015-19) and insisting that YP should be explicitly anti-Zionist, as she is herself; this is a step that Corbyn himself has never taken, and the intervention may have been intended as a wedge issue between him and his Muslim allies. Independent candidates – those not associated with either slate – struggled to be heard above the noise, as did anything resembling an argument from principle.

The results are now in, and the first elected CEC consists of 14 people associated with ‘The Many’, 7 linked to the ‘Grassroots Alliance’ and three independents. When the new CEC met, TM were quick to exploit this numerical advantage, with all the main ‘officer’ posts going to members of the slate; the CEC then established an Officers’ Group, removing decisions in some important areas even from the oversight of the full CEC. The CEC did not discuss the establishment of YP branches, despite this being on the agenda – and despite the persistence of people around the country in organising ‘proto-branches’. I’d be the first to concede that these proto-branches are voluntaristic initiatives, some kicked off by organisations like the SWP and Counterfire, and that they shouldn’t be rubber-stamped – but it’s also undeniable that they’re bringing together committed and able activists from multiple backgrounds, who could be at the heart of YP’s eventual branch network. The evident lack of interest in speeding the process of branch formation is regrettable, to say the least, and suggests that ‘The Many’ wouldn’t be heartbroken if those activists gave up and walked away.

Oh, Jeremy Corbyn. Pace my friend Graham, I actually still think he was the guy vis-à-vis the Labour Party, or at least could have been; “lone bearer of socialist principle” was a powerful position to occupy in the mid-2010s, and he was a good candidate for the job. He was also more sinned against in that role than sinning, as has been demonstrated several times over (most recently by those tribunes of the people Gabriel Pogrund and Harry Yorke). But he had major flaws as a politician, and would have needed to have a pretty extraordinary team around him – with attributes including “will tell JC when he needs to act, keep reminding him if he doesn’t, and if all else fails act on his behalf” – to mitigate them. In the context of Your Party he’s been indulged, frankly, and those flaws have been given free rein. I doubt the project’s salvageable now.

 

2025 in a darkened room

I saw 108 films in 2025 – a bit over two a week. A third of the total – 36 – I saw at home, 72 in the cinema (most of them, confusingly, at Home.) 61 were new releases; out of the other 47, 13 were films I’d seen before. (I also saw 28 Years Later twice, making it a new release and a repeat viewing.)

My 2025 reading list fell naturally into categories, albeit with a bucket category for everything that wasn’t of an identifiable genre (you say ‘literary fiction’, I say ‘bucket’). I haven’t organised my film list by categories, not least because I’m not sure what they’d be. Let’s start with the categories in the previous paragraph and see where we end up.

Repeat viewing, at home: as preparation for sequels and spinoffs, we revisited Mission Impossible: Dead Reckoning Part One, Rogue One, Black Widow and Knives Out. Because one of us hadn’t seen them, we watched Close Encounters of the Third Kind and Orlando (which now looks like a future for British cinema that never was). We watched The Hitcher and The Silence of the Lambs because they were on, and we watched The Muppet Christmas Carol because it was the season to be jolly and joChristmas Eve.

Second-run films, at home
Prep for sequels: Gladiator, M3GAN, 28 Days Later (still amazing), 28 Weeks Later. (The first two were so much better than the sequels.)
Classics: The Most Dangerous Game, Grand Hotel, The Living Dead at Manchester Morgue, Fedora, Babette’s Feast (none of which disappointed)
Horror and horror-adjacent: Knock at the Cabin (the ultimate twist is…), Calvary (very bleak), The Fly, Monsters (very impressive), Personal Shopper (very strange) and No One Will Save You (which stars Kaitlyn Dever (out of Booksmart, not Beanie Feldstein, the other one) and is currently available on Disney+, but is also impressive, bleak and strange).
Bucket: CODA, The Quiet Girl, Yannick, Fall, American Animals, Cinderella III: A Twist in Time, Frank, The Lost Daughter, And Then There Were None. Only one real turkey here (the last-named), but a lot of ho-hums and near-misses. I liked Frank a lot, though, and The Quiet Girl is wonderful. (I’ve just looked up who played ‘Jon’ in the former – in my memory he was a dead ringer for Jon Ronson, which would have been tough to cast (Michael Cera maybe?). It was of course Domhnall Gleason.)

New releases, at home: Quentin Dupieux’ The Second Act was on MUBI (as was Yannick from 2023); I liked it a lot. On Netflix, we watched Ballad of a Small Player (worth checking out), A House of Dynamite and The Thursday Murder Club (worth avoiding).

Repeat viewing, in the cinema: I saw screenings of Blue Velvet (astonishing), CalJaws and The Apartment (what a film). I enjoyed Jaws on the big screen, but it is very TV movie-ish. But then, so is Blue Velvet.

Second-run films, in the cinema: apart from those four, there are ten films in this category, which divide naturally into two categories.
Festival films: I was involved in organising the Manchester International Crime and Justice Film Festival in 2025; we put on free screenings of a selection of films with a  crime and justice connection, including Whistle Down the Wind, Scum (the original, banned TV version), Aki Kaurismäki’s Le Havre, 1001 Martian Nights (a political science fiction artwork from Indonesia) and Je verrai toujours vos visages (a French fictionalised docudrama about restorative justice). You’ve got to admit that’s range.
Revival screenings: during the year we also saw Picnic at Hanging Rock, Slade in Flame (followed by a Q+A with Noddy Holder, no less), Amadeus, Distant Voices, Still Lives and Dogtooth. Two were thoroughly enjoyable, two were outstanding pieces of cinema, and then there was Distant Voices, Still Lives. It’s a marvel; I can only regret not having had it in my life before now.

New releases, in the cinema: and then there were… another 57 films; more than one a week, not to mention more than all the films I’ve mentioned so far. Yikes. Genre time!
SF and sf-derived: Flow, The EndMickey 17, Mission Impossible: The Final ReckoningThunderbolts*, M3GAN 2.0, The Fantastic Four: First Steps
Is Flow sf? Well, there’s been a huge flood and there are no human survivors, so I guess so. It’s lovely, anyway. The End is similarly “something else with an sf premise” – the “something else” in this case being, well, opera. It’s wonderful when it works; Tim McInnerny, no word of a lie, is a revelation. Otherwise, I enjoyed Thunderbolts* and Mickey 17 was OK; R-Patz doesn’t go below ‘OK’.

Crime/thriller/etc: Drop, Caught Stealing, Islands, Dead of Winter, Wake Up Dead Man, The Housemaid
In order: two films that are enjoyable but utterly forgettable; two that are a lot more serious and moving; two that aren’t serious at all, but have so much fun that you don’t mind. Islands stands out; precisely what kind of film you’re watching – and precisely what kind of episode the main character’s living through – doesn’t become clear until the very end.

Historical/biographical: A Complete Unknown, The Brutalist, Gladiator II, I’m Still Here, Harvest, Tornado, The Mastermind
A Complete Unknown is great, of course, although I suspect that you see more of the real Bob Dylan in Marty SupremeGladiator II should basically be banned. Harvest and Tornado are both horror-adjacent period thrillers; Harvest has ‘folk horror’ vibes put on with a trowel, while Tornado has a less obtrusive ‘martial arts’ influence (I liked it a lot). I’m Still Here is good, too.

Comedy: Paddington in Peru, A Real Pain, Friendship, The Ballad of Wallis Island, The Phoenician Scheme, Good Fortune, Eternity
Paddington sequels not written by Paul King and Simon Farnaby should also be banned – and Wes Anderson should only be allowed to make films under strict supervision. (I liked Asteroid City, too!) The last two films on this list are both ‘heavenly’ comedies – riffs on It’s A Wonderful Life and Heaven Can Wait respectively – and are quite charming. Friendship is a toe-curling piece of ‘comedy of embarrassment’, which means that it pales into utter insignificance next to A Real Pain or The Ballad of Wallis Island – both of which cover similar ground with wit, inventiveness, heart and (yes) real pain.

Horror and horror-adjacent: NosferatuPresence, Sister MidnightHallow RoadCompanionHeart EyesThe MonkeyDeath of a UnicornSinners, 28 Years Later, Weapons, Bring Her Back, Together, Frankenstein, Good Boy, Keeper
This was a very good year for horror: big-idea horror (The Monkey, SinnersWeapons), big-production horror (Nosferatu, meet Frankenstein), high-concept/low-budget horror (PresenceHallow Road, Good Boy). Sinners stands out – of course – with Weapons not far behind, and 28 Years Later was a triumph. I was also strongly affected by the grinding relentlessness of Bring Her Back and (beneath its cartoonish early-Peter-Jackson surface) The Monkey. Otherwise I’d just want to single out some less ambitious but (I thought) successful genre experiments: Hallow Road (what if Locke, but supernatural?), Heart Eyes (what if… a slasher rom com?) and Death of a Unicorn (self-explanatory). (Once you’ve seen the trailer for DoaU you’ve basically seen the film, admittedly. I still thought it pretty much worked, whatever Mark Kermode said.)

Documentary: The Last SacrificeHolloway
Holloway‘s good; undramatic but an involving and in parts tough watch. The Last Sacrifice is bad.

Bucket: Hard Truths, When the Light Breaks, Sorry Baby, EddingtonSteve, One Battle After Another, Urchin, Anemone, Die My Love, The Ice Tower, It Was Just An Accident, Sentimental Value
As with The Brutalist and The Mastermind above, I find that a lot of these leave me without much to say; at least, there are only so many times you can say “I can see it’s a serious piece of cinema, but it didn’t quite work for me” before it gets boring. I did like When the Light Breaks and Steve (although they both rip your heart out), and thought there was a lot of promise in Urchin and Anemone. It Was Just An Accident is extraordinary – like an idea by Costa-Gavras scripted by Kafka and directed by Charles Crichton; best of luck to Jafar Panahi and all his compatriots. Sentimental Value, lastly, is wonderful; in my top four or five films of the year.

Speaking of which:

Films of the year (second-run): The Apartment, Babette’s FeastBlue Velvet, Distant Voices Still Lives, Dogtooth, FrankThe Quiet Girl, 28 Days Later. I’m not ranking these, but Distant Voices, Still Lives stands out even in that company.

Worst films of the year (new releases): EddingtonThe Fantastic Four: First Steps, Gladiator II, The Ice Tower, The Last Sacrifice, M3GAN 2.0, Paddington in Peru, The Phoenician Scheme, The Thursday Murder Club. There’s strong competition, but I think Gladiator II just about edges it as worst of the lot.

Films of the year (new releases): The Ballad of Wallis IslandBring Her Back, A Complete Unknown, The End, It Was Just An Accident, A Real Pain, Sentimental Value, Sinners, Tornado, Weapons. Number one, also against stiff competition: The Ballad of Wallis Island.

(These are of course films I saw in 2025, not films released in 2025 – and it’s a list compiled the following March(!), not in time for an end-of-year retrospective. So it’s not too surprising if someone else’s top 10 (say for example Mark Kermode’s) omits A Real Pain on one hand and Sentimental Value on the other. I stand by Tornado, though.)

Playing the odds

Me, last night on Bluesky:

All the local polling that’s been published, and the messaging from both Labour and the Greens, has suggested an incredibly tight result in Gorton and Denton, along the lines of 29%/28%/28% (with the Greens probably, but not at all definitely, in the lead). The betting market on G+D, on the other hand, still had the Greens at 2/1 on when it closed.

If you think of (say) 2/1 odds as an estimated 1/3 probability of winning, and then treat that as a probability of getting any given vote (which it isn’t), then the Greens should get the lion’s share of the Lab/RefUK/Green votes, and end up closer to 50% than 28%.It should, in other words, be Not Even Close. The result will either be an awful warning against taking political betting seriously or an awful warning against ignoring it.

Unless RefUK win, of course, in which case it’ll just be an awful warning.

Gorton and Denton, this morning:

Green Hannah Spencer 14,980 40.6% +27.4%
Reform Matt Goodwin 10,578 28.7% +14.6%
Labour Angeliki Stogia 9,364 25.4% −25.4%

5.3% the field (-16.6%)

Does this vindicate everyone who was citing the betting odds during the campaign, as against (e.g.) this guy?

FFS ignore the betting markets when it comes to election results. This is getting silly.

Alexander Clarkson (@aphclarkson.bsky.social) 2026-02-26T23:27:39.262Z

Well, it does a bit – but with a couple of fairly major qualifications, and some actual maths. To which I now turn.

The mathematics of odds (easy part)

We think of probabilities in terms of fractions – a ‘one in three’ chance, etc. Percentages, although they sound more scientific, are fractions too – we’ve just all agreed to say ‘70%’ and ‘29%’ instead of ‘seven in ten’ and ’29 in a hundred’.

Odds are different. It’s not just that odds are quoted against something happening – ’10 to 1′ is a very bad bet, not a near-certainty. More importantly, when you give the odds against something you’re always quoting two probabilities: the likelihood of it happening and the likelihood of it not happening. “1 in 3” (probability) looks like a numerator and a denominator, because it is: it’s a one-third chance. 3/1 (odds) looks like a numerator and a denominator, but it isn’t: it’s one chance of the event happening and three chances of it not happening. Essentially what you see are two numerators with an implicit denominator, which is the sum of the two: 3/1 means that there’s one chance out of (3+1=4) that the event will happen and 3 chances out of (3+1=4) that it won’t.

The odds on the Greens winning Gorton and Denton, at close of play last night, were 2/1 on: 2/3 probability that they would win vs 1/3 probability that they wouldn’t; call it a 66% chance of winning. Reform were quoted at 5/2 (=2/7=28% chance) and Labour at 4/1(=1/5=20%).

The second and third of these, in particular, don’t look too far adrift from the actual voting percentages of 40%, 28% and 25%. If those percentages were also probabilities, they would equate to odds of 3/2, 5/2 and 3/1.

But there are qualifications.

The qualifications

The most obvious qualification is that the percentages of actual votes cast aren’t probabilities. This isn’t because of some ontological distinction between a competitive estimation of probabilities and the proportions in a set of outcomes, though. If the bookies had been taking bets on how a random individual punter in Gorton and Denton would vote, the odds would represent the bookies’ estimation of how the votes would fall (to see this, imagine scaling up from an x% probability of an individual voter voting for a given party to the probabilities for 100 of those voters, or a thousand, or the whole constituency).

But the bookies weren’t taking bets on a random individual vote, what with it being hard to decide whether to pay out on a bet like that; the bet was on who would win. To make the betting markets track actual preferences, we have to assume that it’s mostly people in the constituency who are betting, and that they’re mostly betting on the party they want to win. We have to assume that the market’s not being distorted deliberately, and that ‘smart’ betting by ordinary punters – people betting on the winner as a sure thing; people hedging their preference by betting on the runner-up – will largely get washed out in the noise. Generally these aren’t crazy assumptions, to be fair, but they do call for a bit of scepticism. (It could be argued that a high-profile election such as this is more likely to have people gaming the betting market, but this is speculative; apart from anything else, a high-profile election is also more likely to have ordinary punters putting a bet on.)

The other factor for scepticism is the obvious fact – frequently cited as if it completely demolished the case for paying any attention to betting odds – that the bookies want to make money. This is less of a knock-down argument than it at first appears. Suppose that the bookies’ finger-in-air estimate is that Labour are probably going to lose. Being motivated by the desire to make money (who knew), they will give Labour good odds, making a promise of a big payout that they think they won’t have to honour. Fiendish! This is all right as far as it goes, but that isn’t very far. Put it this way: how good will they make the odds on Labour? What if there’s another party standing which the bookies also think is going to lose – how good an offer will they make on that party? If it were just a matter of “A is going to win, let’s encourage lots of people to vote for B and C”, the odds on B and C would always be 100 to 1 against. But bookies can’t see the future any more than anyone else, so they set the odds by balancing the lure of a phantom payout on loser party B against the probability that B might actually win. Which is more or less where we came in. Galaxy-brain take: the bookies set the odds in order to make money, and that’s what makes the odds informative.

Where’s my ‘factor for scepticism’ gone? Here it is: the thing to keep in mind isn’t that bookies want to make money, it’s more specifically that they don’t want to lose money. What’s going to happen to the odds on a favourite? They certainly aren’t going to get any longer; the last thing the bookies will want to do is encourage more punters to bet on it. The lifespan of a betting market in a lot of sporting events is measured in minutes, but over the course of a long-running betting market like this one a favourite can get really solidly established; the bookies can collectively reach a point where there really isn’t any doubt which way the market’s going, suspending all judgment on whether the said market tracks the outcome. And, once you’re past that point, there’s no point offering to throw good money after bad. If a given outcome looks better than evens – more likely to happen than not – the odds cited can get arbitrarily short. The Greens finished the campaign trading at 1/2 on – 66% chance of winning – and those were long odds by the standards of the campaign; at one stage their odds were down at 10/3 on, 77% chance. But the shortness of those odds weren’t (just) an estimate of the likelihood of a Green win, let alone the likelihood of an individual punter voting Green; beyond a certain point, that really was the bookies wanting to make money, or rather wanting to avoid paying out more than they had to.

The mathematics of odds (slightly harder part)

Odds make an unexpected appearance when you’re studying statistics, specifically in the form of odds ratios. The idea of an odds ratio is that you sometimes want to compare the likelihood of two pairs of outcomes; in clinical trials, for example, one way to compare a treatment group and a control group is to compare the odds of an infection (say) occurring, as against it not occurring, in the treatment group with the same pair of odds in the control group. The comparison is straightforward, and involves treating the sets of odds as if they were fractions; you divide one by the other, which you can do by multiplying the first number in the first pair by the second in the second pair and vice versa. For example, the ratio of odds of 3/1 against to odds of 4/1 against is (3×1/4×1) = 0.75.

As I mentioned earlier, the actual vote distribution can be translated into odds, if you squint and make a mental apology to your Stats lecturer. And, as I also mentioned earlier, the vote was expected to be a lot closer – and with more scattering to minor parties such as Rejoin EU and the Conservative Party – with both fag-packet estimates and one actual poll converging on the region of 30%/28%/28% as between the Greens, Labour and RefUK.

The analysis I’m about to embark on hits a snag straight away in the shape of Reform UK. Not only were the betting odds on RefUK  – 5/2 – almost identical to the 28% in the polling and the ‘too close to call’ estimates throughout the campaign; they were both almost identical to the vote share their unlovely candidate actually got. The bookies were dead on, but so – in the solitary case of Reform UK – were the parties. So the odds ratios comparing RefUK’s betting form with the result, and comparing the polling with the same result, are both 1: an exact match.

But let’s press on anyway.

Odds Est. = Actual = OR (odds) OR (est)
Greens 1/2 30% 7/3 40% 3/2 3 0.64
RefUK 5/2 28% 5/2 28% 5/2 1 1
Labour 4/1 28% 5/2 25% 3/1 0.75 1.2

Left to right, you’ve got: the final odds against that party winning; the polling estimate, followed by the odds to which this figure is equivalent; the actual vote share, followed by the odds to which that figure is equivalent; the ratio of odds to outcome; and the ratio of the polling estimate to the outcome.

We can see that the polling underestimated the Greens substantially. The betting odds wildly overestimated them, for reasons touched on earlier, but the bookies did at least put them substantially out in front. Since Reform UK rather unsportingly got almost exactly the same vote share everyone expected, we’ll pass over them (although not without pointing out that the bookies didn’t get them wrong). Lastly, the polling slightly overestimated Labour, while the bookies slightly overestimated them.

With the caveat about what happens to the odds when a favourite is locked in, I’d say that the betting odds ended up being a reasonably good predictor of the result in Gorton and Denton. The bookies’ implicit forecast wasn’t dramatically worse than the result predicted by polling, and it did have the additional merit of suggesting that it wasn’t, in fact, going to be a three-way scrap for first place. I can’t conclude this post better than by quoting myself again:

All the local polling that’s been published, and the messaging from both Labour and the Greens, has suggested an incredibly tight result in Gorton and Denton, along the lines of 29%/28%/28% (with the Greens probably, but not at all definitely, in the lead).

If the bookies were right, on the other hand,

the Greens should … end up closer to 50% than 28%.It should, in other words, be Not Even Close. The result will either be an awful warning against taking political betting seriously or an awful warning against ignoring it.

(Although I will admit that 40% isn’t much closer to 50% than 28%!)

2025: Bookcruncher

I read 110 books in 2025; quite a few, really. A lot of it was pretty light, though. In terms of genre the 110 break down as follows:

Non-fiction: 9
SF: 38 (including 28 books from the £10 Box)
Crime: 20
Thriller: 16
Horror: 7
All other fiction: 20

The ‘crime’ and ‘thriller’ categories, in particular, included quite a few books that I can’t imagine wanting to re-read. I’ll try and shift the balance a bit in 2026, perhaps. Maybe this will be the year I read The Mill on the Floss; maybe I’ll even dig into the non-fiction section of my to-read pile. I might even read that book about the new Labour leader, the one I got back in, when was it… ah yes, 2016. Wonder what became of him? (I’m really quite bad at reading non-fiction books – but luckily I don’t depend on them to keep up with the news.)

Non-fiction

Speaking of which… Only nine non-fiction titles, three of which I read for what I laughingly call ‘work’; all those had titles including the words ‘rule of law’. Of the other six, the most substantial were Sam Knight’s The Premonitions Bureau and John Cooper Clarke’s memoir I Wanna Be Yours. The Premonitions Bureau didn’t turn out to be very substantial – lots of background detail, lots of full-page pictures. I was left with the impression that the whole idea of trying to prove the existence of dreams that accurately foretold the future was futile, particularly given that the events foretold tended to be traumatic – after all, if you knew that the plane crash you’d dreamt of was certain to happen, what could you do with that knowledge? I’m not sure how much that sense of futility came from the subject, though, and how much from Knight’s treatment of it.

The John Cooper Clarke memoir creased me up when I looked at it in a bookshop – always a good sign – and mostly delivered subsequently; he doesn’t write an ugly sentence (“If it doesn’t sound any good, it’s because it isn’t any good”). My main problem with it was that almost a third of the book was devoted to Clarke’s fifteen years as a heroin addict, with very little on the thirty years he’d subsequently spent clean. Admittedly, those fifteen years were also the years of his greatest success, but it still felt unbalanced – not to mention that JCC, heroin user, doesn’t seem to have been an especially nice guy.

Favourite non-fiction book of the year: either that or Paul Hanley’s Have a bleedin guess – the 33 1/3 that never was on the Fall’s Hex Enduction Hour.

Horror

Like sf, horror is a genre that’s always worked best for me in short form (although I read 29 sf novels last year, so maybe I should revise that view). In 2025 I read four horror collections, one stand-alone short and two novels. Of the short story collections, Ray Newman’s Intervals of Darkness stands out; both it and the short (by Malcolm Devlin) were very much in “working-class Aickman” territory. One hell of a territory. Neither of the novels were up to much, sadly, and both made me wish their authors had written short stories: Andrew Michael Hurley’s Saltwash because it was an overgrown short story, Adam S. Leslie’s Lost in the Garden because it was a sprawling mess with some brilliant moments, which would have made a great short story collection – but a short story collection, a 96-page collection of vignettes. Rarely has a 300-page book taken me so long to get through.

Favourite horror text of the year: Malcolm Devlin, Engines Beneath Us. Least favourite: Lost in the Garden.

Science Fiction

Most of the “£10 Box” reading project took place during 2025: 28 books in total, all of which I’ve reviewed on the blog. I won’t say anything about them here (a £10 Box retrospective is (still) planned), other than that Roadside Picnic is just as good as everyone says it is, Richard H. Francis’s Blackpool Vanishes is just as good as I remember it was, and the casual sexism of most male sf writers in the 1970s has to be seen to be believed.

I read ten other sf titles in 2025, including two retrospective short story collections and an adaptation of a Douglas Adams Who script. Then there were three books by Gareth Southwell, who’s ploughing an interesting techno-gnostic furrow, and Suzanne Collins’ ‘Hunger Games’ prequel Sunrise on the Reaping; perhaps a prequel too far, given that the only question it can really answer is “how did I get to be a cynical old drunk?”. The other three were by Ira Levin (I got round to reading The Stepford Wives), Jane Rogers (The Testament of Jessie Lamb: great premise, flawed execution) and Adam Roberts (Lake of Darkness: I disagreed, but found I had to disagree at some length – and if nothing else, disagreeing with a novel is an interesting way not to get on with it).

Favourite work of sf, this year or any year: Roadside Picnic. Favourite work of sf not including the £10 Box: Lake of Darkness. Least favourite: A Slip of the Pen, a collection gathering together early pseudonymous pieces by Terry Pratchett: well worth doing, but not really worth the effort of reading.

Thrillers

This is a bit of an artificial category and could be merged with ‘Crime’; one of the books in this category was even called We Solve Murders. But, although there are generally people (a) breaking and (b) upholding the law in these books, the narrative interest isn’t in solving the crime or stopping the perpetrator; quite the reverse in some cases.

There are sixteen titles in this category, but only eight authors; I read three Patricia Highsmiths last year and three Mick Herrons, as well as two each by Celia Dale, Josephine Tey, Richard Osman and (I regret to say) Janice Hallett, whose The Examiner really was an outstanding stinker. The other two were by Holly Seddon (whose 59 Minutes was almost as bad) and Gillian Flynn.

I enjoyed reading Clown Town – the new Slough House novel – but not nearly as much as I enjoyed The Secret Hours, a prequel/companion piece to the series; it resolved a couple of long-running back-story mysteries, filled in the background of some key characters and had an elegiac tone to it, and all in all suggested that there might not be a new Slough House novel. When book series do continue, avoiding diminishing returns is a challenge; ask Richard Osman, or even Patricia Highsmith. The protagonist of The Talented Mr Ripley was a fascinating character, a monstrous underdog with a childlike neediness and innocence. The main character of the second and third ‘Ripley’ novels has achieved success and is quite outstandingly unpleasant in seeking to preserve it, which isn’t quite the same thing. Like Highsmith and Ripley, Josephine Tey always gave the impression of being heavily invested in her central characters, be it Inspector Grant or Brat Farrar; both the latter and his eponymous novel are highly conventional romantic fiction creations, while somehow also being compellingly weird. But the best books in this category were Celia Dale’s A Helping Hand and Sheep’s Clothing; she was an outstanding creator of moral monsters.

Favourite ‘thriller’ of the year: The Secret Hours, closely followed by A Helping Hand. Least favourite: The Examiner.

Crime

Like the neighbouring ‘thriller’ category, this grouping includes some very prolific writers: 17 of the 20 titles are by four authors. The other three were by Henning Mankell (who I probably won’t be pursuing further), Sophie Hannah (who I definitely won’t) and Horst Eckert. A couple of years ago a German friend encouraged me to develop my grasp of the language by reading Krimis and lent me several of hers, including Eckert’s Wolfsspinne. I had recently finished Eckert’s Schwarzlicht when my friend told me that she was terminally ill. I didn’t really want to immerse myself in German after that. I should get back to it this year, though; it was good mental exercise, and I did enjoy those books (as of course did my friend).

The other thing about Krimis is that they take me a while to read, which is more than you can say of a lot of the English-language crime novels I get through. I read three books by Reginald Hill in 2025, having been given four for Christmas. During the year I had also read two books by Anthony Horowitz, five by Agatha Christie and seven by Nicci French. The Christies – four of which were short story collections (or rather one large short story collection split over four volumes) – stick in my mind mainly for their sheer oddity: Christie wrote several different fictional worlds into being, oriented around different central characters, all of them recognisable as versions of her contemporary world but all stylised to just short of the point of caricature. The racism is also memorable, of course. The nearest contemporary equivalent – apart from the racism – is probably Anthony Horowitz, whose books are ingenious, larky, thoroughly enjoyable and thoroughly forgettable. (I notice that in my review I described one of the year’s two Horowitzes as the fourth in its series and “better than the third and fifth”. I do read a lot of this stuff.)

Both Reginald Hill and Nicci French are a bit more of a serious proposition. The protagonists are different – all-too-human but well-intentioned police detectives for Hill, potential victims trying to bypass the police for French – but in both cases the setting is recognisably scuzzy, the pursuit turns over many different stones with more or less unpleasant results, and it’s clear that very few of anybody’s problems will be solved when the crime is. (Albeit that one of the key problems in Nicci French novels is often the continued survival of the central character, which isn’t nothing.)

If I had 2025 again I wouldn’t bother with Sophie Hannah, and the Agatha Christies didn’t really repay the effort. The other 14 titles were all enjoyable, even if not many of them linger in the mind.

Favourite crime fiction of the year: Schwartzlicht. Least favourite: The Telling Error.

English Literature

Lastly, I read twenty books in 2025 that don’t fit into any of the above categories – or rather, that weren’t marketed as fitting into any of them. Stand-alone novellas seem to be having a moment: I’ve already touched on four (by Malcolm Devlin, Gareth Southwell, Gillian Flynn but Janice Hallett). There were four more in this category, by Alan Bennett, Susanna Clarke, Tessa Hadley and Alan Warner (I can recommend the Darkland Tales series, in which Scottish writers are commissioned to write riffs on Scottish history), as well as short-story collections by Tessa Hadley (again) and Magnus Mills.

I read Bernard Mac Laverty’s Cal before re-watching the film (which is remarkably faithful to it); I re-read Pynchon’s Vineland before watching the Paul Thomas Anderson film (which is nothing like it); I read Truman Capote’s Breakfast at Tiffany’s to see what it was like (and I can only assume that the film’s nothing like it). I also read Jane Gardam’s A Long Way from Verona, for the fun of it (and so should you – it’s wonderful).

That leaves ten books, all novels and all published relatively recently.

Jonathan Coe, The Proof of My Innocence
A weird and slightly Gothic shadow-version of What A Carve-Up!, with some of the darker political edge of The Closed Circle and a greater than usual commitment to formal and metafictional experimentation. I think; I should probably re-read it. I do remember that the title features a truly appalling pun, even by Coe’s standards.

Jeremy Cooper, Brian
In which a painfully shy, possibly autistic, central character watches films and grows older. He becomes part of a group of film buffs but with little effect on his life; the narrative is about the films and Brian’s investment in them.

Jennifer Egan, Manhattan Beach
I love A Visit from the Goon Squad with a passion, some of which is presumably owed to its form, so I approached Manhattan Beach – which I’d heard that Egan had begun writing in a similar ‘fix-up’ form before reverting to a more conventional narrative – with some trepidation and a considerable delay. It’s good, though, and not that great a departure from Egan’s other fiction; it has some horribly relatable characters, some heartbreaking moments and (as I wrote last year) “a sex scene that practically leaves you feeling sore”.

Karen Golightly, There are things I know
The things the narrator knows include how numbers work; the things he doesn’t include what people want from him, including the man who picks him up from a school trip claiming to be his uncle. Things could get very dark indeed at this point, but thankfully don’t. Reminded me of Walker Hamilton’s All the little animals, of which you should certainly have heard.

Andrey Kurkov, Death and the Penguin
Poverty and corruption in the life of a freelance journalist in post-Soviet (pre-invasion) Ukraine. And a penguin. (The penguin doesn’t play a huge part in the story, it has to be said.)

Rebecca Makkai, I have some questions for you
A heroic #MeToo story which rapidly degenerates into the kind of self-deluding, relationship-breaking, career-ending, health-destroying mess that setting out to be a hero in real life is liable to cause; it then switches gear and turns back into a heroic #MeToo story. Weirdly disjointed, weirdly disappointing.

Paraic O’Donnell, The Naming of the Birds
Two Victorian police officers are plunged into a mystery whose Gothic horrors go far beyond their abilities. The prose is beautiful and the horrors are unsparing; a “distinctive combination of delicacy and viciousness”, as I said last year.

Michelle Paver, Rainforest
If the last two books were bordering on ‘crime’ and ‘thriller’ respectively, this is definitely bordering on horror. The two strands – inner and outer – of the protagonist’s story don’t entirely knit together, though, or for that matter fall definitively apart. Perhaps this makes the book less ‘generic’, but I felt that it made it less successful (as with the Makkai).

Lynne Steger Strong, Flight
I didn’t really get on with this: the central bereavement that should have been the engine of the story served mainly as a device for bringing a lot of characters together, each with their own unrelated backstory. The multiple meanings of the word ‘flight’ become significant – a literary touch I found more irksome than Jonathan Coe’s puns. It’s all a bit ‘creative writing’.

Asako Yuzuki, Butter
Sometimes it’s hard to be a woman, particularly if you were born in Japan. Japanese food culture seems utterly unlike our own (and substantially more demanding in terms of women’s domestic labour); work and family culture seem oddly similar but with some features greatly exaggerated (specifically including the demands placed on women). There was also a plot, I think. A very odd book, but much of that may have been down to my unfamiliarity with Japanese society, including its fictional conventions.

Favourite ‘non-genre’ fiction of 2025: The Proof of My Innocence, closely followed by Manhattan Beach. Least favourite: Flight, closely followed by I have some questions for you.

Discoveries of the year: Celia Dale, Malcolm Devlin, Karen Golightly, Reginald Hill(!), Ray Newman, Gareth Southwell and of course Arkady and Boris Strugatsky. Devlin, Golightly and Southwell in particular are authors I’d literally never heard of before last year. (Devlin’s and Golightly’s books were both impulse buys from The Book Case in Hebden Bridge, incidentally. Support your local!)

 

 

 

…it’s worth doing well

I’ve got two mottoes as an academic (emeritus). The first came to me fully-formed one afternoon at work, when I was (unusually) doing some marking in the office. A student’s essay had unexpectedly raised a fundamental issue in criminology – the difference between a measure’s reliability and its validity, maybe, or the difference between consequentialist and deontological justifications for a criminal penalty. I could have just ignored it – it wasn’t what the essay was about, it wasn’t going to do much either way in terms of marks, and I had a lot of other essays to do… but no, I realised, I couldn’t just ignore it. “Am I going to add a comment specifically to get into that issue?” I muttered to myself. “Of course I am, I’m a fucking intellectual!”

Then I burst out laughing: my motto, ladies and gentlemen, albeit one that I’ve never actually used where anyone can hear. (Maybe a coffee mug? Or maybe not.) Self-respect and awareness of the qualities I can offer; an equally clear awareness of how little those qualities tend to count for on their own; and an obdurate insistence that I’m going to continue to offer ’em anyway. It’s an attitude with obvious negatives as well as positives, and I don’t particularly recommend it – even if you are – but I can’t deny that it resonates with me.

As for the other motto, let me introduce to the poet James Thomson. I currently volunteer for Oxfam, pricing and writing brief descriptions of books for their online shop. In a donation of antiquarian books we recently received, I found a copy of The Captive Chief and other poems by James Thomson, second edition, 1871. It was a fairly expensively produced slim volume, half-bound, embossed in gold to the spine and with a coat of arms in gold on the front cover. Moreover, it was dedicated by the author – something which invariably makes books a bit more desirable – although the dedication did have the slight disadvantage of being “from the Author” rather than including an autograph.

But who was the author? There have been several poets called James Thomson; Wikipedia knows of three. Given the date of 1871 and the dedication, it didn’t seem likely that it was James Thomson (1700-48), author of “The Seasons”, or James Thomson the Scottish weaver poet (1763-1832) (of whom I had not heard). It looked as if the date would work for James Thomson (1834-82), author of “The City of Dreadful Night” and a prolific writer of verse and prose throughout the 1870s. I assumed that this was the person we were dealing with and started writing the online catalogue entry accordingly.

Then I had to say something about the dedication, which first required making head or tail of the dedication: it seemed to say “To the Reed of Reynolds Hole”. Reeds plural, maybe – Thomson had for some reason dedicated his book to a family rather than a person, perhaps the family of the local squire? And where was Reynolds Hole, anyway? I googled and discovered that it wasn’t a ‘where’ but a ‘who’, namely this gentleman: Samuel Reynolds Hole (a.k.a. “the Rev’d S. Reynolds Hole”), Anglican clergyman, popular preacher and prominent amateur horticulturist. I thought I should also say something about the coat of arms stamped on the front. I couldn’t make out the first word of the motto, but it ended “VEL AUREA NOLO” – something about not wanting gold? Google was my friend again, confirming that “FRAENA VEL AUREA NOLO” – “I want no chains, not even of gold” – was the motto of… Samuel Reynolds Hole.

So far, so good. But how had the London clerk and hack writer James Thomson crossed paths with Samuel Reynolds Hole? Not impossible, but it didn’t seem very likely. I looked more closely at the book and noticed that the prefatory author’s note – opening with a defiant acknowledgment that these were “poems of a working man”, however played-out (in 1871) that sub-genre might be – ended “JAMES THOMSON, SHAWDEN”. I’d never heard of Shawden, but it didn’t sound like an area of London. I also noticed a printed dedication: the author begged leave to dedicate the book to “Lady Fairfax”, noting that he had “served” her ladyship’s father and grandfather.

This definitely wasn’t sounding like James “City of Dreadful Night” Thomson. If anything, James “the weaver poet” Thomson was starting to seem more likely – or he would have done, if only he hadn’t been dead for nearly forty years when the book was published. Once again I used a popular search engine, this time searching for various combinations of “Fairfax” and “Shawden” – although it seemed like a long shot, as I was ruefully aware that Lady Fairfax’s father and grandfather would have borne a different name. But I was lucky: I found a portrait of Lord F. in full military regalia, with accompanying text that confirmed that his wife had been one of the Pawsons of Shawden Hall in Northumbria.

Armed with this information I went in search of James Thomson again, and found what appears to be his sole footprint on the Web: a partially digitised copy of an anthology titled 100 Modern Scottish Poets, published in 1880. From here I learned that James Thomson – my James Thomson – was born in 1825 in Rothes, near Inverness; that he had lived south of the border for the previous thirty years, and worked at Shawden Hall as the gardener (hence, perhaps, the Reynolds Hole connection); and that he had published a well-regarded poetry collection called Northumbria. I got the impression that this was the same collection as The captive chief under another name, but I wouldn’t swear to it.

And that was it: that was all the information about James Thomson (b. Rothes 1825, d. ?) that I was able to wring out of the Internet.

I suppose I should say something about the poetry. It’s not great, to be honest. There are a couple of poems in Scots, including a parody of “A Man’s A Man For A’ That” bathetically celebrating Scottish food, but mostly these are poems in quite conventional forms, written in conventionally ‘poetic’ and archaic language. The relative isolation in which self-taught writers work allows some true originals to come through, but it also makes it more likely that less original writers will be followers of trends rather than leaders.

Now, the work I put in to cataloguing this book accurately has a specific purpose and a short life expectancy: once that book sells, its record will be deleted and all those words will be lost, like tears in rain. Moreover, while I’m sure that there are people out there with a scholarly interest in vernacular poetry of the mid-Victorian period, I’m less sure that anyone’s interested in highly conventional and literary vernacular poetry of the mid-Victorian period – and I very much doubt that anyone out there is collecting the work of James Thomson (of Rothes and Shawden) (1825-?). In profile terms, the other James Thomsons are practically Simon Armitage by comparison.

Which raises the question of whether what I did was worth doing. It didn’t necessarily make the book any more likely to sell, or to make money for Oxfam. It would probably have been more saleable, and at a higher price, if I’d allowed myself to remain in ignorance and attribute it to the City of Dreadful Night guy.

But that would have been wrong; that would have been doing half a job or doing the job badly. This collection was written by James Thomson of Shawden; he was who he was, just as Samuel Reynolds Hole was who he was; my catalogue entry (and this blog post) is a small, and as far as I could guarantee it accurate, contribution to the stock of relevant knowledge.

Which brings me to my second academic motto: in the immortal words of Alan Bennett, “if a thing’s not worth doing, it’s worth doing well”.

 

Palestine Action in the High Court

Like many other people, I was delighted to read that the High Court had found in favour of the appeal against the proscription of Palestine Action as terrorist. You can find the full judgment here (pdf), but do set aside some time if you’re planning on reading it; it’s a High Court judgment, not a press release. This from Doughty Street Chambers is a thorough and reasonably clear summary. For commentary, I recommend DAT Green (good on the intersection between law and politics in the case) and Mark Elliott (more ‘legal-minded’ and a bit more sceptical).

Having read (as they say) the whole thing, I think the judgment is fairly solid, and I’m cautiously optimistic about its chances of being upheld – and ultimately put into action, not least with a repeal of the proscription).

Here are some thoughts. This post originated as a thread on Bluesky, but it’s heavily reorganised and revised here.

Update (18/2/26): I have added a brief reply to arguments raised by Gabriel Tan and Dane Luo.

Direct action, not terrorism

The High Court’s key finding was that Palestine Action is not a terrorist group but a direct action group – although the judgment also suggests that Palestine Action claimed to be engaged in civil disobedience, a claim which it disputes. Either way, it’s pretty clear that direct action is what Palestine Action engaged in, and (pace the High Court) they don’t appear to have claimed otherwise. Quite the reverse:

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If you’re looking for a definition of direct action, that phrase “seeks to make it impossible” is a good pointer. If you carry out direct action you aren’t protesting in the hope that X will stop doing Y, you’re acting directly in such a way that X can’t do Y. Direct action tactics tend not to be legal; they generally involve breaking the law and subsequently going to prison. At least, they involve going to prison unless

– the perpetrators don’t get caught
– a jury declines to convict
– the government declines to prosecute
– the government changes the law

All four of these have been known to happen, and that tells us something about direct action as a type of offending. I mean, a jury isn’t likely to refuse to convict someone standing trial for street theft. If there’s a rash of phone thefts, say, the police may give up trying to do much about them, but you wouldn’t expect the Ministry of Justice to state that phone thieves would never be prosecuted, still less to change the law to legalise phone theft.

So: direct action isn’t like ordinary crime. It’s always political, almost always highly contentious, and generally aimed at preventing something which – the participants believe – should itself be a crime; a greater crime, by definition, than doing a bit of property damage trying to prevent it. And governments sometimes end up agreeing (usually without much fanfare).

When it comes to legitimising direct action, though, judges don’t tend to take the lead. This judgment’s no exception. Instead of going anywhere near the question of whether Palestine Action’s direct action might be legitimate, the High Court tackles the much easier question of whether it constituted peaceful civil disobedience.

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There’s an awful lot of paraphrasing and reading between the lines here. “The submission” (which isn’t quoted) “rests on an assumption” that Palestine Action’s direct action was “synonymous with civil disobedience”? Really? This assumption seems to have been inferred by the Court; likening Palestine Action’s actions to the Civil Rights movement isn’t quite the same thing.

Still, the Court is to be commended, for resisting the government’s assertion that Palestine Action isn’t a peaceful protest group but a terrorist group, and especially for refusing to take those as the only possibilities. This is all the more striking given that the Court effectively directed itself not to consider “direct action”, the obvious third option. Ironically, a more open-minded and protest-friendly judgment – one that noted our tendency to endorse direct action tactics retrospectively, from the Suffragettes to Stop The Seventy Tour – would have been more welcome to the government, as it would have given an Appeal Court judge an obvious opening. The judgment’s avoidance of any kind of endorsement of Palestine Action, or of direct action generally, makes this key negative finding – that Palestine Action is not a terrorist group – all the stronger.

The Appeal: Grounds 8 and 5 (unsuccessful)

Palestine Action appealed against the proscription on eight grounds, of which four were permitted to proceed; these were handily, if not particularly memorably, numbered as Grounds 8, 5, 6 and 2. Ground 8 was that the Home Secretary should have notified them, giving them a chance to appeal, before making the proscription order. The Court points out that this would tie the Home Secretary’s hands in making any future proscription order – which might actually be against a terrorist group, and then where would we be?

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A bit of a catch-22, really: “we can’t give you the chance to appeal against being branded a dangerous terrorist – what if you were a dangerous terrorist?”. In a judgment that’s centrally concerned with the difference between being labelled as a terrorist group and being one, it’s a shame the Court didn’t manage to peel the two apart in this respect.

Ground 5 – “failure to consider relevant matters” – also fell; the Court thought that it covered ground that was also covered in Grounds 6 and 2. To which, as they say, we now turn.

Ground 6: Discretion, but Constrained Discretion

Ground 6 concerns whether the Home Secretary followed her own policy in proscribing Palestine Action. There’s some discussion of different meanings of ‘proportionality’ (which I confess I didn’t entirely follow; I was glad of the Court’s rather disarming conclusion that it couldn’t affect the judgment either way), before we get this crucial passage:

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There are two separate issues here: the Home Secretary’s discretion, as guided by existing policy; and the range of activities considered under that policy.

Firstly, the Home Secretary’s exercise of discretion. (I’ll warn you now, this part is a long one.) The Home Secretary has a power to proscribe, not a duty. That must mean that not every organisation which can plausibly be said to be involved in terrorism ends up being proscribed; there are other factors to consider.

There are four key points here. Firstly, the Home Secretary doesn’t automatically proscribe everything that looks like a terrorist organisation; there will always be edge cases, organisations that might qualify as terrorist from a certain angle but aren’t really candidates for proscribing. But, secondly, while she chooses to proscribe or not at her own discretion, it isn’t unfettered discretion: she can proscribe an organisation because (a) it’s involved in terrorism and (b) it poses an active threat, but not because (a) it’s involved in terrorism and (b) never you mind. Here are some of the factors which will be considered:

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This is Home Office policy, going back to when the Terrorism Act was first passed. It’s not rocket salad; the Home Secretary should ask, among other things, “how big is it?”, “how bad is it?” and (if the first two questions don’t get anywhere) “are other countries banning it?”.

Thirdly, the nature of the policy is to limit the Home Secretary’s discretion: “to constrain use of the discretion so that not all organisations that meet the concerned in terrorism requirement will be proscribed” (italics added for clarity) – and all the relevant considerations have the same function. Implicitly the Home Secretary is asking herself and her advisors a series of negative questions – e.g. “are we sure that the nature and scale of the organisation’s activities aren’t too insignificant to justify proscription?”. And, while the policy allows the Home Secretary to consider other factors, the nature of the policy means that the other factors should also be of the same type.

Lastly, the tests applied by the policy are, implicitly, tests that can be failed: both logically and as a matter of real-world experience, it is always possible to look at what’s apparently a terrorist group and conclude that it’s not worth the bother for the UK government to proscribe it. What that means, though, is that the question isn’t really “how big is this organisation?” but “is this organisation particularly big (as compared with other organisations that aren’t proscribed)?”. And likewise, crucially, with those additional factors: the Home Secretary isn’t free to say “here’s an additional factor weighing in favour of proscription”, but needs to be saying “here’s an additional factor weighing in favour of proscription in this specific case“.

In short: proscription is at the Home Secretary’s discretion; that discretion needs to be exercised according to stated considerations; the nature of those considerations is to limit the choice to proscribe, specifying when it should and, in particular, when it shouldn’t be made; and the judgment required by those considerations is always relative, as it justifies the inclusion of one group in comparison to others which may have been excluded.

There’s no debate over whether Yvette Cooper, the then Home Secretary, took into account factors [1] to [5] above. The point at issue concerns the additional factors which she and her advisors also took into account.

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(3) is a bog-standard “how bad is it?” criterion, while (4) to (6) are “side-effects of proscribing” questions. (The section 11-13 offences referred to here are the ‘membership’, ‘expression of support’ and ‘wearing or carrying an item suggesting support’ offences. The question of whether proscribing would (5) deter people from committing those offences or (4) place an enforcement burden on the police has now been answered fairly conclusively.)

(1) is the problematic element (and to a lesser extent (2), although that doesn’t say much on its own). The problem is that “proscribing organisation X will make it significantly easier to disrupt” is always true: proscribing Palestine Action would make it easier to disrupt its activities, but so would proscribing Reform UK or the Women’s Institute. So this is the wrong kind of ‘consideration’; it’s a consideration that shouldn’t be allowed to weigh in favour of a discretionary decision to proscribe in a specific case, because it will be valid in every case. To put it another way, it’s legitimate for a government to say “here’s how bad this terrorist organisation is, and therefore we’re proscribing it, which will give us powers to disrupt it” – but not to say “this organisation’s so bad we need the powers to disrupt it, therefore we’re proscribing it as terrorist”.

So a benefit of proscribing Palestine Action is cited, wrongly, as a reason for proscribing Palestine Action – in fact, the main reason. We see this again in the Proscription Review Group’s advice to the Home Secretary:

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and again, perhaps inevitably, in Yvette Cooper’s statement justifying proscription:

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When I quoted paragraphs 82-4 (some time ago now) I said that this section of the judgment raised two separate issues, and Cooper’s statement highlights the second one: the range of issues considered. To save on scrolling, here are those paragraphs again:

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“The power in the 2000 Act is to proscribe organisations because they act in ways that mean they are concerned in terrorism, not because of other activities that fall short of terrorism. The nature and scale of an organisation’s activities ought therefore to concern only those activities that amount to terrorism.”

This is surely correct; thinking otherwise would open the door to rampantly opportunistic uses of counter-terrorism legislation, allowing the government to target an organisation it wanted to suppress by fitting one or a few of its actions to the (notoriously capacious) 2000 definition of terrorism and then arguing that the organisation should be proscribed because of all its other undesirable activities. “Regardless of whether this instance itself amounts to terrorism, such activity is clearly intimidatory and unacceptable”… is the kind of thing that a Home Secretary abusing counter-terrorism powers in this way might say.

Ground 2: interference with human rights

So that’s Ground 6, whether the Home Secretary followed her own policy in proscribing Palestine Action (and no, in a court of law it’s not open to the Home Secretary to say “but cynically using whatever powers I could lay my hands on was my policy!”). The other ground on which the High Court found against the government was Ground 2, relating to interference with human rights guaranteed under the European Convention. This can (with any luck) be dealt with a bit more briefly. The rights in question are those guaranteed by Article 10 – freedom of expression, including the right to receive and impart information – and Article 11 – freedom of association and assembly. Quite clearly, making it a criminal offence to (oh say for instance) sit on the ground holding a home-made sign reading “I oppose genocide. I support Palestine Action.” impinges on rights under articles 10 and 11. (It should be noted, for completeness’ sake, that there is a specific immunity from prosecution on the ‘membership’ and ‘support’ offences for anything done in relation to applications for deproscription made to the Home Secretary (as well as appeals against refusals to deproscribe to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (POAC) and appeals to the Appeal Court against decisions of the POAC). I don’t know if there’s an active application to the Home Secretary to deproscribe Palestine Action (or an active appeal to the POAC, or to the Appeal Court against the POAC); if there is, it might be possible to hold a sign expressing support for it without falling foul of the law. Alternatively, of course, it might be considered that supporting a legal appeal doesn’t amount to doing anything in relation to it; in that case your sign, however carefully worded, would only “arouse reasonable suspicion that [you were] a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation” and get you in lumber under section 13.)

The rights under articles 10 and 11, it should be noted, are qualified rights, which governments may restrict for purposes such as public safety and the prevention of crime. More directly relevant here is Article 17, which provides that human rights may not be exploited so as to abuse human rights: death threats aren’t covered under freedom of expression.

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Does article 17 get the government out of trouble? The (current) Home Secretary thought so.

BERJAYA

You’ve got to admit it’s neat: protesting in support of Palestine Action and against their proscription isn’t protected by articles 10 and 11 because it “amounts to the expression of support for or association with terrorist activity”, because Palestine Action is proscribed. But here again the government was writing itself a blank cheque: if protests in support of a terrorist group are not covered by articles 10 and 11, and if proscription makes a group a terrorist group, then criminalising protests against a group’s proscription will never cause any interference with articles 10 and 11. Which is nice, for the government. It’s also an argument that would apply just as well, and in just the same way, if the government had proscribed Reform UK or the WI. And once again, the High Court was not impressed.

BERJAYA

You need to look behind the label, in other words, and ask whether supporting terrorism is actually what the people being criminalised because of the proscription are doing. You also need to consider – a crucial point which the Court correctly highlighted – what the proscription is deterring people from doing; potentially much larger numbers of people.

BERJAYA

The judgment goes on to cite journalists and academics as people who might be especially ‘risk-averse’ in this area, although the discussion of that point ends up largely walking it back and stressing the need to think about interference with rights in concrete terms. I think this is fair enough; it’d be nice if the judgment were a bit more strident in defence of free expression, but then it’d be nice if it admitted that direct action can sometimes be a legitimate tactic. It’s a High Court judgment, you take what you can get. Besides, as far as academia’s concerned it’s probably correct to say that the impact of the proscription wasn’t all that great: speaking as an academic who used to teach on terrorism and counter-terrorism, I think academics have been used to watching their step for some time now. I’d be more concerned about the proscription’s potential effect on students. (Many of my Asian students, in particular, were noticeably self-censoring five years ago – and quite a lot has happened in the last five years.)

Concluding and looking ahead

So: the High Court acknowledges the interference with articles 10 and 11, dismissing the government’s attempt to cover itself with article 17. The proscription did have the effect of interfering with rights to free speech and free assembly; that interference wasn’t justified by the terrorism or support for terrorism that it prevented. That justification could only apply if Palestine Action were a terrorist group – and “Palestine Action, terrorist group” was effectively a legal fiction, which only existed by virtue of the proscription itself. To say that the chilling effect of the proscription on free speech and assembly was justified under article 17 would be to say that it was justified by the proscription itself.

This, to recapitulate, was one of the two grounds on which the High Court found against the government. The other (Ground 6) was the “Home Secretary’s policy” ground: the Court found that, in guiding her discretion whether to proscribe Palestine Action, the Home Secretary had justified the proscription by reference not to the reasons for proscription but to the benefits of proscription, taking into account factors that would always apply, and consequently couldn’t justify a specific decision. To make matters worse, the benefits of proscription – the powers to disrupt Palestine Action that it would give the government – were presented with reference to Palestine Action’s activities in general, with specific reference to incidents which (as the government freely acknowledged) did not amount to terrorism. Reduced to its essentials, the government’s case was “we’re having trouble with this group committing crimes, we need to escalate to treating it as a terrorist threat” – and the government’s powers under counter-terrorism legislation don’t permit that.

Not that the law or the government is helpless against Palestine Action, even were they to be de-proscribed:

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The Elbit trial did recently end in acquittals and failures to convict, admittedly – but it’s hard to imagine that counter-terror charges would have found a more co-operative jury. On the contrary, it looks as if the government’s recourse to proscription, and the subsequent legal victimisation of Palestine Action activists and supporters, may have massively backfired.

Will the decision to strike down the proscription of Palestine Action stand? The government has said it will appeal, but the current Home Secretary’s statement to that effect (on X, of course) doesn’t suggest they’ve got many shots in the locker:

The Court has acknowledged that Palestine Action has carried out acts of terrorism, celebrated those who have taken part in those acts and promoted the use of violence. It has also concluded that Palestine Action is not an ordinary protest or civil disobedience group, and that its actions are not consistent with democratic values and the rule of law. For those reasons, I am disappointed by the Court’s decision and disagree with the notion that banning this terrorist organisation is disproportionate. The proscription of Palestine Action followed a rigorous and evidence-based decision-making process, endorsed by Parliament. The proscription does not prevent peaceful protest in support of the Palestinian cause, another point on which the Court agrees.

I don’t know why Mahmood (or her advisors) imagined that listing her points of agreement with the judgment made her statement stronger. (She surely isn’t thinking of appealing on the basis of an error of law, arguing that the High Court misdirected itself. That would be courageous in the Yes, Minister sense of the word.) If anything it makes it weaker: yes, the High Court acknowledges that Palestine Action “has carried out acts of terrorism” and “is not an ordinary protest or civil disobedience group”; yes, the High Court notes that the proscription “does not prevent peaceful protest in support of the Palestinian cause”. This is all common ground! Mahmood’s actual challenge to the High Court seems to amount to

[1] disagree with the notion that banning [Palestine Action] is disproportionate. The proscription of Palestine Action followed a rigorous and evidence-based decision-making process, endorsed by Parliament.

To which the High Court – and, you’d think, any Appeal Court judge – would reply, “Firstly, the judgment sets out why and how it’s disproportionate; secondly, it was an evidence-based process, but based on the wrong evidence (as the judgement explains)”.

But we shall see. The government may even have factored in a defeat in the Appeal Court, allowing them to chase it up to the Supreme Court – who are both more likely to look under the bonnet of things like the Home Secretary having a policy constraining her own discretion, and (as currently composed) more deferential towards government justifications and invocations of raison d’état.

So it’s not over yet. But round 1 has gone against the government, I suspect rather to their surprise. I’ve known some bad Friday 13ths, but Friday 13th February was a good day: for Palestine Action, for the right to protest and for the rule of law.

Postscript: Tan and Luo on discretion

An interesting argument against the High Court’s conclusion on Ground 6 has been put forward by Gabriel Tan, and developed further in a blog post co-authored with Dane Luo. Tan and Luo highlight the fact that the High Court’s judgment was based not only on policy (rather than statute, or any other legal instrument), but on what the Court took to be the required interpretation of that policy – despite the requirement to interpret it in that way having to be inferred, as no such guidance appeared in the text. Put this way, this seems rather a weak basis for overturning a lawful order.

Similar points have been made by Mark Elliott (indeed, this is why I referred to his commentary as ‘sceptical’) and by Alan Greene, who usefully sets the controversy over this policy in the context of a broader trend towards the use, and exploitation, of ‘soft law’. But Tan and Luo go further. Tan objects to the High Court’s assumption that the purpose of the Home Secretary’s policy was to limit her discretion, and as such that the ‘considerations’ set out in the Home Secretary’s policy document (and by extension any additional considerations brought into play) must be negative conditions, restricting rather than enabling:

The better view is that the policy’s purpose (if necessary to assign it one) is simply to guide (a neutral term) the discretionary power to proscribe, rather than inherently being there to limit them. The fact that the consequences of proscription is [sic] not a factor limiting the power to proscribe therefore does not prevent it from being rationally considered in the proportionality balance.

Secondly, Tan objects to the argument that the operational benefits of proscription, applying in all cases, cannot be an argument in its favour in a specific case:

The fact that operational consequences and advantages of proscription, including the applicability of the s.11-13 offences, applies in every case of proscription does not make it any less of a relevant factor in favour of proscription. Indeed, it may be said that failure to consider this as a relevant factor within the proportionality balance would constitute failure to take into account a relevant consideration.

On the other hand (and thirdly), if benefits peculiar to a specific proscription are required, Tan and Luo argue that the High Court was incorrect to conclude that the Home Secretary did not cite any: on the contrary, Yvette Cooper’s statement to the House of Commons (quoted briefly earlier in this post) gave details of Palestine Action’s escalating campaign of politically-motivated criminal violence; she concluded by stressing the need for the government to have sufficient powers to disrupt these activities.

These are an interesting couple of posts, which seem to me to highlight a genuine area of weakness, even confusion, in the High Court’s reasoning. Unfortunately, Tan’s contribution highlights this confusion while also compounding it. I’m referring to the High Court’s assertion (or inference) that the purpose of the Home Secretary’s policy was to limit her discretion, countered by Tan with the assertion that the policy’s purpose is to guide discretion (if indeed it need be considered to have any purpose at all).

It seems to me that this is a troubled area of the High Court’s judgment, but that Tan’s response does little but add more confusion. If I may be allowed to resort briefly to common sense, the Home Secretary’s policy document is not a poem or an art installation; as a policy document it has to be considered to have some purpose. That purpose, moreover, is a purpose that bears in some way on the Home Secretary’s exercise of the discretionary power to proscribe – more specifically, on her discretionary choice whether or not to exercise that power. Once we grant that point, and take account of the fact that the considerations involved in the policy are specified in a non-exhaustive list, some of the distinctions made by the High Court and relied on by Tan seem less salient. Most obviously, the distinction between decision constrained by certain factors and one guided by those factors surely loses its sense if the decision-maker not only had a free choice among the factors specified, but was free to specify alternative and additional factors.

From his conclusion that the Home Secretary’s policy acted to guide rather than restrict discretion, Tan inferred that – pace the High Court – the considerations involved in the Home Secretary’s policy could include enabling as well as restrictive conditions. But this also seems to me to be a distinction that makes no difference. If the question governed by the policy were how to police a proscribed organisation, the difference between permissive and restrictive conditions would be highly salient. Suppose a policy specifying (restrictively) that a particular policing agency must not commit civil or criminal offences in the course of its duties; a court might well rule that the executive could not consistently add the (permissive) condition that the agency might do whatever was necessary to assure public safety. But if the question, as here, is whether to proscribe an organisation, the distinction between permissive and restrictive conditions falls away: to say that the Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation on the grounds of the threat it poses or the policing advantages accruing from proscription is identical to saying that she must not proscribe any organisation that does not pose a substantial threat, or where the policing advantages accruing from proscription are not anticipated to be great enough. In insisting on the interpretation of relevant considerations as restrictive, and disqualifying the “benefits of proscription” consideration on that basis, it seems to me – from the eminence of my one-year Graduate Diploma in Law (with Distinction mind you) – that the High Court stumbled; Tan is right to argue that factors phrased in ‘permissive’ terms are not barred from consideration in the policy. However, this stipulation has little effect, as any factor bearing on a decision to proscribe can be phrased in ‘permissive’ (you may act when…) or in ‘restrictive’ (you must not act unless…) terms. In particular, and pace both Tan and (for different reasons) the Supreme Court, the benefit of the consequences of proscription is “a factor limiting the power to proscribe”: the less benefit can be identified, the less likely it is that proscription will be justifiable.

However, this is not to say (with Tan) that the benefit of the consequences of proscription can be cited as a relevant consideration. Of course, any government making a proscription order anticipates benefits from so doing, generally (although not necessarily) operational benefits; which is to say, enhanced capacity to pre-empt, criminalise, counter and mitigate the actions of the group proscribed. Tan makes hay with the seemingly absurd idea that the Home Secretary should supposedly be debarred from citing this fundamental benefit as a reason for the proscription which makes it possible. But this is to misrepresent the High Court’s position. The key point here is that any factor cited as a consideration in favour of proscribing a specific group should apply to that group specifically, and not to any group imaginable. Any consideration that counts towards the proscription of any and all groups cannot be cited as a consideration in favour of proscribing any particular group; this includes the operational benefits that can be reaped from doing so. That such benefits will be delivered in practice – in other words, that the powers associated with proscription will be used, and not left to lie on the statute book – is a relevant condition, but a threshold condition: no group should be nominated for proscription unless this condition is met.

So: operational benefits can be cited as a reason for proscribing a group – as a consideration, this is not debarred by its ‘affirmative’ or ‘permissive’ character – but the Home Secretary must be able to cite specific benefits associated with the proscription of the group in question, and not merely the benefits which necessarily accrue from proscription. Which brings us to the operational benefits of proscribing Palestine Action specifically. And, as Tan and Luo point out, the Home Secretary did in fact set these out at some length. However, in the view of the High Court what the Home Secretary described was not the actions of a terrorist group.

Under the Terrorism Act 2000, a terrorist act is one that has a political motive, involves ‘serious violence against a person’ or ‘serious damage to property’, and is ‘designed to influence the government … or to intimidate the public or a section of the public’. (Many other acts – and threats – may also qualify as terrorist, but this is the relevant core definition.) Now, I have only heard of one act of ‘serious violence against a person’ ascribed to Palestine Action; it would be decidedly odd to label a group as ‘terrorist’ exclusively, or almost exclusively, on the basis of property damage. (Or maybe not; we all denounce the planned campaign of terrorism for which Nelson Mandela was convicted, after all, not to mention the arson and explosive attacks carried out by those notorious terrorists the Suffragettes. Don’t we?)

But even if we assume that the ‘act’ component of the 2000 definition can be met by property damage alone, problems remain. Although the Home Secretary was clearly invoking the definition when she told the House of Commons that “Palestine Action has committed acts of serious damage to property with the aim of progressing its political cause and influencing the Government”, the High Court concluded that those acts were a small minority: the great majority of Palestine Action’s acts do not rise to the level of terrorism. (A pedant might also note that, even in those actions which could be plausibly argued to involve ‘serious damage to property’, there is generally no intention to ‘influence the government … or to intimidate the public or a section of the public’. Direct action is about intervening to prevent wrongdoing, not influencing wrongdoers.) And if a group’s actions don’t rise to the level of terrorism, the benefits to the government of dealing with them through counter-terrorist legislation are neither here nor there. In the words of the High Court:

“The power in the 2000 Act is to proscribe organisations because they act in ways that mean they are concerned in terrorism, not because of other activities that fall short of terrorism. The nature and scale of an organisation’s activities ought therefore to concern only those activities that amount to terrorism.”

The same applies to any consideration of the benefits of proscribing the organisation.

Tan and Luo make some good points, particularly on the weight the High Court puts on its distinction between restrictive and permissive considerations. But when the smoke blown up by their posts has cleared, the High Court judgment is still standing.

Lon Fuller, Narrower

I retired (early) in 2022, but I’ve carried on writing; I had two papers published in 2024 and two in 2025, a sustained work rate I never actually achieved while I was employed. Admittedly, my draft of one of the 2025 papers (“Kelsen and ‘primitive’ international law: Three solutions and a problem”) came in at approximately double the required length, and the two 2024 papers (“Hans Kelsen, international law and the ‘primitive’ legal order” and “Rationality and/or Retribution: Making Sense of Kelsen’s Evolutionist Turn”) both began life as offcuts from it. Still, it’s good to be making something out of those ‘extra’ sections rather than just leaving them to sit on my hard drive, and I ended up being quite fond of those two papers. The first one in particular: responding to a particularly searching reviewer’s report took me in some directions I hadn’t been expecting, requiring me to draw on (among other things) a whole series of legal papers available only in French. (Oui, je sais lire français, pour ce que ça vaut; anche italiano e (con meno facilità) Deutsch und español. My conversational French and Italian are pretty poor, unfortunately, and the other languages even worse; if the question is “do you speak…”, the answer has to be No. But reading, and a bit of writing, I can do, pour ce que ça vaut – ce qui, d’après mon expérience, n’est pas grand’chose. Hélas!)

Anyway, I think I’ve said what I wanted to say about Hans Kelsen, international law and Kelsen’s concept of the ‘primitive’; in the unlikely event you’re curious, dear reader, google one of the titles above (top tip: the one beginning “Hans Kelsen” is in Jurisprudence, and it’s Open Access). So that’s three of my four publications in the last two years.

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