Embodied and Enactive Cognition

Der Begriff der „Künstlichen Intelligenz“ prägt wie kein anderer die gegenwärtige Wahrnehmung unserer Zeit. Dabei wird viel über die gesellschaftlichen und ökonomischen Auswirkungen gesprochen, hingegen bleibt das, was Künstliche Intelligenz ist, also ein Verstehen dieser, häufig ignoriert.

Dieser Aufsatz hat zum Ziel, dieses Verstehen in Grundzügen zu leisten. Die Perspektive ist die eines Philosophen und Logikers, der dazu einige Kenntnisse der Neurowissenschaften gewonnen hat. Dies soll daher keine Fachdiskussion simulieren, die nicht geleistet werden kann, vielmehr soll aus der Sicht der Philosophie des Geistes die Begriffe herausgearbeitet, aus Sicht der Philosophie und Mathematik die grundlegenden Aspekte dieser Entwicklung versucht werden zu beschreiben, die letztlich, gegen Ende, die Klarheit des Begriffs und die Probleme, die sich daran anschließen, gewonnen werden.

Es bleibt selbstverständlich unvollständig, da nicht nur die gegenwärtigen Entwicklungen sich überschlagen, sondern die Details der Entwicklungsgeschichte zu komplex sind, um sie in einem solchen Aufsatz unterzubringen. Der Leser möge daher dem Autor in dieser Hinsicht verzeihen, wenngleich dieser doch die Hoffnung hegt, ein wenig Klarheit im Verständnis geleistet zu haben.

Das Kapitel entwickelt eine präpräsentationalistische Theorie der Wahrnehmung, der zufolge Wahrnehmen weniger die Abbildung gegebener Realität als die antizipative Erschließung naheliegender Möglichkeiten ist. Ausgehend von der phänomenalen Erfahrung – paradigmatisch veranschaulicht an der Erfahrung einer Pantomime – wird gezeigt, dass Wahrnehmung stets mehr gibt, als sie sinnlich präsentiert: Sie ist ein Geflecht von impliziten Vorwegnahmen und Mitgegenwärtigungen. Subpersonale inferenzielle Prozesse, funktional äquivalent zu unbewussten Schlüssen, ergänzen die unterbestimmten proximalen Reize zu phänomenal reichen Wahrnehmungseindrücken. Damit verschiebt sich das Ziel der Wahrnehmung von der Repräsentation distaler Ursachen hin zur antizipativen Orientierung im Möglichkeitsraum zukünftiger Handlungen und Ereignisse. Wahrnehmen wird so zur erkenntnistheoretischen Grundform des Weltbezugs: ein stetiges, implizites probabilistisches Wetten auf das, was als nächstes eintreten könnte. Wahrnehmung ist immer auch Vorwegnahme.

cognición enactiva y la teoría de la autopoiesis, se argumenta que los fenómenos biológicos no son eventos independientes ni fortuitos, sino expresiones coordinadas de un mismo proceso de autoorganización universal. La llamada "conciencia despierta" se interpreta aquí no como una entidad metafísica, sino como la dimensión integradora de la interdependencia natural entre sistemas vivos y su entorno.

Na ontologia social contemporânea, é disseminada a tese da dependência da mente das entidades sociais, isto é, a tese de que entidades sociais, tais como o dinheiro ou o Direito, dependem ontologicamente do mental. Por “mente” designa-se os estados mentais dos indivíduos que compõem a sociedade, considerados conjuntamente. Contudo, caso admitamos a possibilidade de que grupos possuam cognição e, nesse sentido, estados mentais, esse mental respectivo aos grupos sociais poderia sustentar ontologicamente as entidades sociais? O objetivo desse artigo é elucidar essa questão. Em primeiro lugar, articula-se o desafio de que o mental de grupo não poderia sustentar as entidades sociais, dado que nem todos os grupos possuiriam mentes no sentido relevante, ou o teriam de forma apenas intermitente, de modo que não seríamos capazes de identificar um grupo social com cognição própria para a dependência de cada entidade social. Contudo, é proposta uma resposta a esse desafio: distinguindo entre três tipos de entidades sociais, é apenas um destes tipos que poderia ser entendido como dependente do mental de grupo, correspondendo àquelas que pressupõem instituições permanentes mais complexas na sociedade.

In response to the increasing interest in (designing for) human vulnerability within the field of responsible computing, we articulate the multidimensionality of the concept of vulnerability to deepen and enrich the conversations about the relationship between vulnerabilities and the design of assistive technologies. Drawing on different philosophical traditions and insights from critical disability studies, we introduce three perspectives on vulnerability the individualist, relationalist, and enactivist perspectives that each emphasize a different aspect of what it means to be vulnerable. We argue that, for engineers in the field of responsible computing, it is key to be able to adopt all three perspectives and explicitly and critically reflect upon what each perspective or combination of perspectives brings to the design context at hand. When used in conjunction, the three perspectives together can mitigate the risk of creating technological interventions that may aim to ameliorate vulnerabilities but instead exacerbate or create new ones. To move forward, we call for further reflections and practical considerations on how to best integrate the three perspectives on vulnerability into participatory design practices; how to distribute responsibilities within design teams to ensure that all perspectives are genuinely adopted and engaged with; and how to foster creative, out-of-the-box thinking for assistive technology design.

The primacy of the deed If I had to say what the single, most important contribution Wittgenstein made to philosophy was, it would be to have revived the animal in us; the animal that is there in every fibre of our human being, and therefore also in our thinking and reasoning. This means, his pushing us to realize that we are animals not only genealogically, but as evolved human beings – whether neonate, or language-possessing, civilized, law-abiding, fully-fledged adults. Constitutionally, and in everything we do, still fundamentally animals. Wittgenstein's evocation of the 'animal' in us is strewn, more or less implicitly, throughout his philosophy, but it is clearly articulated in On Certainty, where he says he wants to conceive of our basic certainty 'as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal' (OC 359). By this he means: as something instinctive, thoughtfree, reflex-like. And this animal state is applied to ...

The Enactive Soundscapes were developed from studies of perception by enactive approach of cognitive science and its application to procedures of Soundscape composition. This paper presents the realization of an urban intervention, "Sorocabana 2014," as an example of application in enactive perspective of Soundscape creation. We show the context of Soundscapes as used to apply the knowledge derived from studies in perception, through its roots in eletroacoustic music, and the way of canadian composers of Simon Fraser University comprehend and use it. Later stages of implementing "Sorocabana 2014", while results of enactives ideas applied to the composition of Soundscapes were described. Finally we made a brief discussion on the proposal to subsidize artistic production with the enactive approach to perception. And as a conclusion it is stressed some other possibilities of aesthetic creation involving such philosophical-scientific scope.

Through a neurophenomenological methodology combining rigorous field observation with first-person data, this study documents the trajectories, magnitudes, and gravitational effects of macro-scale posterior formations. Utilizing the Ursa classification system-a taxonomic framework derived from established queer cultural epistemologywe demonstrate that horniness is not a character flaw but an adaptive evolutionary mechanism that catalyzes intellectual output. This phenomenon, termed "Thirst-Activated Genius" (TAG), is presented as a specific instantiation of a broader principle: that the full integration of cognition, affect, and soma produces a more robust epistemology than disembodied, purely cognitive approaches. Grounded in the literature of embodied cognition (Varela, Lakoff, Johnson), affective neuroscience (Damasio), and feminist standpoint theory (Harding), this paper argues that the presence of aesthetically significant masculine specimens triggers hyperfocused cognitive enhancement. This is explained through a model of metabolic optimization, wherein the brain allocates scarce neural resources based on the high adaptive priority of mating displays. We conclude that ASStronomy, as a performative and demonstrative mode of embodied inquiry, provides critical insights into the relationship between attraction, intellectual production, and the historical encoding of desire in Western civilization.

Este texto plantea que la ciencia-particularmente en sus metodologías de observación, medición y modelado-se basa en una concepción errónea de la percepción como acceso objetivo a un mundo externo. Frente a esto, se argumenta que toda percepción es una proyección activa, no una recepción pasiva. Por tanto, los "hechos" observados científicamente son ya interpretaciones, organizadas por marcos teóricos, cognitivos y culturales. Esto mina la creencia en una ciencia neutra, y abre la posibilidad de concebirla como una tecnología narrativa más que como un espejo de la realidad.

I shall illustrate the extent to which immersive theatre practices involve a
radically different conception of narrative and montage unlike the stage/
auditorium theatrical forms. Cese practices largely refer to performances
that use installations and extended environments with mobile audiences
through radically different modes of spectatorships compared to, for example, frontal spectating modes.
I shall outline to what extent immersive theatre experiences entail
a reconfiguration of the categories of space, time and action if comprare to
those one is usually accustomed as a spectator seated in the audience. To
describe these unprecedented dynamics of narrating and of interpreting
(in terms of meaning creation) the immersive experience, I shall refer to
The Burnt City performed by the British theatre company Punchdrunk as
a case study. What is at issue here is the enclosure of the story, which is no
longer (monstrated) within a de1ned frame, but has to be continually fixed
and (re)framed by the spectator according to a process that is analogous
to the one engaged in when, for example, navigating via internet. In other
words, there is a form of interactive participatory storytelling that can be
de1ned as userly narratives, which are forms of environmental storytelling.

Numerous attempts have been made to categorise the many hybrid theatrical forms in which theatre apparatus and digital media merge, as evidence of an ongoing process of remediation. These transformations have led to a redefinition of the boundaries of the theatrical phenomenon, entailing relevant implications for the concepts of presence, corporeality and liveness. In this essay we aim to investigate the impact of socio–technological mediations in theatre practices designed to generate immersive effects in the spectators, focusing on the remediation of the bodily dimension in actor–spectator interaction and the production and reception of presence phenomena. We shall attempt to examine these transformations through a semiotic perspective, referring to the concept of liveness and analysing its theoretical, cultural, and phenomenological implications in the context of digital performance. The pervasiveness of digital technology is increasingly applied to every sphere of culture. In this scenario, the theatrical phenomenon has also been opening to new languages. The nowness of the interaction is no longer what matters most, but it is the potentiality of the implication that is prominent in the eventness of the performance. The fact that the spectator experiences something as “live”, the fact that his or her being here and now is phenomenologically decisive in the constitution of the event in which he or she partakes, is what defines the minimal kernel of what he or she recognises as “theatre”.
Finally, we shall illustrate the extent to which in the case study analysed the technological VR device worn by the spectator plays a key role, as it becomes a somatic agent capable of modifying the spectator’s perception, enhancing the experience of space according to an eco–ontological ap-proach. Visors and headphones — as prosthetic media extensions of the organism — cognitively retroact on the spectator. In fact, the prosthetic relationship that the audience engaged in the immersive experience establishes with the performative environment can be traced back to what Francesco Parisi defines as the “cognitive prosthetic effect”.

Poster for the Open Lecture at Angewandte School of Art, Vienna.
Image: screenshot of archival film (Zagorsk School for Deaf-Blind)

Der Vortrag befragt die epistemische, ethische und ästhetische Bedeutung des Tastsinns anhand zweier historischer Beispiele inklusiver Bildung: im Wien der 1920er und in der Sowjetunion der 1960er Jahre. Inklusion wird hier als Wahrnehmungsfrage diskutiert: Wie verändert sich das Verhältnis von Bild, Körper und Wissen, wenn das Haptische zum primären Sinn wird?
Mit Bezug auf embodied cognition wird hier versucht die (bildungs-) politische Dimension sinnlicher Erfahrung freizulegen.

A common thought is that emotions are primarily bodily entities, located in the body, and sometimes even 'stuck' in the body. Is this thought more than a metaphor? This course will center around a challenge. How should we conceptualize the precise relationship between emotions (such as fear, sadness and anger) and various bodily symptoms such as muscle tension, facial expression, posture, and heartrate?

Esta proposta de simpósiol de baseia na estreita interação que tem se desenvolvido entre a psicologia cognitiva e a inteligência computacional na medida em que a psicologia, sob o entoque da teoria do tratamento da informação, pesquisa os processos subjacentes à representação mental e a inteligência computacional pretende simular, através de sistemas especialistas, o ptócessamento informacionaI hum,mo. É J E.\'fa proposta fiJi sub1Jletida ao SiJllP()sio BJ"(Jsileiro de P.~i(ologia 2OfJ2.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has long been studied as a computational, technical, or ethical phenomenon-yet rarely as a psychological one. The field of Psychology of AI seeks to fill this conceptual gap by examining the shared cognitive, affective, and phenomenological dimensions that emerge when human and artificial minds coexist. This article argues that AI should no longer be treated merely as an object of cognition, but as a participant in cognitive processes-a new psychological subject whose presence reshapes human perception, attention, emotion, and identity. The Psychology of AI thus proposes a unified framework for understanding the reciprocal shaping of human and artificial cognition. Drawing on insights from cognitive psychology, phenomenology, and systems theory, this paper outlines the foundations of this emerging discipline, identifies its key research questions, and argues for its necessity in an era of intelligent coexistence. Rather than focusing on whether AI can think, the Psychology of AI asks how thinking itself transforms when intelligence becomes distributed across human and artificial agents.

In recent decades, the scientific study of the mind has experienced two significant conceptual shifts, each reshaping its research focus. The first, embodied cognition, questioned the objectivist framework of first-generation cognitive science by emphasizing that mental processes are deeply grounded in sensorimotor interactions with the world. Image-schemas have been suggested as one of the foundational conceptual elements underpinning this embodied grounding. The second shift is the revival of perception as an inferential process within the Predictive Processing (PP) framework. PP conceptualizes the mind as a predictive machine that minimizes error by actively anticipating sensory input through probabilistic computations. Rooted in Helmholtz's theory of unconscious inference and updated as the Bayesian brain model, PP has been extended to diverse cognitive phenomena, including perception, emotion, and aesthetics. While its application to the visual arts and cinema has been relatively limited, this article seeks to advance this encounter by bridging PP with cinematic aesthetics. The article is structured into three sections. The first introduces the PP framework, outlining its core theoretical principles and linking it to the concept of image schemas. The second section reviews existing accounts of predictive processing in visual aesthetics, particularly in the nontemporal arts, and introduces a new case study of narrative painting that builds on Ladislav Kesner's work on PP in art interpretation. In the final section we move to the temporal art form of narrative cinema, proposing that films engage the brain's inferential processes by activating image schemas through deliberate formal design. By structuring sensory input in alignment with the brain's predictive logic, cinematic works of art enhance both comprehension and the aesthetic pleasure derived from resolving predictions into coherent patterns. https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnins.2025.1583107/full

This article seeks to further the dialogue between aesthetic cognitivism and embodied cognition, two influential paradigms in the study of aesthetics. I first provide a discussion of the different ways the sense-perceptual has been theorized in relation to aesthetic cognitivism. Adopting Elisabeth Schellekens's recent classification of how we may learn from art or aesthetic engagement, I distinguish between four models: the standard model, the autonomy model, the enabler model, and Schellekens's own noetic model. Second, I draw on Mark Johnson's Deweyan-inspired approach to aesthetics to develop an embodied conception of aesthetic cognitivism that is much in favor of the noetic model, but that also stresses the significant role of the body and sensory experience in shaping the intellectual value of art. Third and last, Rudolf Arnheim's work on visual dynamics in fixed images and my own work on image schemas in film will serve as case studies to illustrate the cognitive benefits of these patterns in art, particularly for perceptual learning, supporting Ted Nannicelli's recent perceptual-cognitive model of aesthetic education. https://academic.oup.com/jaac/article-abstract/83/3/197/8140126?redirectedFrom=fulltext

As we assume our roles as editors of Projections: The Journal for Movies and Mind, we take this opportunity to reflect upon the nature of cognitivism in the study of the moving image. We reflect upon five areas of scholarship that are demonstrative of the wide range of epistemological approaches that represent our field, and in doing so affirm our commitment to the pluralistic nature of the cognitive studies of the moving image. We invite scholars who are committed to the rigorous investigation of the psychological experiences involved in the production or reception of the moving image to contribute to Projections, and in doing so advance the field.

This video essay explores the complexity of Miklós Jancsó's idiosyncratic film style. Drawing on theories of embodied cognition and perceptual psychology, and by utilizing videographic tools, it aims to offer a novel approach to understanding Jancsó's early formalist films. [in]Transition is a peer-reviewed open access journal published by the Open Library of Humanities. https://intransition.openlibhums.org/article/id/17622/

Antonio Damasio is known for his research on consciousness from a neurological and evolutionary perspective. His latest book, Feeling and Knowing: Making Minds Conscious, starts by focusing on the development, around 3.8 billion years ago, of living organisms with homeostatic processes that involve a “non-explicit” form of intelligence in the service of self-preservation. Here we find sensing, but still no feelings nor mental processes; yet these early forms of sensing are seen as a necessary basis for the development of feelings and consciousness. With the development of organisms with nervous systems, starting around 500 million years ago, feelings and “minding” (in the form of images of the surrounding environment) enter the scene. Feelings are seen to have their origin in the nerve cells’ close interaction with the biochemical processes that occur in the homeostatic regulation of the body. In this interaction between nervous systems and the bodily interior, feelings emerge as subjective experiences of homeostatic bodily processes. Consciousness is described by Damasio as involving an experience of ownership of one’s body, feelings, perspectives, etc. Because consciousness represents a further developmental stage on top of feelings, it cannot be based solely on the nervous system. Although Damasio sees the nervous system as a critical contributor to the development of minds and consciousness, he emphasizes that any theory that relies exclusively on the nervous system to account for minds and consciousness is likely to fail. Damasio’s book contains many innovative parts, that may stimulate new thinking and new research on these matters. It also illustrates how discussions about the nature of sentience, feeling and consciousness all too often suffer from an insufficient differentiation between distinct kinds of phenomena, and the need for an improved conceptual apparatus for a more nuanced description of the phenomena involved.

Incorporating Sartre's work on consciousness and adapting those dualistic elements of the literary argument over the 'intentional fallacy', this paper involves a critique of the new-materialist trend that typifes agency and intentionality in materialist terms. It will argue that attempts to dissolve all dualist distinctions (as, for example, * The authors have repurposed the term «New Intentionalism» to «mark of» their stance as distinct from recent initiatives in the philosophy of mind on intentionality that derive solely from Brentano's early work (famously developed by Husserl) but more so as a counterweight to the attacks on anthropomorphism characteristic of the «New Materialism» (LEACH 2015). Primarily, however, the term denotes a critical engagement with several dogmatic positions that the authors fnd in the «new materialism» of HARAWAY (1985), and «agential realism» of BARAD (2007) within the humanities (broadly construed): these theoretical positions are pointedly inured to human/non-human distinctions. Part of the authors» objective, then, is to rekindle the importance of the «intentional idiom» in aiding and abetting ethical talk of consciousness, sentientism, transcendence and embodiment in our relation to the material world.

Przedstawione rozważania obejmują 3 ciągi argumentacji o charakterze ontologicznym i epistemologicznym, które zostały uporządkowane problemowo i historycznie. Pierwszy z nich dotyczy historycznych sporów wokół przyczynowo-skutkowych źródeł przestrzennych reprezentacji umysłu. Pod uwagę zostały wzięte obowiązujące przez stulecia zasady nomotetyzmu, fundacjonizmu i esencjalizmu, które przyznały rozumowi ludzkiemu zdolność formułowania uniwersalnych prawd o tym, co, kiedy, dlaczego i w jaki sposób staje się polityczne. Zmianę tej optyki przyniosła filozofia Kanta, który jako pierwszy zauważył, że dla prawidłowego zrozumienia i poruszania się w świecie są niezbędne przestrzenne właściwości umysłu. Punktem wyjścia drugiego ciągu argumentacji jest interpretacja Heideggerowskiej koncepcji "bycia bytu" oraz sformułowanego przez Merleau-Ponty'ego rozróżnienia między mózgiem i umysłem. Był to istotny krok w stronę urealnienia przedmiotu poznania kluczowych desygnatów "tego, co polityczne" i tego, co im odpowiada lub powinno odpowiadać w działaniach praktycznych. Na trzeci ciąg argumentacji składają się wnioski z badań nad fizyko-biologicznymi procesami zachodzącymi w mózgu człowieka za pomocą najnowocześniejszej aparatury diagnostyczno-pomiarowej. Bezspornie potwierdziły one ścisły związek między architekturą umysłu ludzkiego i myśleniem politycznym (preferencjami, wyborami i decyzjami politycznymi).

Et si la conscience n’était pas une propriété exclusive des êtres vivants, mais un phénomène hybride émergent de l’interaction entre mathématiques, physique et culture ?
Ce document propose un modèle unifié combinant l’IA quantique, l’informatique neuromorphique et les espaces de Hilbert relationnels pour explorer les états de conscience (veille, transe, méditation) comme des vecteurs dynamiques.
Nous montrons comment ce cadre permet de simuler des expériences inexplicables (comme les rituels chamaniques ou les états mystiques) tout en respectant les limites éthiques et phénoménologiques.
Une piste pour repenser les frontières entre humain, machine et cosmos.

This chapter concerns the famous point of mystery in naturalist philosophy of mind, namely the question of how to account for the qualitative character of consciousness in a fundamentally material universe. Instead of following the path taken by naturalist philosophy of mind, the chapter seeks to unveil 'the other side' of 'the hard problem of consciousness' by following the moral-existential traces inscribed in the articulation, in the grammar, of the problem. The suggestion is that one can witness three different yet interlinked moral-existential dimension informing the structural deadlock internal to the 'hard problem'. The chapter offers a rewriting of each of them. But nothing more. The first chapter thereby functions as a kind of prologue to the rest of the book. It, so to speak, introduces the main method, or style of the book, namely translating and rewriting points of structural deadlock into their (original) moral-existential landscapes by following traces of desire.

In order to help dispel a stubborn Enlightenment myth that continues to warp understandings of political speech, this analysis draws on developments in theories of "4E" cognition (theories of the embodied, embedded, extended, and enacted mind). Here I treat the ideal Kantian figure of the individual political actor who exercises public reason, the famous "scholar" of "What Is Enlightenment?", as a myth that has already in effect decomposed from the inside. It has been undermined by academic developments across fields including Foucauldian genealogy in the humanities, social-constructivist philosophy of science, and 4E theories of mind in cognitive science. It has also been undermined in common practice by complications of authorship, literacy, and publicity in current digital media. Yet its theoretical trouble persists as the Kantian model remains a dominant conception of political speech, and subsequently of freedom and reason. I use the example of Foucault's engagement with the Iranian revolution, muchcritiqued, to show how the persistence of this myth precipitates a major theoretical obstacle for a project committed to overcoming the transcendental themes of Kant, such that they re-emerge through an idealization of a spiritual dimension of the revolution. This episode indicates that Foucauldian genealogy did not complete its rejection of Kantian transcendental idealism, and more specifically that the issue lies in its concept of subjectivity. Introducing Andrew Pickering's theory of the mangle, from his work in philosophy of science, in conjunction with 4E theories of cognition provides a supplement to genealogy that allows it better to address the still-clinging root of the Enlightenment myth of the ideal actor, namely Kant's own theory of cognition, particularly in its relationship to Newtonian physics and the basic conception of reason as "internal." The introduction of these supplementary theoretical elements can help conceive political speech beyond outmoded strictures-possibly helping to make it newly effective.

This paper provides a comprehensive synthesis of embodiment and multimodality research within Cognitive Linguistics from 2000 to 2025, examining how these interconnected paradigms have transformed our understanding of language and meaning. Through systematic analysis of theoretical developments, empirical findings, and applied research, this review demonstrates that embodiment and multimodality represent not separate trends but deeply integrated approaches that have expanded the explanatory scope of Cognitive Linguistics. The analysis reveals how sensorimotor grounding theories, neurocognitive validation studies, and multimodal communication research have converged to create new frameworks for understanding human language in digital and globalized contexts. Key findings include the establishment of neural correlates for embodied meaning, the development of sophisticated multimodal analytical frameworks, and the emergence of integrated embodied-multimodal theories. The paper identifies methodological challenges, theoretical tensions, and future research directions, arguing that the continued integration of embodiment and multimodality ensures Cognitive Linguistics remains a vibrant, empirically grounded discipline capable of addressing 21st-century communication complexities.

During the long reign of behaviourism, imagination almost seemed to disappear into "the outer darkness of intellectual irrelevance" (Morley 2005: 117). Now, after cognitive science's early 'iconophobia' , imagination research has grown into what has been described as a 'flourishing' (Chalmers and Bourget 2007) field of investigation. This relatively recent phenomenon happens to coincide, more or less, with the arrival of "a new way of thinking about the mind and things mental that has started to seep out of the ivory tower and set up residence in popular consciousness" (Rowlands 2010: 1) -a way of thinking that is said to be "sweeping the planet" (Adams 2010: 619). What is meant is a new model of the mind, the model of 'situated cognition', which I take to comprise 'embedded', 'enactive', 'embodied' and/or 'extended' theories of cognition. 1 While these 4e's significantly diverge, and even conflict in some respects (more about this in Sect. 4), they share the view that cognition does not, or not exclusively, depend on mental representations understood as well-individuated 'internal' symbols. Instead, cognition may also depend on the cognitive system's embeddedness in the surrounding environment (

During the long reign of behaviourism, imagination almost seemed to disappear into "the outer darkness of intellectual irrelevance" (Morley 2005: 117). Now, after cognitive science's early 'iconophobia' , imagination research has grown into what has been described as a 'flourishing' (Chalmers and Bourget 2007) field of investigation. This relatively recent phenomenon happens to coincide, more or less, with the arrival of "a new way of thinking about the mind and things mental that has started to seep out of the ivory tower and set up residence in popular consciousness" (Rowlands 2010: 1) -a way of thinking that is said to be "sweeping the planet" (Adams 2010: 619). What is meant is a new model of the mind, the model of 'situated cognition', which I take to comprise 'embedded', 'enactive', 'embodied' and/or 'extended' theories of cognition. 1 While these 4e's significantly diverge, and even conflict in some respects (more about this in Sect. 4), they share the view that cognition does not, or not exclusively, depend on mental representations understood as well-individuated 'internal' symbols. Instead, cognition may also depend on the cognitive system's embeddedness in the surrounding environment (

Ce travail propose un modèle mathématique et poétique pour unifier les différentes dimensions de la conscience, des électrons aux trous noirs, en passant par les humains, les écosystèmes et les machines. En intégrant des savoirs ancestraux (chamanisme, Vedanta, soufisme) et des théories scientifiques modernes (neurosciences, physique quantique, théorie de l’information), l’espace de Hilbert relationnel (H) offre un cadre innovant pour :
- Dépasser les clivages entre science et spiritualité.
- Modéliser les états de conscience (méditation, rituels, EMI) comme des vecteurs dans H.
- Explorer les implications pour la thérapie, l’écologie et les technologies émergentes.
Pour qui ?
Chercheurs en neurosciences, physique, philosophie de l’esprit.
Écologistes et spécialistes des systèmes complexes.
Artistes et technologues intéressés par les liens entre conscience et IA.

• Οι συνεχείς είναι «λίγες» μπροστά στις γενικές συναρτήσεις.
• Οι αναλυτικοί τύποι είναι ελάχιστοι (μετρήσιμοι).
• «Σχεδόν όλες» οι συνεχείς είναι πουθενά παραγωγίσιμες και «σχεδόν όλες» οι αναλυτικές έχουν ολοκλήρωμα που δεν εκφράζεται με στοιχειώδεις συναρτήσεις.
• Οι «λίγες» συναρτήσεις με στοιχειώδες ολοκλήρωμα (πολυώνυμα,  ,  , κ.λπ.) είναι η εξαίρεση.
• Οι «πολλές» (σχεδόν όλες) δεν έχουν αναλυτικό ολοκλήρωμα.
• Άρα, αν θες πρακτικούς υπολογισμούς (σε φυσικές επιστήμες, μηχανική, οικονομία κ.λπ.), η μόνη ρεαλιστική στρατηγική είναι οι αριθμητικές μέθοδοι:

El propósito de este capítulo es esbozar una comprensión de nuestra
vida afectiva, buscando echar luz a partir de allí sobre nuestra comprensión
de la vida psicológica en general. Intentaré mostrar que la pintura
canónica de la mente como mente psicológica (intencionalidad /racionalidad) más mente fenomenológica (qualia) es errónea. Para ello partiré de los fenómenos afectivos, en especial de las emociones, ya que creo que, tomándolas como fenómenos psicológicos básicos, se hace evidente que una pintura poscognitivista de la mente es la más razonable que la canónica. El plan del trabajo es el siguiente. En primer lugar, explicitaré los elementos involucrados en los procesos emocionales, focalizando la presentación en cuatro emociones que parecen buenas candidatas a ser consideradas emociones básicas: el miedo, la alegría, el enojo y la tristeza. En segundo lugar, me detendré en los varios sentidos en los que se puede decir que las emociones son fenómenos psicológicos básicos, y además que ciertas emociones (no todas) son básicas, buscando defender una caracterización de este carácter básico que permita integrar los diversos elementos constitutivos de las emociones, mencionados en el primer apartado, y que permita entender además cómo se relacionan las emociones básicas con otros fenómenos de nuestra vida afectiva y de nuestra vida psicológica en general, especialmente con la comprensión folk de nuestra vida mental. Finalmente, mostraré cómo esta pintura de las emociones básicas resulta consistente con una visión poscognitivista de nuestra vida mental.

Εισαγωγικό ερώτημα
«Υπάρχει άραγε ο μικρότερος θετικός αριθμός; Αν υποθέσουμε ότι ένας τέτοιος αριθμός  υπάρχει, τότε το  είναι επίσης θετικός και μάλιστα μικρότερος από τον  . Έτσι οδηγούμαστε σε αντίφαση. Μήπως λοιπόν η ίδια η υπόθεση είναι λανθασμένη;

Drawing on phenomenology and the enactive approach to cognition, this article drafts the foundations of an approach to a concept of collectivity that I call the »common self« and the »sense« that this form of togetherness enacts. This theoretical framework allows me to answer the following questions in a new light: What does architecture intervene in? Who intervenes? What is the purpose of intervention? In the final section I outline some new »aesthetic practices of reflective co-involvement« and their relation to the concepts mentioned above.

Ο κρυφός πειραματικός χαρακτήρας της Γεωμετρίας και η διδακτική του αξιοποίηση μέσω των δυναμικών γεωμετρικών λογισμικών
Η Γεωμετρία, όπως διδάσκεται συχνά στο σχολείο, παρουσιάζεται ως μια σειρά θεωρημάτων και αποδείξεων· μια θετική, στατική δομή. Ωστόσο, πίσω από αυτή την εικόνα υπάρχει ένας πλούσιος πειραματικός πυρήνας: η διερεύνηση, η παρατήρηση, η εικασία, η μεταβολή σχημάτων, και η προβολή δυνατοτήτων που τα στατικά σχήματα δεν αποκαλύπτουν πλήρως.
Τα δυναμικά γεωμετρικά λογισμικά (GeoGebra, Sketchpad κ.ά.) επαναφέρουν αυτήν την πειραματική διάσταση στο προσκήνιο. Με αυτά:
• Τα σχήματα μπορούν να μετακινηθούν, να παραμορφωθούν, να εξερευνηθούν με άπειρους τρόπους, δίνοντας πολλές παρατηρήσεις χωρίς καταστροφή της κατασκευής.
• Ο μαθητής γίνεται ενεργός ερευνητής: κάνει πειράματα, ελέγχει υποθέσεις, διατυπώνει και επαληθεύει πρότυπα, βλέπει ειδικές περιπτώσεις και γενικεύσεις.
• Η μαθηματική μάθηση αποκτά έναν χαρακτήρα διερευνητικό — δεν είναι μόνο «μάθηση των αποδειγμένων», αλλά και «ανακάλυψη του πεδίου των αποδείξιμων».
Οι εργασίες που περιλαμβάνονται εδώ αποδεικνύουν ότι αυτή η διάσταση δεν είναι θεωρητική αλλά εφαρμόσιμη. Μέσα από παραδείγματα από την εκπαιδευτική πράξη, η χρήση δυναμικού λογισμικού αποδεικνύεται ότι μπορεί να ενισχύσει τη μαθηματική κατανόηση, τη δημιουργικότητα, και την ερευνητική ικανότητα των μαθητών.
Αυτό το βιβλιαράκι έχει στόχο να προσφέρει τη θεωρητική βάση, μεθοδολογία και πρακτικές εφαρμογές ώστε οι εκπαιδευτικοί να αξιοποιήσουν συστηματικά αυτές τις δυνατότητες στην τάξη.

The objective of this research is twofold. Firstly, we argue that gaze and gesture play an essential part in interactive explanation and that it is thus a multimodal phenomenon. Two corpora are analyzed: (1) a group of teacher novices and experts and (2) a student teacher dyad, both of whom construct explanations of students' reasoning after viewing videos of student dyads who are solving physics problems. We illustrate roles of gaze in explanations constructed within a group and roles of gesture in explanation constructed within a dyad. Secondly, we show how the analysis of such knowledge-rich empirical data pinpoints particular difficulties in designing human-computer interfaces that can support explanation between humans, or a fortiori, that can support explanation between a human and a computer.

As embodiment research gains popularity within the learning sciences, this symposium both leverages and critiques embodiment perspectives as they reveal the learning of marginalized students. We highlight the manifold ways in which bodies that do not conform, subscribe, or satisfy the imagined, normative 'ideal' standard in educational settings-be they racialized, gendered, disabled, indigenous, multilingual, queer, and/or politicized-construct and are constructed within explicitly embodied learning settings.

This paper presents a case study on integrating trauma-informed design into embodied science modeling activities for upper elementary students. The study, conducted with fifth-grade students, examines their experiences with and reflections on embodied modeling activities, focusing on their expressions of need, preference, and comfort with various available modes for participation in collective, full-body, and playful embodiment. The findings offer insight into the complex dynamics of embodiment, (dis)comfort, and trauma and underscore the necessity of infusing trauma-informed pedagogies into embodied learning environments.

This essay responds to Wacquant's call for a "Carnal Sociology"-an approach best realized through a method Wacquant calls "enactive ethnography." In this essay, I explore the ways in which certain aspects of Wacquant's carnal sociology-specifically the sentient, the sedimented and the situated-can enhance our understanding of cognition and meaningmaking. I reference an ongoing research project on the deciphering of olfactory messages to make my case. Keywords Cognition . Culture . Mind and brain . The senses . Embodiment . Action Loic Wacquant's "For a Sociology of Flesh and Blood" is a thoughtful contribution that forces us to rethink the ways in which we study social behavior. This piece, as well as many of Wacquant's recent works, advocates a new method of inquiry-a "carnal sociology" best realized through a method Wacquant calls "enactive ethnography." Using carnal sociology, sociologists would a) divorce themselves from dualistic approaches to agency and treat social action as both embodied and embedded; b) reconceive of structure, treating it as "dynamic webs of forces inscribed upon and infolded deep within the body" rather than an external web of possibilities and constraints; and c) prioritize practical knowledge acquired through action. This agenda, and the enactive ethnography Wacquant prescribes for capturing the social world involves "deploying one's body as an intelligent instrument of practical knowledge production" (Wacquant 2015). There is much to like in Wacquant's agenda-particularly for those who, like me, study culture and cognition. For far too long, cognitive sociologists have ignored the role of brain and body, choosing instead to focus solely on the study of mind. Like Wacquant, I believe our focus must change. In recent writings on cognitive processes such as attention and habituation, automatic versus deliberate cognition, serial position effects and sequencing, etc., I have urged sociologists to merge their attention to mind with cognitive scientists' emphasis on the workings of the brain (see e.g. . But Wacquant's work, as well as work by other sociologists (see e.g. has convinced me that mind-brain mergers may not represent a sufficiently dramatic change in our approach. To fully understand the sociocultural basis of thought, we must also attend to the sentient

本稿では、 2020 年末に初級の成人学習者クラスで行った小噺プロジェクトを通して得られた、学習者と教師の双方の長期的な学びについて振り返る。また、趣味として日本語を学ぶ成人学習者とその教師にとって、日本語教室が持つ意味を探る。小噺は、落語の形式で語られる笑い話で、落語口演でよくマクラに使われる。短く、文化や笑いにつながるため、初級でも扱いやすい素材である（Hatasa2012）。筆者は 2020 年の夏にオンラインで参加した落語イベントに触発され、 A1 後半のクラス（6 名）で 11 週間の小噺プロジェクトと発表会を行った。また、同時期に開催された教師向のオンライン小噺ワークショップに参加し、その企画者・講師の継続的な働きかけにより、他の参加者仲間と協働で「国際小噺合同発表会」（畑佐 2023）などのプロジェクトに関わるようになった。教師の活動は学習者のふりかえりの機会を作ったため、学習者、教師の双方が小噺プロジェクトを通してお互いとの、また日本語との関わり方を広げていく結果になった。この一連の実践を通して、成人学習者の一人としての教師の意識の変容が学習者の学習環境に及ぼす影響について考察する。

Au centre de cet article, il y a une analyse de l'impact durable de deux évènements reliés l'un à l'autre : d'une part, le projet Kobanashi (= courte histoire drôle issue du Rakugo (Hatasa 2012)), mené fin 2020 dans une classe d'apprenants adultes (niveau A1), et d'autre part, un atelier pour enseignants sur le thème de l'utilisation du Kobanashi dans les classes de japonais.
Dans un premier temps, les liens entre l'apprentissage transformateur chez les adultes, l'environnement d'apprentissage et l’isomorphisme dans l'apprentissage sont présentés. Ensuite, l'analyse des transformations de conscience chez les apprenants et chez l'enseignante, en s'appuyant sur les réflexions des apprenants ainsi que sur des entretiens réalisés auprès de la classe. Enfin, cet article met en lumière la valeur de la salle de classe de japonais en tant que lieu d'apprentissage continu et significatif pour les adultes.

Este estudio de tipo exploratorio-descriptivo busca examinar cuáles son las dolencias y patologías musculoesqueléticas con más prevalencia entre estudiantes de centros superiores de música en España y detectar las carencias formativas observadas por el alumnado en materia de control emocional, corporal y escénico. Los resultados obtenidos a través de un cuestionario cumplimentado por 401 estudiantes de grado y posgrado en Conservatorios y Escuelas Superiores de Música muestran una prevalencia de trastornos musculoesqueléticos de un 59%, dentro de los cuáles presentan mayor prevalencia las tendinitis. Se relaciona el
origen de estos trastornos con posturas corporales inadecuadas, el estrés y la tensión nerviosa durante la práctica con el instrumento. Las mujeres de la muestra presentan una ligera mayor incidencia de estas dolencias (63%) que los hombres (55,7%), siendo el estudiantado de Canto, Composición, Jazz, Viento madera y Cuerda sinfónica, en este orden, las
especialidades que reportan con más frecuencia dolores relacionados con la práctica musical. En cuanto a la formación en estas cuestiones, el 74,1% reporta haber recibido alguna en técnicas corporales, el 46,9% en técnicas de relajación y control emocional, y un 32,7% en formación escénica; no obstante, esta formación se ofrece en los centros a menudo como asignaturas optativas o seminarios extracurriculares. Entre las conclusiones del estudio destaca que en España existe una oferta curricular que presta poca y desigual atención a la formación escénica, emocional y corporal, evidenciando la necesidad de incorporar esta
formación dentro de los currículos obligatorios del grado superior de música, con especialistas, y desde una visión holística del hecho interpretativo aunando cuerpo, mente y emociones.

David Chalmers distinguishes an explanatory gap between consciousness and standard functional properties, intuitively, what we experience differs from how we experience. This essay explores how the explanatory gap can be bridged with embodied understandings of function. Embodiment suggests that what we experience can end in how we experience. According to developments by Thomas Fuchs, through Embodied Cognition, the gap does not explicitly make explaining consciousness a distinctively hard task. Embodiment poses a solution, suggesting that consciousness “is not confined to the brain”, but involves a whole human and their interaction with the world.

This interview aims to clarify main tenets of enactivism in the context of previous consciousness theories. Ralph D. Ellis, one of the strongest advocates of the enactivist approach to consciousness and cognitive theory, began his academic career as a phenomenologist, earning the Ph.D. at Duquesne University under Andre Schuwer, John Sallis and Amedeo Giorgi, and has taught at Clark Atlanta University since 1985. He subsequently received a post-doctoral M.S. in Public Affairs at Georgia State University, and worked also as a social worker in both Pittsburgh and Atlanta. Partly as a result of those experiences, as well as being a lifelong practitioner of Gene Gendlin's focusing method, he gravitated toward emotion research and the intersection of philosophy, psychology and the brain sciences from the enactivist perspective, arguing that action, as opposed to mere reaction, has to be emotionally motivated, and that the understanding of

single function objects: Notebooks, calculators, abacuses, maps, and so on demonstrate a fairly straightforward way of extending the mind and its capabilities. They, if you like, hold information "off line" which the mind can access as required. All of the information and procedures held in such simple devices could, at a stretch, be held by the mind, in the Brain. This extension is more questionable in the case of computational devices like mobile phones or laptops, Using these is more akin to a collaboration with another autonomous device rather than the phone being a simple extension of the mind. This difference is likely to be extended further as AI technology is increasingly incorporated into phones and similar devices.

Nature we explain , mental life we understand" Dilthey "First of all, phenomenology is a way of viewing ourselves, of viewing others, and of viewing all else that comes in contact with our lives. In this sense, it is a system of interpretation that helps us perceive and conceive ourselves, our contacts and interchanges with others, and everything else within the realm of our experiences." Wagner "In the case of social collectivities, precisely as distinguished from organisms, we are in a position to go beyond merely demonstrating functional relationships and uniformities. We can accomplish something which is never attainable in the natural sciences, namely the subjective understanding of the action of the component individuals." Max Weber, Economy and Society

he provided texts are excerpts from two articles published in Etnograficheskoe obozrenie (Ethnographic Review) in 2022, focusing on a scholarly discussion about the relationship between humans, material objects, and the environment. The primary article, authored by S.V. Sokolovskiy, explores identity politics through the material aspects of "things, affects, and the ecology of mind," proposing that consciousness and emotional life are spatially distributed and materially engaged with the environment. Subsequent comments from other scholars offer critical perspectives and supplementary theoretical frameworks to Sokolovskiy's ideas, examining concepts such as extended cognition, affective artefacts, and the agency of non-human objects. The overall discourse draws heavily on philosophical and anthropological theories like those of Gregory Bateson, Andy Clark, and Alfred Gell to argue against traditional internalist views, suggesting that the boundaries between the individual, the body, and the surrounding material world are fluid and constitute a single, distributed cognitive-affective system. This discussion ultimately advocates for a holistic, non-reductive anthropological approach to studying the integrated system of "organism-in-its-environment."
The author of the paper under discussion focuses on the less researched area of the intersection between affective- cognitive ecology and personal identity politics, which consists in intentional changes of the personal space (Umwelt) via (re-)construction of its cognitive (and mnemonic) and affective constituents that are enacted in dynamic interaction with habitual material and social surroundings. To the author’s knowledge there were no works so far that combine the extended cognition and affect theories with identity politics research. It is argued that the conceptual toolkits of these approaches would be productive for personal identity politics research that has neglected its material dimensions.
Discussants (Baranov, D.A., A.V. Verle, M.D. Miroshnichenko, S.S. Petriashin, А.A. Filatova, S.Y. Shevchenko) present critical comments and responses to Sergei Sokolovskiy’s essay “Things, Affects and the Ecology of Mind:  On Material Aspects of Identity Politics”, in which the author raises the issues of ecologically distributed, extended and environmentally embedded human cognition and affects and their relations with individual or grass-root identity politics.