Books by Paul Boghossian
Papers by Paul Boghossian
Oxford University Press eBooks, Oct 15, 2020
This essay distinguishes between metaphysical and epistemological conceptions of analyticity. The... more This essay distinguishes between metaphysical and epistemological conceptions of analyticity. The former is the idea of a sentence that is ‘true purely in virtue of its meaning’ while the latter is the idea of a sentence that ‘can be justifiably believed merely on the basis of understanding its meaning’. It further argues that, while Quine may have been right to reject the metaphysical notion, the epistemological notion can be defended from his critique and put to work explaining a priori justification. Along the way, a number of further distinctions relevant to the theory of analyticity and the theory of apriority are made and their significance is explained.
Philosophical Studies, Mar 1, 1994
Page 1. PAUL A. BOGHOSSIAN INFERENTIAL ROLE SEMANTICS AND THE ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION (Rec... more Page 1. PAUL A. BOGHOSSIAN INFERENTIAL ROLE SEMANTICS AND THE ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION (Received 15 September 1993) 1. INTRODUCTION Towards the end of their provocative discussion of conceptual ...
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Aug 21, 2015
Oxford University Press eBooks, Oct 15, 2020
The book records a series of philosophical exchanges between its authors, amounting to a debate e... more The book records a series of philosophical exchanges between its authors, amounting to a debate extended over more than fifteen years. Its subject matter is the nature and scope of reason. A central case at issue is basic logical knowledge, and the justification for basic deductive inferences, but the arguments range far more widely, at stake the distinctions between analytic and synthetic, and between a priori and a posteriori. The discussion naturally involves problems about the conditions for linguistic understanding and competence, and what it might be to grasp a concept or to have an intuition. Since reason is central to philosophical method, there are associated implications for how philosophy itself works, or should work. In particular, the discussion raises fundamental concerns about how to approach epistemology.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Oct 15, 2020
This essay distinguishes between Constitutive and Basis versions of understanding-based accounts ... more This essay distinguishes between Constitutive and Basis versions of understanding-based accounts of a priori justification and argues, contra Williamson, that the phenomenon of expert competent dissent doesn’t undermine either one. The argument involves revisiting Williamson’s famous expert-based recipe for generating counterexamples to any constitutive understanding–assent link. Notwithstanding, it is further argued that the theory of the a priori cannot avoid appeal to a notion of intuition or rational insight primarily because there are propositions, such as normative principles, that are synthetic a priori. It answers Williamson’s stated skepticism about the existence of intuitions and makes a start at explaining how intuitions might be able to contribute to a priori justification.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Oct 15, 2020
This essay responds to Williamson’s reformulated argument against the feasibility of a top-down c... more This essay responds to Williamson’s reformulated argument against the feasibility of a top-down characterization of the a priori–a posteriori distinction, arguing that Williamson fails to show that sense experience plays an irreducibly epistemic role in his new Mathematician example. Williamson’s example turns on the problematic claim that there is something intermediate between reading a proof lazily, deferring to the authority of its author, and reading it while checking its soundness for oneself. Furthermore, it is argued that Williamson’s defense of his Central argument is vitiated by a serious misreading of Boghossian’s initial criticism: that criticism was not meant to supply an alternative account of the way in which certain a priori propositions are known.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Oct 15, 2020
This paper argues that Williamson fails to produce successful counterexamples to the existence of... more This paper argues that Williamson fails to produce successful counterexamples to the existence of understanding–assent links, in particular because he fails to show that the expert in his cases has lost underived dispositions to assent. The paper gives grounds for rejecting Williamson’s argument that intuitions, supposing them to exist, cannot be the source of distinctively a priori justification. Finally, it is argued that Williamson’s argument against the existence of intuitions (understood as sui generis states of intellectual seeming) flounders because it rests on a misguided and naïve dichotomy between ‘introspectable’ and ‘postulated’ mental states.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Oct 15, 2020
In these brief comments, the author discusses the origins of his interest in the epistemology, wh... more In these brief comments, the author discusses the origins of his interest in the epistemology, why he has always found inferentialist accounts of it implausible, and why the similarities between the epistemology of logic and the epistemology of other domains have always been salient to him. There is also a brief account of the asymmetry between the role of internalism in Boghossian’s epistemology and the role of externalism in the author’s epistemology. Finally, there are some reflections on the ways in which we can hope to improve the shaky methodology of traditional epistemology, for example by making more use of formal methods and the findings of experimental psychology.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Oct 15, 2020
This essay defends the a priori–a posteriori distinction against two skeptical challenges posed b... more This essay defends the a priori–a posteriori distinction against two skeptical challenges posed by Williamson in Chapter 8. Against the argument that no top-down characterization of the distinction can line up with the intuitive paradigm examples, it contends that the argument’s reliance on the distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ experience renders it ineffective. An alternative way of running the argument is shown to lead to a different conclusion, one about the nature of justifiers. Against Williamson’s central argument, which presents a pair of cases designed to show that whatever distinction the paradigm examples mark it cannot be one of epistemological significance, the essay argues that Williamson fails to draw the correct conclusions from his cases, and in particular fails to show that the subject in either case can acquire justified belief via the type of exercise of the imagination that he describes.
Philosophical Studies, Apr 1, 2009
Philosophical Topics, 1989
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1990
Oxford University Press eBooks, Oct 15, 2020
This essay criticizes Williamson’s attempt, in his book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, to undermi... more This essay criticizes Williamson’s attempt, in his book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, to undermine the interest of the a priori–a posteriori distinction. Williamson’s argument turns on several large claims. The first is that experience often plays a role intermediate between evidential and merely enabling, and that this poses a difficulty for giving a theoretically satisfying account of the distinction. The second is that there are no constitutive understanding–assent links. Both of these claims are subjected to detailed scrutiny. In particular, it is argued that Williamson’s case of the deviant logician, Simon, fails to constitute an intelligible counterexample to the status of conjunction elimination as an understanding–assent link for ‘and’.
El articulo sostiene que hay dos puntos de vista posibles que podrian llamarse “relativismo sobre... more El articulo sostiene que hay dos puntos de vista posibles que podrian llamarse “relativismo sobre la moralidad”. Uno, el relativismo exhaustivo, logra evitar el compromiso con las verdades morales absolutas, pero termina siendo indistinguible del nihilismo, lo cual no era el resultado previsto. El otro, el relativismo absolutista, capta lo que algunas personas consideran como una vision relativista de la moralidad, pero no evita el compromiso de, al menos, algunas verdades morales absolutas. Por lo tanto, es mas dificil evitar el compromiso con las verdades morales absolutas de lo que los relativistas suelen suponer.
Arguing About Knowledge, 2020
The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, 2011
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Books by Paul Boghossian
Papers by Paul Boghossian