- Madrid, Madrid, Spain
- Profesor Titular, Departamento de Humanidades, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Premios de Excelencia, Consejo Social-UC3M-Santander-Airbus, Joven Personal Investigador, 2020edit
En este capítulo prestaremos atención a la psicología de las emociones políticas. El objetivo es ofrecer un marco que integre la evidencia más relevante en este ámbito, ofreciendo al mismo tiempo un mapa que resulte útil para quien... more
En este capítulo prestaremos atención a la psicología de las emociones políticas. El objetivo es ofrecer un marco que integre la evidencia más relevante en este ámbito, ofreciendo al mismo tiempo un mapa que resulte útil para quien estudia las emociones desde la filosofía política, la ética o la teoría crítica y cultural. El mensaje central de este capítulo es que el estudio de las emociones debe ir en conjunción con una mejor comprensión de las dinámicas de interacción y participación política. Frente a modelos individualistas, en épocas recientes hemos empezado a entender que la interacción política se analiza de manera más ajustada desde una visión más social o grupal. Este cambio de paradigma tiene importantes consecuencias para la comprensión de la psicología de nuestras emociones políticas y para las soluciones y medidas de intervención encaminadas a minimizar sus efectos negativos
Research Interests:
Los incentivos forman parte del mobiliario de nuestra vida. Cuando se quiere obligar a alguien a hacer algo, los incentivos facilitan una vía intermedia entre la fuerza y la persuasión. Los incentivos le dan al agente la posibilidad de... more
Los incentivos forman parte del mobiliario de nuestra vida. Cuando se quiere obligar a alguien a hacer algo, los incentivos facilitan una vía intermedia entre la fuerza y la persuasión. Los incentivos le dan al agente la posibilidad de escoger de forma aparentemente voluntaria acciones que no escogería sin esa ayuda extra, orientando su conducta hacia resultados que resultan beneficiosos para todos. Para mucha gente resulta muy cómodo coger el coche por la mañana sin demasiada preocupación. Pero si con el objetivo de reducir las emisiones, los carriles rápidos en nuestras ciudades se reservan para vehículos con al menos dos ocupantes, esta norma facilita un incentivo para coger el bus o para buscar un acompañante de camino al trabajo. Este es solo un ejemplo de los muchos y variados incentivos que encontramos en nuestra vida diaria. Pero hay muchos más. En algunos debates recientes sobre la obligatoriedad de las vacunas contra el coronavirus, por ejemplo, muchas voces han apelado a los incentivos, en diversas variedades y formas, concibiéndolos como herramientas que nos ayudarían a 'gestionar' o 'vencer' las reticencias de algunos ciudadanos ante las nuevas vacunas. El pasaporte inmunológico, que permitiría viajar con libertad después de estar vacunados (y que ahora mismo se discute en muchos países), sería en última instancia un incentivo para acelerar la vacunación. El debate ético en torno a los incentivos, como vemos, está en la calle. Sin embargo, el debate filosófico en torno a estos peculiares mecanismos de gestión e intervención 1 Este escrito se ha redactado en el marco del Proyecto de Investigación 'Epistemología política y patologías del conocimiento-EPISTEPOC', FFI2019/00397/001, financiado por el Ministerio de Ciencia y Universidades. También ha recibido financiación desde la Red de Excelencia 'APPLY-Nuevas tendencias de la filosofía aplicada. De la filosofía teórica a los nuevos retos de la sociedad', (RED2018-102-695-T), financiada por el Ministerio de Ciencia y Universidades.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Rising hostility between members of opposing political factions has gained considerable attention in both academic and popular press. The adverse effects of this phenomenon are widely recognized, but its psychological antecedents remain... more
Rising hostility between members of opposing political factions has gained considerable attention in both academic and popular press. The adverse effects of this phenomenon are widely recognized, but its psychological antecedents remain the focus of ongoing debate in political psychology. Past research has honed in on two conflicting explanations: one highlights the extent to which people self-define as supporters of particular parties or candidates (the identity view), and another points toward the intensity with which they disagree on substantive matters of policy (the issues view). A nationally representative survey of 1051 eligible Spanish voters yielded support for both explanations. The perceived magnitude and nature of disagreement were associated with increased partisan prejudice, while controlling for partisan identification. Path analyses revealed that issue-based prejudice was more pronounced among ideologically extreme agents (β = 0.237, 95% CI [0.174, 0.300]) than toward extreme targets (β = 0.140, 95% CI [0.078, 0.201]), and replicated recent findings that identity-based prejudice is motivated primarily by non-instrumental factors (β = 0.286, 95% CI [0.230, 0.337]). Together, these results indicate that discrimination across party lines responds to two fundamentally distinct, though at times co-occurring, imperatives: to coalesce in ideologically homogeneous communities, and to protect one's sense of partisan identity.
Research Interests:
Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project (XRP) to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy... more
Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project (XRP) to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy (osf.io/dvkpr). Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward.
Research Interests:
Does it make sense for people to hold one another responsible for what they do, as happens in countless social interactions every day? One of the most unsettling lessons from recent psychological research is that people are routinely... more
Does it make sense for people to hold one another responsible for what they do, as happens in countless social interactions every day? One of the most unsettling lessons from recent psychological research is that people are routinely mistaken about the origins of their behavior. Yet philosophical orthodoxy holds that the exercise of morally responsible agency typically requires accurate self-awareness. If the orthodoxy is right, and the psychology is to be believed, people characteristically fail to meet the standards of morally responsible agency, and we are faced with the possibility of skepticism about agency. Unlike many philosophers, I accept the unsettling lesson from psychology. I insist, however, that we are not driven to skepticism. Instead, we should reject the requirement of accurate self-awareness for morally responsible agency. In Talking to Our Selves I develop a dialogic theory, where the exercise of morally responsible agency emerges through a collaborative conversational process by which human beings, although afflicted with a remarkable degree of self-ignorance, are able to realize their values in their lives.
Research Interests:
Bernard Williams proposed his relativism of distance based on the recognition " that others are at varying distances from us ". Recent work in moral psychology and experimental philosophy highlights the prevalence of folk relativism in... more
Bernard Williams proposed his relativism of distance based on the recognition " that others are at varying distances from us ". Recent work in moral psychology and experimental philosophy highlights the prevalence of folk relativism in relation to spatial and temporal distance. However, Williams' relativism of distance as well as recent empirical findings which seem to support some of Williams' main ideas on this issue have received scant attention. In this article, we would like to focus on the phenomenon of moral relativism regarding spatiotemporal distance as an entry point to the nature of folk moral relativism and the methodology of meta-ethics. To do so, we first introduce Williams' relativism of distance. Then we compare Williams' approach on this matter to recent experimental approaches on folk relativism. On this score the main result is that Williams' proposal is consistent with several well-established insights on the experimental study of folk relativism. Williams' relativism of distance is not only empirically plausible, but it is also of relevance for shaping the methodology of an empirically informed meta-ethics. We close this paper by stressing this methodological contribution.
Research Interests:
En este artículo se ofrece una caracterización de la integridad profesional, y de algunos de los dilemas que se le plantean al trabajador social en su práctica cotidiana, a partir de una caracterización formal de nuestros juicios morales.... more
En este artículo se ofrece una caracterización de la integridad profesional, y de algunos de los dilemas que se le plantean al trabajador social en su práctica cotidiana, a partir de una caracterización formal de nuestros juicios morales. Se asume, en el citado texto, que un trabajo previo de clarificación conceptual —eminentemente filosófico y centrado en el tipo de razones que sustentan nuestros juicios morales— podría ser de ayuda a la hora de analizar conflictos y dilemas profesionales típicos. Asumiendo que cualquier dominio profesional debería prestar atención a aquellos datos científicos que serían re-levantes para explicar la labor que se desarrolla dentro del dominio en cuestión, este comentario explora las con-secuencias que para la ética profesional tendría una caracterización filosófica de nuestra capacidad moral que sea «empíricamente informada». Se defenderá en este comentario que esta información empírica debería modular de modo importante las demandas a las que el profesional está sujeto y seguramente también debería llevarnos a re-pensar los mecanismos institucionales que podrían reforzar una correcta práctica profesional. Palabras clave: Ética normativa; meta-ética; razones; intuiciones morales
Research Interests:
Although we are sensitive to the advantages of reactive attitudes as a starting point, we are concerned that confusion on the level of analysis can easily plague this type of account. We defend that what is needed here is a serious... more
Although we are sensitive to the advantages of reactive attitudes as a starting point, we are concerned that confusion on the level of analysis can easily plague this type of account. We defend that what is needed here is a serious appraisal of the effects on the promotion of values of moralistic responses towards different types of agency.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Among the recent proposals for philosophical reform, none has generated as much controversy as experimental philosophy. Despite its originality and the suggestiveness of some of its results, experimental philosophy has been criticized... more
Among the recent proposals for philosophical reform, none has generated as much controversy as experimental philosophy. Despite its originality and the suggestiveness of some of its results, experimental philosophy has been criticized almost from its very beginnings. In this chapter, we focus on a methodological objection due to Anti Kauppinen
(Kauppinen 2005). According to Kauppinen, experimental philosophy (in any of its possible formulations) would not be able to identify the robust conceptual intuitions of speakers. In this chapter, we counter Kauppinen’s criticism by highlighting the relevance of experimental
economics to identify the behavioral dimension of our conceptual competence. To the extent that experimental economics is particularly well equipped to identify the behavioral aspect of our conceptual competence, experimental ethics would do well in enriching its methodology (based on questionnaires and vignettes, and an overly linguistic bias) with behaviorallyoriented experiments. This would permit us to more clearly define the contours of our conceptual competence in the contexts that are relevant for our discussion - attribution of moral responsibility, fairness, etc. Importantly, experimental work on this behavioral dimension of our conceptual competence will also contribute to experimentally modeling processes of reflective equilibrium that would justify our principles and normative standards.
The message of this chapter is therefore twofold: Firstly, we will defend that an experimental philosophy which is methodologically sensitive to the dual nature of our conceptual competence (linguistic responses and behavioral manifestations) should look at itself in the mirror of experimental economics. Secondly, we will argue that moving
experimental ethics closer to the methodology of experimental economics is the first step to experimentally examine actual choice processes, processes that can be described in terms of
reflective equilibrium. The framework offered by reflective equilibrium, we will argue, is more faithful to the complex nature of our real decisions than the simple intuitions of the hypothetical scenarios used by philosophers or the responses to questionnaires and vignettes
that are common in experimental philosophy.
(Kauppinen 2005). According to Kauppinen, experimental philosophy (in any of its possible formulations) would not be able to identify the robust conceptual intuitions of speakers. In this chapter, we counter Kauppinen’s criticism by highlighting the relevance of experimental
economics to identify the behavioral dimension of our conceptual competence. To the extent that experimental economics is particularly well equipped to identify the behavioral aspect of our conceptual competence, experimental ethics would do well in enriching its methodology (based on questionnaires and vignettes, and an overly linguistic bias) with behaviorallyoriented experiments. This would permit us to more clearly define the contours of our conceptual competence in the contexts that are relevant for our discussion - attribution of moral responsibility, fairness, etc. Importantly, experimental work on this behavioral dimension of our conceptual competence will also contribute to experimentally modeling processes of reflective equilibrium that would justify our principles and normative standards.
The message of this chapter is therefore twofold: Firstly, we will defend that an experimental philosophy which is methodologically sensitive to the dual nature of our conceptual competence (linguistic responses and behavioral manifestations) should look at itself in the mirror of experimental economics. Secondly, we will argue that moving
experimental ethics closer to the methodology of experimental economics is the first step to experimentally examine actual choice processes, processes that can be described in terms of
reflective equilibrium. The framework offered by reflective equilibrium, we will argue, is more faithful to the complex nature of our real decisions than the simple intuitions of the hypothetical scenarios used by philosophers or the responses to questionnaires and vignettes
that are common in experimental philosophy.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
En este artículo presentamos las principales corrientes de la Filosofía Experimental y atendemos a una de las críticas más severas a la que se ha sometido este reciente programa de renovación metodológica. Según Antti Kauppinen la... more
En este artículo presentamos las principales corrientes de la Filosofía Experimental y atendemos a una de las críticas más severas a la que se ha sometido este reciente programa de renovación metodológica. Según Antti Kauppinen la Filosofía Experimental está condenada al fracaso porque no puede obtener mediante sus métodos el tipo de intuiciones que interesan a los filósofos –las intuiciones robustas del hablante
competente. Aun aceptando parte de las críticas de Kauppinen, en este artículo sostenemos, en primer lugar, que la supuesta incapacidad de la Filosofía Experimental para acceder a las intuiciones robustas de los hablantes tiene que ver en
gran medida con los métodos experimentales empleados hasta ahora por los filósofos experimentales. En segundo lugar, defendemos que el proyecto de reforma llevado a cabo desde la Filosofía Experimental resultará viable solo si se
adoptan una serie de consejos metodológicos procedentes de la economía experimental. Únicamente entonces podrán los experimentalistas responder con éxito a la objeción de Kauppinen.
competente. Aun aceptando parte de las críticas de Kauppinen, en este artículo sostenemos, en primer lugar, que la supuesta incapacidad de la Filosofía Experimental para acceder a las intuiciones robustas de los hablantes tiene que ver en
gran medida con los métodos experimentales empleados hasta ahora por los filósofos experimentales. En segundo lugar, defendemos que el proyecto de reforma llevado a cabo desde la Filosofía Experimental resultará viable solo si se
adoptan una serie de consejos metodológicos procedentes de la economía experimental. Únicamente entonces podrán los experimentalistas responder con éxito a la objeción de Kauppinen.
