Babak Taghvaee looks at the role air power played in the May attacks by India on Pakistan and the latter’s response
A terrorist attack on April 22, 2025, resulted in the deaths of 25 Indian nationals and one Nepalese civilian near Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir. In response to this act of terrorism, the Indian government took a series of significant actions, including suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, expelling Pakistani diplomats, and closing the borders. Subsequently, the Indian government issued an order for the Indian Air Force (IAF) to conduct retaliatory airstrikes.
On May 7, the IAF executed a series of precision airstrikes targeting nine facilities linked to three prominent Islamic terrorist organisations during an operation codenamed ‘Sindoor’. The Pakistani Air Force (PAF), anticipating Indian counterstrikes, successfully engaged and downed at least three of the 75 Indian fighter aircraft involved in the operation, although Pakistan claims five, including the world’s first combat loss of a Rafale multi-role fighter.
In the wake of these airstrikes, the Pakistan Army and Air Force initiated a counteroffensive, focusing on military targets within India. Utilising one-way attack drones, precision-guided rockets, and air-launched ballistic missiles, Pakistan’s forces targeted Indian air defence systems, radar installations, and airbases located near the international border.
On May 9/10, in retaliation, the IAF launched a strike on 13 military installations within Pakistan, predominantly targeting assets associated with the PAF. This included the destruction or damage of a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft and a Saab 2000 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, along with the neutralisation of several early warning radars belonging to the Pakistan Army Air Defence Corps (PAADC). The escalating hostilities culminated in a ceasefire agreement brokered by the United States, which came into effect on May 10, effectively halting the immediate military actions between the two nations.
Pahalgam terrorist attack
For several decades, Pakistan has served as a sanctuary for numerous Islamist terrorist organisations. A complex interplay of political, ideological, and institutional factors has impeded the capacity – or willingness – of the Pakistan Armed Forces and security apparatus to effectively dismantle these militant groups. These organisations have not only perpetrated violence within Pakistan’s own borders but have also conducted transnational terrorist operations in neighbouring countries, notably India and Iran. In response, both the Iranian and Indian armed forces have occasionally resorted to kinetic operations, including air, drone, and missile strikes against terrorist infrastructure within Pakistani territory. These cross-border strikes have consistently been condemned by Islamabad as violations of its sovereignty and often been followed by retaliatory actions from the Pakistani military. On April 22, five armed militants affiliated with The Resistance Front (TRF), a proxy group of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Islamic terrorist organisation, carried out a mass-casualty terrorist attack in Baisaran Valley, near Pahalgam in the Anantnag district of Jammu and Kashmir. Equipped with AK-47 assault rifles and M4 carbines, the attackers targeted a group of tourists, killing 26 individuals – including 25 Indian nationals and one Nepalese citizen – and injuring at least 20 others.
Prior to executing their victims, its reported the assailants reportedly interrogated the tourists, demanding their names and religious affiliations to distinguish Muslims from non-Muslims. This deliberate targeting strategy underscores the sectarian motivations behind the massacre. Among the deceased were three Indian government officials, including newlywed officers from the Indian Air Force and Indian Navy.
The atrocity provoked widespread public outrage across India and triggered an immediate escalation in diplomatic, economic, and military posturing against Pakistan.
In the wake of the attack, the Indian government implemented a series of punitive measures, culminating in a directive for IAF to execute retaliatory precision strikes. The responsibility for this counter-offensive Operation Sindoor was assigned to the IAF’s Western and Southwestern Air Commands. At the time, these commands jointly fielded a force of approximately 251 combat aircraft distributed across 18 squadrons within 11 operational wings and one forward operating base. The operation began on May 7.
Operation Sindoor
According to official sources in the IAF, Operation Sindoor involved the deployment of approximately 75 to 80 combat aircraft. PAF reporting indicated that the strike package primarily consisted of Rafale EHs, Su-30MKI Flankers, and MiG-29UPG Fulcrums. The Southwestern and Southern Air Commands of the IAF collectively operated an inventory of approximately 207 fourth-generation fighter jets (Rafale EHs, Su-30MKIs, and MiG-29UPGs) with an estimated 141 of them reported as operationally airworthy at the time of the mission.
Additionally, the 40 Wing of the IAF’s Central Air Command, stationed at Maharajpur Air Force Station (AFS), maintained a Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) detachment of four Mirage 2000HIs at Leh AFS, operating under the Western Air Command in proximity to the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan.
According to PAF assessments, Operation Sindoor comprised five principal strike formations: three four-ship formations of Rafale EHs, one four-ship formation of MiG-29UPGs, and one four-ship formation of Su-30MKIs. The MiG-29UPGs and Su-30MKIs were launched from Srinagar AFS, while the Rafale EHs originated from Ambala AFS.
In parallel with the strike package, additional Su-30MKIs and MiG-29UPGs conducted Combat Air Patrol (CAP) missions over Indian airspace. These aircraft were supported by aerial refuelling from Il-78MKI tankers of 78 Squadron and Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) coverage provided by A-50EI aircraft of 50 Squadron, both operating out of Agra AFS under the Central Air Command. On the Pakistani side, at least one aircraft from each of the PAF’s Saab 2000 AEW&C squadrons was airborne at the time of the Indian incursions – one from 3 AEW Squadron operating out of Minhas Air Base, and another from 53 AEW Squadron deployed from Bholari AB.
The Pakistani Saab Erieye AEW&C platforms played a critical role in providing comprehensive situational awareness to PAF assets. These included an undisclosed number of J-10CP and JF-17C Block III multirole fighters conducting CAP missions over Pakistani airspace. Upon detecting inbound Indian aircraft and their stand-off munitions via both airborne sensors and land-based early warning radars, AEW&C crews vectored J-10 and JF-17 units to intercept. Additionally, further interceptors were scrambled to engage the intruding aircraft and neutralise any incoming precision-guided munitions.
Indian Rafale EH shot down
According to statements released by the PAF, five Indian fighter aircraft – comprising three Rafale EHs, one Su-30MKI, and one MiG29UPG – were reportedly downed during the IAF offensive on May 7. However, post-strike open-source intelligence (OSINT), including civilian-recorded videos and photographic evidence circulated by Indian media outlets, confirmed the loss of three aircraft: one Rafale EH (BS001), one Su-30MKI, and one MiG29UPG, all within Indian airspace.
Initially, several Indian media platforms misidentified the wreckage as belonging to Pakistani fighter jets and published the imagery on May 7. Once the wreckage was definitively attributed to IAF assets, the narrative shifted. Facing public scrutiny and potential reputational damage, Indian media outlets began denying the losses – particularly the downing of the Rafale EH, which was widely regarded as the most advanced combat aircraft in India’s inventory. PAF sources attributed all confirmed kills to PL-15 active radar homing long-range air-to-air missiles (ARH LRAAMs), launched by Chengdu J-10CP multirole fighters of 15 Squadron, the ‘Venomous Cobras’. This squadron is a component of the PAF’s 33rd Tactical Wing based at Minhas AB in Kamra. Contrary to Indian expectations, these J-10CPs were reportedly equipped with the non-export variant of the PL-15 missile, featuring an extended engagement envelope of 125-155 miles significantly greater than the commonly assumed export range of 75-90 miles.
This enhanced missile capability allowed a J-10CP to successfully engage and destroy the fourth aircraft in the third Rafale EH formation, identified by the callsign ‘Godzilla 4’. The Rafale was struck over Akali Khurd, a village near Bathinda, approximately 44 miles from the India–Pakistan border, while en route back to Ambala Air Force Station (AFS), home to a key wing of the IAF’s Western Air Command. The PL-15, with its Mach 5+ velocity and extended range, enabled successful beyondvisual-range (BVR) engagement. In addition to the Rafale EH, other PL-15 missiles were credited with kills against a MiG-29UPG and a Su-30MKI. Several additional missiles were launched during the engagement but failed to hit their intended targets. After exhausting the solid propellant in their rocket motors, these failed munitions fell in various regions across western India.
The Indian Armed Forces reportedly recovered some of the missile debris, which is believed to have been subjected to technical exploitation for intelligence and countermeasure development.
A video recorded by a local farmer in Akali Khurd village captured the final moments of the Indian Air Force Rafale EH (tail number ‘BS001’), seconds after it was struck by a PL-15 long-range air-to-air missile on May 7. The footage shows the aircraft in an uncontrolled descent, crashing shortly thereafter, while its self-protection suite actively deployed flares in a last-ditch defensive effort even after its pilot had ejected. The deployment pattern suggests a state of confusion or delayed response – either by the pilot or the aircraft’s defensive avionics – in identifying the nature and trajectory of the incoming threat.
The Rafale’s defensive suite, SPECTRA (Self-Protection Equipment to Counter Threats for Rafale Aircraft), is a multi-spectral integrated electronic warfare system developed by Thales Group. It has been widely promoted by Dassault Aviation as one of the most advanced self-protection systems in service aboard any fourth- or fifth-generation combat aircraft. SPECTRA combines radar warning receivers (RWR), laser warning receivers (LWR), missile approach warning systems (MAWS), and active jamming capabilities into a highly automated and networked defensive architecture.
Despite its sophisticated design, SPECTRA failed to protect Rafale EH ‘BS001’ from the PL-15 missile engagement that night. The exact reason for this failure remains undetermined. Possible explanations include successful electronic warfare countermeasures by the Pakistan Air Force, the advanced seeker and high speed of the PL-15 missile itself, or a technical malfunction within the Rafale’s onboard defensive suite. The incident has raised critical questions regarding the operational effectiveness of self-protection systems in high-threat environments against emerging long-range air-to-air missile technologies.
Operation Sindoor targets
Despite the confirmed loss of three combat aircraft, Operation Sindoor was widely regarded as a strategic success by the Indian Armed Forces in their ongoing counterterrorism campaign against Pakistan-based militant organisations. Following the cessation of hostilities, the Indian government held a press briefing during which it revealed that nine high-value targets had been destroyed during the airstrikes on May 7. These targets were affiliated with three major jihadist groups operating from Pakistan: Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Hizb ul-Mujahideen (HM), and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). According to official Indian accounts, three of the targeted facilities were operated by LeT, one by HM, and five by JeM. The LeT-affiliated targets included the Shawai Nallah Terrorist Training Camp in Muzaffarabad, located within Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK); the Markaz Ahle Hadith in Barnala, PoJK; and the Markaz Taiba Training Centre in Muridke, Punjab. The latter two locations, while publicly functioning as mosques and religious seminaries, were identified by Indian intelligence as ideological indoctrination centres and operational hubs used by LeT to prepare suicide bombers and other militant cadres.
According to Indian sources, these facilities played a central role in the recruitment, radicalisation, and religious training of operatives deployed for cross-border terrorist activities.
The Pakistan government strongly contested these characterisations, claiming that the targeted sites were merely religious institutions and civilian facilities. However, no verifiable evidence was provided to substantiate those claims. Indian officials countered this narrative by highlighting that, although the Pakistani authorities had reportedly issued evacuation orders for religious seminaries in the days leading up to the operation, all the identified targets remained active and occupied at the time of the airstrikes.
On May 8, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh announced that the strikes had neutralised at least 100 militants affiliated with the aforementioned terrorist organisations.
Conversely, the Pakistan government asserted that 31 civilians were killed and denied the presence of militants at any of the targeted locations. This significant discrepancy in casualty figures illustrates the ongoing contest between both nations in the domain of information warfare accompanying the kinetic phase of Operation Sindoor.
Pakistan’s Operation Bunyan al-Marsus
In the immediate aftermath of Operation Sindoor, the Pakistan Armed Forces initiated a multi-domain retaliatory campaign that began with intensified artillery bombardments, mortar fire, and anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) strikes against Indian Army positions along the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir. These initial kinetic actions were followed by night-time Concurrently, the Pakistani military deployed one-way attack drones most notably the Turkish-manufactured Yiha-III – to strike multiple Indian Air Force (IAF) air defence and radar installations across the Jammu and Kashmir region.
J-10CPs and JF-17s: The PAF’s Key Weapons
As of late May, the PAF maintained a fleet of 474 fighter aircraft and advanced jet trainers. Among these, 67 platforms were allocated to training and doctrinal development units, including four Operational Conversion Units (OCUs), one Lead-In Fighter Training Squadron, and three Combat Commanders Schools (CCSs). The remainder were distributed among the PAF’s operational units, comprising nine multirole fighter squadrons, two air superiority squadrons, and four tactical attack squadrons.
During this latest Indo-Pakistani conflict, the PAF faced significant operational constraints regarding the deployment of its 62 F-16 multirole fighters. These included 12 F-16C and six F-16D Block 52 variants, which represent the most advanced Western-origin combat aircraft in Pakistan’s inventory. Owing to end-use monitoring clauses imposed by the United States as part of the foreign military sale agreement, these aircraft are restricted to counter-terrorism missions and could not be employed in conventional combat against the IAF. Furthermore, the PAF’s older Mirage III and Mirage V aircraft, assigned to its four tactical attack squadrons, were of limited use in the air-to-air domain. These legacy platforms continue to serve primarily in ground-attack making them unsuitable for contesting air superiority against modern IAF fighters. As a result, the responsibility for countering IAF incursions fell almost exclusively to the PAF’s Chinese-origin fourth-generation fighters – specifically the JF-17 and J-10CP platforms.
By mid-May, the PAF operated a total of 201 JF-17 series fighters, consisting of 50 JF-17 Block I aircraft (some undergoing modernisation to Block III standard), 55 JF-17 Block IIs, 50 JF-17 Block IIIs, 26 twin-seat JF-17B Block IIs, and 20 Chengdu J-10CP multirole fighters. These platforms were pivotal during the May hostilities, particularly the JF-17 Block II/III and J-10CP variants equipped with the PL-15 active radar-guided long-range air-to-air missile. These aircraft contributed significantly to the PAF’s ability to secure its own airspace and defend critical strategic and military infrastructure. Their effectiveness compelled the IAF to revise its operational strategy following Operation Sindoor, shifting from the use of precision-guided bombs delivered by manned aircraft to the employment of long-range stand-off cruise missiles such as the SCALP-EG and BrahMos-A.
On the eve of Operation Sindoor, the Indian Air Force fielded a total of 531 fighter aircraft. This force structure included 52 MiG-29UPGs, 32 MiG-21 Bisons, 38 Tejas LCA Mk.1s, eight Jaguar IMs, 78 Jaguar ISs, 36 Mirage 2000HIs, 259 Su-30MKIs, and 28 Rafale EHs. Additionally, the IAF maintained a substantial inventory of combat trainer aircraft that could be deployed operationally if required: six MiG-29UBUPGs, four MiG-21UMs, three Tejas LCA-T Mk.1s, 27 Jaguar IBs, ten Mirage 2000THIs, and eight Rafale DHs.
Despite this expansive inventory, the IAF, like its Pakistani counterpart, selectively employed only a subset of its fleet for offensive operations during the conflict. Operations targeting Pakistani terrorist infrastructure were carried out exclusively by MiG29UPG, Su-30MKI, and Rafale EH aircraft assigned to the Western and South-Western Air Commands. As of May 7, these commands had 52, 140, and 15 aircraft of those respective types in service, with estimated combat-ready figures at 37 MiG-29UPGs, 91 Su30MKIs, and 13 Rafale EHs. A minimum of 75 of these participated in Operation Sindoor, of which three were confirmed as combat losses –one MiG-29UPG, one Su-30MKI, and one Rafale EH.
While there is a high probability that the PAF may have incurred aircraft losses during aerial engagements, particularly given the intensity of the air battles and volume of deployed missiles, there is currently no verified visual or forensic evidence available to confirm the downing of any PAF aircraft during the May 2025 conflict. precision missile attacks, launched using the Pakistan Army’s Badr rocket artillery systems.
The escalation culminated on May 10, when the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was ordered to execute a co-ordinated retaliatory air campaign, codenamed Operation Bunyan al-Marsus, a name derived from a Quranic verse symbolising fortified resistance. The primary objective of this operation was the disruption of IAF infrastructure and operational readiness, with particular emphasis on airbases and associated logistical nodes near the Indo-Pakistani border.
During this operation, PAF JF-17 multirole fighter aircraft launched stand-off munitions, including air-launched cruise missiles, targeting several critical Indian military installations. These included Udhampur Air Force Station (AFS), Adampur AFS, Pathankot AFS, as well as three weapon storage facilities located in Uri, Nagrota, and Beas.
Among the targeted airbases, Adampur AFS holds strategic significance as the operational base for No 47 Squadron of the IAF, which flies 18 MiG-29UPG fighters and two MiG29UBUPG trainer variants. Pathankot AFS, under the Western Air Command, hosts the 125 Helicopter Squadron operating AH-64E Apache Guardian attack helicopters. The base had also recently received deployments of HAL Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) from various squadrons. Udhampur AFS, meanwhile, is home to the 153 Helicopter Unit operating Mi-17 utility helicopters, and the 132 Forward Aerial Control Flight, which flies HAL Cheetah light utility helicopters.
As part of the broader operation, the PAF also conducted a Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) mission involving a JF-17 Block II aircraft from 14 Squadron, known as the ‘Tail Choppers’, based at Rafiqui Air Base. Two CM-400AKG hypersonic air-to-surface missiles targeted an Indian S-400 Triumf long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system stationed at Adampur AFS. Subsequent low-resolution satellite imagery analysed by independent defence observers revealed evidence of burn marks and localised ground disturbance at the suspected S-400 site, suggesting the missiles may have struck or degraded key components of the battery.
India’s final response
In direct response to Operation Bunyan al-Marsus, the IAF launched a series of co-ordinated airstrikes targeting multiple strategic military assets in Pakistan. These retaliatory strikes were executed with precision, focusing on degrading Pakistan’s air defence capabilities and operational infrastructure. The targets included four early warning radar installations, seven PAF air bases, and one forward operating base. Preceding the main strike package, the Indian Armed Forces deployed a wave of one-way loitering munitions –specifically Israeli-made IAI Harop and Polish Warmate 5.0 drones – against these facilities.
These drones served dual purposes: to probe and assess the reaction parameters of HQ-9BE short-range SAM systems, and to neutralise or degrade the target acquisition and illumination radars of HQ-16FE medium-range SAM systems. This preparatory tactic weakened the defensive envelope of the targeted sites, thereby facilitating the success of the subsequent cruise missile strikes.
On May 9/10, Su-30MKI multirole fighter aircraft of the IAF launched between 15 and 18 BrahMos-A air-launched ramjet supersonic cruise missiles – typically one per aircraft – against strategic targets in northern and central Pakistan. These strikes inflicted considerable damage.
At PAF Base Nur Khan, a missile strike hit the operations room of the 35 Composite Transport Wing and destroyed two fuel trucks, with collateral damage sustained by at least one C-130 Hercules medium-lift tactical transport aircraft belonging to 6 Air Transport Squadron.
Additional BrahMos missiles targeted a command shelter at the PAF’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) base in Murid, the main runways of PAF Base Mushaf, and the operations room of the 34 Tactical Air Wing at PAF Base Rafiqui. Further strikes were executed against Pakistan Army Air Defence Corps (PAADC) early warning radar installations in Papur, Gujranwala, Lahore, and Chunian.
Simultaneously, Rafale EH aircraft from 17 Squadron conducted long-range stand-off strikes employing at least ten SCALP-EG (Système de Croisière Autonome à Longue Portée – Emploi Général) air-launched cruise missiles, targeting sites across southern Pakistan. Although one missile reportedly failed en route due to engine malfunction, the remaining missiles achieved significant operational impact. Confirmed targets included the runway and VIP pavilion at Rahim Yar Khan Airport, an aircraft maintenance hangar at PAF Base Shahbaz, another hangar and an electronic warfare (EW) radar installation at PAF Base Sukkur, the maintenance hangar of 53 AEW Squadron at PAF Base Bholari, and the Officers’ Mess at the Army Air Defence College in Malir Cantonment, Karachi.
Crucially, learning from the operational setbacks of Operation Sindoor, the IAF adopted a risk-averse posture in this wave of strikes. By employing long-range stand-off weapons – SCALP-EG with a maximum range of 340 miles and BrahMos-A with a 330 miles reach, the IAF avoided exposing its strike aircraft to the JF-17 and J-10CP platforms of the PAF, which were equipped with PL-15 active radar-guided long-range air-to-air missiles.
Furthermore, the prior deployment of loitering munitions had allowed the IAF to assess the vulnerabilities and reaction thresholds of various PA ADC-operated SAM systems, ensuring that the main wave of cruise missile attacks faced minimal effective resistance.
Following three days of hostilities, both India and Pakistan jointly announced a ceasefire agreement, effective from 1700hrs local time on May 10. Formal diplomatic talks began on May 12. Despite the declaration, both sides accused each other of ceasefire violations in the immediate aftermath. In an unexpected diplomatic twist, US Vice President JD Vance dismissed the conflict as “none of our business,” while President Donald Trump publicly claimed on social media that the United States had played a direct role in brokering the ceasefire. While the Pakistani government acknowledged US mediation efforts, Indian officials maintained that the agreement was the result of direct bilateral negotiations without third-party involvement.
COMING SOON
Further analysis on how the Pakistan Air Force managed to shoot down the IAF aircraft will appear soon
