Below, I discuss the critical period ahead for the war in Ukraine. Russia lays ground for annexing parts of Ukraine. However, there is, again, a mismatch between the Kremlin's goals and the exhausted forces it has remaining to deliver those goals (1/).
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Dara Massicot
@MassDara
Senior policy researcher at focusing on defense issues in Russia. Opinions mine. RTs not endorsements.
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The first groups of mobilized Russian forces are now in Ukraine and are sent to the front lines. This phase (through the winter) could be volatile and uncertain. My thoughts on the next few months for Russian forces are below.
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Newly mobilized Russian forces “join an army already degraded in quality and capability,” writes @MassDara. “That does not bode well for Russia’s plans on the battlefield.” nyti.ms/3MSEx9v
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The Kremlin’s recent actions are intended to show resolve. Yet they also show awareness that the war is going poorly and options are shrinking. The months ahead are likely to be volatile and uncertain for all involved, especially if—or when—the gambits fail. What then? (/end)
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If the Kremlin’s gambits don’t work, meaning mobilization fails, or can’t sustain Russian holdings and Ukraine keeps fighting – what then? It’s now time to consider Russian military options that could come next. I discuss in the article (/6)
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Will mobilized forces abandon their positions in equipment, as demoralized forces did near Kharkiv last month? Look at how they are led. No one wants to be there (/5). twitter.com/wartranslated/
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Mobilization is likely to bring unpredictability to the Russian front. Russian military leaders are unlikely to know with confidence how this undisciplined composite force will react when confronted with cold, exhaustion, + combat conditions, once inside Ukraine (/5).
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There are already discipline problems in Russia among mobilized units. They receive less than 30 days of training and 16K currently deployed to Ukraine, Putin said. For now, they are deployed piecemeal to the front line to depleted units. Some are killed within days (/3)
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Annexation and mobilization cannot overcome larger problems for Russian forces in Ukraine: the demands of a high intensity war on a force kept unprepared to wage it; early + severe losses to its elite units; resilience and will to fight of Ukrainians; & western support. (/2)
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None of the Kremlin’s recent gambits—annexation, mobilization, or command shuffles—are likely to improve the Russian military’s battlefield prospects in the months ahead. If, or when, these gambits fail, then what? My latest, below. (/1)
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Newly mobilized Russian forces “join an army already degraded in quality and capability,” writes @MassDara. “That does not bode well for Russia’s plans on the battlefield.” nyti.ms/3CZA2qa
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Sharing an important RAND report from my colleagues Karen Sudkamp and on secondary trauma in the Intelligence Community. Also helpful to other professions who are exposed to sustained traumatic content (like combat footage and atrocities) through their job duties.
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U.S. intelligence community leaders might not always appreciate the complex ways that trauma can affect their workforce.
RAND's Karen Sudkamp, @HeatherJWill, and colleagues discuss why providing post-trauma support is a matter of national security. bit.ly/3fYIv3I
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Such a good point. Also, the NCOs and officers in charge, getting handed hastily trained people who don't want to be there, when they themselves need a break. Some reserve officers and NCOs are coming, but this is not a stable or predictable dynamic in the making.
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Replying to @RALee85 @MassDara and @MarkHertling
Can you imagine what the professional soldier of the Russian Army must seem like after nearly 8 months of continuous fighting (plus whatever pre-deployment duration), especially seeing the mobilized come in & fill the gaps?
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Ukraine needs air defenses to help them with missile strikes against their cities. (Many women “nest” in the days before their baby is born. Me? I angrily typed this article for that which was coming.) VKS is worse off now than I wrote about then. (4/4)
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Hundreds of Russian missiles hit Ukraine today, as in the opening days of this war, causing death, terror, and suffering. It’s punitive voltage from a frustrated force with an angry commander and commander in chief. (3/3)
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Their PGM use theory is well developed. Their force cannot support it. It can generate multiple small salvos against Ukraine limited by low number of available VLS tubes and launchers, inaccurate CEPs, insufficient ISR for target development/BDA. Add in Ukrainian SAMs. 2/4
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Today’s Russian PGM strikes on Ukraine are as clumsy as they are cruel. I’ll not be providing critique on their planning errors or anything that can help improve their targeting strategy. 1/4
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Many reactions will come out on how the Kremlin will respond after the attack on the bridge. I look to experts like Tatiana Stanovaya for nuanced observations, her thoughts below.
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The explosion on the Crimean bridge: A 
#CrimeanBridge
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👀 Surovikin now operational commander of the operation in Ukraine , formerly southern group commander.
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By decision of the Russian Defense Minister Shoigu, Army General Sergey Surovikin has been appointed as a commander of Russia's "Joint Grouping of Forces" in Ukraine.
Previously, Gen. Surovikin held the position of the commander-in-chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces.
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A word about Kartapolov. He ran WEMD, then ran the Main Political-Military directorate 2018-2021. The same directorate responsible for: “ideological patriotism”, “moral and psychological preparation” of the soldiers, and producing political officers. He was part of the problem.
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“We need to stop lying. We have talked about this many times. But somehow the message never reaches individual leaders."
Russian General Andrei Kartapolov addresses the culture of deceit within the Russia’s Defence Ministry that is crippling Putin’s Ukraine invasion
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I shared a few thoughts in this story on Russian mobilization by . The quote “People are not beans” from Fred Kagan is 🥇
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“People are not beans. Units are not units, except on a map. If you take a bunch of pissed-off, demoralized, scared, untrained humans, give them weapons and throw them into a fighting force, you don’t have soldiers.”
New from @PaulSonne washingtonpost.com/national-secur
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A few others who I learn from on Russian nuclear strategy, use thresholds, and targeting are . Their work is excellent.
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A thread from my colleague Edward Geist on battlefield effects of nuclear weapons — and what is not known about those effects. If you are looking for expertise on Russiannuclear weapons now- Edward is excellent (1/2)
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Russia's reverses in Ukraine and Putin's nuclear saber-rattling have stoked anxieties that Russia might use its non-strategic nuclear weapons. An under-appreciated consideration is that we can't predict the physical consequences of such an attack confidently. 1/25
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Images from Lyman, abandoned Russian positions. 4th picture, red bag, stolen women’s tights and an immersion blender. These troops were really out there, slowly getting encircled, yet had mental energy to lug back a stolen immersion blender for the fam back home.
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Лиман Донецької області: наслідки "відведення" військ РФ - спалена техніка та покинуті російськими військами речі, в тому числі жіночий гребінець для волосся та Житомирські шкарпетки
Фото Радіо Свобода передали українські військові, які вчора та сьогодні звільняли місто
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Our new report is finally out on Russian military signaling 👇 If you’ve ever wondered if there are patterns to certain behaviors (interceptions, “buzzing” ships, or others), give it a read!
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This report presents the first comprehensive analysis of Russian coercive signaling toward the U.S. and its allies, providing a better understanding of the drivers of Moscow's behavior and practical guidelines for assessing future events. bit.ly/3SFpxgB
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And, those fall 2021 conscripts who complete their mandatory service this fall—the ones left who withstood pressure to convert to contract service over the past 12 months— technically could be handed mobilization papers on their way out the door on their last day.
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Relatedly, Putin has just signed an order for the autumn draft/conscription. The order aims for 120,000 conscripts (who by law are not allowed to be deployed in combat outside the country), and is separate from the mobilization ordered on Sept. 21. publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/
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and here it is. Annexation ceremony: threats and insistence on a ceasefire in the speech so far...
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Putin calls on Ukraine to stop fighting and negotiate an end to the war with Russia. But these territories are off limits.
"We will defend our lands with all the means at our disposal and do everything to protect our people. This is our great liberating mission."
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Events are likely to happen fast. I recommend following experts on Ukrainian and Russian politics for more insights like and many others for their thoughts. (/end)
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The longer term challenges will be regenerating armored units from long term storage. Others who follow the UAF closely know they have challenges here too. (/13)
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Or they could commit hastily trained mobilized personnel other ways, like feeding them into depleted units along the LOC in an attempt to stabilize its lines with questionable efficacy. I suspect they will do a bit of both approaches - rear support and push to the front. (/12)
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Mobilization *could* help Russia hold on to what it has taken from Ukraine, if mobilized forces are used in auxiliary roles in the occupied territories – for checkpoints, logistics, as drivers, etc. They could free up other (exhausted) soldiers for the line of contact. (/11)
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Russia’s mobilization base has been neglected for a decade and will struggle in many respects. However, it is capable of introducing personnel into Ukraine in the coming weeks – not trained, prepared or equipped - but it is ingesting a large number of people at present (/10)
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Mobilization: through the end of 2022 Ukraine is working to prevent the conflict from ossifying along a frozen line of contact, while Russia is committed to precisely that outcome and holding what it has taken (/9)
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...I am concerned about where all this is heading, and how the Kremlin will respond and lash out when its annexation ploy is ignored. Their reaction will be contingent on a few different factors, and hard to predict just yet. Nukes are not the first step in escalation (/8).
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The Russian military is at its weakest point so far in the war, before it attempts to regenerate in the months and years ahead. Pressing on makes sense for Kyiv and supporters, and also... (/7)
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Russia’s plan relies on shocking Kyiv and Ukraine’s supporters with the threat of escalation to get them to stop. One problem though for Russia’s plan: Ukraine and its supporters are prepared to continue their efforts. (/6)
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Something else to watch for: the nuclear card. Kremlin officials already hinted that Russia’s nuclear guarantees would apply to what they illegally claim as Russian territory. The Kremlin did this after annexing Crimea also (/5)
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If Ukraine and its supporters ignore ‘ceasefires’ that are covers for freezing the conflict, the Kremlin could portray Kyiv as an ‘aggressor’ to the Russian population-- particularly important for them now that mobilization is declared and they need multiple justifications(/4)
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It is possible that soon after illegal annexation, the Kremlin could offer Ukraine a “ceasefire” along the line of contact, to try to freeze the conflict. This would be an unacceptable deal for Kyiv - Kyiv has signaled it will not accept annexation. (/3)
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As I wrote, Russia needs intense fighting to end ASAP. Through annexation, Russia will attempt to “force a rapid end to this phase of the war, stymie Western support for Ukraine, and buy itself time to repair and regenerate its military" (/2)
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It appears that Moscow’s illegal annexation of 4 Ukrainian territories will happen very soon – possibly tomorrow. There's a great deal of uncertainty for what comes next, but I'll share my thoughts on next steps and how mobilized forces aid the Kremlin's goals (or not).
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No I saw that too, I’m pouring scorn on the defmin
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