Counterfactuals

Malden, Mass.: Blackwell (1973)
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Abstract

Counterfactuals is David Lewis' forceful presentation of and sustained argument for a particular view about propositions which express contrary to fact conditionals, including his famous defense of realism about possible worlds and his theory of laws of nature.

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reprint Lewis, David (2001) "Counterfactuals". Wiley-Blackwell
reprint Lewis, David (2013) "Counterfactuals". Wiley-Blackwell

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Author's Profile

David K. Lewis
PhD: Harvard University; Last affiliation: Princeton University

Citations of this work

Modality and Explanatory Reasoning.Boris Christian Kment - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
[no title].Mark Jago - 2013 - Noûs 2013:1-16.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
Metaphysical Causation.Alastair Wilson - 2018 - Noûs 52 (4):723-751.

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